Lila Dhar vs State of Haryana

J.S. Sekhon, J.

Criminal Misc. Nos. 3190M, 3799M, 3251M and 9241M all of 1989, shall be disposed of through a common order as there arise out of the same first information report sought to be quashed by all these petitioners under the provisions of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, inter alia, on the ground of 8/9 years delay in lodging the first information report for the commission of the alleged offices by these petitioners.

The impugned first information report Annexure P1 in Criminal Misc No. 3190M of 1989, lodged by Sh. Satya Pal, Advocate, Fetehabad reads as under :

"I am an Advocate at Fatehabad and also a social worker. In the year 198081, the Haryana Government had advertised the posts of D F. S.Cs through the Haryana Public Service Commission. The essential qualifications of which are as follows :

Graduate 2. Efficiency in Hindi 3. Having an experience as Manager or Executive Officer of any firm for at least three years. Maximum age limit was also prescribed.

For these above mentioned posts Achint Ram Godara S/o Sh. Badri Parsad r/o Neemri P.S. Ratia Distt. Hissar; Lila Dhar son of Shri Ram Parshad, District Hissar and Dharam Paul Jangra r/o District Hissar and many others had applied. Achint Ram Godara, Lila Dhar and Dharam Pal conspired to be selected for the above mentioned posts with the Chairman and other members of the Haryana Public Service Commission and other influential persons in the Haryana Government. Achint Ram Godara got date of Births changed from 13.6.1950 to 27.11.1951 in the Register of birth of 195051 whcih is kept in the C.M.O. Officer, Hissar. Achint Ram Godara was a Law student of D A V. College, Dehradun from July 1973 to June 1976. He was an Advocate at Fatehabad from 1976 to 1980. In spite of this he got a bogus experience certificate as a Manager in connivance with the management of the firm M/s. Hissar Steel Project from 15.7.1975 to 15.8.1980. In the same way Lila Dhar who is a law student in Jaipur University (Raj) got a bogus certificate from M/s. Mutual Steel Ball and Co. India, Jaipur from 1.6.1977 to 31.8.1980 as a Purchase Executive Officer. In the same manner Dharam Paul Jangra who was a law student in K.U. from 1974 to 1977, also got a bogus experience certificate form M/s. Durga Rice Mills, Pipli Road, Kurukshetra as a Manager from May 1974 to April 1977. These above three persons knowingly cheated the Haryana Government by getting themselves appointed as the D.F.S.Cs by producing the bogus experience certificates and by forging date of birth with the active conspiracy of Members and Chairman of the Commission and other high ups and Haryana Government. In this illegal way these person deprived the Haryana Government of lakhs of rupees. So far as I know the Vigilance Department of Haryana conducted an enquiry, but the same was got suppressed by some persons. Had these persons not got appointed on the basis of bogus certificates, three deserving candidates would have been selected on these posts.

It is, therefore, requested that in the public interest legal and suitable action be taken".

During the investigation of the abovereferred case, the police had collected some evidence which is reflected in the return filed by Shri Baldev Raj Kausha, D.S.P. Headquarters, Hissar, in these petitions, except Cr. Misc. No. 3799M of 1989. It is stated in the return that the allegations of the petitioners about the launching of their prosecution after eight years of the incident are false and baseless as their selection by the Commission as D.F.S.Cs has been subjectmatter of challenge in C.W.P. Nos. 3110 and 3188 of 1982, filed by Sh. Partap Singh. It is further stated that the selection of the petitioners to the said post is a shady deal as then the Chairman of the Commission, namely, Shri Balbir Singh Lather and its member Shri Daulat Ram Chaudhary had recorded a dissenting note in this regard and had not taken part in the selection of the petitioners. It is further averred that the conspiracy to fabricate experience certificates and change the date of birth of Achint Ram Godara petitioner in the birth certificate was hatched at the residence of Lila Dhar petitioner at Hissar in the month of August, 1980 and the record of Civil Hospital, Hissar having been got fabricated at Hissar, as stated by the witnesses, the Courts at Hissar as well as the police of Police Station, Hisar, had the jurisdiction to try the investigate the matter. It is further stated that Shri Manohar Lal Superintendent of Police Vigilance, Karnal had enquired into this very matter at the instance of the State Government and submitted report Annexure R.2 much prior to the registration of the present case against the petitioner and thus it cannot be said that the case was registered after a lapse of eight years of the incident. It is further stated that this controversy came under the consideration of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 294/1982 SLP filed by Shri Mohinder Singh which was decided on 7.4.1989, leaving it open to the State Government to investigate into the criminal liability of the present petitioners. On the merits of the case, it was contended that Shri Achint Ram Godara petitioner had fabricated his birth entry and the experienced certificate as he could not attend the regular classes of law in D.A.V. College, Dehradun during the same period when he was allegedly in the service of M/s Hissar Steel Project, Hissar. In the case of Dharam Pal Jangra, it was stated that he could not at the same time work as Manager with M/s Durga Rice and General Mills, Pipli Road Kurkushetra as well as join Law Classes in the Kurukshetra University as a regular student. It is also stated that the certificate issued to Dharam Pal Jangar for his having worked as Field Supervisor from 16.9.1978 to December 1997 in the Narwana Primary Cooperative Land Development Bank Ltd. is not covered by the definition of Executive Officer or as Manager.

In the case of Lila Dhar petitioner, it is stated in Annexure R1 to the return that he remained Law Student in the Jaipur University as a regular student and got bogus experience certificate form M/s Mutual Steel Ball and Company India, Jaipur from 1.6.1977 to 31.8.1980 as Purchase Executive Officer. The respondents also imbibed the report of Vigilance Bureau as Part of the return. It is further stated that Surinder Kumar, Proprietor of M/s Durga Rice and General Mills, Pipli Road, Kurukshetra had not been able to produce any Salary Register. Attendance Register or any accounts such as the returns submitted to the Income Tax, Sales Tax Departments or the records submitted to the E.S.I. Scheme authorities about Dharam Pal Jangra petitioner having worked as such. On the other hand, Surinder Kumar petitioner admitted that he had been forced to issue the said certificate by the officials of the Civil Supplies Department.

I have heard the learned counsel for the parties besides perusing the record.

On the point of jurisdiction of th police of Police Station, Hissar, to investigate into the matter, it transpires that although the experience certificates of the above referred petitioners had not been forged in the area of district Hissar, yet all the same, the prosecution having recorded the evidence of Shri Kapur Singh s\\Sarpanch and Shri Om Parkash General Manager of Hissar Steel Fabrications Pvt. Ltd, Hissar that the conspiracy to fabricate these documents took place at Hissar at the house of Lila Dhar, there is no force in this contention as according to the provisions of Sections 178 and 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court where part of the offence forming part of the same transaction took place, would have jurisdiction to try such offences and Section 156 of Code empowers a police officer to investigate any cognizable case which a court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such police station have the powers to inquire into or trying such offence,

The most material controversy in this case involves the determination whether the registration of the case after a lapse of eight years of the commission of the alleged offences would peruse violate the mandate of inalienable fundamental right of the citizen enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution to a speedy public trial, or whether the right to speedy public trial would only be applicable to the proceedings before the Court or also to police investigation preceding such trial. Secondly whether the delay of eight years in the registration and investigation of the abovereferred case against the petitioners has present resulted in prejudicing them in their setting up a proper defence.

The Full Bench judgment of the Patna High Court in Madheshwardhari Singh and another v. State of Bihar, 1990(3) Recent Criminal Reports 302 : AIR 1986 Patna 324 (in para 15 of the judgment) had rejected the stand of the respondent State in the pleadings that the High Court must in a way read down the right of speedy and public trial in India because of the fact that our Society as yet is not as developed or so affluent as the AngloAmerican one after elaborate discussion and relying upon the historical judgments of the apex Court in Hussainara Khatoon v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1390; The State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punaji Shah, AIR 1981 SC 1675; and

T.V. Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1983(1) Recent Criminal Report 242 : AIR 1983 SC 361. 9. In para 25 of the same judgment, the Full Bench further observed as under :

"Coming now to question No. (2), the core issue is as to what does a speedy public trial in a criminal prosecution truly connote? Does it include within it the preceding Police investigations in the case also or is it confined only to the period of time when the portals of the court are entered in a regular trial? On principle I am clearly of the opinion that in the majestic sweep of the fundamental right of a speedy public trial in the context of a criminal prosecution, initiated at the State''s instance, it necessarily connotes all the period from the date of the levelling of the criminal charge to the date of the rendering of the judgment in Court. Unless it is so held, the cherished fundamental right herein would be whittled down to a teasing mirage, where the investigation of the offences itself may protract on for years (as is well manifested in the present case), and, thus rendering the very concept and purpose of a speedy trial purely illusory. Therefore, a speedy trial in a criminal prosecution herein includes within it both the police investigation of the crime and the later adjudication in Court based thereon."

Again, in para 50 of the judgment, while sounding a sharp note of caution prescribing the maximum limit regarding delay in investigation and trial of criminal cases in the context of denying the right of speedy trial, it was observed as under :

"A sharp note of caution must be sounded. The aforesaid finding must not be misunderstood or misconstrued to mean that a delay of less than seven years would not in any case amount to prejudice. Indeed, what is sought to be laid down is the extreme outer limit whereafter grave prejudice to the accused must be presumed and the infraction of the constitutional right would be plainly established. Really, I am somewhat hesitant in spelling out even the aforesaid outer time limit which, perhaps, errs on the side of strictitude. But since we are following binding precedent, the same has to be unreservedly accepted. Nor is it sought to be laid down that in a lesser period than seven years an accused person would not be able to establish circumstances pointing to the patent prejudice which may entitle him to invoke the guarantee of speedy public trial under Article 21. That is a question which can be properly considered and adjudicated where it may expressly arise. In both the cases before us the delay is admittedly even far beyond the outer limit of seven years. What indeed is sought to be laid down here is that beyond this period of seven years the continuation of the investigation and trial would being in the weightiest presumption that the enshrined right of speedy public trial is violated and the prosecution should be halted in its tracks. This would per se be indicative of prejudice. Thereafter the burden would automatically shift heavily on to the shoulders of the State to show that such grave delay was either entirely the handiwork of the caused himself or was occasioned by such special and exceptional circumstances so as to merit condonation thereof. A criminal prosecution by the State cannot be allowed to become an inquisitorial persecution of the accused. Nor can a fair speedy trial be allowed to become an unending travail for him."

A bare glance through the above referred observations of the Full Bench of the Patan High Court leaves no doubt that delay of more than 7 years in the disposal of the case without any cogent reason would itself amount to prejudice to the accused to set up a proper defence and negation of the fundamental right to speedy trial enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution.

Thus, by necessary implication, there is no doubt that the delay in the registration of the criminal case against the accused persons of initiation of criminal prosecution for a number of years would also result in prejudice to the accused in setting up a proper defend and defeating inalienable fundamental right to speedy trial, especially when in the case in hand the authorities were well vigilant of the commission of the above referred offences because the selection of Lila Dhar, Dharam Pal Jangra and Achint Ram Godara as District Food and Supplies Controllers by the Haryana Public Service Commission was challenged in the year 1982 by Shri Partap Singh through C.W.P. Nos. 3010 and 3188 of 1982, which are still pending in this Court. Thus, it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that the commission of the above referred offences came to light or in the knowledge of the respondents only in the year 1987 when the vigilance enquiry culminating in the report Annexure R1, was submitted in the case.

It is noteworthy that Mohinder Singh challenged the selection of these petitioners as District Food and Supplies Controllers in C.W.P. No. 891 of 1988 on the ground that the was saving as Inspector in the Food and Supplies Department of Haryana and was eligible to be considered along with others for the post of District Food and Supplies Controller by the Commission as he fulfilled the requisite experience by working as Executive Officer. That writ petition was dismissed by the Single each of this Court and the L.P.A. filed by Mohinder Singh also met with the same fate. The apex Court however in Civil Appeal No. 294.1988 after refusing to implead Sarvshri Achint Ram Godara, Dharam Pal Jangra and Lila Dhar present petitioners as respondents, directed the State Government to reconsider the eligibility of Mohinder Singh for appointment to the said by holding that this work as Inspector Civil supplies would amount to requisite experience a Executive Officer. The apex Court in the judgment annexed as Annexure R1 while holding that Mohinder Singh is entitled to be considered for selection, did not fell the necessity of setting aside the selection of the selected candidates at that stage as they have been in service for more than 8 years and one of these officers described as Respondent No. 2 has even been holding promotional post for some time. However, the apex Court refrained from expressing any opinion about the enquiry undertaken by the State Government against some of the selected candidates on the allegations that forged/false certificates had been produced by them in support of their qualification/eligibility by remarking as under :

"It has been brought to our notice that an inquiry was undertaken by the Government against some of the selected candidates on the allegation that forged/false certificates had been produced by them in support of qualification/eligibility and in the inquiry, a prima facie case had been made out. We express no opinion about it as it shall be for the State Government to deal with the question and the appellant''s appeal has nothing to do with that"

A bare glance of the above referred observations of the Supreme Court leaves no doubt that the justification of the pendency of criminal proceedings for a period of eight years was not pertinently under the consideration of the apex Court. Consequently, these observations would have no bearing on the fate of this petition.

As already discussed, the registration of the case after lapse of many years and the protracted investigation had certainly resulted in prejudice to the accused to set up their effective defence as due to the loss of time the entry in the books of the concerned firm which had issued experience certificates to the petitioners would not be available. Similarly, due to passage of time Sh. Achint Ram Godara, accusedpetitioner, shall be at disadvantage to establish the circumstances as to how the entry in the birth register has been tampered with especially when according to the report. Annexure R.1 of the Vigilance Bureau, tampering with has been inferred due to the cutting of a page marks on this register.

For the foregoing reasons, there is no option but to quash the impugned FIR and proceedings resulting therefrom against the petitioners by accepting all these petitions. It is ordered accordingly.

JUDGMENT accordingly