Lakshmi Narayan Prasad vs State of Jhrakhand And Ors

Heard Mr. A.K. Sahani, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Deepak Dubey, the learned counsel for the respondent State.

This writ petition has been heard through Video Conferencing in view of the guidelines of the High Court taking into account the situation arising due

to COVID-19 pandemic. None of the parties have complained about any technical snag of audio-video and with their consent this matter has been

heard.

The petitioner has preferred this writ petition for quashing the order dated 20.06.2019 whereby the petitioner has been terminated with immediate

effect. The prayer is also made for consequential benefits.

The petitioner was appointed on the post of Campus Supervisor, a class 3 post in the Government Polytechnic Ranchi by appointment letter dated

06.06.1997. The petitioner joined there. The petitioner was working on the post of Campus Supervisor in Government Polytechnic, Ranchi since

09.06.1997. The petitioner has almost completed more than 22 years of service without any interruption. The petitioner moved before this Court in

W.P.(S) No.4923 of 2015 praying therein for regularization of the services of the petitioner. The said writ petition is still pending before this Court. By

letter dated 25.05.2019, works were allotted to the employees in Government Women Polytechnic, Ranchi including the petitioner. The name of the

petitioner finds figure at sl.No.11. On report of certain allegation, a two-men fact finding committee was constituted and the said committee has

submitted its report on 14.06.2019. On the basis of the said fact finding committee, the petitioner has been terminated from service by order dated

20.06.2019. Aggrieved with this, the petitioner has filed this writ petition.

Mr. Sahani, the learned counsel for the petitioner assailed the impugned order on the ground that without any departmental proceeding the petitioner

has been terminated which is against the principles of the natural justice. He submits that in the report, the transfer has been recommended so far as

the petitioner is concerned. He submits that without following due procedure of law the termination order has been passed.

Per contra, Mr. Dubey, the learned counsel for the respondent State submits that the petitioner was appointed on contractual basis. He submits that

contractual employee has got no right to regularization. There is serious allegation against the petitioner as he was the Campus Supervisor of Girls

Hostel and the petitioner used to invite in the campus various persons in the premises meant for the girls and used to take liquor in the premises. The

petitioner has also involved in making MMS of private activity of girl students manipulating the CCTV footage of planted CCTV cameras in the entire

premises of girls hostel. The department has constituted two-men committee for carrying spot enquiry. The matter went up to the minister level

whereby strict action was recommended and thereafter the petitioner has been terminated. He submits that there is no violation of principles of natural

justice in view of the fact that the petitioner has been found to be involved in a very serious allegation. The appointment letter of the petitioner is

brought on the record as Annexure-1 to the writ petition.

On perusal of the appointment letter it transpires that the petitioner has been appointed on the contractual post and from time to time it was extended if

it found satisfactory and on perusal of clause-b of the said appointment letter which speaks that after completion of one year of service if the same is

not extended the service will automatically come to an end, however, in the case of the petitioner from time to time the service of the petitioner has

been extended. On serious allegation of misconduct the petitioner's service has been terminated. The petitioner is having alternative remedy as the

petitioner has been appointed as campus Supervisor. A reference is made in the case of 'Oriental Insurance Company vs. T. Mohammad Raisuli

Hassan' reported in (1993) 1 SCC 553. Paragraph no.4 and 5 of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow:

Admittedly, there was no statutory rule requiring one month's notice for termination by the appellant of the service of the respondent. It is only the

term of appointment order, which stipulated for one month's notice or one month's salary in lieu thereof by either side to bring an end to the service of

the respondent, which is made the basis for claiming invalidation of termination. That term contained in clause 10 of the appointment order reads:

This appointment is liable to be terminated at any time by giving one month's notice, in writing, on either side, or a month's salary in lieu of notice,

without assigning any reason.

Breach of this condition, will entitle the company to recover from you one month's salary in lieu of notice.

When the above term in the clause relating to the condition of service of the respondent with the appellant is seen as a whole, there is nothing to

indicate or suggest, even remotely, that non-service of one month's notice as a condition precedent for termination of the respondent's service would

result in vitiation or invalidation of termination, if effected. On the contrary, the second part of the term contained in the clause, ""breach of this

condition, will entitle the company to recover from you one month's salary in lieu of notice"" makes it obvious that the same would be the consequence

if there was a breach of condition on the part of the company in the matter of service of one month's notice before termination of the respondent's

service. Hence, we are constrained to hold that the non-service of one month's notice in writing by the appellant to the respondent before terminating

the latter's service did not invalidate or vitiate such termination. From this, it follows that courts below had misread the said clause, by which either

party was required to serve notice for putting an end to service of the respondent and consequently committed an apparent error in taking the view

that non-service of one month's prior notice to the respondent had vitiated the termination of his service.

It is well settled proposition of law that after a person is appointed on regular basis and if his service is not covered by the statutory rules, he shall be

governed by the terms and conditions on which he was appointed on contractual basis. In such eventuality, there is no reason why the terms and

conditions incorporated in the appointment letter should not be enforced against such employee. The petitioner was admittedly appointed on

contractual basis and his work and conduct has not been found to be satisfactory and the petitioner has been terminated on very serious allegation.

This Court is afraid of exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in view of the fact that the petitioner was appointed on

contractual basis. It is well settled proposition of law that no contractual employee has got a right that his contract be renewed from time to time.

In the light of the above discussions, the Court is not inclined to pass any positive order in favour of the petitioner. Accordingly, the writ petition [W.P.

(S) No. 4269 of 2019] is dismissed, however, the petitioner is at liberty to move before the appropriate forum as the disputed question of fact cannot

be decided in the writ petition.