Lagandhari Yadav vs State Of Madhya Pradesh & Others

This petition has been filed by the petitioner Lagandhari Yadav, presently posted as Uccha Madhyamik Shikshak Government Excellence Higher Secondary School, Chitrangi District Singrauli under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the order dated 22.2.2020 passed by the respondent No.4/Commissioner, Rewa Division, Rewa as also by the order dated 5.5.2020, which has been passed by the respondent No.5/Collector, Singrauli pursuant to the order dated 22.2.2020.

On account of the aforesaid impugned orders the petitioner, who was on 26.5.2018 given the temporary charge of the Block Resource Centre Coordinator (BRCC) in Janpad Shiksha Kendra Chitrangi District Singrauli has been directed to give the charge to the respondent No.7-Phool Chandra Singh.

Shri Ghildiyal, learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued before this Court and has submitted that the impugned orders are liable to be set aside simply only on one ground that the Commissioner, Rewa Division had no jurisdiction to pass the aforesaid order in an appeal, which has been preferred by the respondent No.7 under the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Avam Raj Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993 and the rules made thereunder. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the dispute between the parties in respect of the school education only and there was no reason for the respondent No.7 to invoke the appellate provisions of the Adhiniyam. Thus it is submitted that on this ground only the petition is liable to be allowed and the impugned orders deserve to be quashed having passed without jurisdiction.

A reply to the aforesaid writ petition has also been filed by the respondents.

Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal, learned counsel for the respondent No.7 has submitted that while filing the present writ petition the petitioner has suppressed the material fact regarding the filing of earlier WP No.8148/2017 which was also filed by the petitioner in respect of the same dispute and in that case this Court vide its order dated 29.8.2017 has dismissed the writ petition and has also held that the petitioner, who was appointed as an Incharge in place of the respondent-Phool Chandra Singh has no right to claim any benefit. The copy of the order dated 29.8.2017 has also been placed on record as Annexure R7-6 by the respondent No.7 and thus it is submitted that on this ground only the present petition is liable to be dismissed. It is further submitted that otherwise also in the aforesaid decision this Court has already held that the appeal is maintainable before the Commissioner under the provisions of M.P. Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam and as such this ground of jurisdiction having not raised by the petitioner in the earlier round of litigation, the petitioner is precluded from raising this objection for the first time in the subsequent writ petition and as such the petitioner's plea of lack of jurisdiction is barred by the principle of constructive res-judicata.

Learned counsel for the State has submitted that the question of jurisdiction of Commissioner to decide the appeal has already been decided by this Court in WP No.8148/2017, hence no case for interference is made out and the petition be dismissed.

Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

On perusal of the record this Court finds that the petitioner and the respondent No.7-Phool Chandra Singh have been litigating for the post of BRCC since a long time. In the earlier round of litigation a similar order was passed by the Commissioner, Rewa purported to be under the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Seva (Appeal & Revision) Rules, 1999 in favour of the present respondent No.7 (respondent no.4 in WP No.8148/2017), which was challenged by the petitioner Lagandhari Yadav in WP No.8148/2017 and this Court, while dismissing the aforesaid writ petition in para 10 has held as under:-

"10. So far as the petitioner's right to contest the order of Commissioner is concerned, the same is also not tenable on the ground that the petitioner was only appointed as an incharge in the place of the respondent no.4 hence he cannot derive any benefit out of the same."

Thus it is apparent from the aforesaid decision that this Court has categorically held that the petitioner has no right to challenge the order passed by the Commissioner, as he himself was posted as Incharge in place of present respondent No.7 (respondent No.4 in the said writ petition). This Court also finds that in rebuttal of the return filed by the respondent No.7, the petitioner has not filed any rejoinder as to why the order dated 29.8.2017 passed by this Court in WP No.8148/2017 finds no mention in the entire body of the writ petition. In the considered opinion of this Court the aforesaid omission on the part of the petitioner himself amounts to suppression of material fact, as in the said order this Court has clearly held that the petitioner has no right to challenge the order which has been passed in favour of the respondent No.4 (respondent no.7 herein) which is also the situation in the case at hand as well. The omission on the part of the petitioner is probably because had he mentioned the passing of the aforesaid order in WP No.8148/2017, then he was also required to plead as to how the second petition would be maintainable at his instance when he still continues to be in the same temporary capacity of Incharge, BRCC.

So far as the suppression of material fact is concerned, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dalip Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 114 has held that in case if there is any suppression of material fact, the Court is not required to go into the merits of the case, as the petitioner who has not come with clean hands can not claim equity. The relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment read as under:-

"2. In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the courts have, from time to time, evolved new rules and it is now well established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final.

In Hari Narain v. Badri Das [AIR 1963 SC 1558] this Court adverted to the aforesaid rule and revoked the leave granted to the appellant by making the following observations: (AIR p. 1558)

"It is of utmost importance that in making material statements and setting forth grounds in applications for special leave made under Article 136 of the Constitution, care must be taken not to make any statements which are inaccurate, untrue or misleading. In dealing with applications for special leave, the Court naturally takes statements of fact and grounds of fact contained in the petitions at their face value and it would be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making statements which are untrue and misleading. Thus, if at the hearing of the appeal the Supreme Court is satisfied that the material statements made by the appellant in his application for special leave are inaccurate and misleading, and the respondent is entitled to contend that the appellant may have obtained special leave from the Supreme Court on the strength of what he characterises as misrepresentations of facts contained in the petition for special leave, the Supreme Court may come to the conclusion that in such a case special leave granted to the appellant ought to be revoked."

In Welcom Hotel v. State of  A.P. [(1983) 4 SCC 575 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 872 : AIR 1983 SC 1015] the Court held that a party which has misled the Court in passing an order in its favour is not entitled to be heard on the merits of  the case.

In G.Narayanaswamy   Reddy v. Govt. of Karnataka [(1991) 3 SCC 261 : AIR 1991 SC 1726] the Court denied relief to the appellant who had concealed the fact that the award was not made by the Land Acquisition Officer within the time specified in Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act because of the stay order passed by the High Court. While dismissing the special leave petition, the Court observed: (SCC p. 263, para 2)

"2. ... Curiously enough, there is no reference in the special leave petitions to any of the stay orders and we came to know about these orders only when the respondents appeared in response to the notice and filed their counter-affidavit. In our view, the said interim orders have a direct bearing on the question raised and the non-disclosure of the same certainly amounts to suppression of material facts. On this ground alone, the special leave petitions are liable to be rejected. It is well settled in law that the relief under Article 136 of the Constitution is discretionary and a petitioner who approaches this Court for such relief must come with frank and full disclosure of facts. If he fails to do so and suppresses material facts, his application is liable to be dismissed. We accordingly dismiss the special leave petitions."

In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath [(1994) 1 SCC 1 : JT (1993) 6 SC 331] the Court held that where a preliminary decree was obtained by withholding an important document from the court, the party concerned deserves to be thrown out at any stage of the litigation .

In Prestige Lights Ltd. v. SBI [(2007) 8 SCC 449] it was held that in exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the High Court is not just a court of law, but is also a court of equity and a person who invokes the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is duty-bound to place all the facts before the Court without any reservation. If there is suppression of material facts or twisted facts have been placed before the High Court then it will be fully justified  in  refusing  to  entertain  a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Court referred to the judgment of Scrutton, L.J. in R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners [(1917) 1 KB 486 (CA)] , and  observed:  (Prestige  Lights  Ltd. case [(2007) 8 SCC 449] , SCC p. 462, para 35)

In exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High  Court  will  always  keep  in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the applicant  does  not  disclose  full facts or suppresses   relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading  the  court,  then  the Court  may  dismiss  the  action without adjudicating the matter on merits. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become impossible.

In A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P. [(2007) 4 SCC 221 : AIR 2007 SC 1546] the Court held that Article 136 does not confer a right of appeal on any party. It confers discretion on this Court to grant leave to appeal in appropriate cases. In other words, the Constitution has not made the Supreme Court a regular court of appeal or a court of error. This Court only intervenes where justice, equity and good conscience require such intervention.

In Sunil Poddar v. Union Bank of India [(2008) 2 SCC 326] the Court held that while exercising discretionary and equitable jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, the facts and circumstances of the case should be seen in their entirety to find out if there is miscarriage of justice. If the appellant has not come forward with clean hands, has not candidly disclosed all the facts that he is aware of and he intends to delay the proceedings, then the Court will non -suit him on the ground of contumacious conduct.

In K.D. Sharma v. SAIL [(2008) 12 SCC 481] the Court held that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary and it is imperative that the petitioner approaching the writ court must come with clean hands and put forward all the facts before the Court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the Court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim. The same rule was reiterated in G. Jayashree v. Bhagwandas S. Patel [(2009) 3 SCC 141] .

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We have heard learned counsel for the parties and scrutinized the record. In our opinion, the appeal is liable to be dismissed only on the ground that the tenure-holder Shri Praveen Singh did not state correct facts in the application filed by him on 8-7-1976 before the prescribed authority for setting aside the ex parte order and the appellant did not approach the High Court with clean hands inasmuch as, by making a misleading statement in Para 3 of the writ petition, an impression was created that the tenure-holder did not know of the proceedings initiated by the prescribed authority . By making the said statement, the appellant succeeded in persuading the High Court to pass an interim order which resulted in frustrating the efforts made by the authority concerned to distribute the surplus land among landless persons. Even before this Court, a patently false statement has been made in the rejoinder-affidavit on the issue of receipt of notice dated 29-11-1975 by Shri Praveen Singh."

(emphasis supplied)

In view of the aforesaid dictum of the Supreme Court, taking note of the fact that in the 'chronology of events' filed by the petitioner in the present petition, the filing of W.P. No.8148/2017 is deliberately omitted by the petitioner, this Court has no hesitation to hold that since the petitioner has suppressed the material fact in the petition by not disclosing that he had also preferred W.P. No.8148/2017 which was also dismissed by this Court it does not entitle him to claim any relief on merits.

As a result, the petition being devoid of merit is hereby dismissed. No cost.