Lachhmi Singh and Others vs Emperor

Wort, J.—It is not necessary in this case to give at any great length, the details concerning this case as the argument addressed to us has been directed to one or two points only.

The appeal is against the conviction by the learned Sessions Judge of Muzaffarpur of one Lachhmi Singh sentenced u/s 144 of the Indian Penal Code to eighteen months'' rigorous imprisonment; and u/s 106 of the Code of Criminal Procedure he was bound over for two years. Inder Ojha was sentenced under the same Section to one year''s rigorous, imprisonment, also bound over for two years, Amirchand Koeri u/s 143 to six months and Deonarain Singh to the same term of rigorous imprisonment.

They with eight others were charged with three offences. They were charged first of all with being members of an unlawful assembly the common object of which was to commit assault on the Muhammadans of Jamunapur; they were charged with culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and they were also charged with arson.

The events out of which this prosecution took place related to the Bakrid, a Muhammadan festival, on the 13th June last year.

I should have said that the learned Sessions Judge was assisted by four Assessors, two of whom were Hindus and two Muhammadans; but neither the Sessions Judge, nor this Court, have derived any assistance from their opinion as it was obviously based upon their religious convictions, the two Hindus being of the opinion that the accused, who were Hindus, were not guilty, and the Muhammadans on the other hand being of the opinion that they were guilty.

There was a large number of witnesses called for the prosecution, and, as the learned Sessions Judge points out in his judgment, three different stories were told regarding the events and although they probably approximate on the main point in some material details there was a very considerable difference.

The groups were as follows:

First of all the Police Officers and constables, secondly, the Muhammadan witnesses, and third the story told by the chaukidars. The Sessions Judge placed no reliance upon the last as at the trial they appeared to be hostile and their evidence was entirely discredited. The learned Sessions Judge apparently accepted the story as stated by the Police witnesses, and in general outline it was as follows.

On the evening of the 13th June, there assembled at the site of village Jamunapur a mob of approximately 300 Hindus. From the 11th June the Police and a number of chaukidars had assembled at the Police Station which from the map which is exhibited in the case is shown to be at the juncture of the District Board road with another road or footpath leading in a south-westerly direction. Apprehending as they did that trouble was brewing between the Hindu and Muhammadan communities arising out of the Muhammadan festival, this crowd or mob to which I have referred was met by the Inspector of Police, the Sub-Inspector of Police and some constables at a spot about 200 yards of a small building known as the Madrassa. The Inspector of Police questioned the mob and the leader Lachhmi Singh stated, to paraphrase his observations, that they apprehended that the Muhammadans were about to sacrifice a cow at a tank which is also shown on the map which, as I have said, is exhibited in the case and which tank is opposite the building of the Madrassa.

The Inspector in his evidence states that he assured Lachhmi Singh that nothing of the sort was to take place, but it appears that he was disbelieved by Lachhmi and his followers. Apparently, while this discussion was going on between the Inspector and Lachhmi a portion of the mob about 25 or 30 in number broke away from the rear of the crowd and proceeded along the road towards the Madrassa. There appears to be a considerable discrepancy in the evidence regarding the events which took place in respect to this portion of the crowd breaking away. The prosecution case was that this portion of the crowd consisted of the people who were guilty of setting fire to the Madrassa which certainly burst into flames just about that time; but I can dismiss that part of the prosecution cats without further consideration as the learned Sessions Judge has decided that so far as that part is concerned it is by no means proved that either the portion of the crowd that broke away from the main crowd or the main body were responsible for the fire which, as I have said, consumed the Madrassa. I might mention that in the course of these events certain people lost their lives but at the charge of culpable homicide was not made out against any of the accused, no further mention need be made of this fact.

As I have already stated 12 persons in all were prosecuted for the three offences I have mentioned. Bight of them have been acquitted but the four accused who appeal to this Court have been convicted of being members of an unlawful assembly, two of them having been armed with deadly weapons and the other two being convicted merely of being members of an unlawful assembly.

The main part of the argument depends upon an agreement which it is proved the two communities entered into. I will now make reference to that. Apparently on the 20th July, 1926, an agreement, which has been exhibited in the case, was entered into between the leaders of the Hindu community and the Muhammadan community, Without stating its provisions in detail the substance of that agreement was to the effect, first, that the Muhammadans on their part declared that they would not publicly sacrifice cows and that neither they nor their heirs ever intended to do so and they gave that undertaking. On the other hand the Hindus on their part also declared that from the date of the agreement they would not either sacrifice or kill pigs and that if they did so they would be doubly punished, and the Muhammadans also declared that if they were guilty of breaking their contract "they would be held guilty before Government and would be legally liable for double punishment." That is the agreement which, as I have said, the two communities entered into in July, 1920.

The argument addressed to us by learned Counsel on behalf of the appellants is that there is in this case no common object which in any way can be held to be unlawful and, therefore, the appellants cannot be convicted or sentenced under the Sections of the Penal Code to which I have made reference; and, as I have stated, his argument is mainly directed upon the agreement which I have just mentioned.

As I understand, and in fact to use his words, in this case the Hindu community had a definite right under the contract or agreement; that they had been in the enjoyment of that agreement for a space of more than a year or about a year, and that, therefore, whatever they were doing on that road that day they were doing nothing more than maintaining the right which they had obtained under this agreement. I ought to state here that there is some slight discrepancy in the evidence as to what was the actual object of the Hindus in assembling on that day, Learned Counsel for the appellants state that taking the evidence all that can be stated is that the Hindu community having heard of the rumour which I shall now make mention were merely enquiring as to whether that state of affairs actually existed. The fact to which I refer was this. That the Sub-Inspector in his evidence states that on the previous day, that is the 12th of June, one Ahmad Mia had gone to him and made some statement as to the Muhammadan community being harassed by the Hindus. The actual words which the Inspector used in his evidence were these:

At 2 a.m. on the 12th, Shaukat, Khalil Dewan, and Kurban came to the Police Station and reported to me that they feared that the Hindus of Auriya would attack them. On the same day, the 12th at 7 a.m. Aliman dafadar reported that Ahmad Mia told him, that he had authority from the District Magistrate to kill a cow.

Ahmad Mia was called as a witness and he was tendered by the prosecution for cross-examination but no mention was made of that fact in cross-examination. And the learned Counsel on behalf of the appellants argued that that statement having become known to the Hindus caused a reasonable apprehension in their minds that a cow sacrifice was about to be performed and that all that they were doing was to make an enquiry as to whether their apprehensions were well founded or not. Therefore on the first point his argument is that the accused cannot properly be convicted under the Section under which they have been convicted. Of course, it is impossible to look into the minds of men or in particular these Hindus who assembled on that day, but what their object was must be judged by the surrounding circumstances.

Now it seems to me strange, first, that if their purpose at assembling was an innocent one which is suggested that they first of all should have assembled in such large numbers, and secondly, if it was curiosity or a desire to enquire as is stated, then it also seems rather difficult to understand why it was necessary to go armed as they were with lathis, garansas and spears. It has been suggested that it is a common method in this part of the country ingoing armed but, as a matter of fact, there is no evidence "of it, and all I have to say is that even if persons assemble with arms of that kind, whether it is the custom of the country to go armed like that or not, they are in grave danger of being found to be members of an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons, always provided, of course, it can be shown that there Was a common object in assembling. In my opinion that point, so far as this appeal is concerned, entirely fails. 15. Upon the agreement another argument is based, and that is this, that being in the enjoyment, as I have said, of this right for nearly a year, that all that the Hindus were doing on that occasion was to maintain the right which they had enjoyed for so long a time, and learned Counsel seeks to draw analogies upon cases which, in my judgment, have no reference to the subject-matter of this case. To put it in a sentence, his argument amounts, to this that there being a right under this contract, whether the accused were armed or not they were merely defending a right of property which the law recognises, and he would also say that, therefore, the conviction has been under the fifth Clause of Section 141 and not under the fourth Clause The fifth Clause reads--"By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to compel any person to do what he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do what he is legally entitled to do." In my judgment I think it is perfectly clear that the accused have been charged under the fourth paragraph of Section 141, that is, they have been charged with enforcing a right with a show of criminal force.

In my opinion both these points fail and the appeal should be dismissed.

There remains the question of sentence. It is true that these convicted persons are not shown to have taken any active part, apart from the assembling with arms in the event that happened, either in the destruction of life or in the destruction of the building which was consumed by fire but it is also clear that Lachhmi Singh, who received the heaviest sentence, was the leader of this mob. But taking every thing into consideration, I am or opinion that the sentences are rather excessive and that the sentences of Lachhmi Singh should be reduced to ten months, Inder Ojha reduced to six months, and that of the remaining two accused to two months each.

I should have mentioned in the course of my judgment the fact that Lachhmi Singh had in this possession a weapon aft also Inder Ojha had, and the argument addressed to us is that the evidence is insufficient on that point. But I do not think, reading the evidence, that it leaves "any reasonable doubt in our minds that they were possessed of the weapons which were stated to have been in their possession.

The appeal is dismissed but the sentences are reduced as I have stated. The order as to being bound over u/s 106 of the Criminal Procedure Code will remain.

Adami, J.

I agree.