Lok Ram and Another vs The State

J.S. Bedi, J.—The facts giving rise to this revision are as under:

A.S.I. Hari Chand of Police Station Tauru received information that one truck followed by a car was carrying illicit goods for smuggling and that the truck would avoid the Tauru barrier and would take some other way near village Jhambuwas and Dhadra. A nakabandi party was accordingly arranged by him near village Kalapuri on the night intervening 25th and 26th January, 1964, but no such truck passed by that side. On the next morning at about 8 a.m. the party thus formed went to village Jhambuwas and found truck No. RSL-582 stuck in the mud there. Kishan Lal, Joginder Singh, Lal Singh and Chaman Lal were also found near the track which was lying empty. The police party, however, found some sugar lying scattered here on the ground. After interrogating the above-mentioned persons the police party went to Pataudi where S.I. Ramji Lal also joined them. The party thus formed Ramphal petitioner at the bus stand at Pataudi. He was taken into custody and was interrogated who made a disclosure statement which led to the recovery of 143 bags of Khandsari from the brick-kiln of Lok Ram petitioner. Each of the bags contained 1 1/4 maunds of Khandsari. These were taken into possession S.I. Ramji Lal then sent a ruqa P.D. to the police station on the basis of which Lok Ram, Ramphal, Krishan Lal, Joginder Singh, Lal Chand and Chaman Lal were challened and sent up for trial u/s 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. The Magistrate found the case proved against Ramphal and Lok Ram, convicted them accordingly and sentenced each of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four months. The rest of the accused were acquitted. The petitioners went up in appeal against this order (dated 13th July, 1964) of the Magistrate which was dismissed by Shri F.S. Gill, Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak at Gurgaon, on 11th September, 1964. It is against this order of the Sessions Judge that the petitioners have come up in appeal.

The learned counsel for the petitioners first submitted that Major portion of the statement which Ramphal is alleged to have made u/s 27 of the Evidence Act is inadmissible and only that portion of the statement, which led directly to the recovery of the incriminating article, can be said to be admissible. It is true that there levant statement is very exhaustive and most part of it is inadmissible. Only that portion of the statement which led to the recovery of 143 bags of Khandsari from the brick-kiln of Lok Ram, is admissible. The counsel then invited my attention to clause 3(3) of Punjab Khandsari land Gur Dealers Licensing Order 1963 which came into force on 18th July, 1963. according to which ''any person who stores Khandsari or Gur or both in any quantity exceeding 50 quintal at any one time shall, unless the contrary is proved, be deemed to store Khandsari or Gur or both, as the case may be, for the purpose of sale." The counsel contended that the petitioners did not possess any licence of dealers, and even if we corns to the conclusion that the recovery of Khandsari had been effected from them, they could not be convicted u/s 7 of the Act unless there was some other evidence to show that the petitioners had earlier been dealing with such articles. In this connection the counsel drew my attention to Manipur Administration Vs. M. Nila Chandra Singh, . Their Lordships in that case were dealing with Manipur Food-grains Dealers Licensing Order, 1958, Clause 3(2). The wordings of that clause and the one before me are similar except this that in that order the quantity mentioned was 100 maun is and in the one before me it is 50 quintals. While elucidating the provisions of that clause, the Supreme Court observed that "the statutory presumption raised by clause 3(2) is a rebuttable presumption and only amounts to this and nothing more that the stock found with a given individual of 100 or more Mounds of the specified food grains had been stored by him for the purpose of sale, Having reached this conclusion on the strength of presumption, the prosecution would still have to show that the store of the food-grains for the purpose of sale thus presumed was made by him for the purpose of carrying on the business of store of the said food-grains. The element of business which is essential to attract the provisions of clause 3(1) is thus not covered by the presumption raised under clause 3(2). That part of the case would still have to be proved by the prosecution by other independent evidence." The counsel, therefore, maintained that there were was not an iota of evidence on the record on the basis of which we could say that the petitioners were ever in possession of similar incriminating article before nor was there any evidence to show that they had ever dealt with or bad been dealing with similar stuff, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that by virtue of this clause-clause 3(3)-there is statutory presumption against the person from whom the incriminating food-grains were recovered unless he proves to the contrary. This point was lucidly discussed by the Supreme Court in the case mentioned above and I cannot add anything more.

Some other points were also raised by the petitioners'' counsel, but in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court mentioned above, it is needless to go into them.

The petition is, therefore, accepted and the petitioners acquitted.