M. Vijayaraghava Reddiar vs The Chairman and Managing Director, Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others

V.S. Sirpurkar. J.

This appeal is against the order passed by the learned single Judge by which the Writ Petition filed by the appellant/petitioner was dismissed. In

that writ petition, it was complained that the action of disconnection of the water supply, taken by the respondent-Board by order dated 5-11-

1999 was illegal and bad.

Admitted facts are that the petitioner is the owner of the premises at No. 16, Rameswaram Road, T. Nagar, Chennai-17. He had the water

connection from the respondent-Board. By the impugned order he was informed that during surprise inspection at his premises on 5-11-1999, it

was found that he had directly connected electric motor with metro water service line, indicating direct suction of metro water which was Illegal. It

was on that ground, the water line was disconnected straightway. That was challenged in the writ petition. It was the contention of the

appellant/petitioner that this was done under Regulation 45 of the Madras Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Act, 1978 and that

Regulation 45 was ultra vires the Act. The learned Single Judge has found firstly that the said Regulation 45 was not ultra vires the Act. It was also

contended that the Regulation 45 which was based u/s 81(2)(k) of the Act requires the prior sanction of the Government. The learned Judge found

that that was also not necessary. The learned Judge has found the action of the respondent-Board to be in order. In paragraph 7 of his order, the

learned single Judge observed that if the disconnection was made Illegally, it was always open to the appellant/petitioner to approach the

respondent-Board by way of a representation regarding his stand with respect to the Illegality, and if the appellant/petitioner was able to prove his

case, then the respondent-Board would be duty bound to restore the water Supply without insisting on the other conditions mentioned in the said

Regulation. It was also pointed out to the learned single Judge that a notice was already issued on 15-11-1999 and the respondent-Board was

directed to consider the said notice-cum-representation given on behalf of the appellant/petitioner on merits and pass orders within two weeks

from the date of the receipt of the order. Very strangely enough, though this relief was given, the appellant/petitioner has come up in an appeal

contending that Regulation 45 under which the respondent-Board purportedly acted, was ultra vires the Act.

Before going to that question as to whether Regulation 45 is ultra vires the Act and before considering as to whether the learned single Judge

was right in holding that Regulation to be in order, we would rather consider some other provisions of the Act. u/s 45 of the Act, the water

connections for domestic consumption and use are provided. The power to cut off the water supply is provided by Section 49 of the Act. It is

interesting to see Section 49(d) and Section 49(j). Section 49 starts with non-obstante clause and suggests that notwithstanding anything contained

in the Act, the authorised authority may cut off the connection between any water works of the Board and any premises to which water is supplied

from such works or may turn off such supply in any of the following cases. Sub-section (d) provides as under :

If the owner or occupier of the premises fails to fix or prevents the fixing of a meter as required by or under the provisions of this Act, or wilfully

or negligently injures or damages the meter or otherwise Interferes with any pipe or tap or main or other work conveying water from any works of

the Board.

S. 49(j) of the Act provides :

If there is any default in complying with any requisition made under this Act, or of any provision of this Act or any instrument made thereunder is

contravened.

Further Section 69(c) of the Act provides as under ;

No person shall-

(a) and (b) ......

(c) take or utilise any water except as authorised by or under this Act.

The conjoint reading of all these provisions under Sections 49 and 69 of the Act suggests that there is a total prohibition: u/s 49(d) from

interfering with the pipe line. S. 49(j) provides that if any contravention of any provision is found out, the water line can be cut. That can be done

for an eventuality u/s 49(d) also Section 69(c) specifically provides that a consumer could not take the water except as authorised by or under this

Act. This would suggest that it is not left to the consumer to decide as to in what manner he would take the water, which would include drawing

supply with the help of electric pump unless it is specifically authorised. In this case, there is no such authorisation either pleaded or proved.

The learned counsel for the appellant says that in the first place, there was no Illegal water connection and the allegation in that behalf was totally

incorrect. We do not find in the order of the learned single Judge any such claim having been made by the appellant/petitioner. Besides, we will not

go into the factual question as to whether there was actually an electric pump connected to the tap of the respondent-Board. We will have to

accept the inspection report dated 5-11-1999, as there are no mala fides pleaded or proved against the officials. Once it is clear that the consumer

had fixed the electric pump to the pipe, the action comes directly under the provisions of Section 49(d) as, also u/s 69(c) of the Act. We have

deliberately quoted Section 69(c) as we do not find anywhere in the Act that the water could be pulled using the electric pumps getting them

connected to the water taps. Therefore, this is a clear case where Section 49 itself would be activated because of the approach of the Ss.| 49(d),

49(J) and 69(c) of the Act.

If that is so, there would be no question of further considering as to whether the Regulation 45 is ultra vires or not. This is besides the point that

we do not find any reason as to why the reasoning given by the learned single Judge that it is ultra vires the Act is in any way wrong. We have

given these additional reasons as the learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner contended that the power to cut the water supply emanates only

from Regulation 45. That is not correct. The power comes from Section 49 also in the way we have shown in the earlier paragraphs. If that is so,

then there is no question of Interfering with the order of the learned single Judge.

The learned single Judge had also given a facility of making the representation to the respondent-Board and had directed the respondent-Board

to take further action on the basis of that representation. The learned Special Government pleader appearing for the respondent-Board points out

that though the initial representation dated 15-11-1999 has been given, the appellant/petitioner has not chosen to pursue the matter further. We

only make it clear that if the appellant/petitioner wants to do it, he may still do it. The respondent-Board may decide the question in the light of the

abovementioned provisions. With these observations, we dismiss the writ appeal. No costs. Consequently, connected CMP is also dismissed.