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Judgment
R. Banumathi, J.—Petitioner seeks Writ of Certiorari to quash the Award of the Labour Court in I.D. Nos. 54 and 59 of 2001 dated
31.1.2003 whereby the Labour Court, Pondicherry directed the Petitioner-Management to reinstate the Respondents-Workmen w.e.f. 21.8.1998
with half back wages and with continuity of service and other attendant benefits.
Since common points arise for consideration, both the Writ Petitions were taken up together and disposed of by this Common Order. For
convenience, the Writ Petitioner is referred as Petitioner-Management and Workmen are referred as 2nd Respondent-Workmen.
Briefly stated case of 2nd Respondent-Workmen is that Petitioner-Management is running a factory in manufacturing electrical products in
Pondicherry. 2nd Respondent-Workmen acquired ITI technical qualification and they were in continuous service of Petitioner-Management as
casual labourers for the period indicated infra. Though, 2nd Respondent-Workmen were engaged as casual labourers, they were treated as
permanent workmen in all aspects and the work was extracted from them like any other permanent workmen. Further case of 2nd Respondent-
Workmen is that after they had put in service for the period stated infra, Petitioner-Management resorted illegal method of obtaining certain
documents signed by them and issuing orders as if they have been appointed as trainees. Totally, 31 workmen were given training agreement and
out of them, 25 only absorbed and the remaining workmen including 2nd Respondent-Workmen were denied the job. After conciliation efforts
failed, 2nd Respondent-Workmen raised the Industrial Disputes.
As per G.O. Rt. No. 173/2001/AIL/L dated 21.9.2001 and as per G.O. Rt. No. 179/2001/AIL/L dated 03.10.2001, Industrial Disputes were
referred to the Labour Court for adjudicating the following:
Whether the non-employment of 2nd Respondent-Workmen - M. Boothanathan, Selvam, Ramalingam, D. Ramesh and D. Kolanjinathan by
the Petitioner-Management of M/s. Larsen & Toubro Limited, Pondicherry is justified or not?
To what relief/benefits the said workmen are entitled to?
To compute the relief, if any, awarded in terms of money if it can be so computed?
Petitioner-Management resisted the Industrial Disputes contending that 2nd Respondent-Workmen worked as contract labourers through
contractor during the intermittent intervals. According to the Petitioner-Management, 2nd Respondent-Workmen were having no qualification and
therefore, by the order dated 08.7.1996, they have been appointed as trainees imposing condition that appointment is subject to their passing
apprenticeship examination in the first attempt. As per the contract, training period is for two years and no assurance was given to the 2nd
Respondent-Workmen for permanent work. According to Petitioner-Management, after the expiry of training period, their services would
automatically cease and after the expiry of training, the 2nd Respondent-Workmen were ceased to attend the factory. Case of Petitioner-
Management is that 2nd Respondent-Workmen cannot be compelled to take trainees on regular basis despite their inefficiency found during the
training period and Petitioner-Management prayed for dismissal of the Industrial Disputes.
In the Labour Court, in I.D. No. 54/2001, on the side of 2nd Respondent-Workmen Exs.A1 to A7 were marked and on the side of Petitioner-
Management, Exs.B1 to B36 were marked. Like wise in I.D. No. 59/2001, on the side of 2nd Respondent-Workmen, Exs.A1 to A42 were
marked and on the side of Petitioner-Management, Exs.B1 to B14 were marked. No oral evidence was adduced on either side.
Upon consideration of evidence, Labour Court held that 2nd Respondent-Workmen were having requisite experience and qualification (ITI)
and they have been working for a long period with the Petitioner-Management. Labour Court upheld that Petitioner-Management was not justified
in treating the 2nd Respondent-Workmen as mere trainees and subsequently terminating their services in violation of Section 25-F of Industrial
Disputes Act without any notice and without any compensation. Labour Court further held that appointing the 2nd Respondent-Workmen as
trainees and training measures were resorted to by the Petitioner-Management is only a device to summarily terminate them without assigning any
reason. Pointing out that 2nd Respondent-Workmen have put in 240 days service in a year, Labour Court held that they shall be deemed to be
worked in continuous service and they are entitled to reinstatement w.e.f. 21.8.1998 and ordered reinstatement with half back wages with
continuity of service and other attendant benefits.
In both the Industrial Disputes, the Labour Court framed the following points for consideration:
Whether those three Petitioners were working continuously as casual labourers for several years under the Respondent management and if so,
whether the Respondent management subsequently treated those three Petitioners as trainees unjustifiably and ultimately terminated them from
service under the guise of inefficiency of the Petitioners during the training period and on the ground of expiry of contract?
2 Whetherthe Petitioners are entitled for reinstatement?
3 To what relief?
Taking strong objection as to the above points framed by the Labour Court, Mr. Sanjoy Mohan, learned Counsel for Petitioner-Management
interalia contended that the points framed by the Labour Court as to whether engagement of the individuals as trainees was justified or not was in
excess of jurisdiction of the powers conferred on a Labour Court u/s 2-A of I.D. Act. In support of his contention, learned Counsel for Petitioner
placed reliance upon Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. Vs. Anil and Others,
Mr. V. Prakash, learned Senior Counsel for 2nd Respondent-Workmen in W.P. No. 11476/2003 has submitted that the spirit of the Award is
that the Management has treated the contract casual labourers as trainees and that their termination is in violation of Section 25-F of I.D. Act and
mere fact that Labour Court has gone into the question of Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act would not affect the correctness of the
Award of Labour Court. Placing reliance upon The Management of Bata India Limited and Hosur Bata Employees Union Vs. The Presiding
Officer Industrial Tribunal and The Workmen rep. by Podhu Seyalalar Hosur Bata Employees Union, it was further submitted that exercising
jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India, the finding of Labour Court can be interfered only to correct the error or law and not
otherwise.
Mr. S. Ayyadurai, learned Counsel for 2nd Respondent-Workmen in W.P. No. 11475/2003 has submitted that the alleged offer of
employment dated 08.7.1996 issued to 2nd Respondent-Workmen were only as trainees but they were not given any training in the so called
period of training and appointing the workmen as trainees was a clear act of unfair labour practice. It was further submitted that services of 2nd
Respondent-Workmen was orally terminated by the Management at the end of the alleged training only with a view to deny the permanent status
to them and upon consideration of materials on record, Labour Court has rightly ordered reinstatement with half back wages. In support of his
contention, learned Counsel has placed reliance upon Farzand Vs. Mohan Singh and Others, and Hutchiah Vs. Karnataka State Road Transport
Corporation,
Upon consideration of the Award of the Labour Court and submissions of the Counsels, the following points arise for determination in these
Writ Petitions:
Whether by considering the question of status of 2nd Respondent-Workmen, Labour Court exceeded its jurisdiction by widening the scope of
Section 2-A of I.D. Act?
Whether Labour Court was right in considering the question as to the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and whether
Labour Court erred in saying that the provision of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 has not been complied with?
Whether the Labour Court has committed an error of jurisdiction when it proceed to consider the Apprentice Act which had no application to
the case on hand?
Point No. 2: Case of 2nd Respondent-Workmen is that Petitioner-Management continuously engaged them as casual labourers and even
though, they have been employed as casual labourers and in all aspects, they have been performing the work as that of any permanent workmen.
Particulars of period during which the 2nd Respondent-Workmen were engaged as casual labourers and the nature of duties discharged by them
are as under:
Name of employee Period worked as Nature of work
W.P.No. & I.D.No.
casual labour
W.P.No.11475/03 1) M.Boothathan 8.3.95 to 8.7.96 Galvanising
I.D.No.54/2001
2) K.Selvam 1992 to 8.7.96 Quality control
3) V.Ramalingam 10.11.95 to 8.7.96 Quality control
1) D.Ramesh 21.11.95 to 8.7.96 Turner
W.P.No.11476/03
I.D.No.59/2001
2) D.Kolanjinathan 1.9.94 to 8.7.96 Machine operator
According to Petitioner-Management, on application of 2nd Respondent-Workmen [Kolanjinathan dated 12.5.1994 (Ex.B1 in I.D. No.
59/2001) and D. Ramesh dated 20.11.1995 (Ex.B2 in I.D. No. 59/2001), by the order dated 08.7.1996, 2nd Respondent-Workmen were
offered employment as ""trainees"" which during the first year of training at the stipend of Rs. 900/-and during the second year at the stipend of Rs.
1000/-per month.
By the order dated 08.7.1996 even though 2nd Respondent-Workmen were said to be appointed as trainees, before the Labour Court, the
2nd Respondent-Workmen had produced the ESI cards showing their date of entry into Petitioner-Management as -Kolanjinathan on 1.9.1994;
Ramesh on 21.12.1995; Booth than on 08.3.1995 and Ramalingam on 10.11.1995 [Exs.A27, A28 in I.D. No. 59/2001 and Exs.A3 in I.D. No.
54/2001]. In the ESI cards [ Exs.A27, A28 in I.D. No. 59/2001 and Exs.A3 in I.D. No. 54/2001, the employer Code Number is shown as
13433"". In all the ESI cards, the employer Code number is shown as ""13433"" which is the Code number of Petitioner-Management. From the
ESI cards produced by the 2nd Respondent-Workmen, Labour Court has held that 2nd Respondent-Workmen have been working even prior to
08.7.1996 i.e. the date of appointing as ""trainees"".
In so far as ESI cards and Identity cards, the Petitioner-Management contended that 2nd Respondent-Workmen were working as casual
labourers under the contractor and ESI cards containing Code No. 13433 was issued for being engaged as they have been working intermittently
through the contractor. Upon consideration of the contention of Petitioner-Management, Labour Court observed that under the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, the principal employer should get his establishment registered under the said Act for engaging contract
labourers and that the said contractor should have licence with details of contract labourers and in the absence of such clear arrangements effected
under the special enactment, the principal employer would be deemed to be the employer and the contract labourers would be deemed to be
directly as workers under the principal employer. Labour Court further observed that in the absence of details about the contractors, the 2nd
Respondent-Workmen who were working as casual labourers under the contract, Petitioner-Management shall be deemed to be the employer
relating to the workmen.
On a careful consideration, this Court is of the view that Labour Court committed an error in arriving at those findings. The Labour Court was
not right in saying that in the absence of clear arrangements and documents, the casual labourers would be deemed to be directly as workers under
the principal employer is not correct.
Assailing the reasoning of Labour Court, learned Counsel for Petitioner-Management contended that Labour Court erred in saying that since
the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act had not been complied with. It was further contended that Labour Court failed to appreciate
that there was no pleading to the effect that the provisions of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act had not been complied with and the
finding of the Labour Court is per se erroneous.
Of course, it was nobody''s case that the provisions of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act had not been complied with. No
allegation or oral evidence was let in to substantiate the plea that the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act had not been complied with.
Labour Court misconstrued the provision of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act finding that in the absence of details about the
contractor, the 2nd Respondent-Workmen who were then working as casual labourers shall be deemed to be the workmen under the principal
employer is erroneous.
Labour Court also misconstrued the provisions of the Act merely because principal employer has not produced the documents or that they
have not been complied with certain provisions, 2nd Respondent-Workmen do not automatically become the employees under the principal
employer. There are well recognised tests to determine whether contract labourer is under the direct employment of the principal employer. Since
the said issue is not raised before the Labour Court, we need not elaborate upon the same.
Labour Court erred in saying that in the absence of such clear arrangements effected under the special enactment, the principal employer
would be deemed to be the employer and the contract labourers would be deemed directly as workers under the principal employer. Even though,
Labour Court has observed that the provisions of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act has not been complied with, the said finding
does not form a basis of the Award. In my considered view such an erroneous finding of the Labour Court does not affect the correctness of the
Award and Point No. 2 is answered accordingly.
Point No. 1: In their Petitions, 2nd Respondent-Workmen have categorically stated that prior to their appointment as trainees, they were
engaged as casual labourers and they were discharging the work like any other permanent workmen. Even though Petitioner-Management has
taken the plea that 2nd Respondent-Workmen have been intermittently engaged through the contractor, Petitioner-Management has not come out
with the details of contractors. Labour Court took the view that services of the workmen was orally terminated by the Management at the end of
the period of alleged training with a view to deny them permanent status. Labour Court further held that taking the 2nd Respondent-Workmen as
trainees and the alleged training measures were only as a device to summarily terminate the services of the 2nd Respondent-Workmen without
complying the provisions of Section 25-F of I.D. Act.
Learned Counsel for Petitioner-Management has submitted that in exercising jurisdiction of the powers u/s 2-A of I.D. Act, the issue before
the Labour Court is whether non-employment of the individual concerns was justified or not and while so, Labour Court went into the question
beyond the jurisdiction by framing an issue as to whether engagement of 2nd Respondent-Workmen as trainees was justified or not. It was further
submitted that sitting in jurisdiction u/s 2-A of I.D. Act, Labour Court cannot go into the question that could be decided only in a reference u/s 10
of I.D. Act. Placing reliance upon 2006 W.P. No. & I.D. No. Name of employee Period worked as casual labour Nature of work W.P. No.
11475/03 I.D. No. 54/2001 1) M. Boothathan 2) K. Selvam 3) V. Ramalingam 8.3.95 to 8.7.96 1992 to 8.7.96 10.11.95 to 8.7.96 Galvanising
Quality control Quality control W.P. No. 11476/03 I.D. No. 59/2001 1) D. Ramesh 2) D. Kolanjinathan 21.11.95 to 8.7.96 1.9.94 to 8.7.96
Turner Machine operator Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. v. Anila and Ors. (11) SCALE 567, it was contended that there is a difference between
an individual dispute u/s 2-A of I.D. Act whereas Section 2(i) of I.D. Act covers a wider field. In the said decision, the Supreme Court observed
as under:
.... There is a difference between an individual dispute which is deemed to be an industrial dispute u/s 2-A of the said 1947 Act on one hand
and an industrial dispute espoused by the union in terms of Section 2(i) of the said 1947 Act. An individual dispute which is deemed to be an
industrial dispute u/s 2-A concerns discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination whereas an industrial dispute u/s 2(i) covers a wider field. It
includes even the question of status. This aspect is very relevant for the purposes of deciding this case. In the case of Radhey Shyam and Anr. v.
State of Haryana and Anr. 1998 II LKLJ 1217, it has been held after considering various judgments of the Supreme Court that, Section 2-A
contemplates nothing more than to declare an individual dispute to be an industrial dispute. It does not amend the definition of industrial dispute set
out in Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (which is similar to Section 2(i) of the said 1947 Act). Section 2-A does not cover every
type of dispute between an individual workman and his employer. Section 2-A enables the individual worker to raise an industrial dispute,
notwithstanding, that no other workmen or union is a party to the dispute. Section 2-A applies only to disputes relating to discharge, dismissal,
retrenchment or termination of service of an individual workman. It does not cover other kinds of disputes such as bonus, wages, leave facilities
etc.
It is fairly well settled that individual dispute u/s 2-A of I.D. Act concerns discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination whereas Section
2(i) of I.D. Act covers wider field. In the instant case, even though, the issue related to non-employment of 2nd Respondent-Workmen, the parties
did raise an issue as to the status of 2nd Respondent-Workmen. In I.D. No. 59/2001, the 2nd Respondent-Workmen have clearly averred that
they have been offered employment by the Petitioner-Management as casual labourers and after undergoing a thorough process of selection and
interview, they were appointed as casual labourers and that they have been placed on par with the other permanent workers on the aspects of job
responsibilities. 2nd Respondent-Workmen further averred that taking advantage of fiduciary relationship and the commanding position, Petitioner-
Management took the signature of the 2nd Respondent-Workmen in sending the documents and issued the order dated 08.7.1996 as if the 2nd
Respondent-Workmen were appointed as ""trainees"".
Before the Labour Court, Management has filed counter denying the offer of employment by the Management in the capacity of casual
labourers. Petitioner-Management took a stand that 2nd Respondent-Workmen accepted the offer of ""trainee"" and having accepted the offer as
trainee, the 2nd Respondent-Workmen cannot turn round and contend that they have been previously employed as casual labourers.
Considering the averments in the Petition and the counter-affidavit, it is clear that prior employment of 2nd Respondent-Workmen was
specifically pleaded and Petitioner-Management has also traversed the said pleading. When the plea had been specifically pleaded by the
Workmen and traversed by the Petitioner-Management and when the parties produced evidence on that issue, framing of point for determination
as to whether the status of workmen and the finding of the Labour Court on that point cannot be said to be in excess of jurisdiction. When the
parties went on trial knowing fully well and when they were required to prove and when they have adduced evidence in support of their respective
pleas and when the evidence was considered by the Labour Court, Petitioner-Management cannot turn round and contend that Labour Court
exceeded its jurisdiction in widening the scope of Section 2-A of I.D. Act. It is pertinent to note that in its counter-affidavit, Petitioner-
Management has not raised any plea that Labour Court has no jurisdiction to go into the status of the 2nd Respondent-Workmen. There is no
force in the contention that exercising jurisdiction u/s 2-A of I.D. Act, Labour Court exceeded its jurisdiction in considering the status of the 2nd
Respondent-Workmen and Point No. 1 is answered accordingly.
Point No. 3: In the offer of employment as trainee, it was stated that the appointment is subject to passing of apprenticeship examination in the
first attempt and production of certificate to that effect. Learned Counsel for Petitioner-Management has submitted that this was not the case
covered by Apprentice Act. Considering the clause in the order of appointment as trainee, Labour Court held that the provisions of Apprentice
Act has to be considered in the light of the fact established in the case. Adverting to the same, Labour Court proceeded to examine the point
whether Management complied with the provisions of the Apprentice Act and further observed that Petitioner-Management could not produce any
evidence that it has complied with the provisions of Apprentice Act. Learned Counsel for Petitioner-Management has submitted that this was not
the case covered by Apprentice Act and while so, Labour Court proceeded to hold that engagement of traineeship was not in accordance with the
Apprenticeship Act. It was further submitted that in the said process, Labour Court has failed to appreciate that it was nobody''s case that the
training was under Apprentice Act. Learned Counsel would further contend that all the parties have agreed that Model Standing Orders were
applicable to the establishment and that in terms of that Act and Model Standing orders, engagement of trainees was permitted. Learned Counsel
would further contend that by examining the question of compliance of the provision of Apprentice Act, Labour Court has committed a serious
error of jurisdiction when proceeded to consider the case as one covered by the Apprentice Act, 1961.
No doubt, question of application of Apprentice Act was not raised before the Labour Court. Case of Management was that by the offer of
employment dated 08.7.1996, 2nd Respondent-Workmen were taken as trainees and based upon their performance appraisal, the 2nd
Respondent-Workmen were unsuccessful and they were relieved as per the terms of the Act. According to Petitioner-Management, one of the
important features of the contract was that the training period of two years will automatically come to an end and no pay or retrenchment
compensation will be payable to the trainees. It is seen from the documents Exs.B11 to B14 in I.D. No. 59/2001 and Exs.B5 to B36 in I.D. No.
54/2001, no training measures seem to have been imparted to the 2nd Respondent-Workmen. But the performance appraisal would clearly show
that the 2nd Respondent-Workmen were doing the works of permanent nature. Based upon the materials available on record, Labour Court has
rightly held that offer of training was only a device to summarily terminate the 2nd Respondent-Workmen without assigning any reason.
While speaking about the powers under Article 226 of Constitution of India, in Ramniklal N. Bhutta and another Vs. State of Maharashtra and
others, the Supreme Court observed as follows:
.... The power under Article 266 is discretionary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of interests of justice and not merely on the making out
of a legal point. And in the matter of land acquisition for public purposes, the interests of justice and the public interest coalesce. They are very
often one and the same. Even in a civil suit, granting of injunction or other similar orders, more particularly of an interlocutory nature, is equally
discretionary. The Courts have to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis the private interest while exercising the power under Article 226 - indeed any
of their discretionary powers. It may even be open to the High Court to direct, in case it finds finally that the acquisition was vitiated on account of
non-compliance with some legal requirement that the persons interested shall also be entitled to a particular amount of damages to be awarded as a
lumpsum or calculated at a certain percentage of compensation payable. ...
Dealing with the powers of the High Court against the orders of the Tribunal, in Shama Prashant Raje Vs. Ganpatrao and Others, the Supreme
Court held that the High Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India cannot convert itself into a Court of appeal and examine the facts for
correctness of the decision as to whether the view is proper or not. In Paragraph (5), the Supreme Court observed as follows:
... Undoubtedly, in a proceeding under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution the High Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded
by a competent Tribunal. The jurisdiction of the High Court, therefore, is supervisory and not appellate. Consequently, Article 226 is not intended
to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decision impugned and decide what is
the proper view to be taken or order to be made, but notwithstanding the same, on a mere perusal of the order of an inferior Tribunal if the High
Court comes to a conclusion that such Tribunal has committed manifest error by misconstruing certain documents, or the High Court comes to the
conclusion that on the materials it is not possible for a reasonable man to come to a conclusion arrived at by the interior Tribunal or the inferior
Tribunal has ignored to take into consideration certain relevant materials or has taken into consideration certain materials which are not admissible,
then the High Court will be fully justified in interfering with the findings of the inferior Tribunal. ...
The same view was reiterated in Maharashtra Academy of Engineering and Educational Research v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (2001)
10 SCC 166 in the following lines:
2 .... It is well settled that an order of an inferior Tribunal or a statutory authority could be interfered with by the High Court while exercising
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, only if the Court comes to the conclusion that the order is contrary to certain provisions of law or
the authority concerned took into consideration certain extraneous materials, not germane to the issue or the authority concerned failed to take into
consideration certain materials which are otherwise relevant or the finding is one on the materials which could not have been arrived at by any
reasonable man. ...
It is clear that scope of jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India in issuing Writ of Certiorari is restricted to
cases where there are manifest error in the impugned order or the order is contrary to the provisions of law or the order has been passed without
jurisdiction or in cases where the authority, while passing orders has taken into consideration certain extraneous matters which are not relevant or
in cases where the authority has failed to take into consideration certain relevant factors, particularly the basic principle that on the materials
available, no ordinary reasonable person would come to such a conclusion. See The Management of Bata India Limited and Hosur Bata
Employees Union Vs. The Presiding Officer Industrial Tribunal and The Workmen rep. by Podhu Seyalalar Hosur Bata Employees Union,
Exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India, High Court cannot interfere with the same and that the finding of the Labour
Court is based upon the evidence and materials on record warranting no interference. Petitioner Management has not made out any valid ground to
set aside the award of the Labour Court and the Writ Petitions are liable to be dismissed.
In the result, these Writ Petitions are dismissed. Consequently, connected M. Ps. are closed. No costs.
Para 18 end
Labour Court misconstrued the provision of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act finding that in the absence of details about the
contractor, the 2nd Respondent-Workmen who were then working as casual labourers shall be deemed to be the workmen under the principal
employer is erroneous.
Para 18-A
Labour Court misconstrued the provisions of the Act merely because principal employer has not produced the documents or that they have not
been complied with certain provisions, 2nd Respondent-Workmen do not automatically become the employees under the principal employer.
There are well recognised tests to determine whether contract labourer is under the direct employment of the principal employer. Since the said
issue is not raised before the Labour Court, we need not elaborate upon the same.
Para 28-A
While speaking about the powers under Article 226 of Constitution of India, in Ramniklal N. Bhutta and another Vs. State of Maharashtra and
others, , the Supreme Court observed as follows:
.... The power under Article 266 is discretionary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of interests of justice and not merely on the making out
of a legal 26 point. And in the matter of land acquisition for public purposes, the interests of justice and the public interest coalesce. They are very
often one and the same. Even in a civil suit, granting of injunction or other similar orders, more particularly of an interlocutory nature, is equally
discretionary. The Courts have to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis the private interest while exercising the power under Article 226 - indeed any
of their discretionary powers. It may even be open to the High Court to direct, in case it finds finally that the acquisition was vitiated on account of
non-compliance with some legal requirement that the persons interested shall also be entitled to a particular amount of damages to be awarded as a
lumpsum or calculated at a certain percentage of compensation payable. ....
While dealing with the powers of the high Court against the orders of the Tribunal, in Shama Prashant Raje Vs. Ganpatrao and Others, , the
Supreme Court held that the High Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India cannot convert itself into a Court of appeal and examine the
facts for correctness of the decision as to whether the view is proper or not. In Paragraph (5), the Supreme Court held as follows:
... Undoubtedly, in a proceeding under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution the High Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded
by a competent Tribunal. The jurisdiction of the High Court, therefore, is supervisory and not appellate. Consequently, Article 226 is not intended
to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decision impugned and decide what is
the proper view to be taken or order to be made, but notwithstanding the same, on a mere perusal of the order of an inferior Tribunal if the High
Court comes to a conclusion that such Tribunal has committed manifest error by misconstruing certain documents, or the High Court comes to the
conclusion that on the materials it is not possible for a reasonable man to come to a conclusion arrived at by the interior Tribunal or the inferior
Tribunal has ignored to take into consideration certain relevant materials or has taken into consideration certain materials which are not admissible,
then the High Court will be fully justified in interfering with the findings of the inferior Tribunal. ....
The same view was reiterated in (2001) 10 SCC 166 (Maharashtra Academy of Engineering and Educational Research v. State of
Maharashtra) in the following lines:
... It is well settled that an order of an inferior Tribunal or a statutory authority could be interfered with by the HighCourt while exercising
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, only if the Court comes to the conclusion that the order is contrary to certain provisions of law or
the authority concerned took into consideration certain extraneous materials, not germane to the issue or the authority concerned failed to take into
consideration certain materials which are otherwise relevant or the finding is one on the materials which could not have been arrived at by any
reasonable man. ....
It is clear that scope of jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India in issuing Writ of Certiorari is restricted to
cases where there are manifest error in the impugned order or the order is contrary to the provisions of law or the order has been passed without
jurisdiction or in cases where the authority, while passing orders has taken into consideration certain extraneous matters which are not relevant or
in cases where the authority has failed to take into consideration certain relevant factors, particularly the basic principle that on the materials 29
available, no ordinary reasonable person would come to such a conclusion. (See The Management of Bata India Limited and Hosur Bata
Employees Union Vs. The Presiding Officer Industrial Tribunal and The Workmen rep. by Podhu Seyalalar Hosur Bata Employees Union, .