High CourtsSingle Bench

Land Acquisition Officer, D.I.S. vs Madan Gajendra and Others

Orissa High Court · Decided on 15 April 1975 · Citation: (1975) 41 CLT 869

HON’BLE JUDGES
S.K. Ray, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Section 18, 23, 4(1)
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
First Appeal No. 149 of 1970
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Judgment

11 paragraphs · 1,242 words

S.K. Ray, J.—This appeal is by the Land Acquisition Officer and arise out of a reference case u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.

2.

Ac. 0.780 decimals of land in khata No. 648 of mouza West Badagada within Bhubaneswar P.S. was acquired for the public purpose of construction of Daya West Branch Canal. Notification u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was published on 12-1-1967. The Land Acquisition Collector determined the value of the acquired land at Rs. 15. 600/ - which works out to the rate of Rs. 20, 000/ - per acre. He added Rs. 2, 340/ - as statutory compensation and made an award for an aggregate amount of Rs. 17, 940/ -, as against the claim of Rs. 70,000/ - per acre. Being aggrieved by the award of the Land Acquisition Collector, the Respondents applied for a reference to the Sub-Judge for determination of fair market value of the acquired land u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. A reference was, accordingly, made.

3.

The Sub-Judge after receiving evidence from the contesting parties, granted a higher compensation at the rate of Rs. 50, 000/ - per acre and added to it 25 per cent more towards the potential value. In addition, he granted 15 per cent solatium and directed 6 per cent interest to run on the excess of the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector till the date of payment. Being aggrieved by this decision of the Sub-Judge, the present appeal has been filed.

4.

Mr. Patra, the learned Standing Counsel has urged two points:

(1) Exts. 1 to 3 which are three sale transactions were proved without objection by the owners of the acquired land in proof of higher compensation, but the contents thereof had not been properly proved. Admission of those documents into evidence without objection merely dispenses with the proof of the execution thereof, but the contents are not proved automatically. Since the contents have not been proved by examining either the purchaser or the vendor they cannot be utilised for the purpose of ascertaining the market value of the lands in the vicinity of the acquired land. In support of this proposition he relied on two decisions, viz., Maharao Shri Madansinhji Vs. State of Gujarat, and P.C. Purushothama Reddiar Vs. S. Perumal, .

(2) The Sub-Judge was wrong after determining the market value of the acquired land in adding 25 per cent more towards the potential value which is inherent in the market value as determined.

5.

It is true that the two decisions cited by him in Maharao Shri Madansinhji Vs. State of Gujarat, and P.C. Purushothama Reddiar Vs. S. Perumal, , support his contention that where a deed of sale is admitted into evidence without objection it merely amounts to dispensing with proof of formal execution but does not ipso facto bringing into evidence the contents thereof. That proposition is no longer good law as will appear from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Kerala Vs. Mariamma Abraham and Another, . In that case it was contended that the police reports are inadmissible in evidence as the Head Constables who covered those meetings had not been examined in the case. Those reports, however, had been marked without any objection. It was held that when the documents had been marked without objection it was not open to the Respondent to object to their admissibility. It was also further urged before their Lordships of the Supreme Court that even if the reports are held to be admissible, the contents of those documents cannot be looked into. Again their Lordships rejected that contention saying that once the documents are properly admitted, the contents of those documents are also admitted into evidence though those contents may not be conclusive evidence. Therefore, in view of this decision of the Supreme Court, the contents of Exts. 1 to 3, which were properly admitted without objection must also be taken to have been admitted into evidence. The Sub-Judge, therefore, was justified in relying upon the contents of those documents in ascertaining the market value of the acquired land. This contenting of Mr. Patra, therefore, fails.

6.

Coming to the second contention, it is true than the Supreme Court has held in the case of Raghubans Narain Singh v. The Uttar Pradesh Government AIR 1967 S.C. 465 that the market value on the basis of which compensation is payable u/s 23 of the Act means the price that a willing purchaser would pay to a willing seller for a property having due regard to its existing condition, with all its existing advantages, and its potential possibilities when laid out in its most advantageous manner, excluding any advantages due to the carrying out of the scheme for the purpose for which the property is compulsorily acquired. This principle might apply where there is evidence of sale transactions relating to the period of acquisition u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act; but where, as in the instant case, the sale deeds, viz., Exts.1 to 3 are of the year 1964 to 1966 when the acquisition is of the year 1967, the said principle cannot appropriately be applied. There is a gap of two years between the period when sale transactions evidenced by Exts.1 to 3 took place and the date when the acquisition in question took place. The intervening period of two years is a large gap is which a lot of improvement in the vicinity had taken place and many more advantages which could not have been conceived of or envisaged between 1964 to 1966 came into existence by or during the year of acquisition in question, thereby enhancing the potential value of the land. In such cases it is reasonable and fair to add something more to the market value of land as prevalent during the years 1964 to 1966 so as to arrive at the correct market price of the land in the year 1967. In my opinion the Sub-Judge was justified in adding 25 per cent to the market value which he has deduced on a consideration of the sale deeds Exts. 1 to 3. This principle of assessment of the market value has been adopted by this Court in the case of Musmat Khuduna Bibi v. State of Orissa 34 (1968) C.L.T. 1043. Therefore, this ground of objection is rejected.

7.

The learned Sub-Judge after considering the market value evidenced by Exts.1 to 3 and the oral evidence on the point and determining the market price deducible from those documents, keeping in mind some special advantages which were available in those cases and rejecting Ext. A as a fair guide on account of the fact that by the time the transaction evidenced by Ext. A was entered into there was an apprehension in the mind of the people of the locality that their lands are liable to be acquired by Government which led to low valuation of lands in private transactions, he has reached the reasonable conclusion that the market rate of the lands of similar quality and advantages to the acquired land in the locality would be about Rs. 50, 000/ - per acre. I see no justifiable ground to differ from it.

8.

Since the only two points raised have been negatived, this appeal is bound to fail which is, accordingly, dismissed, but, in the circumstances of the case, without costs.

Appeal is dismissed without costs.