Lalchand vs Kanhaiyalal

P.V. Dixit, C.J.—This reference by my learned brother Tare J. arises out of an appeal by the judgment-debtor against an order passed by the Additional District Judge. Panna, in execution proceedings of a decree. The decree under execution was drawn up on 26th October 1956 consequent to the orders pronounced by the judicial Commissioner, Vindhya Pradesh on 23rd December 1955 in a miscellaneous civil appeal and a civil revision. When the decree-holder filed an application for execution for recovery of costs awarded by the judicial Commissioner: the judgment-debtor-appellant raised the objection that the application was barred by time under article 182 of the Limitation Act as it had been filed more than three years after the date of the delivery of the order viz. 23rd December 1955. This objection was over-ruled by the executing court which held that as the decree in the appeal was framed and signed on 26th October 1956 and the costs were taxed in the revision-petition on 20th October 1956, limitation would start from these dates, and the execution application was thus within time. The judgment debtor then appealed to this Court.

When the appeal came up for bearing before my learned brother sitting singly, it was argued on behalf of the appellant that under article 182 (1) the limitation would begin to run from the date on which the Judicial Commissioner pronounced the order and not from the date on which the decree was formally drawn up or an order taxing the costs in the revision-petition was signed. Reliance was placed on Nathulal vs. Nandram 1959 J. L. J. 644. In reply, the respondent contended on the authority of Bhagwant vs. Liquidator, Co-operative Society, Sarphapur I. L. R. 1955 Nag. 791 that the decree-holder would be entitled to ask for the exclusion u/s 12 of the Limitation Act of the period intervening between the pronouncement of the orders in the appeal and the revision petition and the date on which the decree was signed or costs were taxed. It was also pointed out before the learned Single Judge that in Nathulal vs: Nandram 1959 I L J 644 reliance was placed on AIR 1927 1 (Nagpur) , which had already been dissented from in Bhagwant vs. Liquidater. Co-operative Society Sarphapur I. L. R. 1955 Nag. 791. The matter has now been referred to this Bench for a decision on the question of limitation arising in the appeal.

In connection with the question whether the respondent''s application for execution was within time, two points arise for consideration. One is as regards the date from which limitation would run under Article 182 (1) and the other is as to whether u/s 12 Limitation Act the decree-holder is entitled to deduct the period between the date of the judgment and the date on which the decree was signed in computing the period of limitation for the execution application. So far as the first point is concerned, it is no longer res integra. In Bhagwant vs. Liquidater. Co-operative Society. Sarphapur I. L. R. 1955 Nag. 791 itself the Full Bench has observed that by the CPC the decree bears the date of the judgment and that limitation runs from the date of the judgment irrespective of the fact when the decree is drawn up. The decision in Nathulal vs. Nandram 1959 J L J 644 only holds that under article 182 (1) the date of the decree means the date of the Judgment and that limitation for an application for execution commence from the date of pronouncement of judgment and not from the date when the decree is actually prepared and signed. That decision in no way runs counter to what has been observed in Bhagwant''s case I. L. R. 1955 Nag. 791. In Nathulal''s case (supra) reference was no doubt made to the Full Bench decision of the late Judicial Commissioner''s Court in AIR 1927 1 (Nagpur) . But that was for the purpose of showing that in that case also the question of exclusion of time u/s 12 (2) Limitation Act was considered because of the undisputed proposition that limitation ran from the date of the judgment and not from the date when the decree was actually drawn up. The principle that limitation begins to run when the judgment is pronounced and not when the decree is drawn up was accepted in Bhagwant''s case I. L. R, 1955 Nag. 791. Therefore the fact that the Full Bench in Bhagwant''s case (Supra) dissented from the view expressed in AIR 1927 1 (Nagpur) on the question of exclusion of time u/s 12 Limitation Act does not in any way make the decision in Nathulal''s case 1959 J L J 644 as one not in accord with the Full Bench decision in Bhagwant''s case (supra). Therefore in the present case limitation under article 182 for the execution application tiled by the respondent must be taken as having commenced from the date of the pronouncement of the order of the Judicial Commissioner, Vindhya Pradesh, viz, 23rd December 1955.

The further question whether in computing the period of limitation for the execution application the respondent is entitled as of right to ask for the exclusion of the period during which the decree had not been drawn up and the order taxing the costs had not been signed does not present any difficulty. Before any exclusion can be claimed u/s 12(2) Limitation Act that provision must be applicable to the proceeding in respect of which limitation is to be computed. Now section 12(2) does not in terms apply to an application for execution. Its applicability is confined only to appeals, applications for leave to appeal and applications for review of judgments as understood in their technical sense (see Beharilal Chaurasia vs. The Regional Transport Authority, Rewa. 1961 JLJ. 94. An application for execution does not fall in any of the categories of legal proceedings mentioned in section 12(2) Limitation Act. If, on the authority of the decision in Beharilal Chaurasiya''s case (supra), section 12(2) is not applicable to an application for execution, then the question whether the respondent decree-holder is entitled as of right to ask for the exclusion of the period of interval between the date of pronouncing the judgment and the date of drawing up the decree cannot arise for consideration. Learned counsel for the respondent suggested that the principle laid down in Bhagwant''s case, I. L. R. 1955 Nag. 791 would also apply to the question of limitation under article 182 Limitation Act. It is difficult to see how the question of the applicability of the principle laid down in Bhagwant''s Case (supra) can at all arise here. In Bhagwant''s case the Full Bench has not held that as u/s 12(2) Limitation Act a decree-holder (appellant is entitled as of right to ask for the exclusion of the period during which the court does not draw up the decree, therefore the limitation for the purpose of an appeal would run from the date on which the decree was actually drawn up and not from the date of the judgment. On the other hand, the Full Bench emphasized that limitation would run from the date of the judgment irrespective of the fact when the decree is drawn up. The Full Banch has also nowhere laid down that section 12 Limitation Act is applicable to an application for execution or that the delay in signing the decree can be excluded in the computation of the period of limitation irrespective of the fact whether section 12(2) does or does not apply to the proceedings in question. It is, therefore, altogether unrealistic to say that on the principle laid down in Bhagwant''s case (supra) the respondent is entitled to exclusion of time u/s 12(2) even though it does not apply to an application for execution or that limitation under article 182(1) would run from the date on which the decree was actually signed. It may be pointed out that in Nathulal vs. Nandram 1959 JLJ 644. the question whether the delay in signing a decree could be considered as time requisite u/s 12(2) Limitation Act was left open. That must now be answered by saying that section 12(2) has no applicability to an application for execution.

The reference must, therefore, be answered by saying that limitation for the respondent''s application for execution began to run from 23rd December 1955 and that section 12(2) Limitation Act has no applicability to an application for execution.