M. Ranganarayanan vs Central Bank of India

Srinivasan, J.—In this writ petition the Petitioner is challenging the termination of his employment by the second Respondent by order dated

20.7.1982. The Petitioner filed an application for employment on 12.3.1978. In the application he described himself as belonging to the community

of Konda Reddy. At the bottom of the application he certified that the information given therein is correct and complete to the best of his

knowledge and belief. He also said ""I understand and agree that misrepresentation, falsification or omission of material fact may be caused for

rejection of my application or for termination of employment. I understand and agree that the statements made in this application may be subject to

verification from each of my former employers and any other person who may have information concerning me"". Along with the application he has

produced a certificate issued by the Tahsildar in 1977 to the effect that the belonged to Konda Reddy community. He was appointed by the bank

and he joined service on 17.7.1978. He was confirmed on 17.1.1979. Then it was found out that the certificate issued by the Tahsildar was not

correct and he did not belong to Konda Reddy Community. Hence the bank passed an order on 20.7.1982 terminating his employment. The

relevant part of the memorandum issued by the bank reads as follows:

Mr. N. Ranganarayanan was recruited as clerk on 17.7.1978 at Peelamedu, Coimbatore-4 in terms of bank''s memo dated 7.7.1978 in the

reserved list as he claimed to belong to the Scheduled Tribe Community namely, Konda Reddy Community.

The fact, as it has emerged is that the Konda Reddy community does not exist in Samugarengapuram village Nanguneri taluk of which Sri

Ranganarayanan is a native and hence he cannot be said to belong to the Scheduled Tribe category. Accordingly, the contract of appointment

becomes voidable and the bank hereby rescinds the contract of appointment with immediate effect, which is based on this wrong premise.

The cessation of employer-employee relationship as a result thereof, does not amount to discharge simplicitor. However, as a measure of abundant

caution, pay order for Rs. 2,646.06 being 3 months'' pay and allowance in lieu of notice is enclosed herewith.

The aforesaid cessation of the contract of service with immediate effect does not amount to retrenchment. However, as a measure of a abundant

caution a pay order for Rs. 1,764.04 by way of retrenchment of service is enclosed herewith. He may call on the bank to collect his other legal

dues.

It is the said termination which is challenged in this writ petition.

When the matter camp up before a Division Bench earlier along with a batch of petitions, relating to the Konda Reddy Communities the Division

Bench passed an order in this matter separately calling for a report from the District Collector, Tirunelveli. The order reads as follows:

The Petitioner, on being appointed as a clerk-typist in the second Respondent bank has filed the writ petition for a writ of certiorari for quashing

the order of termination dated 20.7.1982, on the ground that he does not belong to Konda Reddy Community. Apart from other points taken by

him, he also relies upon the report of the Special Tahsildar dated 5-3-1981 submitted to District Harijan Welfare Officer, Tirunelveli, which was

prepared on the verifications sought for by the second Respondent-bank. The ultimate communications, which have emerged from the District

Revenue Officer and the Collector, do not disclose that the report dated 5.3.1981 of the Special Tahsildar, Cheranmahadevi had been looked

into. The file produced by the Additional Government Pleader discloses that not only the said report but the entire enquiry file forms part of the

record. In spite of such a detailed report submitted concerning the claims made by the Petitioner, when the ultimate decision arrived at, per se

appears to be based only on a vague general report submitted by the Tahsildar, Nanguneri, it has become necessary to direct the Collector (third

Respondent) to consider the contents of the report dated 5.3.1981 along with the other reports and documents sent by bank and take a decision

as to whether the claim of the Petitioner that he belongs to Konda Reddy community is substantiated or not. Pendency of the writ petition does not

preclude a decision being arrived at, on the merits of the matter, by taking into account all the relevant factors, the order shall disclose reasons for

the conclusion arrived at.

Report to be submitted by 1.2.1985.

Such a report was sent by the Collector to this Court, but, unfortunately, the matter does not seem to have been posted before Court thereafter

for orders for a long time. Subsequently the matter was posted in 1994 before a single judge. Then the learned judge called upon the Government

Pleader to produce the relevant records and also get the report of the Collector. On a communication from the Government Pleader, the Collector

has sent a copy of the report along with a covering letter dated 31.3.1994 bearing Roc. No. B4. 399995/94. It is seen from the report which is

dated 31.7.1985 addressed to the Registrar of this Court that an enquiry was held and the Petitioner had participated in the same. After referring

to some earlier enquiries held by the Tahsildar the report says that the District Revenue Officer conducted an enquiry on 19.3.1985 pursuant to the

order of this Court and heard the Petitioner. A statement was also obtained from him. Then the report proceeds to discuss the materials made

available with the Collector. Ultimately the Collector found that the Petitioner does not belong to Konda Reddy Community. The Collector has

also pointed out that there is no material whatever prior to 1950 indicating that the Petitioner belonged to Konda Reddy Community and only

subsequent documents have been produced to show as if the Petitioner belonged to Konda Reddy community. The Collector has also placed

reliance on the circumstance that in the village to which the Petitioner belongs, no person belonged to Konda Reddy community and the residents

were only Reddiars and not Konda Reddiars.

After the report was received no affidavit has been filed by the Petitioner denying the contents of the report. It is not the case of the Petitioner

that no enquiry was held as directed by this Court or that no statement was recorded from him. In the circumstances, there cannot be any obstacle

in accepting the report of the District Collector which has been given after a due enquiry. It has been now found in the enquiry that the Petitioner

does not belong to Konda Reddy community. Even otherwise the claim of the Petitioner that he belongs to the said community cannot be accepted

as there is no proof of the same.

Yet Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contends that the writ Petitioner has to succeed because, the order of termination is invalid for certain

reasons: The first contention of Learned Counsel is that the report should not be accepted because it is on the basis that there is no person

belonging to the community in the said locality. Learned Counsel submits that it is one thing to say that no person belonging to the community is

available in the village and another thing to say that the Petitioner is not a person belonging to the community. The distinction in the present case is

one without any difference. The emphasis on the fact that there is no person belonging to the, community in that village is made only because the

entire village consists of people of other communities and at no time anybody belonging to Konda Reddy community was resident of that place.

But the report does not stop with that. The report has gone to the extent of finding that the Petitioner does not belong to Konda Reddy community

and there is no evidence to prove the same. Hence this contention is without any substance and it is rejected.

The next contention is that the certificate issued by the Tahsildar in 1977 showing that the Petitioner belongs to Konda Reddy community has

not yet been cancelled and unless and until the certificate is cancelled it has to be acted upon by the public authorities and, therefore, the order of

termination is bad. Reliance is placed upon Sakthi Devi, S.P. v. The Collector of Salem, Salem Etc. 98 L.W. 105 in support of the said

proposition. The said ruling will not apply in this case. In the present case an enquiry was directed by this Court in this writ petition and the

Collector was directed to submit a report. Pursuant thereto the enquiry has been held and the Collector has given a report that the Petitioner does

not belong to Konda Reddy community. Hence if the report is accepted by this Court, it follows that the Petitioner does not belong to that

community. He cannot place any reliance on the certificate issued by the Tahsildar earlier in 1977. It goes without saying that the said certificate

has no validity in the fact of the present finding arrived at by this Court on the basis of the report of the Collector. The certificate has ceased to be

effective and it cannot operate as against this finding.

I have considered this question in detail in my judgment dated 2.12.1994 in S.M. Chinnaraj v. Central Bank of India and Anr. W.P. No. 7876

of 1985 and pointed out that the certificate of the Tahsildar because ineffective. I have referred to the judgment in Sakthi Devi, S.P. v. The

Collector of Salem, Salem etc. 98 L.W. 105 and said thus:

It was held in that case that so long as a certificate brought into existence by the empowered public authority is not cancelled, all public authorities

in Central Government and public sector undertakings and bodies etc., which are under its control are bound to treat the contents of such

certificate as correct. The proposition has no application in the present case.

The same reasoning would apply in the present case and the ruling in Sakthi Devi''s case (Supra) will not help the Petitioner in any manner.

The next contention urged by Learned Counsel is that the Petitioner is a permanent employee and that if at all he is only guilty of misconduct in

having produced a false certificate. According Learned Counsel, the bank is entitled to take a disciplinary action but erred in having passed an

order of termination without taking any such reason or enquiring Learned Counsel submits that para 522 of the Sastry Award will not apply and in

any, event the said paragraph is unconstitutional and violative of the principle enshrined in the Constitution of India. Reliance is placed on the

judgment in West Bengal State Electricity Board and Others Vs. Desh Bandhu Ghosh and Others, and Central Inland Water Transport

Corporation Limited and Another Vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly and Another, . In these cases the Supreme Court struck down certain clauses in the

Regulation framed by the employers enabling them to terminate the service of an employee by giving three months'' notice. Learned Counsel

submits that in view of those judgments para 522 of the Sastry Award has become invalid. I am unable to accept this contention. Para 522(1) of

the Award reads thus:

In cases not involving disciplinary action for misconduct and subject to Clause (6) below, the employment of a permanent employee may be

terminated by three months'' notice or on payment of three months'' pay and allowances in lieu of notice. The services of a probationer may be

terminated by one month''s notice or on payment of a month''s pay and allowances in lieu of notice.

The award is one arrived on at a by-partite settlement under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. It cannot be a equated to a unilateral

Regulation framed by the management. As it is a settlement under the Act it is binding on both parties. Para 522 cannot, therefore, be ignored or

brushed aside on the basis of the rulings given by the Supreme Court in above two cases. The aspect of the matter has been considered by a

learned judge of this Court in T.D. Digambar Vs. Central Bank of India and Another, . The learned judge has rejected a similar contention in the

following words:

The plea of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and challenge to paragraph 522 of the Bi-Partite settlement also does not merit any

acceptance. On behalf of the Petitioner, reliance was placed on the decision in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and Another

Vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly and Another, and Spencer and Company Limited v. B. Vajravelu (1989) 2 L.W. 53, (Summary of Cases) and it was

contended that the Respondent which is a nationalised bank being ""State"" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India is subject to

Article 14 of the Constitution of India and consequently, paragraph 522 which provides for arbitrary termination is liable to be struck down as

being opposed to public policy and violation of the principles of natural justice too. In my view, having regard to the origin of the Sastry Award as

a judgment of a tribunal and its adoption throughout by means of bi-partite statutory settlement the principles enunciated in the Central Inland

Water Transport Corporation Limited and Another Vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly and Another, : will have no application to the case on hand. Spencer

and Company Ltd. v. B. Vajravelu (1989) 2 L.W. 53 (Summary of Cases) equally has no application having regard to the specific finding therein

that the order ex facie showed adverse imputation against the employees for misconduct which is not and could not be said to be the case herein.

For the Respondents, the Supreme Court decision in Supreme Court Employees'' Welfare Association and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and

Another, , was relied upon to contend that when a particular decision has become final and binding between the parties, they would always be

bound by the said decision and it cannot be set at naught on the ground that such decision was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It

was also contended that the validity of paragraph 522 of the Sastry Award in question was the subject matter of challenge and the Apex Court

repelled the same in the decision in The Chartered Bank, Bombay Vs. The Chartered Bank Employees'' Union, . In paragraph 7 of the said

judgment while construing the scope of power of the Bank under paragraph 522 of the Sastry Award, it was held as hereunder:

Two courses were open to it; it could have taken disciplinary action under paragraph 521 of the Bank Award or it could have acted under

paragraph 522(i) The submission on behalf on the Bank is that it did not want to go into the squabble between the Chief Cashier and the

Respondent and as the Chief Cashier had withdrawn his guarantee with respect to the Respondent it acted bona fide in proceeding under

paragraph 522(i) and thus no question arose of its taking disciplinary action against the Respondent"". Consequently, the provision contained in

paras. 521 and 522 had different and distinct roles to play and had been held to be binding all along upon the parties and the plea based on Article

16 of the Constitution of India, in my view, is wholly misconceived. The clause in question cannot be said to have been either unilaterally thrust on

the employee or that the employee was made to agree taking advantage of the dominant role the management had at its command to play in the

matter. As referred to already, the bi-partite settlement had its origin in Sastry Award having been rendered by a Judicial Tribunal, that the same

was given statutory force and has all along been observed to be the charter of right in respect of the employer and employee relationship of the

Bank and its employees and that the said award continued to bind the rights of parties by bilateral settlement entered into under the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947. The challenge to such a provision pressing into service the principles enunciated in the Central Inland Water Transport

Corporation Limited and Another Vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly and Another, , does not carry any weight or merit. The challenge, therefore, fails and

shall stand rejected.

It is argued by Learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the facts in the case of T.D. Digambar, referred to above are entirely different and it was

a case of statutory prohibition against continuance in employment contained in Section 10(1)(b)(iii) of the Banking Regulation Act. Such a

distinction cannot be made with reference to paragraph 522. The only question with which we are concerned is, whether paragraph 522 of Sastry

Award is unenforceable. In that regard the discussion of the learned judge is quite relevant and I agree with the reasoning given by the learned

Judge. Hence there is no merit in the contention of Learned Counsel.

It is next argued that the Sastry Award cannot be placed on any higher footing than a Regulation because of Section 19(3) of the Banking

Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1970. That Sub-section reads as follows:

Until any regulation is made under Sub-section (1), the articles of association of the existing bank and every regulation, rule, bye-law or order

made by the existing bank shall, if in force at commencement of this Act, be deemed to be regulations made under Sub-section (1) and shall have

effect accordingly and any reference therein to any authority of the existing bank shall be deemed to be a reference to the corresponding authority

of the corresponding new bank and until any such corresponding authority is constituted under this Art, shall be deemed to refer to the

Custodian....

There is no substance in this contention. Just because the Section provides that a Regulation which was existing previously at the commencement of

the Act be deemed to be a Regulation, under Sub-section (1) it does not mean that the Sastry Award will have only such force as that of a

unilateral regulation made by the management. The Section introduces only a statutory fiction and that itself shows that the award is not the same as

a regulation framed by the management. Fiction cannot be extended beyond the purpose thereof. Even otherwise, on the basis of the reasoning

given by Raju, J., in T.D. Digambar''s case (Supra), paragraph 522 is binding on the parties.

Reliance is placed upon the judgment of a learned single judge of this Court in R. Poongothai v. Dean, Thanjavur Medical College, Thanjavur

and Ors. W.P. No. 1250 of 1981 - order dated 24.12.1981 for the purpose of contending that merely because a community is not existing in a

particular district, it does not mean that a particular individual does not belong to that community. The said ruling has no application in the present

case in view of the facts already stated.

Learned Counsel for the Respondents drew my attention to the judgments in The Chartered Bank, Bombay Vs. The Chartered Bank

Employees'' Union, and K. Palanikumar Vs. Indian Bank and Another, and submits that in these case a similar termination has been upheld on the

basis that there is no necessity for holding a disciplinary enquiry. The rulings will certainly apply in the present case.

There is absolutely no merit in any of the contentions put forward by the Petitioner''s counsel. In the circumstances, the writ petition fails and is

dismissed. No costs.