M. Subramanian vs The General Manager and The Branch Manager, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation

K. Chandru, J.—The Petitioner who is working as a Driver in the Respondent Transport Corporation, has come forward to challenge an order of transfer, dated 16.09.2010, wherein and by which the Petitioner was transferred from Usilampatti Branch to Thirupuvanam Branch. The same order relates to two other drivers also.

The contention of the Petitioner was that transfer order was a non speaking order. There was no application of mind. It was issued with malafide intention. The transfer order issued during the middle of the academic period is invalid and it is opposed to Wednesbury''s principle of unreasonableness and also it is contrary to Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution of India. The Petitioner had further stated that his wife is having treatment at Usilampatti and he has school going children, whereas in the same depot, there are workers who do not have any school going children.

It is not clear as to how these facts can be relevant in impugning the transfer order. On the other hand, the Petitioner who is a driver in the Respondent Corporation has been working for more than 10 years in the same depot. The transfer order cannot be impugned only on the ground that it does not give any reason. One is not expected to write reasons for transfer. In the absence of any personal malafide against the Respondents, the transfer order cannot be impugned by the Petitioner. Under the relevant Standing Order, an employee of the Corporation is entitled for transfer from one branch to an another branch and from one depot to an another depot.

As admittedly, since the Petitioner belongs to Transport Corporation, he is entitled to serve wherever a posting is given to him. Therefore, the basic question is whether the Petitioner is entitled to resist an order of transfer or in the alternative, through the Court, can get the posting to a particular place in the absence of Rules. Under the Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India being Transport Corporation, transfer is an incidence of service of any service personnel and unless the transfer is made on the ground of mala fide or for extraneous reasons, the Court cannot go behind the power of the authorities in effecting transfer.

In this context, it is necessary to refer to the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court reported in State of U.P. and Others Vs. Siya Ram and Another, . In paragraph 5 observed as follows.

The High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India had gone into the question as to whether the transfer was in the interest of public service. That would essentially require factual adjudication and invariably depend upon peculiar facts and circumstances of the case concerned. No government servant or employee of a public undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place or place of his choice since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to other is not only an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the courts or the tribunals normally cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine, as though they were appellate authorities substituting their own decision for that of the employer/management, as against such orders passed in the interest of administrative exigencies of the service concerned. This position was highlighted by this Court in National Hydroelectric Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Shri Bhagwan1.

Further, the Hon''ble Supreme Court in yet another decision State of U.P. and Others Vs. Gobardhan Lal, observed as follows:

It is too late in the day for anygovernment servant to contend that once appointed orposted in a particular place or position, he should continue in such place or position as long as he desires. Transfer of an employee is not only an incidentinherent in the terms of appointment but also implicit asan essential condition of service in the absence of anyspecific indication to the contra, in the law governing or conditions of service. Unless the order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of a mala fide exercise of power or violative of any statutory provision (an Act orrule) or passed by an authority not competent to do so,an order of transfer cannot lightly be interfered with asa matter of course or routine for any or every type ofgrievance sought to be made. Even administrative guidelines for regulating transfers or containing transferpolicies at best may afford an opportunity to the officer or servant concerned to approach their higher authorities for redress but cannot have the consequence of depriving or denying the competentauthority to transfer a particular officer/servant to anyplace in public interest and as is found necessitated byexigencies of service as long as the official status is notaffected adversely and there is no infraction of anycareer prospects such as seniority, scale of pay andsecured emoluments. This Court has often reiterated that the order of transfer made even in transgression of administrative guidelines cannot also be interferedwith, as they do not confer any legally enforceable rights, unless, as noticed supra, shown to be vitiated bymala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provision.

Inspite of all these judgments against the Petitioner, the counsel for the Petitioner placed reliance upon an order of the Supreme Court in Director of School Education v. O. Karuppa Thevan . While the earlier decisions referred to the legal precedents, the order referred to by the Petitioner is an order given under special power vested with the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, which cannot be quoted as a precedent in any other case.

In essence, this Court is only bound by the legal precedents laid down by the Supreme Court and did not have special power like Article 142 which is vested with the Supreme Court alone for rendering effective and complete justice. The learned Counsel vehemently contended that this Court should follow Karuppa Thevan''s case (cited supra) but little realising that the power to grant such relief is only vested with the Supreme Court and not on this Court. There are enough binding precedents on this issue, which is contrary to the proposition advanced by the Petitioner. In the absence of any malafide alleged against the Respondents and lack of jurisdiction in passing an order of transfer, this Court is not inclined to entertain the writ petition.

In the light of the above, the writ petition will stand dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions stand closed.