Lakshmi and Others vs N.A. Nasia and Another

K.K. Sasidharan, J.—These two civil revisions are directed against the order dated 1.8.2006 in I.A. Nos. 344 and 345 of 2006 in M.C.O.P. No. 878 of 2003, respectively, on the file of learned Principal District Judge, Tirunelveli.

The claim petition in M.C.O.P. No. 878 of 2003 has been preferred by the revision petitioners before the trial court against the respondents claiming a compensation of Rs. 4,00,000 on account of the death of the breadwinner of the family in the accident that occurred on 23.4.2003 involving the vehicle owned by respondent No. 1 and insured by respondent No. 2. Even though the petitioners claimed a sum of Rs. 17,05,000, the claim was restricted to Rs. 4,00,000 on account of their inability to pay the court-fee for the same.

The claim petition was resisted by the respondent No. 2 by filing counter, wherein they have admitted the insurance, but disputed the claim on various grounds including the negligence of the deceased.

The matter was subsequently posted on 28.2.2005 for the purpose of enquiry. The petitioner No. 1 being the wife of the deceased was conducting the proceedings on behalf of the petitioners as the petitioner Nos. 2 to 4 are minor. Since the petitioners failed to appear before court on 28.2.2005, the claim petition was dismissed for default on the very same date.

Subsequently, the petitioners filed an application to restore the claim petition as well as to condone the delay of 249 days in filing the said application.

In the affidavit filed in support of the application it was the case of the petitioners that they were away from their native place and were residing in a remote place in Karnataka in connection with the employment of the petitioner No. 1 and the letter stated to have been sent by the counsel for the petitioners did not reach the hands of the petitioners on time and as such, they failed to appear before the court on 28.2.2005 which resulted in dismissing the claim petition for default on the very date of the hearing. The delay was accordingly explained by the petitioners and as such they have prayed for condoning the delay of 249 days in filing the application to set aside the ex parte order and to restore the claim petition.

The applications in I.A. Nos. 344 and 345 of 2006 were contested by insurance company, respondent No. 2 and it was their case that in the hi-tech e-mail era, it cannot be said that the letter sent by the counsel for the petitioners did not reach them on time. Accordingly the respondent No. 2 prayed for dismissal of the application.

Learned trial Judge considered the application like any other civil proceeding and found that each day''s delay has not been accounted for by the revision petitioners and ultimately dismissed both the applications as per order dated 1.8.2006. It is the said order, which is impugned in the present revisions.

I have heard Mr. T. Selvakumaran, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners and Mr. A.S. Mathialagan, learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 2. I have also gone through the order of the learned trial Judge as well as the material pleadings in the matter.

It is found from the order impugned in the revisions that the learned trial Judge approached the issue in a hyper technical manner without understanding the ground realities. It is not the case of the learned trial Judge that the petitioners have been continuously absent and failed to prosecute the claim petition in spite of due opportunity given to them. The petitioners are the legal heirs of the deceased and the petitioner No. 1 is none other than the wife of the deceased. The accident took place on 23.4.2003 and the petitioners are all residents of Samraj Nagar District in the State of Karnataka. It is evident from the records that the matter was entrusted to a local counsel and the petitioners were far away in their native place. When the petitioners have come up with an explanation that the letter stated to have been sent by the counsel did not reach them on time as they were away on account of their employment, the trial court should have taken the said explanation as sufficient cause for condoning the delay. The petitioners were not benefited by dragging the matter and in fact they are the beneficiaries in case the claim petition is decided at the earliest point of time.

The Claims Tribunals are constituted to grant compensation to the accident victims and the legal heirs of the deceased who died in such motor accidents. Sub-section (4) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act was substituted by Act 54 of 1994, in and by which it was provided that the Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of an accident forwarded to it under Sub-section (6) of Section 158 as an application for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 158(6) which was substituted by Act 54 of 1994 w.e.f. 14.11.1994 mandates that in case of receipt of information regarding any accident involving death or bodily injury to any person the officer-in-charge of the police station shall forward a copy of the case within 30 days from the date of recording of information or on completion of such report to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction and a copy thereof to the concerned insurer.

It is only with a view to enable the poor claimants to claim compensation without filing an application before the Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area where the accident took place that Sub-section (2) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act was substituted by Act 54 of 1994 by permitting an application to be filed at the option of the claimant, either to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area where the accident occurred or before the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on business. This provision also shows that Parliament in their wisdom by considering the difficulties of the poor claimants to approach the Claims Tribunal of the area where the accident took place, wanted to give justice to the parties at their doorstep instead of driving them to the far-off places, where the accident actually took place.

The Apex Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another Vs. Mst. Katiji and Others, , considered the issue pertaining to the approach to be adopted by the court in an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 and observed thus:

(3) The legislature has conferred the power to condone the delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on ''merits''. The expression ''sufficient cause'' employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that:

(1) Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

(2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

(3) "Every day''s delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour''s delay every second''s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

(4) When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.

(5) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

(6) It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

In R.N. Jadi and Brothers and Others Vs. Subhashchandra, , Apex Court considered the procedural law vis-a-vis substantive law and observed as under:

(9) All the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The language employed by the draftsman of processual law may be liberal or stringent, but the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to advance the cause of justice. In an adversarial system, no party should ordinarily be denied the opportunity of participating in the process of justice dispensation. Unless compelled by express and specific language of the statute, the provisions of Civil Procedure Code, or any other procedural enactment ought not to be construed in a manner which would leave the court helpless to meet extraordinary situations in the ends of justice.

(10) The mortality of justice at the hands of law troubles a Judge''s conscience and points an angry interrogation at the law reformer.

(11) The processual law so dominates in certain systems as to overpower substantive rights and substantial justice. The humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid not the mistress of legal justice, compels consideration of vesting a residuary power in Judges to act ex debito justiciae where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly inequitable. Justice is the goal of jurisprudence processual as much as substantive. See Sushil Kumar Sen Vs. State of Bihar, .

(12) No person has vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner for the time being by or for the court in which the case is pending, and if by an Act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode. See Blyth v. Blyth. A procedural law should not ordinarily be construed as mandatory, the procedural law is always subservient to and is in aid to justice. Any interpretation which eludes or frustrates the recipient of justice is not to be followed. See Shreenath and Another Vs. Rajesh and Others, .

(13) Processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant not a resistant in the administration of justice.

All these provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act regarding payment of compensation were introduced with a view to help the injured as well as the legal heirs of the deceased with a view to receive compensation without undergoing the various technicalities involved in filing an application for compensation. When the intention of Parliament is very clear that the injured as well as the legal heirs of the deceased involved in accident cases should get the compensation at the earliest point of time without even filing a formal application for compensation, the Claims Tribunals constituted as per Section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act should bear in mind that they are doing service to the society by disposing the claim petition without taking upon technicalities. In such matters technicality shall be avoided to the extent possible and the Claims Tribunals are expected to render justice without driving the applicants from pillar to post. In fact after the amendment, even the limitation prescribed for filing claim petition has been removed from the statute. Because of the hyper technical attitude taken by the learned Claims Tribunal the poor petitioners were denied compensation even though the accident occurred in the year 2003. The respondent No. 2 who is none other than the insurance company established by the government and is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India also opposed the prayer to condone the delay by tooth and nail without any social responsibility. Therefore, I am of the view that the learned Claims Tribunal was clearly in error in rejecting the applications filed by the petitioners to restore the claim petition and also to condone the delay in filing the application to restore the claim petition. In the said circumstances I am constrained to set aside the order of the learned trial Judge dated 1.8.2006 in I.A. Nos. 344 and 345 of 2006 in M.C.O.P. No. 878 of 2003 and accordingly, both the civil revision petitions are allowed. However in the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.

Since the claim petition is of the year 2003 the learned trial Judge is directed to dispose the M.C.O.P. No. 878 of 2003 as expeditiously as possible and in any case not later than two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and report compliance to this court.