Lalit Mohan vs Secretary/General Manager, District Co-operative Bank and Another

A. Chakarabarti, J.—The petitioner has challenged the continuation of the petitioner under suspension more than six months without serving a charge sheet.

The facts of the case as made out in the writ petition are that the petitioner was suspended by the order dated January 31, 1994 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition.) As the suspension of the petitioner was in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding and no charge-sheet was served for a long time, the petitioner moved the present writ petition in August, 1994. During the pendency of the writ petition charge-sheet was served in December, 1994.

Counter and rejoinder-affidavits have been filed.

Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as also the learned counsel for the respondents. Parties agreed that the writ petition may be disposed of finally at this stage.

The scope of the writ petition is very short. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that under Regulation 85(x) of the U.P. Cooperative Society Employees Service Regulation 1975, the petitioner cannot be continued under suspension for more than six months. The said provision runs as follows.

"85(x). No employee shall ordinarily remain under suspension for more than six months."

On the basis of the aforesaid provision, the petitioner states that the suspension effected by order dated January 31, 1994 could not be continued for more than six months particularly when charge-sheet has been served very late for no fault of the petitioner.

The learned counsel for the respondents gave stress on the word ''ordinarily'' in the said provision and contended that the said word ''ordinarily'' empowers the respondents to continue suspension for more than six months in appropriate circumstances.

The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the rulings in the case of Mahesh Babu Yadav v. U.P. Rajya Sahkari Bhumi Vikas Bank and Ors. 1991 (63) FLR 349, Shobha Ram v. Chairman, District Cooperative Bank Ltd., Varanasi and Ors. (Photo copy of the judgment supplied) and the case of Vishnu Narain Tripathi v. Registrar U.P. Cooperative Society, Lucknow and Ors. 1991(62)FLR 59. But upon perusal of the said judgments it appears that in none of the said cases the implication of the use of the word ''ordinarily'' has been considered.

The learned counsel for the respondents referred to various cases including the case of Kailash Chandra Vs. Union of India (UOI), , Nirmal Chand Jain Vs. The District Magistrate, Jabalpur and Another, , Krishan Dayal and Others Vs. General Manager, Northern Railway, Baroda House, New Delhi, and the Full Bench in the case of Aldo Maria Patroni and Another Vs. E.C. Kesavan and Others, . In the said cases, the user of the word ''ordinarily'' in various statutes and its implications have been considered. Considering the law laid down in the said cases and the meaning of the word ''ordinarily'' as given in various Dictionaries it seems mat the word ''ordinarily'' means in the majority of cases but not invariably. Agreeing with the said view I feel that in the present rule also the word ''ordinarily'' means majority of cases unless there are special circumstances.

In the present case, the counter-affidavit tiled by the respondents and the supplementary counter-affidavit do not disclose any fact justifying continuance of the suspension for more than six months bringing the case within the scope of the word ''ordinarily'' and exercise of discretion thereby. The only relevant fact disclosed by the respondents in justification of the delay in issuance of charge-sheet was due to collection of some more materials on record for preparation of the charge-sheet and that a series of fraud have been committed by the petitioner and one after another documents in which fraud was played by the petitioner required to be found out to prepare the charge sheet.

As the records were admittedly lying with the respondents and no material was disclosed justifying requirement of about one year to prepare the charge-sheet, I do not feel inclined to accept that there was sufficient justification for the delay in serving the charge-sheet.

In the facts as aforesaid and in view of the contention appearing from the Regulation 85(x) of the said Regulations, I do not think that the petitioner can be continued to be under suspension under the said provision.

In the circumstances, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order of suspension is set aside. I make it clear that this order will not prejudice the respondents to continue and complete the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner in accordance with law.

There will be no order as to costs.