LUDHIANA IMPROVEMENT TRUST vs S Harmanjit Singh

THIS appeal has been filed by the appellant against the order dated 30.07.2013 passed by the learned State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Punjab (in short, ''the State Commission'') in Execution Petition No. 16/2012 in CC No.3/2009 S. Harmanjit Singh and Anr. Vs. State of Punjab and Anr. by which, while allowing Execution Application, Ludhiana Improvement Trust was directed to charge Rs.3973/ - per sq. yd. from the complainant and to issue fresh allotment letter.

BRIEF facts of the case are that complainant/Respondent No.1 filed complaint before State Commission against OP No. 1/Respondent No. 2 and OP No. 2 and 3/appellants and learned State Commission vide order dated 2.8.2012 allowed complaint and directed OPs to allot 500 sq. yd. plot and was further awarded compensation of Rs.1,00,000/ - and Rs.20,000/ - as cost of litigation. As plot was not allotted, complainant filed execution application before State Commission and learned State Commission vide impugned order allowed execution application and directed OPs to charge Rs.3973/ - per sq. yd. for the plot and further directed to issue fresh allotment letter against which this appeal has been filed along with application for condonation of delay.

HEARD learned Counsel for the appellant on application for condonation of delay. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that delay of 384 days occurred in filing appeal in getting opinion of Advocate and approval from Head Office (HO), hence, delay may be condoned.

AS per application, appellant prayed for condonation of delay of 384, whereas as per office report there is delay of 377 days.

APPELLANT in the application submitted that certified copy of impugned order dated 30.7.2013 was issued by learned State Commission on 31.12.2013 and was received by appellant on 15.1.2014. Thereafter, opinion was sought from Advocate on 20.2.2014 and opinion was received from Advocate on 19.3.2014. It was further submitted that case was sent to HO, Chandigarh for grant of approval on 15.5.2014 and HO asked some more details on 16.7.2014 which were sent to HO on 10.9.2014. It was further submitted that again some more information was asked by HO on 5.11.2014 which was sent on 17.12.2014. It was further submitted that approval for filing appeal was granted by HO on 28.1.2015 and thereafter, appellant approached Advocate who prepared appeal and filed on 26.2.2015.

PERUSAL of application reveals that after receiving copy of order on 15.1.2014, it was sent to the Advocate for opinion on 20.2.2014, meaning thereby, after more than a month. After receiving opinion from the Advocate on 19.3.2014, case was sent to HO on 15.5.2014 for approval, i.e., after almost two months. It further reveals that HO asked for some more details on 16.7.2014,i.e. again after two months and details were sent on 10.9.2014, i.e., after almost two months. It further reveals that some more information was asked after almost two months on 5.11.2014 and that was sent on 17.12.2014, i.e., after almost 40 days. It further reveals that HO granted approval for filing appeal after 11/2 month on 28.1.2015 and then appeal was filed on 26.2.2015.

NO reasonable explanation has been given by appellant for causing delay of 1 -2 months at every stage. As there is inordinate delay of 377 days, this delay cannot be condoned in the light of the following judgments passed by the Hon''ble Apex Court.

IN R.B. Ramlingam Vs. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, 2009 2 Scale 108, it has been observed: "We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition."

IN Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., 1962 AIR(SC) 361, it has been observed; "It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant."

HON ''ble Supreme Court after exhaustively considering the case law on the aspect of condonation of delay observed in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. Vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation, 2010 5 SCC 459 as under; "We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time."

HON ''ble Apex Court in Post Master General and Ors. Vs. Living Media India Ltd. and Anr., 2012 3 SCC 563 has not condoned delay in filing appeal even by Government department and further observed that condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the Government departments.

HON ''ble Apex Court in Anshul Aggarwal Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority,2012 2 CPC 3 observed as under: "It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for filing appeals and revisions in Consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the Consumer disputes will get defeated, if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras".

Thus, it becomes clear that there is no reasonable explanation at all for condonation of inordinate delay of 377 days. In such circumstances, application for condonation of delay is dismissed. As application for condonation of delay has been dismissed, revision petition being barred by limitation is also liable to be dismissed.

CONSEQUENTLY , the revision petition filed by the petitioner is dismissed as barred by limitation at admission stage with no order as to costs.