M. Krishnakumar vs Tamil Selvi

Pratap Singh, J.—Accused 1, 2 and 7 to 10 in C.C. 7253/87 on the file of X Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras, have filed this petition u/s 482 Criminal Procedure Code, praying to call for the records in the aforesaid case and quash the same.

The respondent has filed private complaint against 14 accused, out of whom petitioners 1 to 6 are accused 1, 2 and 7 to 10, for offences u/s 494 I.P.C. and 494 read with 109 I.P.C. The allegations in it are briefly as follows:

The complainant is the wife of first accused and the marriage was solemnised on 1.7.83 and all the other accused who are close relatives and friends participated in the marriage ceremony. The complainant and first accused lived at Krishnapan Tank Street, Madras-79 along with mother-in-law and accused 7 to 10. Till November, 1983, they lived together. The first accused ill treated her and tortured her, demanding scooter and gold chain. Accused 7 to 10 joined the first accused in torturing her. Ultimately, in November, 1983, they drove her out of the matrimonial Home. She took shelter in her parents house and is now permanently residing at Anna Nagar, Madras-40 with her parents. Accused 1, 11 and 12 made arrangements for the second marriage with the second accused through accused 6 to 10. They know very well that marriage between the complainant and first accused is subsisting. Accused 2 to 5, 13 and 14 actively participated and connived in the solemnisation of the second marriage on 17.4.87 between 6 to 7.30 A.M. at Thirupathy Choultry. Accused 11, 12 and 6 to 10 actively made arrangements for the second marriage of the first accused with the second accused. They abetted the offence. Accused 13 and 14 also took active part in the performance of the second marriage. All the accused had taken active part in the performance of the second marriage of the first accused with the second accused knowing fully well that the marriage of the complainant with the first accused is subsisting. Hence first accused is liable to be punished u/s 494, I.P.C. and accused 2 to 14 are liable to be punished u/s 494 I.P.C. and 494 read with 100, I.P.C.

Mr. Rubert J. Barnabas, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, would contend that it is said that second marriage was solemnised at Thirupathy and hence the offence was committed only at Thirupathy and u/s 177, Criminal Procedure Code, only the Judicial Magistrate at Thirupathy has got jurisdiction to try the case and the Metropolitan Magistrate, Madras has got no jurisdiction to try the case. He would further contend that allegations in the complaint do not make out offences against the petitioners.

As per the complaint, the second marriage was solemnised at Thirupathy on 17.4.87. Mr. Rubert J. Barnabas would rely upon Section 177 of the Code, as per which every offence shall be ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. He also relied upon the ruling reported in Vasantha Krishnaswami Vs. M.S. Krishnaswami, . In that case, Justice Ramakrishnan has stated as follows:

But for a criminal offence u/s 17 read with Section 494 or S.494 I.P.C. there is no such provision enlarging the jurisdiction. Therefore the ordinary rule about jurisdiction prescribed in S.177 Crl.P.C. has to apply, and the venue of trials in the court having jurisdiction over the place of the second marriage.

This ruling was rendered when the old Criminal Procedure Code was in force. As on that day, only the court where the second marriage was solemnised had jurisdiction to try the offence. After the advent of new Criminal Procedure Code, the position is totally changed by the induction of Section 182 in the Code. Section 182(2) of the new Code reads as follows:

Offences committed by letters, etc.

(1)....

(2) Any offence punishable u/s 494 or section 495 of the Indian Penal Code maybe inquired into or tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or the offender last resided with his or her spouse by the first marriage, or the wife by the first marriage has taken up permanent residence after the commission of the offence.

There was no corresponding section in the old Criminal Procedure Code. Now in view of this new Section.

(i) The court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed:

(ii) or the offender last resided with his or her by the first marriage:

(iii) or the wife by the first marriage has taken up permanent residence after the commission of the offence can try the offence.

In the case before me, in para 5 of the complaint it is alleged as follows:

The complainant and the first accused lived at No. 89 Krishappan Tank Street, Seven Wells, Madras-79....

and at the end of the same para it is alleged as follows:

"The complainant took asylum in her parents house to save her life and now permanently residing at No.Z 2987, Anna Nagar, Madras-49 along with her parents." The above extracted portions will fall in within Clauses (ii) and (iii) referred to supra and as such, the Metropolitan Magistrate Court at Madras has got jurisdiction to try the offence. The ruling rendered in AIR 1967 Mad 241 referred to supra is no longer good law, in view of the new section 182 (2) of the new Criminal Procedure Code.

The second contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners is that the allegations do not make out the offences alleged against the petitioners. Even in my summarization of the complaint in a concise form, which I have given at the outset, I have referred to the allegations made against accused 1, 2 and 7 to 10, who are the petitioners herein. They show that accused 2, and 7 to 10 had participated in the first marriage between the complainant and the first accused and they were well aware of the subsistence of that first marriage. The allegations would further specifically allege that these accused took active part and connived at the second marriage and they made arrangements. Thus allegations are there to make out the offences alleged against the petitioners. Hence the second objection also fails to the ground.

In view of the above, the petition which does not have any merit shall stand dismissed.