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8 paragraphs · 656 wordsA.H. Khan, J.—The facts leading to this appeal in short are that the judgment of the trial Court was pronounced on 25.1.1957. It is admitted that 26th and 27th January 1957 were public holidays. After the reopening of the Courts, the judgment debtor applied for copy of the judgment which was given to him in four days. He filed the appeal on 1-3-57. This appeal after excluding the days spent in obtaining a copy i.e. four days is admittedly beyond time if period of Limitation is computed from 26th January 1957, and on this ground the learned District Judge, Gwalior, has dismissed it
The question for decision in this case is whether in computing the period of limitation, two days i.e. 26th and 27th January on which the courts admittedly remained closed, because of the public holidays, should be excluded or not. It seems there is a conflict of judicial opinion on the point. On the one hand the view taken in A. I. R. 1938 All, 105 (Puttulal Vs. Bhagwan Dass and others) and A. I. R. 1920 Mad 359 (Dompudi Subramanyan Vs. Nuns Narasingham is that where a judgment is pronounced on a day prior to the vacation of the Court and an application for a copy is not made tell several days after the reopening of the Court, the applicant can not be entitled to deduct the period of vacation On the other hand I have been referred to A. I. R. 1916 Pat 317 (Debi Charanlal and others Vs. Mehdi Hussain and others) which has taken a contrary view.
With great respect to the learned Judges, I find myself in accord with the Patna view. The determination of the question leally depends upon tie interpretation of Sec. 12 of the Limitation Act, and particularly in determining the meaning of the expression, '' the time requisite for obtaining copy of the decree "The judgment in this case was pronounced on 25th January and ordinarily the time would run from the 26th January. But where the 26th and 27th January were admittedly public holidays, no application for a copy could be presented because the court was closed. In the circumstances it is just and proper that these two days should be excluded in computing the period of limitation.
In construing the expression "the time requisite for obtaining a copy," emphasis is both on the words "requisite" and "obtaining". I suggest that the word "requiste" mess the time properly and reasonably required. During the two days when the Court was closed 26th and 27th January, it was impossible to obtain any copy or even to apply for it. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Vol.VI of the India Law Reports Rangoon Series page 302, have observed that the word ''requisite means properly required and thrown upon the appellant''s legal advisers the necessity of showing that no part of the delay is due to their fault."
It was no fault of the appellant and he could not possibly apply for a copy if the court was closed on the 26th and 27th of January, because both days were holidays. In A. I. R. 1928 P.C 103 (Jijibhoy N. Surty Vs T.S. Chetyar (a firm)), their Lordships again expressed the same view and further explained the meaning of the word "requisite".
I, therefore, hold that if a judgment is pronounced on such a date that the day or days following it are holidays, during which the appellant can not apply for a copy, then in computing period of limitation prescribed for appeal, such holidays would be excluded.
It is admitted that if the 26th and 27th of January are excluded, the appeal before the court below is within time.
For reasons stated above. I would allow the appeal and send the case back to the first appellate Court for hearing the appeal on merits, Costs to abide the event.
