M. Rajiah vs State

N. Arumugham, J.—The convicted accused who was tried along with another for the offences u/s 420 I.P.C. and Sections 5(2) and 5(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 is the Revision Petitioner herein, challenging the impugned order passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Chennai in Crl. M.P. No. 4800/96 in C.C. No. 2/72 dated 18.10.1996 for want of its correctness and legality.

Being the second accused along with one Parthasarathy, the accused stood charged for the offences under Sections 420 I.P.C. and Sections 5(2) and 5(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act in C.C. No. 2/72 on the file of the Principal Sessions Judge, Chennai. After the trial, it appears both the accused were acquitted, but however, in the appeal preferred to the High Court against the judgment of acquittal in Crl. Appeal No. 360/74 by the State, both were found guilty by this Court and accordingly convicted and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year. The Petitioner was in jail for about 30 days. Challenging the said verdict by this Court, the Crl. Appeal No. 362/80 preferred by the Petitioner before the Supreme Court of India ended in dismissal, but, however, the sentence awarded by this Court as stated above was modified by the Supreme Court to a period of three months by its order dated 28.9.1993. Even thereafter, a Review Petition filed before the Supreme Court was also dismissed on 13.12.1993. Thus the entire proceedings covered a total period of about 23 years commencing from 1973 to 1993. In the meantime, the Government of Tamil Nadu had occasioned to give remissions in furtherance of the exercise of their statutory power provided u/s 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as well as the power vested under Article 161 of the Constitution of India which resulted in three G.Os. passed viz., (1) G.O.Ms. No. 279 dated 23.2.1992, (2) G.O.Ms. No. 296 dated 20.2.1993 and (3) G.O.Ms. No. 204 dated 23.2.1994 irrespective of the fact that investigation was done by the local police or some other agency and thereby provided the remissions in the sentence awarded against the persons found convicted.

To wipe out the remaining portion of the sentence altogether, the attempt was made by the Petitioner-second accused alone by filing the petition above referred to, by relying upon the decisions held in framing case laws.

The Respondent-Central Bureau of Investigation, constituted under Special Police Establishment Act, resisted the petition and filed a counter inter alia contending that the factual scenario of the case viz., the legal proceedings are stated to be correct which went to the extent of the dismissal of a Writ Petition filed on behalf of the revision Petitioner in W.P. No. 1564/96, and that Section 432 Code of Criminal Procedure provides the benefit of remission in sentence only by the State and not by the Court of law as it was the administrative function of the Executive. Therefore, the relief claimed upon the basis of the three Government Orders providing remission of sentence vest with only the Government in the List II of the Constitution of India and List III also. It was contended further that Article 161 of the Constitution of India deals with corruption, and that the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 is not in List I and is traceable only to Entry (1) in List III, and that if the offence is against law within List I, the State Government has no power to grant remission. It was also contended that as the Petitioner was working as an Inspector in the Department of Industries and tried along with one Parthasarathy for the offence u/s 120-B read with 420 I.P.C. and Section 5(2) read with 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, as the case had been detected and investigated by the Anti Corruption Bureau of C.B.I. under the Special Police Establishment Act, the State Government does not have any command or authority over the C.B.I. It was also contended that since the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 falls under Entry (1) List III of Constitution of India whereby the State Government as well as the Central Government has concurrent jurisdiction to detect the case and charge the accused for offences committed by them under the Act, it cannot be said the relief asked for in the instant case can be granted by the Court of law. Even u/s 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, while exercising the power in order to give the remission of sentence, the State Government has to act only after consultation with the Central Government in certain cases. The powers conferred by Sections 432 and 433 upon the State Government to remit or commute a sentence in any case, where the sentence is for an offence (a) which is investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment (SPE) constituted under Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 or any other agency empowered to make investigation into an offence under any Central Act other than this Code or (b) which involved the misappropriation or destruction or damage to any property belonging to Central Government or (c) which was committed by a person in the services of the Central Government while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties shall not be exercised by the State Government except after consultation with the Central Government, by virtue of Section 435 Code of Criminal Procedure. That would mean, the prior sanction has to be obtained by the State Government to remit the sentences against the Petitioner, which was lacking in this case. Therefore, this petition is not at all maintainable and no relief as prayed for in the petition can be granted to the Petitioner.

After hearing both parties and the case laws relied upon on their behalf, the learned Principal Sessions Judge after having an elaborate discussion and consideration dismissed the petition by passing the impugned order and it is this order which is being canvassed in this Revision for want of its propriety and legality.

I have heard the Bar for the Petitioner assailing the impugned order on more than one ground and justifying the impugned order for and on behalf of the Respondent.

Mr. G. Krishnan, learned senior counsel contended first while challenging the impugned order that the respective G.Os. passed by the Government of Tamil Nadu providing the remission in sentences were in tune with the power vested with it under Article 161 of the Constitution of India and likewise the Governor of the State is also empowered to pass special ordinances giving or providing remission in sentences to the various categories of the offence and if we go through the breadth and length of the G.Os. above referred, it is seen that the offences of the instant one have not at all been exempted from the applicability of the said G.Os. and that in as much as the present offences, viz., offence u/s 420 I.P.C. and under Sections 5(2) and 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, are not specifically and explicitly excluded. It is deemed that the benefit conferred by the three G.Os. altogether can be made applicable to and that in providing such remedy there is virtually no legal impediment or obstacle, and that therefore, the finding and conclusions arrived at by the learned Principal Sessions Judge are not correct, and that his approach is incorrect. Therefore, he has persuaded me to interfere in this Revision.

On the contrary, Mr. P. Rajamanickam, learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the Respondent was stern about the legal concept that is found against the Petitioner, by relying upon several case laws and also the statutory provisions and the constitutional mandate. He was able to distinguish the very category of the offences in the instant case as one being investigated by the Prevention of Corruption Wing of the C.B.I. under Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, which has got a special jurisdiction and being employed under the Central Government Act viz. Delhi Special Police Establishment Act and not by any State Government Act and contend since the present case resulted out of the investigation done by the C.B.I. constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act and not by the statute of the State Government, the State Government has no power to give remissions to such of the offences without the consultation of the Central Government and also the offences established in the instant case do not fall in the categories referred to in the List exclusively to be dealt with by the State Government. To substantiate his contention, the learned Counsel has relied upon several case laws. In the context of the above rival position, the question that arises for my consideration is, whether the impugned order in the instant Revision lacks any legality or propriety.

It is not in dispute that the Petitioner along with another stood charged for the offences u/s 420 I.P.C. and Sections 5(2) read with 5(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act in C.C. No. 3/72 on the file of the Principal Sessions Judge, Chennai by the Respondent C.B.I. and not by any investigating agency of the State cadre. The facts are, the accused were not found guilty by the trial court, but in the appeal against acquittal in Crl. Appeal No. 360/74, the appeal was allowed and accordingly this Court found both of them guilty convicted and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year, which sentence was further reduced to one of three months by the Supreme Court in Crl. Appeal No. 362/80. The conviction rendered against them were confirmed followed by the dismissal of a Review Petition filed on their behalf in the Apex Court on 13.12.1993.

The second accused alone filed the petition before the trial Judge and no petition was filed on behalf of the other. To appreciate the rival contentions, I have to advert the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provides the remissions in the sentence awarded against the accused. Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure runs like this:

Power to suspend or remit sentences. (1) When any person has been sentenced to punishment for an offence, the appropriate Government may, at any time, without conditions or upon any conditions which the person sentenced accepts, suspend the execution of his sentence or remit the whole or any part of the punishment to which he has been sentenced.

(2) Whenever an application is made to the appropriate Government for the suspension or remission of a sentence, the appropriate Government may require the presiding Judge of the Court before or by which the conviction was had to be confirmed, to state his opinion as to whether the application should be granted or refused, together with his reasons for such opinion and also to forward with the statement of such opinion a certified copy or the record of the trial or of such record thereof as exists.

(3) If any condition on which a sentence has been suspended or remitted is, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, not fulfilled, the appropriate Government may cancel the suspension or remission, and there upon the person in whose favour the sentence has been suspended or remitted may, if at a large, be arrested by any police officer, without warrant and remanded to undergo the unexpired portion of the sentence.

(4) The condition on which a sentence is suspended or remitted under this section may be one to be fulfilled by the person in whose favour the sentence is suspended or remitted, or one independent of his will.

(5) The appropriate Government may, by general rules or special orders, give directions as to the suspension of sentences and the conditions on which petitions should be presented and dealt with:

Provided that in the case of any sentence (other than a sentence of fine) passed on a male person above the age of eighteen years, no such petition by the person sentenced or by any other person on his behalf shall be entertained, unless the person sentenced is in jail, and

(a) where such petition is made by the person sentenced, it is presented through the officer in charge of the jail; or

(b) Where such petition is made by any other person, it contains a declaration that the person sentenced is in jail.

(6) The provisions of the above sub-sections shall also apply to any order passed by a Criminal Court under any section of this Code or of any other law which restricts the liberty of any person or imposes any liability upon him or his property.

(7) In this Section and in Section 433, the expression ''appropriate Government'' means,-

(a) in cases where the sentence is for an offence against, or the order referred to in Sub-section (6) is passed under, any law relating to a matter to which the Executive power of the Union extends, the Central Government;

(b) in other cases, the Government of the State within which the offender is sentenced or the said order is passed.

Section 433 deals with the power to commute sentence and says that,

The appropriate Government may, without the consent of the person sentenced, commute-

(a) a sentence of death, for any other punishment provided by the Indian Penal Code;

(b) a sentence of imprisonment for life, for imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years or for fine;

(c) a sentence of rigorous imprisonment, for simple imprisonment for any term to which that person might have been sentenced, or for fine;

(d) a sentence of simple imprisonment, for fine.

A casual reading of the above two sanctions of law clearly enjoins that the power to remit the sentences or give remission of sentences to any accused for any offence, the term or the duration of which has been categorised is vested with the State Government by the mode provided therein and not otherwise, and if the State Government or the Central Government was approached for the commutation or the remission of sentences by and on behalf of any convicted person, then the statute also provides the mode in which it has to be dealt with and thus, it is seen very clearly the mode of remission or commutation of sentences has to be necessarily done only by the State and the Executive. For this position, the Bar for the respective parties are not in controversy.

At the same time, as pointed out, I have to advert to Articles 161 and 162 of the Constitution of India. Article 161 runs like this:

The Governor of a State shall have the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of any offence against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the State extends.

Thus it has been provided by the Constitution a mandate has been vested with the Governor of a State to have the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites and remissions of sentences and punishment by way of either suspension or remission or commutation of any convicted persons from the offence against any law but however, particularly relating to a matter to which the executive power of the State extends. Thus, the power vested with the Governor under this Article to commute the sentence or to provide the remission of sentences, though an independent one and exclusive but provided to the extent the executive power of the State extends and not beyond that. Therefore, we can take it that the Executive of the State Government as well as the Governor of the State have equal power to pass the Government Order or the Special Ordinances both for providing remissions, commutation of sentence to the convicted persons of any category only to the extent of the power of the State extends and not beyond that.

Article 162 of the Constitution of India also occupies a very paramount role in the present context, which runs like this:

Extent of executive power of State:

Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive power of a State shall extend to the matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has power to make laws:

Provided that in any matter with respect to which the Legislature of a State and Parliament have power to make laws, the Executive power of the State shall be subject to, and limited by, the Executive power expressly conferred by this Constitution or by any law made by Parliament upon the Union or authorities thereof.

The Proviso added to the above Article 162 thus clarifies the extent to which the power to be exercised by the State and the Parliament with regard to the same subject and for the said reasoning this Proviso has been pressed more by the learned Counsel for the Respondent, and that while doing so he has contended that the G.O. passed either by the State Government or the Governor are applicable only to the persons accused of such offences which are projected before the Court of law by the State investigating cadre and not by any cases investigated by the investigating agency constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act. Therefore, in the light of the above distinction it was contended that whatever the terms or the benefit of the remission provided by the State Government on the one hand or by the Governor of the State by virtue of his constitutional power or u/s 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure respectively, such benefit would apply only for those whose cases have been investigated by the State Police and Prosecution launched in a Court of law and in the instant case since the Respondent is the Special Police Establishment who happens to be the prosecuting agency under the Special Police Establishment Act, the benefit of remission provided under the respective G.Os. cannot at all be made applicable to the present case, and that therefore, the various findings given by the trial Court are to be justified.

In support of his view, he made reliance upon the following case laws.

In State of Punjab v. Kesar Singh 1996 SCC (Cri.) 1034 the Supreme Court has held as follows:

In our opinion the direction given by the High Court was not at all appropriate or permissible in law. The mandate of Section 433 Code of Criminal Procedure enables the Government in an appropriate case to commute the sentence of a convict and to prematurely order his release before expiry of the sentence as imposed by the Courts. Clause (b) of Section 433 Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the sentence of imprisonment for life may be commuted for imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or fine. Undisputedly, the Respondent had not completed 14 years sentence when he filed the petition u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure seeking premature release. The direction of the High Court therefore to prematurely release the Respondent and set him at liberty forthwith could not have been made. That apart, even if the High Court could give such a direction, it could only direct consideration of the case of premature release by the Government and could not have ordered the premature release of the Respondent itself. The right to exercise the power u/s 433 Code of Criminal Procedure vests m the Government and has to be exercised by the Government in accordance with the rules and established principles. The impugned order of the High Court cannot, therefore, be sustained and is hereby set aside.

In Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, with regard to the meaning attributable to the word "law" in Article 162 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court has held the following:

The State Government cannot while taking recourse to the executive power of the State under Article 162, deprive a person of his properly. Such power can be exercised only by authority of law and not by a mere executive fiat or order. Article 162, as is clear from the owning words, is subject to other provisions of the Constitution. It is, therefore, necessarily subject to Article 300A. The word "law" in the context of Article 300A must mean an Act of Parliament or of a State Legislature, a rule, or a statutory order, having the force of law, that is positive or State-made law. The effect of the Constitution (Fourth) Amendment Act, 1955, is that there can be no "deprivation" unless there is extinction of the right to property.

In Sri Sugli Vs. Collector/District Magistrate, Allahabad and Another, a Division Bench had an occasion to observe as follows:

Under Article 162 of the Constitution, the State is not competent to issue any order which runs contrary to the statutory rules or an Act. The Executive must abide by that Act or the Rules. It cannot ignore or act contrary to the Rules or the Act. We need not elaborate this point, except mentioning the decision of the Supreme Court in Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur and Others Vs. The State of Punjab, . It was observed in this case:

ordinarily the executive power connotes the residue of governmental functions that remain after legislative and judicial functions are taken away.

In State of Sikkim Vs. Dorjee Tshering Bhutia and others, the Supreme Court has observed the following:

The executive power of the State under Article 162 of the Constitution of India extends to the matters with respect to which the legislature of the State has power to make laws. The Government business is conducted under Article 166(3) of the Constitution in accordance with the Rules of Business made by the Governor. Under the said Rules unless the Government business is divided amongst the ministers and specific functions are allocated to different ministries. Each ministry can, therefore, issue orders or notifications in respect of the functions which have been allocated to it under the Rules of Business.

18-A. The executive power of the State cannot be exercised in the field which is already occupied by the laws made by the Legislature. It is settled law that any order, instruction, direction or Notification issued in exercise of the Executive power of the State which is contrary to any statutory provisions, is without jurisdiction and is a nullity. But in this case we are faced with a peculiar situation. The Rules, though enforced, remained unworkable for about five years. The Public Service Commission, which was the authority to implement the Rules, was not in existence during the said period. There is nothing on record to show as to why the Public Service Commission was not constituted during all those five years. In the absence of any material to the contrary we assume that there were justifiable reasons for the delay in constituting the Commission. The executive power of the State being divided amongst various functionaries under Article 166(3) of the Constitution of India there is possibility of lack of co-ordination amongst various limbs of the Government working within their respective spheres of allocation. The object of regulating the recruitment and conditions of service by statutory provisions is to rule out arbitrariness, provide consistency and crystallise the rights of employees concerned. The statutory provisions which are unworkable and inoperative cannot achieve these objectives. Such provisions are non est till made operational. It is the operative statutory provisions which have the effect of ousting Executive power of the State from the same field. When in a peculiar situation, as in the present case, the statutory provisions could not be operated there was no bar for the State Government to act in exercise of its executive power. The impugned notification to hold special selection was issued almost four years after the enforcement of the Rules. It was done to remove stagnation and to afford an opportunity to the eligible persons to enter the service. In our view the State Government was justified in issuing the impugned notification in exercise of its executive power and the High Court fell into error in quashing the same.

In re Chandra Mohan 1992 M.L.J. Rep (Cri.) 161 while dealing with the scope of Sections 432, 433 and 435(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the learned single Judge of this Court had held in ail almost identical facts/situation of the instant case, in the following words:

Section 435(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure shows that when the case is investigated into by the Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, or by any other Agency empowered under any Central Act other than the Code, the State Government can pass orders of remission only after consultation with the Central Government. In the instant case, the investigation is by the Central Bureau of Investigation which is a wing of the Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. Consultation of the Central Government is, therefore, necessary. The two remission Government Orders do not show that the State Government consulted the Central Government before passing them, nor has any material been placed before the Court to show that the State Government consulted to Central Government. The two Government Orders viz., G.O.Ms. No. 180, Home (Prisons IV) Department, dated 28.1.1989 and G.O.Ms. No. 781, Home (P.R.C. Department), dated 11.4.1990, therefore, will not apply to this particular case in view of Section 435(1)(a) of Code of Criminal Procedure.

It has also become necessary to advert Section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which runs like this:

State Government to act after consultation with Central Government in certain cases. (1) The powers conferred by Sections 432 and 433 upon the State Government to remit or commute a sentence, in any case where the sentence is for an offence-

(a) which was investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, or by any other agency empowered to make investigation into an offence under any Central Act other than this Code, or

(b) which involved the misappropriation or destruction of, or damage to, any property belonging to the Central Government, or

(c) which was committed by a person in the service of the Central Government while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, shall not be exercised by the State Government except after consultation with the Central Government.

(2) No order of suspension, remission or commutation of sentences passed by the State Government in relation to a person, who has been convicted of offences, some of which relate to matters to which the executive power of the Union extends, and who has been sentenced to separate terms of imprisonment which are to run concurrently, shall have effect unless an order for the suspension, remission or commutation, as the case may be, of such sentences has also been made by the Central Government in relation to the offences committed by such person with regard to matters to which the executive power of the Union extends.

In the light of the above Section of law and the statutory mandate provided, if one wants to get the benefit of the remission provided by the State Government to a person convicted of an offence which was investigated by the C.B.I. wing established under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act it shall be done only in case where the relevant respective G.Os. or the Ordinances would have been passed with the consultation of the Central Government, and if such consultation is absent, then it is very difficult for the Court to concede every contentions and the efforts taken by the learned senior counsel for the revision Petitioner in the instant case.

In Veluswami, S.S.R. v. Sabestian and 5 Ors. 1996 2 L.W. (Cri.) 376 I have had the occasion to hold the following which is useful to be read out at this juncture:

From a careful perusal of the impugned judgment, it is patently clear that the learned lower Appellate Judge while giving the reasoning has covered the period so consumed as a ground for modification, but never provided any interaction or nexus for the modification of the period in all the counts of charges to a total period of modification into 2 1/2 years, which is not only erroneous, but also alien to the functionary system. Each count of charges with the gravity of the offences established by the prosecution has to be assessed necessarily and independently with regard to the awarding of punishment by way of sentence or fine. The law provided therefore under the Indian Penology has to be necessarily adverted to and by so doing, the Court has to arrive at or evolve the adequate sentence to each of the counts in which the prosecution offered to prove. This rule however, appears to have not been followed by the learned lower Appellate Judge in the instant case.

Thus, having considered the legal principles and the ratio held by the Courts of law and the Apex Court, it is made clear that though the State as well as the Governor of a State had the power to pass an order or the Ordinance providing the remissions or commuting the sentences of any offence categorised therein, if the remission is to be intended to such of the cases where the investigation was conducted by the investigating agency belonging to not the State Government, but the agency of the Central Government, then by virtue of Section 435 as specifically spelt out, in the absence of any material or evidence to show that the said G.Os. or the Ordinances have been passed after consultation with the Central Government, it cannot be made applicable to such of the cases, where the investigation was done by the Central Government investigating agency. By applying the above principle of the facts of the instant case, it cannot be disputed that the Respondent being the investigating agency established under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, an Act passed by the Parliament, a consultation before passing Government Orders, with regard to the three G.Os. referred to by the learned Senior Counsel in the instant case, is expected. But, however, as contended, no material or iota of evidence is available with the said three G.Os. providing for the benefit of remission to the persons convicted of the offences to show that they have been passed after consultation with the Central Government. It is therefore under these circumstances, I am fully constrained to accept the very contentions and efforts made by Mr. P. Rajamanickam, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent to the effect that the Petitioner is not entitled to and cannot have the relief claimed in this petition. Learned senior counsel Mr. G. Krishnan, has placed reliance in the case State of Punjab and others Vs. Joginder Singh and others, where, Their Lordships, ha(Sic) ruled the following:

Remission cannot detract from the quantum and quality of the judicial sentence except to the extent permitted by Section 432 of the Code, subject of course to Section 433A, or where the clemency power under the Constitution is invoked. But while exercising the constitutional power under Article 72/161, the President or the Governor, as the case may be, must act on the advice of the Council of Ministers. The power under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution is absolute and cannot be fettered by any statutory provision such as Sections 432, 433 and 433-A of the Code. This power cannot be altered, modified or interfered with in any manner whatsoever by any statutory provisions or Prison Rules.

Reliance also was placed by the learned Senior Counsel in a case held by a learned singe Judge of this Court in Srinivasan, G. and Ors. v. P. Shanmugam and Ors. 1995 1 L.W. (Cri.) 80 at page 84.

Sriramulu, B. and Ors. v. Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu and Anr. 1995 2 L.W. (Cri.) 670 held by a learned Singe Judge of this Court was also relied upon to show that the State Government as well as the Governor has got power to pass orders or the Ordinances to provide remissions or commutation of sentences to such of the offences which have been categorised in the impugned order.

I have carefully gone through the case laws relied on by the learned Senior Counsel in support of the case of the Petitioner. The very entitlement of the remission has not at all been disputed in the case laws cited above by the learned senior counsel. But to the crux of the instant case, the very entitlement of the benefit of the G.O. passed by the State Government on three occasions referred supra is in question and it remains to be seen, whether the Petitioner is entitled to get it. As I have already held, in a case projected and investigated by the special investigating agency established under the Special Police Establishment Act, being an act of Parliament to exempt or to provide the benefit of such G.Os. passed by the State Government or the Governor either under the statute or the constitutional power should have been made with the consultation of the Central Government before passing the same, and that in so far as the same is lacking and that no iota of materials or evidence is made available to show the compliance of the said mandate, I am at every difficulty to accept the very contention made by the learned senior counsel Mr. G. Krishnan, and that therefore, I am quite in agreement with various findings and observations given by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Chennai in the impugned order. For all the reasonings give above, I do not find any merits in the petition or in the contentions made on behalf of the Petitioner through the Bar. With the result, the revision lacks merits and accordingly it is liable to be dismissed.

In the result, for all the foregoing reasonings, the revision fails and it is dismissed. Consequently, the orders passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Chennai in Crl. M.P. No. 4800/96 in C.C. No. 2/72 dated 18.10.1996 is hereby confirmed and maintained. Consequently, Crl. M.P. No. 101/97 is also dismissed.