Laxman das vs Purshottam Das

S.N. Aggarwal, J.—This Second Appeal is by the tenant aggrieved by his ejectment u/s 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. There are concurrent findings of the two courts below against the appellant that the suit shop is required bonafidely by the respondent for the auto business of his son and wife running in the name and style of M/s Seth and Sons. The finding as to bona fide requirement is a finding of fact and can not be interfered with in the present appeal unless the appeal raises a substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC 1908. Shri V.K. Bhardwaj, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant/tenant has argued that Section 12 (l)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 does not visualise bona fide need of a firm or of the wife of the landlord/owner of the property. It is submitted by the learned senior counsel that in the present case, the respondent being the landlord of the appellant had claimed ejectment of the appellant for the bona fide need of a firm M/s Seth and sons, which was owned by his son and the wife. The contention is that the firm for whom ejectment was sought by the respondent does not come within the ambit of Section 12 (l)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. This argument in the opinion of this court is completely devoid of any merit. For a proper appreciation of the contention of the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, it would be necessary to refer to the pleadings of the respondent contained in his ejectment petition, wherein he has set out his bona fide requirement of the suit shop and the same is extracted below:-

It shall also be significant to refer to the provisions of Section 12 (l)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 under which eviction was claimed by the respondent against the appellant and the same is extracted below:-

"that the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable nonresidential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned."

A plain reading of the statutory provisions contained in Section 12 (a)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 makes it abundantly clear that a landlord can claim eviction of his tenant on the ground of bona fide need of commercial premises if the same is required either for his own business or for the purpose of any of his major son or unmarried daughter or any other member of his family for whose benefit the premises is held. A reference to the pleadings of the respondent in the ejectment petition extracted hereinabove would show that respondent had made out a bona fide need of the suit shop for the business of his major adopted son Vinit Kumar run by him under the name and style of M/s Seth and sons. The fact that the wife of the respondent was also a partner in the business of his son makes no difference as far as bona fide need of major son is concerned. If a reference is made to the pleadings of the respondent contained in his ejectment petition, it can not be said that the claim for bona fide need made by the respondent against the appellant was for a firm as sought to be contended by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant. In law a person doing business is entitled to induct as many persons as he likes as partners in his business. Merely because there are partners in the business of the son of the landlord, it does not preclude him from seeking eviction against his tenant, if he otherwise needs the suit premises bonafidely. Hence, I do not find any merit in the present second appeal, which is completely devoid of any merit and is, therefore, dismissed summarily with no order as to costs.

At this stage, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that the appellant does not intend to go any further in appeal against the order of this court and wants to finish the matter once for all. He, therefore, makes an oral request for grant of two years'' time to the appellant for vacating the suit accommodation so that he may arrange for an alternative accommodation for earning his livelihood. The counsel for the parties have been heard on the question of grant of time to the appellant for vacating the suit accommodation. The time for two years prayed for by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant for vacating the suit shop has been strongly opposed by Shri Sarvesh Sharma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent. The appellant is stated to be in possession of the suit shop since 1974. Having regard to the fact that the appellant is in possession of the suit shop for last more than 35 years, this court considers it in the interest of justice to grant him one year''s time for vacating the suit shop on the same terms and conditions of tenancy as on date subject to his filing an undertaking in this court in the form of his affidavit within 10 days from today undertaking to vacate the suit accommodation latest by 3Pt December 2012. A copy of the said undertaking should also be filed by the appellant before the executing court within the same time period of 10 days. In case the appellant fails to file the requisite undertaking within 10 days from today, then the respondent shall be entitled to execute the ejectment decree against him forthwith.