Lee Kun Hee and Others vs State of U.P. and Another

R.D. Khare, J.—Heard learned Counsel for the applicants and learned A.G.A. for the State respondent.

The present 482, Cr.P.C. application has been filed for quashing the proceedings of criminal complaint No. 30 of 2005 re-numbered 3794 of 2005 pending before I Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad as well as staying the operation and effect of the orders dated12.1.2005, 16.3.2005 and 11.8.2006 passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad, whereby summons were issued and non-bailable warrants have been issued against the applicants No. 1 to 4, who are foreign nationals and who are summoned under Sections 403, 305, 415, 418, 420, 423, 120B and 34 IPC.

Learned Counsel for the applicants No. 1 to 5 has initially drawn the attention of this Court to the copy of the agreement (page 165), which was executed between M/s Sky Impex Ltd. and M/s J.C.E. Consultancy and has contended that there is no privity of contract between the accused persons sought to be summoned and the complainant, opposite party No. 2, inasmuch as the accused persons are not party to the said agreement, either as buyer or purchaser, and the terms and conditions of said agreement dated 1.12.2001 would not be applicable so far as the accused persons are concerned. It is thus contended that the said agreement has been entered into between two different parties, who are independent of the accused persons and said contract was entered into at Dubai. It is next contended that even if there is breach of agreement between the parties, then too no criminal liability can be fastened for breach of any contract/terms and it would not amount to cheating as defined u/s 405 IPC.

The attention of the Court was next drawn to the complaint filed by the complainant and the allegations made in the complaint are that M/s Sky Impex Limited, Dubai has placed an order for purchase of Coke Calcination Plant from JCE Consultancy, New Delhi on 25th November, 2001 and pursuant thereto an agreement was entered into between the M/s Sky Impex Ltd. and JCE Consultancy on 1st December, 2001. As per the said agreement M/s Sky Impex Ltd. had agreed to endorse the bills of exchange of Samsung Gulf Electronics in favour of JCE Consultancy (complainant) and alternatively M/s Sky Impex Ltd. agreed to transfer the amount directly to the JCE Consultancy. The complaint further mentions that JCE Consultancy had delivered the plant to M/s Sky Impex Ltd, which was in turn sent to Samsung Gulf Electronics and that Samsung Gulf Electronics accepted the bills of exchange dated 1st February, 2002, which was endorsed by M/s Sky Impex Ltd. in favour of M/s JCE Consultancy and the said bills of exchange was not paid upon demand and therefore the complaint was filed by the complainant.

The complainant, JCE Consultancy had also filed a civil suit bearing commercial action No. 482 of 2005 before the court of First Instance at Dubai for recovery including the amount of bills of exchange in question. It is contended that in the said suit there is no allegation made by the complainant against the applicants regarding commission of any criminal offence. It is further contended that the copy of bills of exchange, annexed with civil suit filed at Dubai, bears different endorsement than one annexed to criminal complaint No. 30 of 2005 filed at Ghaziabad, in which non-bailable warrant has been issued. It is further contended that none of the applicants are in any way involved in the issuance of bills of exchange and applicants No. 1 and 2 are not even the members of Board of Directors of applicant No. 5, which is an independent entity. It is next contended on behalf of the applicants that criminal proceedings have been filed on a fictitious entity on a forged bills of exchange at the instance of absconding persons against whom Interpol has issued Red Corner Notices and extradition proceedings are under way in respect of conviction sentence imposed by a competent court in Dubai on complaint filed by Samsung Gulf Electronics. It is next contended that several threatening letters were sent to the top official of Samsung Gulf Electronics threatening for their criminal prosecution and to defame them in case the said complaint at Dubai was not withdrawn. Reference in this regard has been drawn to the affidavit dated 7.7.2005 sent to Samsung Gulf Electronics by FAX.

It is also contended that Samsung Gulf Electronics is a company incorporated at Dubai under the laws of UAE having registered office at Dubai, which deals the home appliances, mobile phones and electronic products but have no business operations or office in India. It is further contended that one Mr. S.C. Baek, who was Financial Controller of Samsung, was transferred to South Korea in December, 2003 but he disappeared before handing over the charge, whereupon his office was opened and large number of bills of exchange, delivery orders, proforma invoices and purchase orders relating to fake and fraudulent transactions between Mr. Baek, purporting to act on behalf of Samsung with Sky Impex Ltd. BVI, Sky Impex LLC, Busley Industries Ltd. and others were found. It is emphasized that all the documents related to purchases of products, which were never dealt with or received by Samsung. It is further contended that Mr. Baek alleging to act on behalf of Samsung, place fictitious orders for various goods on Sky Impex, without the knowledge and approval of Samsung and these orders related to goods in which Samsung did not trade or deal in nor was any receipt of such goods available nor were such goods received or available in the warehouses of Samsung. Immediately thereafter on 6.1.2004 Samsung lodged a complaint of fraud, forgery and cheating at Dubai against Mr. Baek and three others, namely, Mr. S.S. Anand, Mr. Pradeep Kumar Ghathania and Ms. Meline Wilby, who were dealing on behalf of the aforementioned companies and for which Samsung suffered loss to the tune of more than US$ 8,599,757/-. The Dubai police had apprehended Mr. S.S. Anand and kept his passport as security and directed him to appear on 10th January, 2004 but thereafter Mr. S.S. Anand absconded and is not traceable.

It is next contended on behalf of the applicants that as Samsung had lodged complaint before Dubai police, Mr. S.S. Anand and Mr. Pradeep Kumar Ghathania started threatening the high officers of Samsung to withdraw the case filed at Dubai, otherwise they would be implicated in false cases in India. Thereafter, Samsung appointed an expert, M/s Pricewaterhouse Coopers to investigate the entire matter. The Investigating Agency investigated the matter and submitted its detailed report dated 14th January, 2004, in which it was found/reported that all the aforesaid transactions were fictitious and they were not authorized by Samsung, which report was also handed over to the Dubai police.

It is next contended that on or about 25.9.2004 and 3.10.2004, Samsung received photocopy of the summons dated 15.9.2004 issued by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad in respect of criminal complaint No. 5606 of 2004 filed by Mr. Pradeep Kumar Ghathania at Ghaziabad under Sections 499, 500, 501, 503, 504 IPC alleging that he has been defamed by the report dated 14th January, 2004 of M/s Princewaterhouse Coopers. The applicants, thereafter, filed criminal misc. 11207 and 14465 of 2004 before this Court for quashing of the said criminal complaint on the ground that no offence is disclosed against the applicants and that Ghaziabad court had no jurisdiction to proceed with the case. The said proceedings was quashed by this Court vide judgment and order dated 31.3.2005 on the ground that they were counter blast to the proceedings initiated by the applicants at Dubai. Against the said order of this Court dated 31.3.2005, Mr. Pradeep Kumar Chathania filed SLP (Criminal M.P. No. 11480 of 2005), which was dismissed by Hon''ble Supreme Court vide order dated 11.8.2006.

It has beenaverred in the present petition that on 21.12.2004 the Public Prosecutor, Dubai submitted a report reporting that Mr. Pradeep Kumar Ghathania, Mr. S.S. Anand, Ms. Meline Welby and Mr. S.C. Baek have committed offences of cheating, fraud, criminal misappropriation and criminal conspiracy whereupon the case was committed to the court of First Instance, Dubai as case No. 751 of 2004. However, the accused persons did not appear before the Dubai court and remained absconding but Mr. S.S. Anand and Mr. Pradeep Kumar Ghathania were represented by their respective counsels before the Dubai court.

The records of this petition further reveal that on 7th January, 2005, JCE Consultancy and Proprietorship Company instituted criminal complaint No. 30 of 2005 re-numbered as 3794 of 2005 in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad against the applicants on the ground that a bills of exchange drawn by Samsung Gulf Electronics, FZE in favour of M/s Sky Impex had not been honoured/paid by the Samsung. The said complaint was filed at the instance of Mr. Pradeep Kumar Ghathania and Mr. S.S. Anand, who were Directors of M/s Sky Impex. The 7th Additional Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad passed summoning order on 12.1.2005 on the said complaint and, it is contended that, the said summoning order was never received by the applicants. Thereafter, bailable warrants were issued on 3.2.2005, which again was not received by the applicants, as contended by the learned Counsel for the applicants. Ultimately non-bailable warrants were issued on 16.3.2005 against the applicants under Sections 403, 405, 420, 423, 120B/34 IPC. The records also show that on 21st March, 2005 7th Additional Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad directed that the non-bailable warrant, against the applicants, be executed through the Central Bureau of Investigation (Interpol Wing) and on the same day the Magistrate wrote a letter to the CBI (Interpol Wing) to secure execution of the non-bailable warrants upon the applicants and on coming to know about the issuance of non-bailable warrants, Samsung filed criminal revision No. 154 of 2005 before Sessions Judge, Ghaziabad on 6th August, 2005 against the summoning order as well as against non-bailable warrants, in which interim stay order was granted.

It is next contended that on 18th July, 2005, the court of First Instance, Dubai passed a judgment in case No. 751 of 2004 holding all the four accused, i.e., Mr. Baek, Mr. S.S. Anand, Mr. Pradeep Kumar Ghathania and Ms. Meline Wilby, to be guilty of cheating, forgery, criminal conspiracy by entering into fictitious transactions resulting in financial loss of US$. 8,599,757/-, thus, the Dubai court sentenced all the accused to two years imprisonment followed by deportation.

It is next contended that thereafter Samsung filed a writ petition No. 1663 of 2005 before the Delhi High Court that Advocates for the accused be directed to disclose from which courts arrest warrants had been obtained against the applicants/Samsung. The Delhi High Court disposed of the aforesaid writ petition on 05.10.2005 recording the statement of the counsel that they were aware of only the arrest warrants issued by the court of 7th Additional Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad. Thereafter, on 12.12.2005, extradition proceedings were set in motion with the Public Prosecution, Dubai by addressing a letter to the Director General, Department of Criminal Investigation for extradition of the accused persons from India to Dubai. The Interpol, Abu Dhabi also wrote a letter to the Interpol, New Delhi informing that accused Mr. Pradeep Kumar Ghathania and Mr. S.S. Anand were wanted on a charge of fraud and they have been sentenced to two years imprisonment each followed by deportation and therefore, they maybe located and arrested pending forwarding their extradition. The warrants of arrest were also sent to Interpol, New Delhi. In pursuance to above, Interpol, New Delhi had forwarded the request to the concerned police authorities to arrest the accused persons. Red corner notice had also been issued by Interpol against Mr. Pradeep Kumar Ghathania, Mr. S.S. Anand and others. The records further show that on19.5.2006, Mr. Pradeep Kumar Ghathania filed criminal writ petition No. 1234 of 2006 before Delhi High Court for restraining CBI and other police authorities from arresting him on the requisition of the U.A.E. Government. The Delhi High Court only issued notice and declined to pass any interim order in favour of the accused. Thereafter, it is contended that Mr. Pradeep Kumar Ghathania absconded and the police is looking for him.

Learned Counsel for the applicants has further contended that there is a valid extradition treaty between India and U.A.E. under which the accused is liable to be extradited from the India to U.A.E. to undergo the sentence imposed by the competent court. The accused did not file any appeal against the judgment and order dated 18th July, 2005, which has become final.

It is next contended that the Additional Sessions Judge, Ghaziabad dismissed the criminal revision No. 154 of 2005, vide order dated 15th July, 2006 on the ground that revision is not maintainable against summoning order and for which only application/petition u/s 482, Cr.P.C. can be filed.

It is next contended that merely on the oral request of the complainant and without any notice to the applicants, the Magistrate, Ghaziabad again issued non-bailable warrants against the applicants on 11.8.2006 inspite of the fact the applicant No. 5 had duly entered appearance on that date and also filed an application for discharge of applicants No. 1 to 4, which was take on record and 23.9.2006 was the date fixed thereon.

Learned Counsel for the applicants has further contended that applicants filed criminal writ petition No. 163 of 2006 before Hon''ble Supreme Court on 19.8.2006 under Article 32 of the Constitution of India praying for quashing the complaint case No. 30 of 2005 (renumbered as 3794 of 2005) and for issuing a writ of mandamus directing the CBI to register a case against JCE Consultancy and Proprietorship Company as well as issue a writ of mandamus directing to frame appropriate guidelines regarding issue and execution of arrest warrants against foreign nationals. The Hon''ble Apex Court, vide order dated 8.9.2006 permitted the applicants to withdraw the aforesaid writ petition with the liberty to file proceedings in appropriate forum. Hence, the present application/petition.

It is further contended that the applicants No. 1 to 4 does not have any business operation in India and further the complaint does not disclose any offence against any of the officers of the Samsung. It is, thus, contended that the applicants No. 1 to 4 are being falsely implicated inspite of the fact that they have no concern with the controversy in question. It is further argued that the complaint is based solely on an allegedly unpaid bills of exchange, which the complaint itself alleges, was drawn, accepted and payable at Dubai, thus, it is argued that the court of Ghaziabad does not have any territorial jurisdiction.

It is further contended that criminal complaint is total contravention of the specific provisions of Section 188, Cr.P.C., which provides that an offence committed outside India can be dealt with in India only if the same is committed by a citizen of India or by a person, not being such citizen, on any ship or aircraft registered in India. Further, no such offence can be enquired into or tried in India except with the previous sanction of the Central Government, which is also lacking in the present case.

It is further argued on behalf of the applicant that there is no territorial jurisdiction vested upon Ghaziabad court in view of the provisions of Section 134, 135 of Negotiable Instruments Act, therefore, the entire proceedings are vitiated. It is further argued that there is no allegation in the complaint that the bills of exchange was ever presented to the applicants No. 1 to 5 and that the same was refused and therefore, complaint is in contravention of Section 134 of Negotiable Instruments Act. It is also contended that there is no allegation in the complaint that the bills of exchange was presented and was refused, therefore, it is in contravention of Section 156 of Negotiable Instruments Act. It is further contended that as per the provisions of Section 70 of Negotiable Instruments Act, the place of presentation of bills of exchange was at Dubai but there is no averment made in the complaint by the complainant that the same was ever presented at Dubai and so also complaint is bad in law. It is further argued that as per Section 31 of Negotiable Instruments Act the original bills of exchange is to be honoured. The complaint does not contain any averment that any original bills of exchange was ever presented by the applicants No. 1 to 5 and so also the complaint is liable to be set aside, beside that the provisions of Section 99 and 104 of Negotiable Instruments Act have not been followed. Learned Counsel for the applicants has further argued that breach of contract has been alleged in imputing criminality upon applicant No. 1 to 5, but from the allegations, as contained in the complaint, even if it is taken to be true in its entirety, though denied, no offence is made out or disclosed against the applicants No. 1 to 5 under the charged sections, inasmuch as all the allegations made have been made against the opposite party No. 7, thus, it is contended that prosecution of the applicants No. 1 to 5 is misuse of the process of court. It is further contended that the complainant has taken contrary stand in the proceedings initiated before the court of First Instance at Dubai and in the criminal proceedings initiated at Ghaziabad, which itself shows that the complaint is based on totally false and non-existent ground. It has been contended on behalf of the applicants that the civil proceedings initiated by the complainant at Dubai has been dismissed by the Court of First Instance at Dubai vide order dated 24.1.2008. It is further argued that the matter is purely of civil nature, which has been dragged into criminal prosecution of the applicants No. 1 to 5 at the behest of opposite party No. 2, which is nothing but gross misuse of process of court. It has further been argued on behalf of the applicants that the filing of a criminal complaint at Ghaziabad by the complainant is nothing but a counter blast to the proceedings initiated by the applicants at Dubai. Learned Counsel for the applicants has relied upon a judgment of Hon''ble Supreme Court in case of Indian Oil Corporation Vs. NEPC India Ltd. and Others, whereby Hon''ble Apex Court has held that there is a growing feeling that it is necessary to take notice of growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. It has been further held that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is likelihood of imminent settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged. In the said regard learned Counsel for the applicants has also relied upon a judgement of Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Rukmini Amma Saradamma Vs. Kallyani Sulochana and others, wherein Hon''ble Apex Court has held that it is also salutary to note that judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment.

It is further argued that the allegations made is regarding breach of contractual agreement and even if such agreement exits though vehemently denied, there would be necessarily an arbitration clause in every such agreement, besides the admitted fact that no previty of contract existed between the applicants No. 1 to 5 and the complainant. The agreement referred to is between the complainant and M/s Sky Impex Ltd., on account of which applicants No. 1 to 5 cannot be sued by the complainant. It is thus, argued that the complaint case is not maintainable and is liable to be quashed.

It is also contended that the complaint itself has been filed by fictitious entity. In the revision proceedings filed by the applicant No. 5 in respect of the non-bailable warrant issued in the present complaint, the Process Server has given a report that there was no office of the complainant at the address given in the notice and that the said building itself was under construction and the watchman of the building also intimated that no person by the name of the complainant had any office in the said building. It is, thus, contended that the compliant itself is fictitious and is not maintainable.

Learned Counsel for the applicants has further argued that the summoning order/warrants were issued by the Magistrate without satisfying himself whether the allegations made in the complaint, on its face value and the statements recorded, prima facie reveal the commission of any offence against the applicants. Therefore, he has acted in the teeth of the order passed by Hon''ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Another Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and Others, It is further argued that the criminal prosecution should not be used by the private complainant as an instrument of personal, vendetta to harass any person, it is, thus, argued that issuance of process against the applicants No. 1 to 5 is in contravention of settled law laid down by Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab National Bank and others Vs. Surendra Prasad Sinha, wherein Hon''ble Apex Court has held that the Magistrate is legally bound to find whether the concerned accused should be legally responsible for the offence charged for and only on being satisfied that the law casts liability or creates offence against the juristic person or the persons impleaded then only process should be issued. It has further been held that at that stage the court would be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all the relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process lest it would be an instrument in the hands of the private complaint as vendetta to harass the person needlessly. In the said regard learned Counsel for the applicants has also relied upon a judgment in the case of Madhvrao Jiwajirao Scindia and Ors. v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre reported in 1996 (1) SCC 692.

Reference has also been made to the judgment of Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of S.W. Palanitkar and others Vs. State of Bihar and another, in the aforesaid regard and it is, therefore, prayed that the present 482, Cr.P.C. application be allowed and the complaint be quashed.

It is further argued that the complaint has been filed against the applicants No. 1 to 4, who are not working in the Samsung company registered at Dubai, therefore, complaint is not maintainable against them and is liable to be dismissed. It is also contended that this fact has not been specifically denied by the complainant in the paragraph No. 26 of the counter affidavit. It is further argued that every company authorizes a particular officer either by resolution of Board of Directors of the Company or by specifying the designation of the officer of the company, who would be responsible for the acts of the company in the memorandum or article of Association of the company. It is, thus, contended that the applicants No. 1 and 2 are not officers, who could be held to be responsible for alleged act or omission by Samsung Gulf Electronics, which is a registered company at Dubai, having its registered office at Dubai and which is a separate legal entity. It is, thus contended that the complaint filed against the applicants No. 1 to 4 is not maintainable.

Learned Counsel for the applicants has contended that the impugned summoning order is very cryptic order, a perusal of which would show that there is no application of mind by the concerned Magistrate while passing the same and the applicants No. 1 to 5 cannot be put to trial on the basis of said order. It is also contended that there is no mensrea attributable in the present case to the applicants No. 1 to 5, as such, no criminal liability can be fasten upon the applicants No. 1 to 5, when there is no previty of contract between the said applicants and the complainant. Learned Counsel for the applicants has relied upon a judgment of Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Sharon Michael and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr. reported in (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 103 in support of his contention.

Learned Counsel for the complainant/opposite party No. 2 has raised preliminary objection regarding maintainability of present 482, Cr.P.C. application on the ground that the present 482, Cr.P.C. application has been filed under the signature of Sri Siddharth Pandit, the power of attorney holder and therefore, same is not maintainable as criminal proceeding cannot be initiated at the behest of power of attorney holder as the deed of attorney in favour of Mr. Siddharth Pandit has not been signed by the accused applicants themselves, but by their attorneys, namely, Sri Bong Sik Park and Sri Yong Won Taek, therefore, the present application u/s 482, Cr.P.C. is not maintainable. This preliminary objection was raised at the behest of opposite party No. 2 at the very initial stage and after hearing the parties, this Court, vide order dated 19.12.2008 had decided the said issue holding that Siddharth Pandit was duly authorized to file the present application/petition. In view of the aforesaid order of this Court deciding the aforesaid preliminary issue, the said preliminary objection cannot be re-agitated again by the private opposite party at the stage of final hearing as the said preliminary objection has already been set at rest by the earlier order of this Court dated 19.12.2008. No other preliminary objection was raised by the complaint/opposite party. The operative part of the order dated 19.12.2008 is being quoted below:

After giving careful though to the matter, I am satisfied that Siddharth Pandit was a duly appointed attorney of the accused applicants in accordance with the authority conferred on Mr. B.S. Park and W.Y. Taek and as such the application is maintainable.

No other objection in respect of maintainability of the application has been raised. In view of above, the objection has no force and is accordingly rejected.

List before the appropriate Bench in the ordinary course.

It is also contended by the learned Counsel for the complainant/opposite party No. 2 that the present application deserves to be dismissed outright in view of the fact that the applicants could not make out any case for interference by this Court in exercise of inherent jurisdiction u/s 482, Cr.P.C. inasmuch as applicants have not made out any case with regard to the offence made out against them in the complaint and they have raised such issues in their 482, Cr.P.C. application, which are in no way linked with the controversy in question and therefore, application deserves to be dismissed. In support of his contention, reliance has been placed on the decisions of Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, State of Bihar Vs. Rajendra Agrawalla, ; State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Golconda Linga Swamy and Another, and the decision of this Court rendered in the case of Mohammed Ashraf Vs. Sushri Mayawati, Chief Minister and Others, and Minakshi Bala Vs. Sudhir Kumar and Others,

It is next contended that the present 482, Cr.P.C. application is also not maintainable in view of the fact that another application has been filed by the applicants seeking recall of the warrant and for discharge of applicants No. 1 to 5, which has been filed by them before the Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad in the year 2006 itself, therefore, parallel proceedings for the same cause of action, cannot be permitted to be drawn as per law. It is thus, contended that unless the discharge application is decided, the proceedings of complaint case cannot be quashed.

It is further argued that the said discharge application, copy of which has been filed as annexure-18 to the affidavit, would demonstrate that it contains all the averments, which has been made in the present 482, Cr.P.C. application, which can be better considered and decided by the Magistrate at Ghaziabad and it cannot be decided on the basis of affidavits filed in the present 482, Cr.P.C. application. In support of his contention learned Counsel for the complainant/opposite party No. 2 has relied upon a judgment of Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Jai Singh Vs. Union of India and Others, and has referred paragraph No. 4 wherein Hon''ble Supreme Court has held that two parallel remedies in respect of the same matter cannot be pursued at the same time. It is also contended that the applicants deserves no indulgence by this Court as they have chosen not to appear before the Magistrate at Ghaziabad, who has found a prima facie case against them and instead, they are going forum hunting and filing one petition after the other for the same cause of action, as such, the application deserved to be dismissed on this ground also.

Learned Counsel for the complainant-opposite party No. 2 has further contended that for proving criminal conspiracy of the applicants, their statements are necessarily to be recorded to ascertain whether there is any meeting of mind or not and this process can only be done during trial and not in the proceedings u/s 482, Cr.P.C. and so also the present 482, Cr.P.C. application deserves to be dismissed. It is further contended that it cannot be said that perusal of complaint along with the documents appended thereto is not without any substance or that no offence under the charged sections is made out.

Learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2 has stated that when the contesting opposite party sent a claim/notice for the amount of the bills of exchange through their counsel to Samsung Gulf Electronics, he got an answer form the advocates of Samsung Gulf Electronics, in which existence and authenticity of the bills of exchange in question was accepted, but a defence was taken that since some credit note had been issued to Sky Impex, therefore the amount would not be paid to the contesting opposite party. It is also argued that the fact remains that contesting opposite party is in possession of bills of exchange, which was duly admitted by Samsung Gulf Electronics and contesting opposite party is entitled to be paid the amount of the said bills. It is further submitted that the applicants are trying to set up stories regarding their relationship with their erstwhile financial controller and which stories are in no way related to the point in issue in the complaint, therefore, the said stories are being created only to create confusion. It is further submitted that all references to the averments made in 482, Cr.P.C. application filed by Samsung Gulf Electronics, against the persons named therein, are of no relevance whatsoever and in fact, is merely an attempt to merge and confuse two entirely separate issues, in order to find a defence where none really exists and this question of fact can better be appreciated in the trial. It is further submitted by the learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2 that the applicants are making a mention of the report of Princewaterhouse Coopers, but Princewaterhouse Coopers had actually certified and endorsed the fact that the bills of exchange were genuine and the genuineness of the bills of exchange in question have never been questioned in the said report, thus the said report is of no consequence so far as the complaint filed by the contesting opposite party is concerned. It is next submitted that the contention of the applicants that the contesting opposite party has filed a civil suit for recovery of its dues on the basis of the bills of exchange in question at Dubai, therefore, no complaint can be initiated against them in the court of law in India is also baseless inasmuch as same cause of action can give rise to two independent consequences, one being civil in nature and the other constituting a criminal offence, as the contesting opposite party was doing his business at Ghaziabad, made demand for his dues from Ghaziabad, he did the work and delivered the goods from Ghaziabad and the refusal to pay his dues was received by him at Ghaziabad, therefore, Ghaziabad court has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. Reference in this regard has been placed in the case of Trisuns Chemical Industry Vs. Rajesh Agarwal and others, . It is further contended that it is not open for the applicants to now raise issue of genuineness of bills of exchange before this Court, which is exercising supervisory jurisdiction and such issue will be raised before the trial court during trial.

Learned Counsel for the contesting opposite party has contended that in making a reference to some anonymous fax messages, received by the applicants, from such persons with whom they are said to have some dispute, is also entirely misplaced and has no bearing whatsoever to the controversy in question, which is pending consideration before the court of Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad and thus, they are of no consequence. It is next contended that applicants No. 1 to 4 are liable to be prosecuted in the complaint case in view of the fact that whatever follows in law, will have to be borne by Samsung Gulf Electronics and all other persons who are principal officers of the said company and who are persons holding fiduciary capacity with respect to the Samsung group and Samsung Gulf Electronics, thus, it cannot be said that no complaint could have been filed against the applicants No. 1 to 4. It is further contended that there is no violation of provisions of Section 188, Cr.P.C. inasmuch as cause of action is fragmented and a court having jurisdiction over the area where part of cause of action occurred can take cognizance of the same. It is further contended that averments regarding the fact that no offence under the charged section is made out against the applicants No. 1 to 5, can be scrutinized and decided after adducing the evidence in trial, therefore, the contention of learned Counsel for the applicants that no offence is made out, by bare reading of the complaint, is misconceived. In reply to the contention that the complaint has been filed by fictitious entity, is also incorrect and it is contended that the contesting opposite party is a member of NOIDA Entrepreneurs Association and is conducting his business from Ghaziabad and is maintaining bank accounts at Ghaziabad. It is next contended that beside this commercial contact, there is no connection or linkage between the contesting opposite party and M/s Sky Impex Ltd. Learned Counsel for the contesting opposite party has drawn the attention to the agreement dated 1.12.2001 and has contended that it contains clear recital and it shall be governed by the laws of India.

It is next contended that the common summoning order was passed against all the applicants and the complaint cannot be quashed in part and that this Court has already dismissed the 482, Cr.P.C. application of the co-accused M/s Sky Impex Ltd, BVI under the same complaint case number and charged section vide order dated 21.2.2007 and had also dismissed the 482, Cr.P.C. application of the other co-accused, Mr. S.C. Baek, vide order dated 5.5.2008. It has further been contended that M/s Sky Impex Ltd., BVI had also preferred SLP No. 1825 of 2007 against the dismissal order passed by this Court in 482, Cr.P.C. application and Hon''ble Supreme Court vide order dated 9.4.2007 was pleased to dismiss the same as withdrawn. It is thus contended that the present petition, which is also filed for quashing of the same complaint under the same charged section/offences regarding which 482, Cr.P.C. application of other co-accused has been dismissed by this Court as well as Hon''ble Supreme Court, it is, thus, argued that the present 482, Cr.P.C. application deserves to be dismissed in view of the Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2 has relied a judgment of Hon''ble Supreme Court reported in Deep Chand and Others Vs. Mohan Lal, , in support of his contention.

Learned Counsel for the applicants, in reply to above, has stated that even if the petition of co-accused u/s 482, Cr.P.C. has been dismissed, this Court, under law, should dispose of the present 482, Cr.P.C. application on merits after hearing both the parties and he has relied upon a judgment of Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Vasudev Dani v. Purushottam Das Khandelwal and Anr. reported in (2004) 13 SCC 506 in support of his contention.

Learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2 has argued that as the matter of co-accused has been dismissed by this Court, hence, the present application is also liable to be dismissed and in case this Court pleased to defer from the order of earlier Bench of coordinate jurisdiction then appropriately the matter may have to be referred to larger Bench of this Court. Learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2 has relied upon judgment of Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Singh, Secretary Home and Another Vs. Mittanlal Hindoliya, wherein Hon''ble Apex Court has held that if single Judge of the High Court does not agree with the earlier view expressed by the learned Single Judge of the same High Court on an identical point, then the matter should be referred to Division Bench instead of deciding the same. It is also argued that the judgment referred by the learned Counsel for the applicants that in the matter Vasudev Dani v. Purushottam Das Khandelwal and Anr. (Supra) is a judgment per-incurium inasmuch as in the case of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs. Mumbai Shramik Sangha and Others, the Constitution Bench considered the rule of judicial discipline and propriety as also the theory of precedence and held that a Bench of the same quorum can not question the correctness of the decision by another Bench of coordinate strength in which case the matter may be placed for consideration before a Bench of larger quorum. It was further held that in other words, a Bench of lesser quorum cannot express disagreement with, or question the correctness of, the view taken by a Bench of larger quorum. Learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2 has also referred to judgment of Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Rajasthan Public Service Commission and Another Vs. Harish Kumar Purohit and Others, in support of his contention. Learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2 has also relied upon judgment of Hon''ble Apex in the case of Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and Another Vs. State of Maharashtra and Another, in support of his contention, and it is argued that the law of precedence is to be taken into consideration in view of the judgment of Hon''ble Apex Court, referred to above, in order to ensure the sanctity of the settled law as laid down by the courts and to avoid any unnecessary confusion. It is further contended that the judgment cited by the learned Counsel for the applicants, i.e., Vasudev Dani v. Purushottam Das Khandelwal and Anr. (Supra) does not consider or take into account the previous decisions of Hon''ble Supreme Court on the point of doctrine of procedure, it is thus, contended that the said decision is no precedential value. It is argued by the learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2 that as this Court had dismissed the 482, Cr.P.C. application of other co-accused, on that account also the present application is not maintainable and deserved to be dismissed.

Learned Counsel for the private respondent has argued that since the Hon''ble Apex Court has dismissed the SLP of the co-accused, filed against the order of this Court in a petition u/s 482, Cr.P.C., in which identical prayer was made as has been made in the present application, therefore, the order of this Court passed in application moved u/s 482, Cr.P.C. of co-accused, is not an order of coordinate court but as it has been affirmed by the Hon''ble Apex Court, it will be treated an order of Apex Court and in the aforesaid regard reliance has been placed upon a judgment of Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Ranbir Singh Rathaur and Others etc. etc., wherein orders passed in earlier writ petitions on the same subject matter filed before the High Court had attained finality and Special Leave Petitions filed there against had been dismissed and regarding maintainability of subsequent writ petitions for the same subject matter, it was held that to say that though finality had been achieved, justice stood at a higher pedestal is not an answer to the basic question as to whether the High Court was competent to reopen the whole issue which stood concluded. It is, thus, argued by the learned Counsel for the private respondent that in the aforesaid case the High Court has decided various writ petitions filed by different persons, involving same question of law, which was again reopened by the High Court in subsequent writ petition and it was held by Hon''ble Apex Court that High Court could not have done the same. It is further argued that in the present case there is a single complaint against several co-accused, who are identically placed and applications u/s 482, Cr.P.C. of the co-accused in the same complaint case, has been dismissed, which order has been affirmed by the Hon''ble Apex Court, it is, thus, contended that filing of application u/s 482, Cr.P.C. by co-accused for the same relief, is not maintainable.

Learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2 has argued that the annexures, which are appended to the writ petition or 482, Cr.P.C. application in support of the averments made therein but which are not part of criminal complaint nor the police report, nor have been be relied upon by the Investigating Officer then on the basis of such documents, produced only before the High Court, the accused-applicants cannot be declared to be innocent and the proceedings cannot be quashed by treating such documents as evidence. In this regard learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2 has relied upon a judgment of Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar and Another Vs. P.P. Sharma, IAS and Another, It is, thus, argued that in the present case the applicants No. 1 to 5 have tried to bring such facts which are foreign to the controversy in question and they are trying to confuse the main issue and on such averments the complaint cannot be quashed. Learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2 has further referred to the judgment of Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Trisuns Chemical Industry Vs. Rajesh Agarwal and others, and has argued that even if it is presumed that though vehemently denied, that there is some agreement containing arbitration clause, it cannot be a ground for quashing of the complaint of cheating. It has further been held that the Magistrate, taking cognizance of the offence, may not be the concerned Magistrate to try the case but a Judicial Magistrate, I class can take cognizance of the offence, whether committed within his jurisdiction or not and that power of Judicial Magistrate of I class to take cognizance is not impared by territorial jurisdiction. It is, thus, argued on behalf of opposite party No. 2 that the contention of the applicants No. 1 to 5 that the complaint deserves to be dismissed on the ground of territorial jurisdiction is also misconceived. It is next contended that the applicants No. 1 to 5 are trying to disown the act done by their Financial Controller, who was duly authorized to act on their behalf by the resolution of the Board and to sign on the bills of exchange etc. by making a false averment that when he was transferred to South Korea on the ground, of irregular functioning, he absconded without handing over the charge and when an invantary of his office was made, then it was revealed that he was indulging in execution of forged and fictitious agreements bills of exchange etc. in favour of various companies including M/s Sky Impex Ltd. without the sanction of Samsung, for which Samsung would not be responsible. It is argued that issuance of bills of exchange and even the receipt of the goods has been admitted by the Samsung Gulf Electronics, copy of which has been filed as Ka-9, Ka-7 filed along with the complaint, which has been filed as annexure-1 to the affidavit and thus, the averments made by the applicants that forge and fictitious bills of exchange was issued by the Financial Controller, without any sanction and that they did not receive any goods is totally false and which fact can only be proved by adducing of full evidence and this factual aspect of the matter cannot be decided by this Court in exercise of powers u/s 482, Cr.P.C. It is further contended that the applicants No. 1 to 5 had filed a discharge application before the Magistrate at Ghaziabad on 10th August, 2006 for discharging them on the ground that no offence is disclosed from the bare reading of the complaint and that complaint is malafide. Thereafter, the said applicants also filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India before Hon''ble Apex Court, which was permitted to be withdrawn by Hon''ble Apex Court with a observation that petitioners may approach the appropriate forum. It is also contended that since applicants No. 1 to 4 had filed a discharge application before the Magistrate at Ghaziabad, prior to filing of writ petition before Hon''ble Apex Court, then after the order of Hon''ble Apex Court, it was only just and proper and they should have approached appropriate forum where they had filed the said discharge application and it was not open for them to file application u/s 482, Cr.P.C., whereby joint parallel proceeding for the same relief, as was claimed in the application and that too on the same ground, it is, thus, contended that application u/s 482, Cr.P.C is not maintainable.

In reply, learned Counsel for the applicants has stated that Hon''ble Apex Court had permitted the applicants to move application before the appropriate forum, therefore, for quashing the complaint, they could have approached this Hon''ble Court by filing application u/s 482, Cr.P.C. and not to the concerned Magistrate. He has also stated that stage of discharge had not yet reached as per the provisions of Section 244, Cr.P.C., therefore, application u/s 245, Cr.P.C. for discharge could not have been entertained or adjudicated by the concerned Magistrate and so also the only option left with the applicants was to prefer application u/s 482, Cr.P.C. before this Court. In support of his contention learned Counsel for the applicant has relied upon a judgment in the case of Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal and Ors. reported in 2004 SCC (Cri) 1927. Learned Counsel for the applicants has further contended that in a criminal case facts of each case is to be considered separately and principle of res-judicata shall not apply in criminal matter. In support of his contention he has also relied upon a judgment of Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Devendra and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr. reported in (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 461.

After hearing the rival claim of the parties it is evident that the complaint of the complainant u/s 403, 305, 415, 418, 420, 423, 120B and 34 IPC is for non-payment of bills of exchange allegedly presented to the opposite party No. 2 for supply of items/machinery by the complainant based on the agreement dated 1.12.2001, which was between complainant and M/s Sky Impex Ltd., thus, there was no previty of contract between the applicants and complainant with regard to said agreement, although the said agreement contains a recital to the effect that laws of India would apply. The documents which have been filed along with the complaint does not go to show that goods regarding which the bills of exchange was issued was the subject matter of the said agreement dated 1.12.2001 as reference has been made to a different contract regarding goods that were sent and were said to have been received by the applicant No. 5. Again there is nothing on record to show that the number of contract which has been referred in paper No. Ka-4, is in any way related to the agreement dated 1.12.2001. The contention of the applicants No. 1 to 5 that the bills of exchange appended along with the complaint bears different endorsement than the one, which has been filed in the civil proceedings at Dubai is a matter of record, for which learned Counsel for the complainant has argued that the same shall be aptly replied during trial and no specific averments regarding the same can be made before this Court as it would adversely effect their case before the trial court. He has further stated that issuance of bills of exchange is not denied by the applicants No. 1 to 5 and applicants have only tried to get away from the financial liability and are trying to usurp the same, which is legally to be paid to the complainant, by fabricated and false story, which are unrelated and foreign to the issue in the proceedings pending before the Trial Judge, Ghaziabad. The matter in hand is primarily based on contractual matter and whether vicarious criminality can be attributed upon the applicants No. 1 to 5 on the allegations made in the complaint is a question, which can be determined after adducing of the evidence by the parties. Further, the factual aspect of the matter regarding irregular functioning of Mr. S.C. Baek, the erstwhile Financial Controller of Samsung Gulf Electronics, the threatening letters which were allegedly sent by Mr. Pradeep Kumar Ghathania to the top officials of Samsung Gulf Electronics, whether Mr. S.C. Baek had obtained the sanction of Samsung Gulf Electronics for placing the order or issuing bills of exchange etc. are all factual matter to be decided after adducing the evidence before trial and which cannot be gone into by this Court in exercise of power u/s 482, Cr.P.C.

As discussed above, there are documents on record, filed along with the complaint, showing authorization of Mr. S.C. Baek to act on behalf of Samsung Gulf Electronics for issuing bills of exchange etc., record showing that the consignment was sent to the applicant No. 5, which was received by them and whether these documents are genuine or forged or whether the said document was issued on account of business courtesy, as contended by the learned Counsel for the applicants. As per the contention of the rival parties, the question of presentation or non-presentation of bills of exchange for payment to the applicant No. 5 is also a factual dispute, which can also be better adjudicated after adducing the evidence. With regard to the averments made by the learned Counsel for the parties regarding contravention of various provisions of Negotiable Instruments Act, they can be proved only after adducing of evidence. Furthermore if there is any contract entered into in India or any offence was committed pursuant thereto in India by Foreign Nationals can be determined after investigation and adducing evidence between the parties.

From the facts, as discussed above, the various aspects of the case which need consideration are; whether applicants No. 1 to 5 can be held vicariously liable for criminality attributed to them, in view of the fact that no previty of contract existed between the applicants No. 1 to 5 and the opposite party No. 2; whether alleged items/goods were ever supplied by the complainant to the applicant No. 5 pursuant to the contract No. SI/SAM/19/11/01, as per paper No. Ka-4 annexed with the complaint and whether the same is in any way related or connected with the contract dated 1.12.2001 between M/s Sky Impex Ltd. and the complainant; whether as per the contract/law applicable in the present case, applicants No. 1 to 4, who are foreign nationals, can be prosecuted as per the Indian laws in view of the recital made in the agreement dated 1.12.2001 that the contract shall be governed by the laws of India; whether the documents which were appended by the complainant along with the complaint filed at Ghaziabad would in any way tantamount to the admission of the applicant No. 5 with regard to receiving of the items/goods alleged to have been supplied by the complainant and whether there was any admission on the part of the applicant No. 5 regarding liability of payment thereof; whether the applicant No. 5 deals with the goods allegedly supplied by the complainant and whether such goods could have been ordered to be supplied to the applicant No. 5; whether reply sent on behalf of the applicant No. 5 dated 21st December, 2004, filed as paper No. Ka-9 to the complaint, would amount to admission of financial liability in view of the fact that the said letter contains recital to the effect that credit note was already issued by the beneficiaries of bills of exchange, M/s Sky Impex Ltd. on 22nd June, 2002, before the due date of payment, and therefore, applicant No. 5 was not responsible to make any payment to the complainant pursuant to the bills of exchange in question; whether the applicants No. 1 to 5 can be prosecuted if the credit note has already been issued to the beneficiaries, M/s Sky Impex Ltd., or otherwise M/s Sky Impex Ltd. alone could have been prosecuted; whether Mr. S.C. Baek, who was admittedly the Financial Controller of the applicant No. 5 was duly authorized for placing any orders or for issuing bills of exchange in question on behalf of applicant No. 5 for the goods alleged to have been supplied or whether the defence as set up by the applicant No. 5 that when Mr. S.C. Baek was found to be irregularly functioning and was transferred to South Korea, he absconded and when an inventory of his office was prepared, it was revealed that he was indulging into false and fictitious contract, issuing of bills of exchange without authorization etc. and whether such defence is permissible under law as would amount to sidetracking or denying the financial liability of the applicant No. 5; whether applicants No. 1 to 5 are trying to confuse the matter by raising such issues, which are totally unrelated to the complainant, to avoid their financial liability; whether the fact of sending the threatening letters/massage by Mr. S.S. Anand and Mr. Pradeep Kumar Ghathania to the top officials of M/s Samsung Gulf Electronics, has any relation to the main controversy raised in the complaint regarding non-payment of bills of exchange allegedly issued at the behest of applicant No. 5 or whether it has been raised in order to sidetrack the issue of financial liability pursuant to the bills of exchange in question; whether the endorsement made in the copy of bills of exchange filed by the complainant in his complaint at Ghaziabad is different from the endorsement made in the copy of complaint made in the civil proceedings at Dubai and its effect in view of the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the complainant that the answer to this would adversely affect their case during trial; whether the bills of exchange in question was ever presented to the applicant No. 5 for payment and whether there is violation of provisions of Section 134, 135, 136, 70, 31, 104 of Negotiable Instruments Act; whether the applicants No. 1 to 4 can be prosecuted at all in view of the fact that they are not officers responsible for Samsung Gulf Electronics, which is a separate legal entity and whether Samsung Gulf Electronics, Dubai is a subsidiary company of main Samsung Company; whether the criminal complaint, at the behest of complainant filed at Ghaziabad, is maintainable in view of that the complainant has initiated civil proceedings for the same bills of exchange at Dubai specially in view of the contention of learned Counsel for the applicant that answer to this would adversely affect the trial; whether the offence committed is fragmented and whether the applicants No. 1 to 5 can be permitted to be prosecuted in view of the fact that 482, Cr.P.C. application of other co-accused has been rejected by this Court; whether the Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad was competent to issue summons/process against applicants in view of the fact that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint; whether there was sufficient evidence/ground for the Magistrate to issue process; whether the complaint has been filed by fictitious entity, which does not have any office at Ghaziabad; whether controversy in question is purely of civil nature, which has been dragged into criminal prosecution of the applicants No. 1 to5; whether genuineness of bills of exchange was ever disputed by the applicant No. 5; whether parallel proceedings can be permitted to be drawn by the applicants No. 1 to 5 by filing the present 482, Cr.P.C. application and by filing discharge application before the Magistrate, Ghaziabad at the same time.

Learned Counsel for the private respondent has contended that he has raised his arguments only with regard to the maintainability of the present application moved u/s 482, Cr.P.C. and not on merits of the case and that may be decided first. However, as discussed above, this Court vide its order dated 19.12.2008 has already decided the question of maintainability and it was recorded that no other ground regarding maintainability was agitated on behalf of private respondent, therefore, said question cannot be re-agitated at this state when matter is posted for final arguments and arguments have proceeded for days together. Thus, question of maintainability, as it has been settled by the earlier order of this Court, cannot be permitted to be re-agitated.

In view of the observations made above it is apparent that the present case involves various questions of fact, which cannot be gone into by this Court in exercise of its extra ordinary powers u/s 482, Cr.P.C. as has been repeatedly held by this Court as well as by Hon''ble Apex Court. Such factual aspect can well be dealt with by the concerned Magistrate after adducing evidence on such issues and questions as are involved and to decide the same after hearing the parties.

The fact that the applicants had moved an application for discharge in the pending complaint case before the concerned Magistrate at Ghaziabad, which was filed on 11.8.2006 on almost the same grounds and averments as has been taken in the present application. Thus, the applicants are already availed the remedy, which was open to them under the Code by moving the discharge application, which is stated to be pending consideration before the Magistrate. Furthermore it is most relevant to take note of the fact that a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction had already decided two 482, Cr.P.C. applications filed by two other co-accused, namely, M/s Sky Impex Ltd. BVI and Mr. S.C. Baek, which were already decided on 21.2.2007 and 5.5.2007 respectively, which 482, Cr.P.C. applications were filed by the co-accused against the same complaint, under the same charged sections and for the same cause of action as are raised in the present 482, Cr.P.C. application. M/s Sky Impex Ltd. BVI, thereafter, also preferred SLP No. 1825 of 2007 against the dismissal order of its 482, Cr.P.C. applications and Hon''ble Apex Court, vide order dated 9.4.2007 had also dismissed the said SLP as withdrawn. Thus, in view of the constitutional provisions and the point of facts as narrated above, it will only be appropriate for the applicants to pursue the discharge application filed by them, which is stated to be pending before the concerned Magistrate.

From the perusal of the material on record and looking into the facts of the case and after considering the submission made at the bar, which relates to the disputed questions of fact, which cannot be adjudicated upon by this Court u/s 482, Cr.P.C., inasmuch as at this stage only a prima facie case is to be seen in the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in cases of R.P. Kapur Vs. The State of Punjab, State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 SCC (Cr.) 426; State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma 1992 SCC (Cr.) 192 and lastly Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Saraful Haq and Anr. (Para-10) 2005 SCC (Cri.) 283. The disputed defence of the accused, therefore, cannot be considered at this stage. Moreover, the applicants had already moved an application for discharge, which is pending consideration before the Magistrate concerned.

In view of the above the prayers for quashing the proceedings of criminal complaint No. 30 of 2005 re-numbered 3794 of 2005 pending before I Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad, is refused. However, it is provided that if the applicants appear and surrender before the court below within a period of 30 days from today and apply for bail, then their prayer for bail shall be considered in view of the settled law laid down by the Seven Judges'' decision of this Court in the case of Amarawati and Anr. v. State of U.P. reported in 2004 (57) ALR 290 and in the recent decision of the Supreme Court dated 23.3.09 in Criminal Appeal No. 538 of 2009, Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P. after hearing the Public Prosecutor. For a period of 30 days from today or till the disposal of the application for grant of bail, whichever is earlier, no coercive action shall be taken against the applicants. However, in case the applicants do not appear before the court below within the aforesaid period, coercive action shall be taken against them.

With the aforesaid directions, this application is disposed off.