Lakshmi Bai and Others vs The Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Ferozepore and others

R.S. Narula, J.—The first ground on which Mr. Joginder Singh Wasu, the Learned Counsel for the petitioners seeks to attack the impugned order of the Additional Director, Consolidation of Ho dings, Punjab, Ferozepore, dated August 17, 1966 (Annexure ''A'') is that it was passed in a petition u/s 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act (50 of 1948) (hereinafter called the Act), presented after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed by rule 18 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules 1949. The second proviso to the aforesaid rule no doubt empowers the State Government to admit an application u/s 42 of the Act after the expiry of the period of limitation if the applicant satisfies the authority concerned that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. In the impugned order it has been noticed that the application u/s 42 was barred by time, but a direction appears to have been given to compensate the petitioners in a time barred application being allowed against them in the following words:

Therefore, in the interest of justice and equity and to help proper cultivation of land, paths have to be provided, but as the petitioners seek redress in a time barred petition, so they shall have to surrender area which may come under the path." According to the law laid down by a Division Bench of this Court (Shamsher Bahadur, J. and myself) in Sewa Singh v. State of Punjab ILR (1967) 2 P&H. 89 the ground on which the time barred application was entertained by the State Government in the instant case is not a valid one and is extraneous to the legal consideration under the proviso. Mr. J.N. Seth, the Learned Counsel for respondents Nos. 2 to 5, has referred to the following observations in the judgment of a Full Bench of this Court in 5. Gurdial Singh and others v. The State of Punjab (1987) 69 P.L.R. 689.

In a proper case, if the justice so requires, and there was good cause for a person not approaching the authorities u/s 42 within six months proviso gives ample scope for extension of time and it would run counter to the very idea with which rule 18 was made, if whenever a Director proceeds to interfere even after noticing that the application was after expiry of six mouths, it had to be presumed that he purported to act, in the exercise of his power to act suo motu.

In the instant case the Additional Director does not purport to have acted suo motu, but to have condoned the delay. There is no quarrel with the proposition of law laid down by the Full Bench in Gurdial Singh''s case 2 (supra). Moreover the Additional Director had ample jurisdiction under the second proviso to rule 18 to extend the time, but the said jurisdiction was circumscribed by the contingency mentioned in the proviso itself. It is not within the jurisdiction of the appropriate authority or the State Government u/s 42 of the Act to grant redress in a time barred petition by merely compensating the party against whom some relief is intended to be given because of the application being barred by time. The only ground on which the prescribed period of six months can be extended for entertaining an application u/s 42 of the Act is where the applicant is able to satisfy the authority concerned about his having been prevented from submitting the application within the prescribed time by sufficient cause. The impugned order has, therefore, to be set aside on this short ground and it is unnecessary to hear counsel on other points which travel into the merits of the convtoversy.

I accordingly allow this writ petition and set aside the order of the Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab Ferozepore, dated August 17, 1966 (Annexure ''A'') without any order as to costs. This order would not stand in the way of the appropriate State authority from entertaining, considering and deciding on merits any application of Sarwan Singh etc. under the second proviso to rule 18 for condonation of the delay in filing their applications on merits in accordance with law.