AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
No AI summary yet
Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.
Judgment
61 paragraphs · 1,360 wordsS. Tamilvanan, J.—This Civil Revision has been preferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the order, dated
17.11.2012 made in I.A. No. 113 of 2012 in R.C.O.P. No. 213 of 2011 on the file of the Principal District Munsif Court, Coimbatore. It is an
admitted fact that the petitioner is a tenant and the respondent, Kumudavalli is the landlady. The Rent Control Original Petition in R.C.O.P. No.
213 of 2011 was filed by her u/s 10(2)(i) and 14(1) of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, seeking eviction of the
petitioner/tenant. In the said RCOP, Interlocutory Application in I.A. No. 113 of 2012 was filed under Order III Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, seeking an order to recognise the father of the landlady, A. Arunachalam as power of attorney of the landlady and conduct the said
RCOP proceeding.
As per the impugned order, the Court below permitted the landlady, the respondent herein to proceed with the RCOP, as petitioner through her
said power of attorney. Aggrieved by the said order, the revision has been preferred by the petitioner/tenant.
Mr. N. Manokaran, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/tenant submitted that though RCOP was filed in the year 2011, the respondent
herein filed the aforesaid Interlocutory Application only in the year 2012 to recognize her power of attorney agent under Order III Rule 1 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that even at the time of filing the RCOP, the respondent could have
obtained permission/leave of the Court but without getting any such order, the respondent/landlady is not entitled to seek an order, recognising the
power of attorney deed and according to him, which amounts to ratifying the act of the landlady, which is not permissible in law. In support of his
contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision, The Lakshmi Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. R. Ramajaam, R. Mylswamy, K.
Arumugam and K.GF. Somasundaram, , wherein this Court (K.K. Sasidharan, J) has held as follows:
The fourth respondent has file the Suit in his capacity as agent of respondents 1 to 3. Obviously, he was claiming to be an attorney within the
meaning of Rule 2(a) of Order 3. A conjoint reading of the provisions of Order 3, Rules 1 and 2 along with Rule 16 of the Civil Rules of Practice
clearly shows that the power of attorney has to be produced before the Trial Court and a specific order has to be passed by the Judge permitting
the power agent to appear on behalf of the party. There is no question of permitting the party to represent the interest of another in a Civil Suit
unless such authorization was produced before the Court. In case a person was permitted to represent the plaintiffs in a Suit without there being a
document within the meaning of Order 3, Rule 2(a) it would ultimately result in a serious situation to the plaintiffs inasmuch as any decree passed in
such Suit would be binding on the plaintiffs on account of the permission granted by the Court to the agent to file the Suit and to conduct the
proceedings.
Per contra, Mr. M. Sanjaiyen, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/landlady submitted that even in the RCOP field by the respondent,
the landlady has specifically stated in paragraph number 1 itself that her father A. Arunachalam was appointed by her as power of attorney to
conduct the case. Further, the learned counsel for the respondent referred to Document No. 1 available in the list of documents, wherein copy of
the power of attorney deed, dated 25.02.2008 is available, whereby the respondent/landlady has appointed her father, A. Arunachalam as her
power of attorney, to conduct the case. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, after the counter being filed by the petitioner herein
as tenant, the Interlocutory Application was filed by the respondent/landlady to recognise her power of attorney, that was ordered subsequently.
According to the learned counsel for the respondent, it was only a curable defect and that would not affect the rights of the petitioner/tenant and
therefore, considering the facts and circumstances, the Court below has allowed the Interlocutory Application filed by the respondent/landlady. In
support of his contention, the learned counsel relied on the decision in M. Vairavan Vs. R.V. Periannan Chettiar and Others, , wherein this Court
(S.R. Singharavelan, J) has held that Application filed under Order III Rule 1 and 2 of the CPC at the stage of trial or arguments, to permit one of
the plaintiffs to act as power agent of other plaintiffs could be allowed. In the said case, no permission was sought for at the time of institution of the
suit, however, this Court held that it was a curable defect and hence an application could be filed at any stages of suit and there was nothing
improper for trial Court to allow the same, when there was no prejudice caused to the defendant.
In the aforesaid decision, this Court has also relied on the decision of the Hon''ble Apex Court in Uday Shankar Triyar Vs. Ram Kalewar
Prasad Singh and Another, , wherein the Hon''ble Apex Court has held as follows:
Here again it has always been recognized that if a plaint is not signed by the plaintiff or his duly authorised agent due to any bonafide error, the
defect can be permitted to be rectified either by the Trial Court at any time before judgment, or even by the Appellate Court by permitting
appropriate amendment, when such defect comes to its notice during hearing.
It is seen that Order III Rule 1 of the CPC reads as follows:
Appearance, etc., may be in person, by recognized agent or by pleader: Any appearance, application or act in or to any Court, required or
authorized by law to be made or done by a party in such Court may, except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in
force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognized agent, or by a pleader (appearing, applying or acting, as the case may be) on
his behalf:
Provided that any such appearance shall, if the Court so directs, be made by the party in person.
It cannot be disputed that any party could contest the case through power of attorney and for which, seek permission to recognise the power of
attorney, by producing the power of attorney deed. In the light of the decision rendered by the Hon''ble Apex Court in Uday Shankar Triyar Vs.
Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh and Another, and in M. Vairavan Vs. R.V. Periannan Chettiar and Others, , this Court, it is held as a curable defect.
Hence, the impugned order could not be prejudicial to the other party and the error could be rectified, since it has to be construed only as curable
defect.
In the instant case, admittedly, the petitioner is a tenant and the respondent, Kumudavalli is a landlady. Even in the RCOP, it has been averred
that the landlady has appointed her father, Arunachalam, as her power of attorney to conduct RCOP on behalf of the respondent/landlady. It is
seen that allowing the petition would not change the cause of action or legally affect the petitioner, therefore, the impugned order is not prejudicial
to the rights of the petitioner/tenant. Hence, it has to be construed by the Court that it is a curable defect and the decision rendered in M. Vairavan
Vs. R.V. Periannan Chettiar and Others, is squarely applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. Having gone through the facts and
circumstances, in the light of decisions referred to by both the learned counsel, I am of the view that there is no error or infirmity in the impugned
order, so as to warrant any interference by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution and accordingly, the same is liable to be dismissed.
In the result, this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is also dismissed. No costs.
