LEENA KALRA vs HARYANA URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

-PETITIONER was the complainant before the District Forum, where she had filed a complaint alleging deficiency in service on the part of the respondent.

VERY briefly stated the facts of the case are that the complainant was allotted residential plot No. 309 situated in Sector 45, Gurgaon on 19. 2. 1998 for a tentative price of Rs. 11,97,200. It was her case that after some time she changed her residential address and informed the same to the respondents in the year 2000. Since the basic facilities were not being provided and development work was not being completed, she was not paying the instalments regularly. When she went to enquire about the status of development work, basic amenities in the site in August 2004, she was told that the plot has been resumed in 2002 vide resumption order. Against that order she filed an appeal on 17. 8. 2004 but the same was dismissed vide order dated 10. 3. 2005. Against this order, she made a representation to the Principal Secretary and Financial Commissioner vide letter dated 15. 7. 2005 but no action had been taken. It is in these circumstances a complaint was filed before the District Forum who allowed the complaint and directed the respondent/opposite party to restore the allotment and complete the work around the booth and since development work was not completed, the complainant was not liable to pay interest on the balance amount. The complainant was also held entitled to cost of Rs. 2,100. Aggrieved by this order, the respondent HUDA filed an appeal before the State Commission, who allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed by the District Forum, hene this revision petition before us. After perusal of the material on record and after hearing the learned Counsel for the petitioner, we are left with no doubt that the petitioner had exercised his right of appeal against the order of resumption passed by the Estate Officer and this appeal came to be dismissed.

As held by us in catena of judgments that while Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act provides additional remedy but we cannot sit on judgment after a consumer has adopted certain route of his own free will to get the relief from another competent Forum. In this case, the petitioner at the time of filing the appeal before the Administrator, HUDA had two options, either to approach the Consumer Fora or appeal against the Resumption order. Since she exercised his option to appeal before the Administrator, HUDA, she could not take advantage of Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act. Remedy for the petitioner was to file appeal revision/seek remedy or relief by resorting to seeking relief from a Competent Authority, where the order passed by Administrator, HUDA, could be heard. Having opted for the other route, the petitioner cannot now seek remedy under Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act in view of which, the Consumer Fora could not have entertained this complaint.

WITH a view not to leave the petitioner remediless, she would be free to approach the higher authority whosoever it is to seek relief against the order passed by the Administrator, HUDA by filing second appeal or revision whatever, is allowed under the law. For this purpose, the petitioner would be at liberty to seek a set of time spent before the Consumer Fora under Section 14 of the Limitation Act as per law laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Laxmi Engineering Works v. P. S. G. Industrial Institute, II (1995) CPJ 1 (SC)= (1995) 3 SCC 583. With these observations, this revision petition stands disposed of accordingly. Revision Petition disposed of.