Lalit Kumar vs Om Prakash Dhiman

Hemant Gupta, J.—The Respondent, a Non Resident Indian, has filed the petition for ejectment of the present Petitioner u/s 13B of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for short ''the Act'') as applicable to Chandigarh vide Government of India notification dated 09th October, 2009.

The Petitioner had earlier filed an application for leave to defend, which was allowed by the learned Rent Controller on 30th September, 2010. However, in revision against the said order, the said order was set aside by this Court. Thereafter, the learned Rent Controller passed the order of eviction. The arguments raised before the Rent Controller was that after leave to defend application was declined, the order of ejectment was not to be passed and the Court is to consider the grounds of eviction. Such argument has been negated by the Rent Controller.

Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has vehemently argued that the Petitioner has sought leave to defend on five grounds, but it was allowed on one ground by the learned Rent. Controller. This Court while allowing the revision found the said ground without merit and allowed the revision. There was no occasion for the Petitioner to seek leave to defend on other grounds before this Court. Therefore, the Rent Controller was bound to consider other grounds as well for grant of leave to defend.

I do not find any merit in the said argument. This Court in its order dated 16th March, 2011 has set aside the order dated 30th September, 2010. This Court has not granted liberty to the Petitioner to agitate the other grounds to seek leave to defend. Once, the leave to defend application stands dismissed by this Court, there is no option for the Rent Controller, but to pass an order of eviction.

Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has argued that Section 13B inserted in the Act by Punjab Act No. 9 of 2001 has been extended to the Union Territory of Chandigarh by Government of India vide notification dated 9th October, 2009 in exercise of powers conferred by Section 87 of the Punjab Reorganization Act, 1966 (for short ''the Punjab Act''). It is contended that such extension of a Statute by way of an executive action is not permissible. Reliance is placed upon an interim order passed in titled "Vishva Shrava Talwar v. Sh. Davinder Singh Aulakh Civil Revision No. 3548 of 2011", wherein dispossession was stayed on the basis of such contention.

I do not find any merit in the said argument in view of the judgment of Hon''ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Birch and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, . In the aforesaid case, Punjab Act No. 2 of 1985 inserting Section 13A in the Act was extended to the urban area of Chandigarh by Government of India vide notification dated 15.12.1986 purportedly in exercise of powers conferred u/s 87 of the Punjab Act. The Hon''ble Supreme Court found that the impugned notification is intra vires of Section 87 of the Punjab Act. The Court has considered the scope of Section 89, which gives limited powers to the Central Government to adapt existing laws within a period of two years, whereas u/s 87 of the Act, Central Government could extend to Union Territory any law in force in any part of India. In the aforesaid judgment, the constitutional validity of Section 87 was also challenged, which was negated relying upon the judgment in Delhi Laws Act case, AIR 1951 SC 332. It was held to the following effect:

But, these niceties apart, we think that Section 87 is quite valid even on the "policy and guideline" theory if one has proper regard to the context of the Act and the object and purpose sought to be achieved by Section 87 of the Act. The judicial decisions referred to above make it clear that it is not necessary that the legislature should "dot all the i''s and cross all the t''s" of its policy.

It is sufficient if it gives the broadest indication of a general policy of the legislature. If we bear this in mind and have regard to the history of this type of legislation, there will be no difficulty at all.

Section 87, like the provisions of Acts I, II and III, is a provision necessitated by changes resulting in territories coming under the legislative jurisdiction of the Centre. There are territories situated in the midst of contiguous territories which have a proper legislature. They are small territories falling under the legislative jurisdiction of Parliament which has hardly sufficient time to look after the details of all their legislative needs and requirements. To require or expect parliament to legislate for them will entail a disproportionate pressure on its legislative schedule. It will also mean the unnecessary utilization of the time of a large number of members of Parliament for, except the few (less than ten) members returned to Parliament from the Union Territory, none also is likely to be interested in such legislation. In such a situation, the most convenient course of legislating for them is the adaptation, by extension, of laws in force in other areas of the country....

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For the reasons discussed above, we reject the contentions of the Petitioners challenging the constitutional validity of Section 87.

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...We, therefore, think that since the extension of the 1985 Act only adds provisions in respect of aspects not covered by the 1974 Parliament Act and in a manner not inconsistent therewith, the impugned notification is quite valid and not liable to be struck down.

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33(8) Sri Swarup raised a point that if Section 87 is read as empowering the extension of any law at any time, Section 89 which prescribes a maximum time limit of two years within which to adapt existing laws for their application to Chandigarh would become redundant. This argument overlooks a very crucial difference between Sections 87 and 89. This is that, within the period of two years mentioned in Section 89, the Central Government can, while adapting pre-existing laws make any changes therein, including changes by way of repeal or amendment. Bus Section 87, though capable of enforcement indefinitely, confers a more limited power. It can be invoked only to extend laws already in existence to the Union Territory and cannot make any substantial changes therein. The power u/s 89 is limited in time, but extensive in scope while u/s 87 the power is indefinite in point of duration but very much more restricted in its scope.

Since the extension of the provisions of Punjab Act No. 2 of 1985 to Chandigarh by way of an executive action has been upheld in the aforesaid judgment, therefore, for the same reason, the extension of Punjab Act No. 9 of 2001 by way of notification by the Central Government to the urban area of Chandigarh cannot be said to be illegal in any manner.

In view of the above, I do not find any merit in the present writ petition. The same is accordingly dismissed.