Laljee Ram Bhagat vs Nand Lal Singh and Others

Shambhu Pd. Singh, J.—The petitioner has made this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ quashing the orders dated the 15th of September, 1966, of the Collector, Purnea (Annexure 1), 22nd of March, 1967, of the Commissioner, Bhagalpur Division (Annexure 2) and 27th of March, 1968, of the Additional Member, Beard of Revenue, Bihar, at Patna (Annexure 3).

On the 8th of November, 1965, the petitioner purchased from one Asharfi Yadav 54 1/2 decimals of land in Plot No. 220 khata No. 507, Touzi No. 1239, in Katihar, in the district of Purnea. On 9th of December, 1965, the petitioner purchased ten dhurs of land in plot No. 216 from one Hiralal Yadav. On the 20th of January, 1966, opposite party No. 1, who admittedly owns part of plot No. 220, made an application before the Collector of Purnea u/s 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area & Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1962 (hereafter to be referred to as "the Act"). The petitioner did not appear before the Collector to oppose that application and accordingly it was allowed ex parte (vide Annexure 1). The petitioner was directed to convey the land purchased by him in plot No. 220 to opposite party No. 1 by executing and registering a document of transfer within a period of two months. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the Commissioner and the same was dismissed (vide Annexure 2). The petitioner then moved the Board of Revenue and his application there too has been dismissed (Vide Annexure 3) on a finding that plot No. 216, which was purchased by the petitioner subsequent to his purchase of a portion of plot No. 220, was not adjacent to the other plot, that is, plot No. 220, as another plot intervenes between these two plots.

In this Court after the filing of the main application a supplementary affidavit has been filed on behalf of the petitioner alleging that the petitioner''s vendor Asharfi Yadav offered for sale his share in plot No. 220 to opposite party No. 1 on the 10th of October, 1965, and he refused to purchase the same and that on the 9th of December, 1965, the petitioner purchased from one Rasik Lal Yadav plot No. 219, which is adjoining to plot No. 220. These new assertions are questions of fact which require investigation and as those questions were not raised either in appeal before the Commissioner or in the application in revision before the Board of Revenue, in my opinion, the petitioner cannot be allowed to raise them here. I accordingly proceed to examine whether the petitioner has been able to make out a case for issuance of a writ on the admitted facts which were raised in the courts below.

Mr. Rameshwar Choudhary, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that the expression ''adjoining'', when used as an adjective, means ''nearby'' and as such even though plot No. 216 does not touch plot No. 220, as found by the courts below, opposite party No. 1 is not entitled to maintain an application u/s 16(3) of the Act. Sub-clause (i) of Sub-section (3) of Section 16 runs as follows:

When any transfer of land is made after the commencement of this Act to any person other than a cosharer or a raiyat of adjoining land, any co-sharer of the transferor or any raiyat holding land adjoining the land transferred, shall be entitled, within three months of the date of registration of the document of transfer, to make an application before the Collector in the prescribed manner for the transfer of the land to him on the terms and conditions contained in the said deed.

It is manifest from the language of this sub-section that a raiyat holding land adjoining the land transferred cannot maintain a petition under this sub-section if the transfer is in favour of another raiyat of adjoining land. A question, therefore, does arise whether the petitioner is a raiyat of the adjoining land because plot No. 216 is nearby to plot No. 220 though they do not touch each other. According to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the word ''adjoining'', when used as an adjective, means ''lying next''. According to Webster''s Third New International Dictionary, Volume I, ''adjoining'', when used as an adjective, means ''touching or bounding at some point or on some line''. It also means ''near in space (in case of islands etc.):

The words ''adjoining'' and ''adjacent'' are synonymous and one of the meanings of the word ''adjacent'', according to Webstor''s Dictionary, is ''relatively near and having nothing of the same kind intervening''. Therefore, in case of lands, where some other land intervenes between the two plots, they cannot be said adjoining even though they may be near each other. Thus, there appears to be no substance in the contention of Mr. Choudhary that even though plot Nos. 216 and 220 do not touch each other, they are adjoining as they are near each other and, therefore, the petitioner is a raiyat of an adjoining land so far as plot No. 220 is concerned.

In the case of Hiratal Agrawal v. Rampadarath Singh 1969 BLJR 186 the Supreme Court has observed:

The object of Sub-section (3) is to secure consolidation by giving the right of reconveyance to a co-sharer or a raiyat of an adjoining area so that the land in question can be used in that most advantageous manner and also to prevent fragmentation of the land.

That case before their Lordships of the Supreme Court also arose out of a proceeding u/s 16(3) of the Act. The very object of the sub-section, as enunciated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, will be defeated if a person whose land does not touch the land in dispute is allowed to have same right as a person whose land touches the land in dispute. In view of the aforesaid observation of their Lordships of the Supreme Court also the term ''adjoining'' in Sub-section (3) of Section 16 must mean ''touching each other''.

For the foregoing reasons, in my opinion, the petitioner has not made out a case for quashing the orders passed by the Collector, Commissioner and the Additional Member, Board of Revenue contained in Annexures 1, 2 and 3 respectively. The application is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order for costs.

S.N.P. Singh, J.

I agree.