Life Insurance Corporation of India vs Ravinder Singh Chahal

B.N. Kirpal, J.—The short but interesting question which arises for consideration in this civil revision filed u/s 115, Civil Procedure Code, is whether the death of an assured in Delhi would give the courts in Delhi jurisdiction to try a suit against the Life Insurance Corporation for recovery of the sum assured.

Briefly stated, the facts are that the deceased had taken out a life insurance policy for a sum of Rs. 98,000 and had made the plaintiff as her nominee. This policy was issued by the Jullundur Divisional Office of the Life Insurance Corporation.

The assured died in Delhi, on January 19, 1982. The plaintiff, being the nominee and heir of the deceased, applied to the Life Insurance Corporation for payment of money. The money was not paid and the plaintiff filed a suit in the Court of the District Judge, Delhi, for the recovery of Rs. 99,990.

In the plaint it was, inter alia, stated that a part of the cause of action had arisen in Delhi, because it was here that the wife of the plaintiff had died.

In the written statement, an objection had been taken with regard to the territorial jurisdiction of the court to try the suit. According to the petitioner/defendant the court at Delhi had no jurisdiction to try the suit.

The trial court framed the following preliminary issue :

"I. Whether the Delhi courts have territorial jurisdiction to try this suit ? OPP"

The aforesaid issue was tried as a preliminary issue. The Additional District Judge, Delhi, by his order dated May 11, 1984, held that the courts in Delhi had the jurisdiction to try the suit because a part of the cause of action had arisen here. According to the trial court, the death of the assured formed a part of the cause of action and as the death had occurred in Delhi, the suit be filed here. The preliminary issue was accordingly decided in favor of the plaintiff-respondent.

Mr. Arun Mohan, the learned counsel or the petitioner in this revision petition filed against the aforesaid decision, has sought to contend that the death of wife of the plaintiff cannot be regarded as a part of the cause of action. He contends that the death is only a contingency in a point of time upon which the money becomes payable. The learned counsel further contends that section 20, Code of Civil Procedure, has to be so construed as to serve the principles of the statute. It is contended that the framers of the Code postulated that a suit should ordinarily be tried at a place where evidence is really available. According to the learned counsel, the insurance policy had been taken out at Jullundur and the deceased had originally been examined by the doctors there and all the evidence would be readily available at Jullundur and not at New Delhi. It is lastly contended that death is not an essential part of the cause of action. The learned counsel has also, in support of his arguments, relied upon a decision in Jupiter General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Abdul Aziz, AIR 1924 Ran 2.

It is now well-settled that a cause of action means a bundle of essential which it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to succeed. To put it differently, if a suit cannot succeed without proving a particular fact, then that fact becomes an essential fact. It cannot be disputed that, in the case of a life insurance policy having been taken, a claim cannot be made for payment of money before the policy has matured or unless and until the person taking the policy has died. In order, Therefore, to make a claim, it is necessary to allege and prove the death of a person. It is only if the person assured dies, that there can possibly be a liability of the insurance company to pay the money. In the case of a life insurance policy, the money is payable before its maturity on the happening of a contingency and that contingency is the death of the assured. It is only when that event occurs that, prior to the maturity of the policy, that a claim can been made for a payment of the sum assured.

Without alleging and proving the death of person assured, no claim can be made on the Life Insurance Corporation for payment of money on account of the death of the assured. It is not as if the plaintiff will have only to prove the death of a person on a particular day. He will also have to allege and, if required to do so, prove as to how the assured died. It is usually the term of a policy that the money will not be payable if the death of the assured occurs due to his committing suicide. Whenever a claim is, Therefore, made for the payment of money, it has to be alleged and proved by the nominee that the death was not by reason of suicide having been committed. It is, Therefore, not correct to say that the death of a person cannot be regarded as being a part of a cause of action. To my mind, as the right to receive money would arise on the death having taken place prior to the policy having matured, the factum of death is the most important parts of the cause of action. In fact, if in the plaint, death of the assured is not alleged, then the plaint may well be rejected on the ground of non-disclosure of cause of action.

The matter may be looked at from another angle. Limitation for the purposes of filing a suit is calculated from the day the cause of action arises. Under article 44 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, a suit on a policy of insurance, when the sum assured is payable after the proof of death, can be filed within three years of the date of death. the cause of action, according to the Limitation Act, Therefore, commences on the death of the person. As such it is futile, to my mind, to seek to contend that the death of a person cannot be regarded as a part of the cause of action when the claim is made on a policy of life insurance which has been taken.

The learned counsel for the petitioner has strongly relied upon a Division Bench authority of Jupiter General Insurance Co.''s, case AIR 1924 Rang 2. In that case, it was held that the words "cause of action" do not include the loss or damage to property insured. With respect, I am unable to agree with the said decision. The learned judges have noted that it has been repeatedly held, time and again in a number of decisions, that the words "cause of action" mean every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove if traversed in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. The learned judges have also taken note of the fact that in cases where goods are insured and damage to the goods takes place at a place other than where the insurance policy was taken, then a suit may be filed at a place where the damage occurred. The learned judges, however, observed that startling results would follow if section 20 was to be interpreted to enable suits to be filed at places where the property which was insured is lost or damaged. I find it difficult to agree with this proposition. The CPC enables a suit to be filed even at the principal place of business, even though no part of cause of action may have arisen there. So, merely the convenience of the parties for the conduct of the trial is not the only criteria for determining the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Furthermore, the learned judges have treated the contracts of insurance differently from other contracts. I find no basis for this. On the other hand, in Peoples Insurance Co., Ltd. Vs. Benoy Bhusan Bhowmik and Others, and Shivkumar Radhakishindas v. Bombay Life Assurance Co. Ltd. [1934] 4 Comp Case 190 (Sind), it has been held that a suit for insurance money can be instituted in a court within whose territorial jurisdiction the assured has died. The Calcutta High Court dissented from the aforesaid decision of the Rangoon High Court. The judicial Commissioner in Shivkumar Radhakishindas v. Bombay Life Assurance Co. Ltd. [1934] 4 Comp Case 190 (Sind); AIR 1934 Sind 76, also dissented from the Rangoon case. I am in respectful agreement with the decision of the Calcutta High Court it was held that the death of the assured is a material part of the cause of action, and the court at the place where the assured died had jurisdiction to try the suit for the recovery of the insurance money.

For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the opinion that the trial court rightly came to the conclusion that the Delhi courts have territorial jurisdiction to try the suit because Smt. Ravinder Chahal, the wife of the plaintiff, who had taken out a life insurance policy had died at Delhi.

The petition is accordingly dismissed with costs. Counsel''s fee Rs. 500.