M. Angappan and Another vs The Deputy Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments and Another

S. Ramachandra Ayyar, C.J.—This appeal is against the judgment of Srinivasan J., and it involves the construction of Section 101 of the

Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959. For the Sri Mariamman and Sri Angalamman Temples at Andipatti Village, Salem Taluk,

the Area Committee appointed the second Respondent to this appeal and four others as non-hereditary trustees. The five trustees appear to have

met on 17th January 1961, and elected the second Respondent as the Chairman of the Board of Trustees. The second Respondent applied then

before the Deputy Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, for a certificate u/s 101 of the Act to enable him to take

possession of the properties from the Appellants who claim to be the hereditary trustees of the institution.

We are not here concerned with the question whether they are the hereditary trustees or not. The only point taken in this appeal is whether it

would be competent for the second Respondent alone to apply to the Deputy Commissioner u/s 101 of the Act for a certificate, or whether it

would be necessary that the entire body of trustees should so apply. Srinivasan J., has held that the second Respondent could sustain the

application by himself. The same view appears to have been taken by Jagadisan J., in Writ Petition No. 272 of 1959. In a later case, however,

Srinivasan J., after discussing the matter more fully, came to the conclusion that an application for the issue of a certificate by one only of the

trustees, where there are more than one, even if he happens to be the Managing Trustee, would be incompetent. This view, in our opinion, accords

with the provisions of the section itself. Section 101 provides that where a person has been appointed as a trustee and he is resisted in obtaining

possession of the religious institution or its properties or its records by any one of the persons referred to in that section, he would be entitled to

obtain an order from a Magistrate having jurisdiction over the area for being put in possession of the properties. To entitle him to do so he will have

to produce a certificate by the Commissioner in the prescribed form setting forth that the properties in question belong to the religious institution.

The proviso to that section says that before issuing any such certificate the Commissioner shall give notice to the person complained against of his

intention to issue the certificate. The application for certificate is therefore, itself a statutory proceeding. A careful reading of the section shows that

the only person entitled to obtain the certificate would be the person who has been appointed as a trustee or executive officer as the case may be.

It is a well-known rule of interpretation that where a statute employs a singular it will include the plural unless it is otherwise indicated. When,

therefore, a single trustee is appointed he would undoubtedly have the right to apply for the certificate and then armed with the certificate apply

again to the appropriate Magistrate for being put in possession of the property. But, whereas in the present case more than one trustee has been

appointed, all of them should apply together. This is the plain reading of the statute. This view is in accord with the principle as well.

It is well settled that in the case of co-trustees the office is a joint one, all of them forming, as it were, one collective body. They should,

therefore, execute the duties of their office in their joint capacity. It will undoubtedly be open to them in matters of a routine nature to divide their

duties. But, so far as their application to Courts and to public authorities or enforcement of statutory right or privileges are concerned, they should

all figure as a party or apply for the same. This principle has been recognized by this Court in Ramalingam alias Karuppanna Koundar Vs. Peria

Kali Goundan and Others, . In that case a scheme provided that the managing trustee could represent the Devasthanam in all suits and

proceedings. Notwithstanding that provision it was held that all the trustees should figure as parties in suits and proceedings, the principle being that

it is only the entire body of trustees that can represent the institution.

The question was more elaborately considered in Commissioner, H.R. and C.E. v. Sethurama ILR (1960) Mad. 211, 218 to which one of us was

a party. It was observed.

It is well settled that where there are more trustees or managers than one all would be entitled to act jointly; they would be in the position of joint

trustees and form a corporate body...A scheme providing for the management (of a private temple) by turns amongst the members of a family

would be only an arrangement inter se, but outside the family the Co-trustees would form a corporate entity. The representation of an institution

could be valid or effective only if all the trustees jointly act; a fortiori the institution or the body of trustees can be bound (by an order of the Board

under the Act) only if, they are all impleaded (to the proceedings before the Board).

It is, however, suggested by the learned Additional Government Pleader that whatever may be the position in regard to representing religious

institution generally an application u/s 101 of the Act, must be held to be competent even if any one among several trustees were alone to make the

application. Support for the argument is sought from the terms of the section which says where a person has been appointed as trustee which is

sought to be interpreted to mean any one person appointed as a trustee. There is no warrant for that view. A trustee means all the trustees where

there are more than one appointed. We have earlier referred to the fact that in the case of appointment of joint trustees the singular word a person

will include all the trustees.

The learned Additional Government Pleader has placed considerable reliance upon the following passage in Mukherjea''s The Hindu Law of

Religious and Charitable Trust, 1952 edition, page 253.

It is not uncommon to hear one of several trustees spoken of as the acting trustee but the court knows no such distinction; all who accept the office

are in the eyes of the law acting trustees. If any one refuse or be incapable to join, it is not competent for the others to proceed without him, but the

administration of the trust must in that case devolve upon the court. However, the act of one trustee done with the sanction and approval of a co-

trustee may be regarded as the act of both. But such sanction or approval must be strictly proved.

Relying on the above statement of the law it has been argued that inasmuch as the Chairman of the Board of Trustees in the instant case has

been authorized to institute proceedings u/s 101 of the Act the filing of the petition by him must be regarded as having been made by all.

We are, however, unable to accept that argument. The particular passage referred refers to the validation of acts done by one of the trustees

with the sanction of others they must be of a routine kind. That has no application to the case of representation in suits, particularly so in a matter of

fulfilling the terms of a statute which contemplates the application by the entire body of trustees. In Kullaudayar Poosari v. Arunachala Pandaram

(1964) 77 L.W. 109 Srinivasan J., observed that in order to obtain an effective determination of the question u/s 101 it would be necessary that

the institution should be represented in the proper legal form, and, that could be achieved when the entire body of trustees were brought on record.

In the judgment now under appeal the learned Judge has no doubt made a distinction between a case of an application for a certificate and the

proceedings following the issue of a certificate, viz., those instituted before the Magistrate. On the terms of the statute it is not possible to sustain

any such distinction. In respect of both of them Section 101 enables the trustees appointed to apply. We have earlier said that the word trustee will

mean trustees where more than one have been appointed. It would, therefore, follow that for both the purpose of applying and obtaining a

certificate from the Commissioner as well as for instituting the proceedings u/s 101 of the Act, in pursuance of such certificate before a Magistrate,

all the trustees appointed should join together. The certificate now granted, being in favour of one among five trustees, cannot be accepted as a

valid one. The appeal will have, therefore, to be allowed. There will be no order as to costs.