M. Padmavathy, 11, 1st Floor, East Spurtank Road, Chennai-31 and others vs The Government of Tamil Nadu and others

The petitioners in all these writ petitions are the owners of the lands acquired by the respondents for the establishment of the industrial complex.

They have filed these writ petitions, challenging the acquisition of their lands. Apart from the availability of the poramboke lands, the Government

has decided to acquite an extent of 935.52.0 Hectares in Sriperumbudur ''C'', Pondur ''A'', Pondur ''C'', Irungulam, Araneri, Mambakkam,

Thirumangalam. Sirumangadu and Santhavellur villages of Sriperumbudur Taluk of Kancheepuram District to form an industrial complex in the

area. The State Industries Promotion Corporation of Tamil Nadu (SIPCOT) addressed the Government for administrative sanction for the

establishment of an industrial complex in the above area and also to acquire the private lands by invoking the urgency clause u/s 17(1) of the Land

Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act I of 1984) (hereinafter called as ''the said Act'') and also for the transfer of the poramboke lands. This was

necessitated as several multi-national companies, non-resident industrialists and local entrepreneurs are evincing keen interest in investing in Tamil

Nadu, particularly round about Chennai. The Government of Tamil Nadu accorded sanction for the acquisition of the lands under the urgency

provisions of the Act in G.O.Ms.No.61 Industries (MID-II) Department, dated 24.2.97.

For the purpose of convenience, the total extent of 935.52.0 Hectares was divided into 8 blocks. The notification u/s 4(1) was published in the

Government Gazette on 25.9.97. The said notification was published in the newspapers on 12.10.97 and in the locality on 3.11.97. Since urgency

provision had been invoked, the declaration u/s 6 of the said Act was published in the Government Gazette on 13.11.97. in the newspapers on

23.11.97 and in the locality on 3.12.97.

A notice u/s 9(3) and 10 of the Act, for the award enquiry had been served on the petitioners. Some of the petitioners appeared for the enquiry

and some did not appear. After completion of the award enquiry, in many of the cases, 80% of the proposed compensation had been deposited

and the possession of the major portion of the land had been taken on 9.1.98 itself. At this stage, these writ petitions have been filed, challenging

the acquisition of the lands by very few land owners.

Mr. David Thiagaraj, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P. No.1190 of 1998 contended that the petitioner purchased the

property on 30.7.96. The mutation in the revenue records had been made on 30.8.97 by incorporating the name of the petitioner, as the owner of

the land. When the notification u/s 4(1) was published on 25.9.97, the petitioner''s name ought to have been found in the said notification. The

petitioner''s name do not find a place in the said notification and as such the local publication made by the respondents is of no consequence. The

learned counsel further contended that the respondents have invoked the urgency clause without any application of mind and absolutely there is no

immediate need for such a large extent of land for the purpose of invoking the urgency clause. The notification do not spell out the reason for

invoking the urgency clause. Without passing the award, 80% of the compensation amount cannot be deposited. Even if it is deposited, it would be

based only on vague calculation and not on an ascertained amount. The petitioner was not served with any notice for the award enquiry. Further

the land is part and parcel of the approved lay out and hence the same cannot be acquired.

Mr. Abdul Razak, on behalf of the petitioners in W.P. 14020 of 1998 and W.P. 4915 of 1999 contended that the proposal for the approval of

4(1) notification was sent on 6.7.97. The said draft notification was approved by the Government on 12.1.98 and was published in the gazette on

13.1.98. Thereafter, only on 13.2.98 the said notification was published in the newspaper. The substance of the said notification was published in

the local area on 6.2.98. The declaration u/s 6 was approved on 16.6.98 and published in the gazette on 22.6.98. The same was published in the

newspaper on 28.6.98 and the substance of the said declaration was published in the local area on 20.7.98. From the above dates, there is a delay

of 5 1/2 months in the approval of 4(1} notification and as such the invocation of the urgency clause cannot be sustained. Further Explanation to

Section 17(1) makes it clear that the urgency clause can be invoked only in respect of waste or arable land. In this case, the notification u/s 4(1) do

not specify the nature of the land and as such the urgency clause has no application for the lands that are to be acquired.

Mr. Bhavanantham the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in W.P.No.87 and 88 of 1999 contended that Section 17 of the

said Act cannot be read in isolation of Section 4(1) and 5-A of the Act. The mere existence of urgency alone is not sufficient. The respondents

have to establish the immediate need of the land to eliminate the enquiry u/s 5-A of the said Act and such reason ought to have been stated in the

notification u/s 4(1) itself. The absence of such reason in the notification u/s 4(1) would amount to the non-application of mind by the authorities.

Further the learned counsel contended that when such large extent of land is to be acquired, it is the absolute need on the part of the respondents

to establish that the entire land is immediately needed for the purpose for which it is being acquired. The absence of such immediate need of the

entire land cannot justify the dispensation of the statutory enquiry u/s 5-A of the said Act. So far as the lands which are the subject-matter in these

writ petitions are concerned, there are standing casurina trees in the said lands which do not find a place in the notification u/s 4(1) as well as

declaration u/s 6 of the said Act. Only after due notice to the land owners, the compensation amount can be determined and the award can be

passed. A reading of sub-section 3-A and 3-B of Section 17 requires the authorities to tender 80% of the compensation amount to the owners of

the land before ever the same is deposited. Hence in this case, the proper procedure has not been followed. He also contended that the character

of the land has not been mentioned in the notification as to where it is waste or arable and hence the notification itself is vitiated.

Mr. Jeevarethinam, the learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.No.1711 of 1999 contended that the petitioner has purchased a small plot for

the purpose of constructing a house. The said land is surrounded by hospitals and as such in this area the industries cannot be permitted to be

established, as it may cause injury to the health of the patients who are undergoing treatment in such hospitals. The petitioner has also made

representation to the authorities for exempting their land from acquisition. The said representation is lying over and no order has been passed till

date. When once the industries cannot be started in the area, the acquisition of the land for the said purpose cannot be sustained.

Mr. Subba Reddy, the learned counsel for the petitioners in W.P. Nos.7368, 7369, 3283 and 2541 of 1998 and W.P. 355 of 1999 contended

that the land of the petitioners is part of the approved lay out prior to the notification u/s 4(1). The lay out was approved on 21.7.97. The

notification u/s 4(1) was published on 25.9.97. The declaration u/s 6 was made in November, 1997. The writ petition was admitted on 9.3-98 and

status-quo order was granted. It is stated in the counter that on 9.1.98 possession has been taken and hence the deposit was made. Sub-section

(1) of Section 17 contemplates a sequence of events i.e., the deposit of 80% of the compensation amount and then taking over possession of the

land. While so, both cannot be on the same day. So far as the invoking of urgency clause is concerned, he also adopted the arguments of Mr.

David Thiagaraj as well as other counsel.

Mr.K. Doraisamy, the learned senior counsel, on behalf of the petitioners in W.P. No.8692 & 8693 of 1998 contended that the petitioners are

exporters of granites and they purchased the lands on 21.5.90 and 28.6.90 under registered sale deeds. Their names do not find a place in the

notification u/s 4(1) or declaration u/s 6 of the Act. The notification u/s 4(1) was published as early as 9.9.97 and the declaration u/s 6 was made

in September and October, 1997. The land has been allotted to an industry which has been impleaded as the respondent. Though the name of the

petitioners do not find a place in the notification u/s 4(1) or declaration u/s 6, the notice u/s 9(3) and 10 was served on the first petitioner alone on

19.1.98. The Land Acquisition Officer ought to have made enquiries and traced the owners of the land and served on them. The petitioners are

also export oriented industry and their lands cannot be acquired for the allotment of the same to another industry. This cannot be construed as the

acquisition for the public purpose. Since 80% of the compensation amount, as contemplated u/s 17(3) of the Act had not been complied with the

compensation cannot be sought for at this stage. But, however, the respondents have taken possession on 9.1.98 and 6.2.98 respectively. So far

as invoking the urgency clause is concerned, the learned senior counsel has adopted the arguments of other counsel.

On the contrary, Mr. Rajavelu, the learned Government Pleader contended that totally an extent of 2000 and odd acres of land near around

Sriperumbudur Taluk was acquired. The proposal for the said acquisition in order to establish an industrial complex was approved by the

Government in G.O.Ms.No.61 Industries (MID-II) Department, dated 24.2.97. The proposal was initiated by SIPCOT and the same was

accepted by the Government in view of the requirements of the land for allotting the same to the new entrepreneurs within Tamil Nadu, within India

as well as for the multi-national companies. The Government has thought it fit to invoke the urgency provision in order to avoid any further delay in

these matters. Already the compensation amount has been determined and 80% of the said amount had been deposited. Major portion of the land

had been taken possession in January, 1998 and in some of the cases, the allotment has also been made. When the allotment has been made, that

itself will be of some evidence before this court that the lands are needed urgently since the entrepreneurs are waiting for the allotment. Hence the

invoking the urgency clause for the acquisition of the lands cannot be said to be without the application of mind or without any urgent need for the

same. Further when the establishment of the industrial complex in a vast area is only for the advantage of the public, especially taking into

consideration the providing of employment to the unemployed, residing in the nearby areas, naturally the public interest should be compared with

the-private interest of the owners of the small extent of the land, while considering the minor irregularities. The need for invoking the urgency clause

is the subjective satisfaction of the authorities and such subjective satisfaction can be ascertained from the file. But, however, such subjective

satisfaction is not justiciable and as such if the authorities have sufficient reason to take a decision for invoking the urgency clause, it is not open to

this court to consider as to such reasons are sufficient or not.

Recently yet another batch of writ petitions W.P. No.13965 of 1996 etc. have been filed when the lands were acquired for the same purpose

and Kanakaraj. J, (as he then was) dismissed those writ petitions by judgment dated 14.11.97 and the same was confirmed in Writ Appeal

No.1535 of 1997 by judgment dated 5.12.97. The non-mentioning of the character of the land in the notification u/s 4(1) of is concerned, the

same will not vitiate the acquisition proceeding. In view of the amended provisions of the Act, there is no need to specify the reasons for invoking

the urgency clause, either in the notification u/s 4(1) or the declaration u/s 6 of the Act. Many of the land owners have received the notice u/s 9(3)

and 10; only few had attended the enquiry and many did not attend the enquiry and hence 80% of the probable compensation amount had been

duly deposited in the Treasury in compliance of sub-section (3) of Section 17 of the said Act. So far as the delay either in the approval of the

notification or the delay between the notification u/s 4(1) and the declaration u/s 6 are concerned, the same would not vitiate the proceedings;

especially when the larger area is under acquisition which naturally would cause some delay on the administrative side for the establishment of the

staff to carry out the work.

Mr.K. Doraisamy, by way of reply added that the lands are lying still vacant and as such the petitioners may be permitted to pay the

development charges and get the allotment of the lands for their industrial purpose.

The following questions arise for consideration:

(i) Whether the non-mentioning of the name of certain land owners either in the notification u/s 4(1) or the declaration u/s 6 would vitiate the

proceedings.

(ii) Whether the urgency provision has been invoked by the authorities either without applying their mind or without any real urgency for the need of

the land.

(iii) Whether the delay in the approval of the notification u/s 4(1) would vitiate the invoking of the urgency clause.

(iv) Whether the acquisition of the land of the petitioner in W.P. No.1711 of 1999 is vitiated, since no industry can be started in her land, as the

same is surrounded by private nursing homes?

(v) Whether the notification u/s 4(1) or the declaration u/s 6 is vitiated due to the non-mentioning of the need for invoking the urgency clause.

(vi) Whether the invoking of the urgency clause is vitiated, since the lands have not been classified either as waste or arable, as contended by some

of the petitioners?

In this case, the State Government had decided to acquire an extent of 935.52.0 Hectares in 9 villages, comprising in Sriperumbudur Taluk of

Kancheepuram District for the purpose of establishing an industrial complex. This area is only the patta lands. Apart from this, the Government has

also made use of the Poramboke Lands, as part of the establishment of the industrial complex. 4(1) notification was published in the gazette on

25.9.97, in the news papers on 12.10.97 and in the locality on 3.11.97. The declaration u/s 6 was published in the gazette 13.11.97, in the

newspapers on 23.11.97 and 24.11.97 and in the locality on 3.12.97. From the counter affidavit it is clear that the land owners have been served

with the notice u/s 9(3) and 10 and possession has been taken on 9.1.98, barring minor extent of lands.

From the file, it is clear that originally in 1995 the proposal was started to have the Madras Industrial Park in an extent of about 450 acres. At

that stage, the minimum transfer of the poramboke lands has been ordered as early as 2.6.95 by the then Chief Minister in order to make 200

acres of poramboke lands and 250 acres private lands available. But subsequently in November, 1995 the SIPCOT proposed to develop the

industrial complex in an area of 1465 acres of patta land and 364 acres of poramboke land. The Government has also accorded sanction for the

acquisition of this larger extent. Subsequently several leading multi-national companies like Hyundai Motor Corporation, Mitsubishi of Japan,

BMW - Hero etc. and other companies proposed to invest in Tamil Nadu and for their requirement an extent of more than 2000 acres was

urgently needed. The Hon''ble Chief Minister had ordered that the acquisition can be proceeded with. Immediately the requirement of the staff and

the establishment has been worked out to carry out the acquisition proceedings and that was sanctioned. Hyundai Motor Company proposed to

sign an MOU on 18.7.96 and required the allotment of the land immediately thereon. The authorities, having the need of the land, has decided to

complete the acquisition proceedings by the end of 1996 for which purpose additional strength of the staff was necessitated and the proposal was

submitted to the Government. Thereafter on 24.2.97 by G.O.Ms.No. 61 the Government had sanctioned the acquisition of an extent of 603.21.5

hectares of the lands by invoking the urgency clause and to transfer an extent of 147.66.0 hectares of poramboke land in favour of SIPCOT, for

setting up the industrial complex. From the note file, it is clear that the Government has decided to invoke the urgency clause considering the

requirement of the land by the several entrepreneurs who are waiting to make investment to start industries. The Government, having satisfied the

need of the SIPCOT for the establishment of the industrial complex, especially by the multi-national companies, had invoked the urgency clause in

order to satisfy their immediate need. Sometimes the delay in making the land available for the allotment would dissuade the entrepreneurs in

making the investment. This may lead the entrepreneurs to search some other place where the land is immediately available for their investment and

by that the State Government may loose the establishment of the industries within the State. It is unnecessary to extract the correspondence from

the files. However, I am satisfied on perusal of the file that the authorities had acted strictly in order to have the establishment of the industrial

complex within the State. In fact G.O.Ms.No. 88 dated 26.3.97 the Government has accorded sanction to acquire 603.53.0 hectares by invoking

urgency clause and the transfer of an extent of 147.37.5 hectares of poramboke land.

The learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P. No.1 190 of 1998 has relied upon two judgments reported in Nutaki Sesharatanam v. Sub-

Collector, Land Acquisition, Vijayawada, 1992 (I) MLJ 26 and Thiruvaleeswarar Temple v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1990 (I) MLJ 142 and

contended that the notification u/s 4(1) should contain the names of the owners of the land and the non- mentioning of the petitioners name in the

said 4(1) notification would vitiate the acquisition proceedings.

So far as this aspect is concerned, even though the name of the owners of the land has to be mentioned in the notification u/s 4(1) as well as

the declaration u/s 6, it should be borne in mind that the notification is issued on the basis of an earlier report submitted to the Government for

approval. Hence there will be some time gap between the proposal sent for acceptance and the approval of the same and thereafter the

publication. In this case, 4(1) notification was published in the Gazette on 25.9.97. The petitioners name has been entered in the revenue records

only on 13.8.97, which is much later than the proposal submitted by the Land Acquisition Officer. Hence on the date of the Report submitted for

approval of the Government, the name of the petitioners do not find place in the revenue records and as such it cannot be said that the land

acquisition proceedings is vitiated by virtue of the non-mentioning of the names of the petitioners either in the 4(1) notification or declaration u/s 6.

17-A. Even apart from this, it may be pertinent to note that the Government has invoked the urgency clause for the acquisition of the land. Hence

there is no question of service of any individual notice on the owners of the land, calling for any objections arises only if such right of the land owner

is deprived, then only it can be said that the land acquisition proceedings is vitiated. In view of invoking the urgency clause, the land owner is

entitled only for the notice in the award enquiry and in the counter it has been specifically stated that the petitioner''s husband has represented the

petitioner in the award enquiry. Hence the first issue is answered against these petitioners.

Issue Nos.2 and 5:- It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that when larger area of nearly 2,000 and odd acres are to be

acquired, the authorities ought not to have invoked the urgency clause, because the entire area may not be required simultaneously for allotment.

Further it is contended that there is nothing on record to show that the proposed scheme requires the land immediately, necessitating the invoking

of urgency provisions under the Act. The authorities, in a mechanical manner, had invoked the Urgency provisions, without any application of mind.

In support of their contention, they referred to the judgment Chinnamma and Others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Another, wherein the

learned Judges have held as follows:

However, as the learned counsel for the petitioners contended that at no stage, the question of urgency was considered by the Government, we

perused the note files relating to issue of the said G.O.Ms.No. 694 dated 21st May, 1982, and we are surprised to find that there is not even a

discussion on the question of urgency in the office of the Government. The note file refers to the earlier G.O.Ms.No. 976 Industries, dated

15.7.1981, directing the acquisition of lands in Gummudipoondi under ordinary provisions and the request of SIPCOT to acquire lands under the

emergency provisions and to give suitable directions to the Collector of Chinglepat. The office note has been signed by the Under Secretary, the

Joint Secretary, and then the Secretary of the Industries Department. Then the file goes to the Revenue Department and the file is returned with an

endorsement with which we are not concerned. After the file goes back to the Industries Department, again the note refers to the requested of the

SIPCOT for the acquisition of the lands under the emergency provisions after setting out the facts and circumstances which led to the acquisition of

the lands. After setting out the facts, in paragraph 7 of the note, the request of the Managing Director of SIPCOT for invoking the urgency clause is

referred to and in paragraph 8, orders are sought for on the request contained in paragraph 7. The note does not contain any discussion either for

or against on the request of the Managing Director of SIPCOT or on the question of urgency. When orders are sought for on the request of the

Managing Director, SIPCOT, contained in paragraph 7, no orders have been passed by any one. After paragraph 8, which seeks an order on the

request of the Managing Director, SIPCOT, the Under Secretary, Joint Secretary and the Secretary, have merely signed without passing any

orders. The file also contains the mere signatures of Mr.S. Thirunavukkarasu, Minister for Revenue. Thus the file does not contain any discussion

or decision by anyone on the request of the Managing Director of SIPCOT for invoking the urgency clause. If the office in its note had suggested

the acceptance of the proposal of the Managing Director, SIPCOT, to acquire the lands invoking the urgency clause and in approval of that

suggestion, signature is affixed by the Secretaries or the concerned Ministers, it would have been a different thing.

The other judgment relied upon by the counsel for the petitioners is State of Punjab and Another Vs. Gurdial Singh and Others, . That is a case

where a site was chosen for new grain market in the year 1962 and the same was abandoned. Again in 1971, the new venture was initiated. The

acquisition proceedings were quashed on the ground of mala fides. In 1977, dispensing with the enquiry, by invoking the urgency provisions, the

lands were sought to be acquired. The High Court quashed the acquisition proceedings on the ground of mala fides finding that the lands were

sought to be acquired only due to political animosity. The State Government preferred an appeal before the Apex Court. The Apex Court also

dismissed the same, accepting the finding of the High Court. The Apex Court has held that the invoking of the urgency clause, after lapse of long

time, cannot be accepted, stating that save in real urgency where public interest does not brook even the minimum time needed to give a hearing,

land acquisition authorities should not, having regard to Articles 14 (and 19), burke an enquiry u/s 17 of the Act. Taking into consideration the

slumbering process, pending for years and suddenly exciting itself into immediate forcible taking, makes a travesty of emergency power.

Reliance was placed in the judgment of the Apex Court in Om Prakash and Another Vs. State of U.P. and Others, . The apex Court has held

that when the Government took more than nine months in issuing declaration u/s 6, after the acquisition notification, then there was no real urgency

for invoking the urgency provisions of the Act and as such the same is not justified in the following terms:

Even if acquisition takes place urgently by dispensing with inquiry u/s 5-A and the possession is taken urgently after Section 6 notification within

15 days of issuance of notice u/s 9, sub-section (1), even then there is no guarantee that the acquired land would not be encroached upon by

unruly persons. It is a law and order problem which has nothing to do with the acquisition and urgency for taking possession. Even that apart, it is

easy to visualise that if objections are heard in connection with Section 5-A inquiry and in the meantime, they remain in possession of land sought

to be acquired they would be the best persons to protect their properties against encroachers. Consequently, the ground put forward by NOIDA

in its written request dated 14.12.1989 for invoking urgency powers must be held to be totally irrelevant. Even that part, if that was the urgency

suggested by NOIDA on 14.12.1989, we fail to appreciate as to how the State authorities did not respond to that proposal equally urgently and

why they issued notification u/s 4 read with Section 17(4) after one year in January, 1991. On this aspect, no explanation whatsoever was

furnished by the respondent State authorities before the High Court. It is also interesting to note that even after dispensing with inquiry u/s 5-A

pursuant to the exercise of powers u/s 17(a) on 5th January, 1991 Section 6 notification saw the light of the day only on 7.1.1992. If the urgency

was of such a nature that it could not brook the delay on account of Section 5-A proceedings, it is difficult to appreciate as to why Section 66

notification in the present case could be issued only after one year from the issuance of Section 4 notification. No explanation for this delay is

forthcoming on record. This also shows that according to the State authorities, there was no real urgency underlying dispensing with Section 5-A

inquiry despite NOIDA suggesting at the top of its voice about the need for urgently acquiring the lands for the development of Sector No. 43 and

others sectors.

Even though some other judgments had been cited in support of the same principle, I am of the view that there is no need to refer those

judgments, since there is no necessity to multiply the citations for the same purpose.

On the contrary, the learned Government Pleader cited the judgment of the Supreme Court in A.P. Sareen and others Vs. State of U.P. and

others, wherein the learned Judges have held as follows:

Since inquiry u/s 5-A has been dispensed with, as provided under the Act, 80% of the compensation was required to be given to the claimants. In

this case, instead of adopting the said procedure, after publication of the notification u/s 4(1), they published the notification in the local newspapers

in English as well as Hindi and also substance thereof in the locality and thereafter personal notices appear to have been issued to the owners of the

lands. After completion of this process, proceedings were put up before the Government for publication of the declaration u/s 6 which came to be

made on April 18, 1996. The appellant filed the writ petition on July 19, 1996 and consequently possession could not be taken. After the writ

petition was disposed of, possession was taken on December, 10, 1996. In this backdrop, the need of urgent possession was dissipated by

beaurocratic inadvertence and the urgency did not cease. Urgency continues as long as scheme is not initiated, action taken and process

completed.

The Government Pleader placed reliance on another judgment in Union of India and others Vs. Praveen Gupta and others, where the Supreme

Court has held as follows:

It is now settled legal position that decision on urgency is an administrative decision and is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the appropriate

Government on the basis of the material available on record. Therefore, there was no need to pass any reasoned order to reach the conclusion that

there is urgency so as to dispense with the enquiry u/s 5-A in exercise of power u/s 17(a).

In a recent judgment in Bhagat Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Others, the Supreme Court has held as follows:

In our view, the subjective satisfaction for dispensing with inquiry under S. 5-A is based on sufficient material and cannot be faulted. The

photographs as to the filthy state of the present Mandi with garbage and stray cattle and pigs show that the place is so loathsome that it will be

precarious and perhaps hazardous to store vegetables or foodgrains in the existing market. We are, therefore, of the view that the urgency clause

was rightly invoked by the government. There are also enough precedents in connection with acquisition of land for markets where S. 5-A has

been dispensed with and such action was upheld.......

It was then urged for the appellant that there was a delay of full one year between the S. 4(l) notification and S. 6 declaration and this showed the

lethargy of the Government and this would reveal that Government would not have lost anything if only a hearing u/s 5-A was given to the owners

so that they could place their grievances before the Government. In this connection, we may state that the respondents have explained the delay as

having been caused in as much as of various steps were required to be taken to finalise the proceedings. It was necessary to issue newspaper

publications and also make local publication of the substance of the S. 4(1) notification. There was also delay on account of following other

administrative procedures. In view of the above explanation we are not prepared to hold that the latter delay between S. 4(l) notification and S. 6

declaration has any great impact on the subjective satisfaction arrived at when orders dispensing with the S. 5-A inquiry were passed earlier.

In the same area, some other lands were acquired for the use of the SIPCOT for the establishment of the industrial complex and to place the

major portion of the land with the Hyundai Motor Company, the foreign investors. The Government has invoked the urgency provision and the

acquisition was challenged on the ground that the urgency provision ought not to have been invoked. J. Kanakaraj, J (as he then was) by his

judgment dated 14.11.97 in W.P. No.13965 of 1996 etc. has upheld the land acquisition proceeding and dismissed the writ petitions and the

principles laid down therein are covered the issues involved in these writ petitions.

From the above said principles, it is clear that the Government ought to have considered the need for invoking the urgency clause and accepted

the proposal of the SIPCOT. If that be so, then the invoking of the urgency clause cannot be interfered with. The conclusion or the acceptance by

the Government is an administrative action and if such administrative action is based upon the materials available on record, the same cannot be

interfered with. The language of 4(1) notification is not conclusive but the court is required to consider the materials whether there is any urgency to

exercise the power u/s 17(4) of the Act, as held in Union of India and others Vs. Praveen Gupta and others, .

As stated already, in the file in G.O.Ms.No.248 Industries (MIG.2) Department, dated 27.10.95, it is stated as follows:

The Government have examined the proposal of State Industries Promotion Corporation of Tamil Nadu Ltd., with several multinational

companies, non-resident Indians and local entrepreneurs evincing keen interest in investing in Tamil Nadu especially near Madras, the Government

considers that the lands referred to in para 2 above have to be acquired under the urgency clause so as to make them readily available for such

projects. Accordingly, the Government accord administrative sanction to the Collector, Chengalpattu, M.G.R. District for acquisition of lands,

under Urgency Provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

Originally the proposal was started with G.O.Ms.No. 134 dated 6.6.95 for the acquisition of 300 acres, subsequently the same had been

increased to 1,400 and odd acres in G.O.Ms.No. 248 dated 27.10.95, taking into consideration of the need of the entrepreneurs who evince keen

interest in commencing the industries.

Further the note file pertaining to G.O.Ms.No. 61 dated 24.2.97 contains the note which was signed by the concerned Secretary and the

Hon''ble Chief Minister as follows:

The above extracted portion clearly reveals that the Government has considered the request of SIPCOT not only for the acquisition of land;

but also the need for invoking the urgency clause. From the above extracted portions of the file, it is clear that the Government has applied its mind

and accepted the proposal of the SIPCOT and decided to acquire the land by invoking the urgency provision.

Either the notification u/s 4(1) or the declaration u/s 6 need not contain the reasons for invoking the urgency clause. When once it is held that

invoking of the urgency provision is an administrative action of the State Government and its subjective satisfaction, normally such reasons need not

be published in the acquisition proceedings. The court has to satisfy itself with regard to the availability of the materials before the State

Government for taking such a decision of invoking the urgency clause and such materials had been accepted by the State Government, after due

consideration of the same.

It may be worthwhile to refer a passage from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ramniklal N. Bhutta and another Vs. State of

Maharashtra and others, which is as follows:

''Before parting with this case, we think it necessary to make a few observations relevant to land acquisition proceedings. Our country is now

launched upon a ambitious programme of alt round economic advancement to make our economy competitive in the world market. We are

anxious to attract foreign direct investment to the maximum extent. We propose to compete with China economically. We wish to attain the pace

of progress achieved by some of the Asian countries, referred to as ""Asian tigers"" e.g., South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. It is, however,

recognised on all hands that the infrastructure necessary for sustaining such a pace of progress is woefully lacking in our country. The means of

transportation, power and communications are in dire need of substantial improvement, expansion and modernisation. These things very often call

for acquisition of land and that too without any delay. It is, however, natural that in most of these cases, the persons affected; challenge the

acquisition proceedings in Courts. These challenges are generally in the shape of writ petitions filed in High Courts. Invariably, stay of acquisition is

asked for and in some cases, orders by way of stay or injunction are also made. Whatever may have been the practices in the past, a time has

come where the court should keep the larger public interest in mind while exercising their power of granting stay/injunction. The power under

Article 226 is discretionary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of interests of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point. And in

the matter of land acquisition for public purposes, the interests of justice and the public interests coalesce. They are very often one and the same.

Even in a Civil Suit, granting of injunction or other similar orders, more particularly of an interlocutory nature, is equally discretionary. The courts

have to weigh the public interest viz-a-vis the private interest while exercising the power under Article 226--indeed any of their discretionary

powers.

In two of the writ petitions, the allottees have filed petitions to implead themselves as co-respondents, which means that the Government has

already taken possession of the major portion of the lands and in fact allotment has also been made. Further in the counter the respondents have

stated that 80% of the compensation amount had been deposited and the possession has been taken, barring only one writ petition, where before

even the possession was taken, the petitioner had obtained the interim stay. There cannot be any doubt that the decision of the Government that

the lands are required urgently for the purpose of establishing the industrial complex is based on materials. When more than 2000 and odd acres of

land are under acquisition, the petitioners, owning a very small extent, have filed these writ petitions. As held by the Apex Court in Ramniklal N.

Bhuttha''s case, the public interest and entire scheme have to be taken into consideration. If the acquisition proceedings is quashed, then there is no

doubt that the entire industrial development scheme would become stand still.

Even though the petitioners placed reliance in the judgment of the apex court in Om Prakash and Another Vs. State of U.P. and Others, , I am

of the view that the same may not be of any help for them. Though the learned Judges of the apex Court have found fault with the State

Government in invoking the urgency provisions, but still they declined to interfere on the ground that only a meagre number of land owners have

challenged the acquisition and the majority owners had accepted, in the following terms:

Now remains the vital question as to whether in the light of our finding on Point No.1 the notification u/s 4(1) so far as it dispenses with Section 5-

A inquiry by invoking powers u/s 17(4) of the Act and the consequential notification u/s 6 are required to be set aside or not. We must keep in

view that we are called upon to exercise our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Such jurisdiction will necessarily have to be

exercised in the light of facts and circumstances of these cases. Section 4 notification in the present case is dated 5th January, 1991. It is followed

by Section 6 notification dated 7th January, 1992. In between the appellants went to the High Court and got status quo order since 31st March,

1992. Result is that till today even after the expiry of 6 years and more, the land acquisition proceedings qua the appellants'' lands have remained

stagnant. It is also to be kept in view that the impugned notification u/s 6 of the Act was issued for the purpose of planned development of District

Ghaziabad through NOIDA and by the said notification, 496 acres of land spread over hundreds of plot numbers have been acquired. Out of

494.26 acres of land under acquisition, only the present appellants owning about 50 acres, making a grievance about acquisition of their lands have

gone to the court. Thus, almost 9/10th of the acquired lands have stood validly acquired under the land acquisition proceedings and only dispute

centers round 1/10th of these acquired lands owned by the present appellants. It is a comprehensive project for the further planned development in

the district. Under these circumstances, we find considerable force in the contention of learned senior counsel for the respondent that it is neither

advisable nor feasible to interfere with the acquisition of such large tracts of lands when the occupants of 9/10th of the acquired lands have not

thought it fit to challenge these acquisition proceedings and the occupants of only 1/10th of lands are agitating their grievance since more than six

years firstly before the High Court and then before this Court. The appellants main grievance centres round the question whether their lands having

alleged abadi could be acquired in the light of the State policy for not acquiring such lands. For such a contention, of course, grievance could have

been made u/s 5-A inquiry if it was held. But that could have been urged years back before Section 6 notification saw the light of the day in 1992.

Now after a passage of more than six years, it would not be feasible to put the clock back and permit the appellants to agitate this contention

which appears to be the sole contention for opposing the acquisition proceedings in the facts of the present cases by permitting them to urge this

grievance in Section 5-A inquiry which according to them should be held at this stage. We will show presently that this solitary grievance of the

appellants could be vindicated before the State authorities themselves by relegating the appellants to proper remedy by way of representation u/s

48 of the Act and when that remedy is available to the appellants and when that is the sole grievance of the appellants, at this stage no useful

purpose would be served by striking down the notification u/s 4(1) qua the appellants so far as invocation of Section 17(4) is concerned and the

consequent notification u/s 6. That we cannot permit upsetting the entire apple can of acquisition of 500 acres only at the behest of 1/10th of

landowners whose lands are sought to be acquired.

Unlike the Chinnamma and Others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Another, as stated already, on a perusal of the file, I am satisfied that the State

Government had sufficient materials for the purpose of invoking the urgency provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and after due consideration of

those materials, the Government had decided to invoke the same. Hence issues 2 and 5 are also held against the petitioners.

So far as the third issue regarding the delay in approval of either 4(1) notification or declaration u/s 6 is concerned, in view of the recent

judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Bhagat Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Others, if the respondent has explained the delay in respect of the

various steps required to be taken to finalise the proceedings, then the delay occurred in the administrative process cannot vitiate the acquisition

proceedings by invoking the urgency provision. In this case, the respondents had explained the delay in the counter affidavit filed by them in

accordance with the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Bhagat Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Others, , and as such the said delay will not

vitiate the invoking of the urgency provision.

So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P. No1711 of 1999 that no industry can be started in his land since the

same is surrounded by nursing homes is concerned, when a larger area of nearly 2,000 acres and odd are under acquisition for the purpose of

establishing the industrial complex, naturally SIPCOT will take into consideration the nature of the industry for the allotment of the particular site. It

cannot be said that all the industries are either causing nuisance or injurious to the health. Moreover, in such a large area, while forming the scheme,

certain space is to be earmarked for road, garden or parking etc. Hence considering all these aspects, it is not for this court to decide as to

whether any industry can be permitted in the petitioner''s place or not and it is for the concerned authority to take a decision, while making the

allotment.

Regarding issue No.6 is concerned, though most of the counsel advanced arguments on the basis that the urgency clause can be invoked only if

the lands are arable or waste, in fact reliance was also placed in the judgment reported in Dora Phalauli Vs. State of Punjab and Others, . The

notification also do hot mention as to whether the land is arable or waste.

Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, prior to amendment is as follows:

17(1) In case of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the

expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in section 9, sub-section (1) take possession of any waste or arable land

needed for public purposes or for a company. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances.

The Land Acquisition Act was amended in the year 1984 under the Amendment Act 68 of 1984. After the amendment Section 17 of the Land

Acquisition Act is as follows:

Special powers in cases of urgency, - (1) In cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no

such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9 sub-section (1) take

possession of any land needed for public purpose, such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in Government, free from all encumbrances.

By the amendment Act, the words ''waste or arable'' had been removed and as such after the introduction of the amendment to the Land

Acquisition Act under Act 68 of 1984, there is no restriction for invoking the urgency provision of the Act with regard to the classification of the

land. Hence there is no substance in the argument of the counsel for the petitioners.

For all the reasons stated above, I am of the view that the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed as devoid of any merits. Accordingly all the

writ petitions are dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.