M. Garudasekhara Reddy vs T. Nagi Reddy

P.S. Narayana, J.—This Revision is filed against an order dated 8.10.1998 passed in S.C.No.86 of 1997 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Gooty.

The facts in brief are as follows:

The revision petitioner-plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of an amount of Rs.8,160/- against the respondent-defendant on the strength of a promissory note. It is the case of the revision petitioner that the respondent borrowed a sum of Rs.6,000/- on 24.9.1994 agreeing to repay the same with an interest of 12% per annum and executed the suit promissory note and in spite of repeated demands, since no payment was made, the suit was filed. The defendant filed the written statement denying the execution of the suit promissory note and taking a stand that there are factions in the village and on the apprehension that the respondent-defendant may leave a particular faction, signatures were obtained on blank papers forcibly and it was also further specifically pleaded that the respondent-defendant and his father went to the Circle Inspector of Police, Gooty by name Karunanidhi and informed him about what had happened to them earlier and the Circle Inspector of Police called the revision petitioner-plaintiff and enquired into the matter also. The revision petitioner had given a notice and a reply was given to the notice issued by the revision petitioner.

The points which had been framed are as follows:

(a) Whether the plaintiff used force, threat and obtained the suit pronote from the defendant and if so, the suit pronote is supported by cash consideration?

(b) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the suit amount as prayed for ?

(c) To what relief ?

On behalf of the revision petitioner he had examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs. A1 to A3 were marked and apart from this evidence, P.W.2, one of the attestors of the suit pronote Ex.A1 was also examined. On behalf of the respondent-defendant, the defendant had examined himself as D.W.1 and Ex.B1 was marked and the respondent-defendant had also examined D.Ws 2 and 3, the scribe and another attestor of the suit promissory note. On appreciation of the evidence of P.Ws1 and 2 and D.Ws 1 to 3 and Exs. A1 to A3 and B1, the Court below came to the conclusion that the suit promissory note is not supported by cash consideration and hence the revision petitioner is not entitled for the relief of recovery of any amount and accordingly dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the same, the present Revision is filed.

Sri Lakshmi Narayana Reddy, learned counsel representing Mr. Soma Konda Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner had strenuously contended that the approach of the Court below is totally erroneous and merely because two witnesses were examined apart from D.W.1, such evidence cannot be given a greater weight without considering the evidence of P.W.2. The learned counsel also had contended that the principle underlying Section 118 of the Negotiable instruments Act, 1882 (for short ''the Act'') was not properly appreciated by the Court below. The learned counsel also strenuously contended that though the first point which was framed for consideration by the Court below is whether the plaintiff used force, threat and obtained the suit pronote from the defendant, if so, the suit pronote is supported by cash consideration, there is absolutely no evidence placed by the respondent-defendant so as to substantiate his stand. In the absence of any evidence in this regard and in the light of the presumption in favour of the revision petitioner-plaintiff u/s 118 of the Act, the Court below should have decreed the suit instead of dismissing the same.

Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, 1887 dealing with revision of decrees and orders of Courts of Small Causes cases reads as follows:

"The High Court for the purpose of satisfying itself with a decree or order made in any case decided by a Court of Small Causes was according to law, may call for that case and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit"

The powers of the High Court u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, 1887 are, no doubt, definitely wider when compared to Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But, at the same time, they cannot be equated with the appellate powers. Now, it has to be considered weather the Court below had gone wrong in dismissing the suit of the revision petitioner.

It is no doubt true that as far as point No.1 is concerned, the specific stand taken by the respondent-defendant is that on threat, signatures were obtained on blank papers and the matter was reported to the Circle Inspector of Police. But, however, there is no evidence placed on this aspect. The evidence of D.Ws 2 and 3, no doubt, is available to support the case of the respondent-defendant relating to the circumstances under which Ex.A1 came into consideration. But, however, the evidence of these witnesses is not clear on several aspects. May be that D.Ws 2 and 3 are interested in supporting the case of the respondent-defendant. Section 118 of the Act dealing with the special rules of evidence and the presumptions as to the negotiable instruments on consideration, in fact, specifies that unless the contrary is proved, the following presumption shall be made:

(a) Of consideration: That every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration."

In the law Negotiable Instruments and Dishonour of Cheques by me, 2nd edition, at page 193, while dealing with the presumption of consideration, relying upon Manyam Janakalakshmi Vs. Manyam Madhava Rao and Others, , the opinion was expressed as follows:

"The presumption is that there was consideration and not that there was any particular consideration that which might be recited in the instrument or that which might be alleged in the plaint. The presumption arises as soon as the execution of the instrument is closed and the presumption continues until the contrary is proved i.e. until it is proved that there was no consideration."

In the light of the presumption available in favour of the revision petitioner-plaintiff, the facts of the case have to be examined. The evidence of P.Ws 1 and 2 on the aspect of execution of Ex.A1 promissory note is clear and categorical. No doubt, the evidence of D.Ws 2 and 3 also is available on record. But, while appreciating the facts of a particular case, the other circumstances and the defence taken by the respondent-defendant also may have to be taken into consideration. It is the specific stand taken by the respondent-defendant that the signatures were obtained by force and the respondent-defendant and his father approached the Circle Inspector of Police in this regard. But, however, absolutely there is no evidence to establish these circumstances which are definitely material while arriving at a conclusion whether the defence set up by the respondent-defendant is true or not. Evidently, the Court below, while appreciating the evidence, had felt that inasmuch as two witnesses relating to Ex.A1 transaction i.e. D.Ws 2 and 3 had been examined on behalf of the respondent-defendant, better weight has to be given to the case of the respondent-defendant. I do not think that this approach of the Court below is legally sustainable, especially, in the light of the presumption available in favour of the revision petitioner-plaintiff. Apart from it, I am not inclined to agree with the finding of the Court below that this transaction came into existence only in pursuance of some factions in the village. It is also pertinent to note that the amount involved is only Rs.6,000/- and I do not think that for the sake of retaining a person in a particular faction, such documents will be taken. Especially, in the absence of evidence relating to the threats of force, I am not inclined to uphold the case of the respondent-defendant and hence, the erroneous approach of the Court below definitely falls within the revisional jurisdiction of Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, 1887 and thus I am inclined to allow this revision.

For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order dated 8.10.1998 passed in S.C.No.86 of 1997 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Gooty is set aside and the Civil Revision Petition is allowed decreeing the suit in S.C.No. 86 of 1998, but, in the circumstances of the case, without costs.