Lakshmiammal vs Boobalan and Others

Balasubrahmanyan , J.—One Balasundaram Chettiar who is now no more, had a deposit with the A.B.T. (P.) Ltd., Polachi. On the date of

his death, there were amounts still in deposit with that concern. Subsequently, Lakshmiammal, the Petitioner in this revision, filed a petition for the

issue of a succession certificate in the District Munsif''s Court, Coimbatore. An order was passed in that petition on 5-4-1966 enabling her to

obtain an aggregate sum of Rs. 16,461-45, from the A B T (P) Ltd. It may be observed that in the said O.P., the petitioner was described as the

wife of the late Balasundaram Chettiar. Subsequently, after nearly fl years, on 26-5-1977, respondents 1 to 9 filed an application before the

learned District Munsif invoking the inherent powers of the court and praying for an order directing the petitioner to deposit Rs. 4184-98 out of the

amount which had been received by her from ABT (P) Ltd., on the strength of the succession certificate issued in her favour by the court. The

respondents claimed in their application that the petitioner Lakshmiammal could claim no interest on the amounts lying in deposit to the credit of the

deceased Balasundaram Chettiar and that she had obtained a succession certificate in respect thereof by abusing the process of court. On notice of

this application, the petitioner denied all the allegations leveled against her. She also submitted that the application for directing her to redeposit the

amount obtained by her from A B T (P) Ltd. did not lie.

The learned District Munsif overruled the contentions of the petitioner and directed her to deposit the amount of Rs. 4184-98 into court. The

learned District Munsif, in the course of his order, also upheld the maintainability of the application filed by the respondents.

The petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the learned District Munsif to call upon her to redeposit the amount which she had obtained from A B

T (P) Ltd. on the strength of the succession certificate earlier issued to her. Learned counsel for the petitioner put her point on the basis that when

once a succession certificate had been granted, the court granting the said certificate becomes functus officio.

I do not think this way of describing the court''s want of jurisdiction is a correct one. The Indian Succession Act 1925 makes a comprehensive

provision for the issue of succession certificates under Part X of that Act. It provides for an elaborate procedure for the application and for the

hearing and the making of an order for the issue of a succession certificate Vide Ss. 372, 373 and 374 of the Act. S. 383 provides for a revocation

of the succession certificate by the court which grants it under certain circumstances. This shows that in a proper sense it cannot be held that on the

issue of a succession certificate the court concerned becomes functus officio.

This is not, however, to say that the application which was filed by the respondents in this case before the court below could be maintained. It

may be observed that in that application the respondents were not minded to obtain a revocation of the succession certificate already granted; nor

was any relief, as such, asked for in respect of anything touching the succession certificate. On the contrary, the relief claimed by the respondents

was for a direction to the petitioner that she should deposit an amount of debt owing to the deceased which she was empowered to collect from

the deceased''s debtors. In my view, so long as the succession certificate remained intact and had not been revoked or otherwise set aside, the

succession certificate and anything done pursuant thereto could not be unsettled, The respondents purported to file their application as a

proceeding in continuation of the original petition filed by the petitioner for the issue of a succession certificate. But there is nothing in the

Succession Act under which third parties and strangers to the proceedings could invoke the powers of the Court not in respect of the certificate

itself, but as respects the realisations of debts effected by the holder of the succession certificate subsequent to the issue of the certificate and on

the strength of that certificate.

There is yet another consideration. Part X of the Succession Act itself clearly recognises that when once a succession certificate has been

granted, such a certificate would be conclusive as against the persons owing such debts. So far as those persons are concerned, all payments made

by them in respect of such debts to the person to whom the certificate is granted would be fully indemnified as against the subsequent claimants.

This shows that as respects one of the parties to a succession certificate, namely, the deceased''s debtors, strangers to the proceedings can have

no remedy whatsoever as respects the grant of the succession certificate or as respects anything done pursuant to such succession certificate.

Nor is this all. The -jurisdiction of the court issuing the succession certificate is, in some respects, a peculiar jurisdiction. In one sense, it is like

any other jurisdiction exercisable by a civil court trying adversary proceedings. In another sense, it does not possess the same degree of finality as

the decision of a civil court in a civil suit or other contentious proceedings. This latter aspect of the jurisdiction is illustrated by the provisions of S.

373 of the Act, under this provision; the Court has Power to decide in a summary manner the entitlement of a party to the issue of a succession

certificate. This decision, however, will have to be arrived at only where the Judge decides that the right to collect the debt belongs to the

applicant. S. 373, however, provides that if the Judge cannot decide the right to the certificate without determining questions of law or fact which

seem to be too intricate and difficult for determination in a summary proceeding, the Judge may nevertheless grant a certificate to the applicant if it

appears to the court that he is a person having prima facie the best title to that certificate. This provision shows that within the narrow limitations of

a summary procedure, the court has yet the fullest power to grant a succession certificate, and when once a certificate is granted on a prima facie

satisfaction of the Judge, even where there is scope for a fuller inquiry, such a certificate has precisely the same status as a certificate which is

issued after a full and final enquiry and to the complete satisfaction of the court. The only way to remove the certificate out of the way is either by

way of an appeal or by way of a revocation.

Having regard to these peculiar characteristics of the grant, express provision is made by S. 387 of the Act, saving the remedy by way of a suit

to question the right or title of any party under a succession certificate, This provision is to the effect that no decision under Part X of the Indian

Succession Act, on any question of right between any parties shall be held to bar the trial of a similar issue in any suit or any other proceedings

between the same parties. The same section further provides that nothing in Part X shall be construed to affect the liability of any person to account

for any money or any debt to any person who may be held lawfully entitled thereto. The later Dart of S. 387 apparently has reference to a party

who is held by a competent court to be lawfully entitled to any money or debt being the subject matter of a succession certificate. Although this

section is couched in a negative form, the fact that such a provision finds its place in Part X of the Succession Act itself shows that, excepting by

way of a regular suit, the validity of the grant cannot be questioned by any third Party. There is a reference under S. 387 not only to suits but also

to other proceedings. Obviously, the reference is to suits and other proceedings between those who are already parties to the succession certificate

proceedings. S. 387 have nothing to say as respects those who are perfect strangers to the proceedings for the issue of a succession certificate. In

my judgment, their position is a fortiori. Even if in regard to the parties to a succession certificate proceedings, their right to challenge the title of the

grantee of a succession certificate is reserved to a separate suit or other legal proceeding 5 then the position must be a fortiori in regard to third

parties or strangers to those proceedings These people cannot proceed to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court issuing the succession certificate as

Persons entitled to pursue such a remedy. In this sense therefore, the application filed by respondents I to 3 before the learned District Munsif was

incompetent and ought to have been thrown out by the learned District Munsif as not maintainable.

The learned District Munsif has overruled the submissions made by the petitioner on the question of maintainability in the view that the inherent

powers of the court were so vast as to include the ordering of a payment on application in the manner don e in the present case. I have earlier

summarised the scheme of Part X of the Succession Act, with particular reference to the provisions defining the limits of the court''s jurisdiction.

This Dart of the law relating to succession certificates must, in my judgment, be regarded as a complete and self-contained Code. Within the four

corners of Part X of the Succession Act, it might well be open to read implied or ancillary powers as a necessary concomitant of powers which are

expressly conferred on the Court. But apart from these express powers and ancillary and implied powers, there is no scope for introducing the

doctrine of inherent powers of the court for the purpose of attributing to the court Jurisdiction in regard to a matter not covered by Part X of the

Act, either expressly by its provisions or by necessary intendment.

The power to issue a succession certificate is no doubt conferred by the Succession Act to a Judge who is already the Presiding Officer of a

court of original Jurisdiction. But merely because he happens to be a court and as a civil court he may have inherent powers to exercise in civil suits

and other allied proceedings, it cannot be said that they are also available for being invoked when the learned Judge is sitting and disposing of

proceedings under Part X of the Succession Act.

In any case, I am satisfied that the subject matter of the application raises a contested issue about the title to the amount owed by A, B. T. (P)

Ltd., to the estate of the deceased Balasundram Chettiar. This controversy or lis cannot be sought to be agitated by a mere interlocutory

proceeding which, in its very nature, has to be inquired into and disposed of without the advantages of, a full blooded trial which the Parties can, as

of right, have only in a regular suit.

For all the above reasons, the civil revision petition is allowed the order of the learned District Munsif is set aside, and the application filed

before the learned District Munsif (I. A. 83 of 1979) is dismissed.

Respondents 1 to 3, although served with notice of this civil revision petition, have not appeared in court either by person or by a counsel.

However, Miss Dominique, learned counsel for the petitioner, carried me through the relevant provisions of the Succession Act in sufficient detail

to enable me to dispose of the civil revision petition fairly fully, I suppose. The civil revision petition is disposed of accordingly.

Petition dismissed.