M.A. Haleem vs State of Hyderabad

Taki Bilgrami, J.—This application for issue of a Writ of Certiorari or any other suitable writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution is directed against an order of the Deputy Inspector General of Police, East Range reverting the applicant from the post of an Inspector of Police to that of a Sub-Inspector and an order of the Inspector General of Police dated 21-9-1952 finally dismissing the petitioner from the service. The charges against the applicant were of corruption and misconduct. The applicant challenges the order of reversion on the ground that no notice was served on him or any opportunity afforded for defending the case before passing the order. The dismissal order is impeached on the ground that two notices, one of the charges and the other of the punishment proposed as required by Art. 311 (2) and the Hyderabad Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules were not given and that the Public Service Commission was not consulted before passing the order of dismissal.

The inquiry it is also asserted was conducted unfairly and on utter disregard of the basic principles of natural justice.

The point round which the controversy has mainly centred in this case is the necessity of issuing two separate notices at different stages of the inquiry. The counsel for the applicant urges that apart from the Civil Service Rules referred to above and Art. 311 (2), it is absolutely essential that a notice of the charges and a separate notice of the punishment proposed be issued at different stages of the inquiry: If the dismissing authority fails to issue any one of these the whole inquiry is vitiated and the order is rendered null and void.

Reliance is placed on -- ''Hiro Lilaram Chablani v. State of Hyderabad'', (S) AIR 1955 Hyd 48 (A) and also on a more recent case of the Nagpur High Court, -- AIR 1955 175 (Nagpur) ; - C. Sambandam Vs. The General Manager, South Indian Railway, Tiruchirapalli, and also a decision of the Privy Council in -- AIR 1948 121 (Privy Council) The Advocate General on the other hand contends that Chablani''s case and also cases of other High Courts cited above are based on the decision of the Privy Council in ''I. M. Lall''s case (D)''. Their Lordships did not intend in that case an inflexible rule of universal application that without regard to the particular facts of the case two notices are absolutely essential.

An earlier Federal Court''s decision -- AIR 1945 47 (Federal Court) was followed and their Lordships of the Privy Council never intended to go further than the Federal Court, in this matter. Spens C. J. delivering the judgment of the majority has made it clear that he did not intend to lay down a rule which could govern all cases that two notices are necessary, and that whether they were necessary in a particular case or not will depend on the peculiar circumstance of that case; as will appear from the following observations which occur in the judgment:

It is suggested that in some cases it will be sufficient to indicate the charges, the evidence in which those charges are put forward and to make it clear that unless the person can on that information show good cause against being dismissed or reduced if all or any of the charges are proved, dismissal or reduction in rank will follow. This may indeed be sufficient in some cases.

''In our judgment each case will have to turn on its own facts'', but the real point of the sub-section is in our judgment that the person who is to be dismissed or reduced must know that that punishment is proposed as the punishment for certain acts or omissions on his part and must be told the grounds on which it is proposed to take such action and must be given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause why such punishment should not be imposed.

The underlined (here in single quotation) passage clearly indicates that the necessity of two separate notices is dependent on the circumstances of each case and not an inflexible rule which cannot be departed from under any circumstances. In view of the above passage and also from what has been said in the Privy Council decision we are inclined to think that this contention of the learned Advocate General is not without force. Lord Thankerton in his judgment remarked that he saw no difficulty on the statutory opportunity reasonably afforded at more than one stage. If it is taken to be the opinion of their Lordships that two notices arc absolutely essential under the Statute, as is urged on behalf of the applicant, such a remark would be rendered out of place and meaningless.

This remark is not compatible with the view that two notices are obligatory under the statute. If there is a statutory obligation to do a thing there can be no question of there being no statutory impediment to doing it. It is true that in the vast majority of cases it may result in injustice if an opportunity for meeting the charges after the issue of notice is not given and then also a later notice of the punishment proposed. But circumstances are conceivable in which the Court may be able to hold that by giving only one notice of both charges and punishment no injustice has resulted, We are not prepared to hold that under Art. 311 (2) as it is worded there is any statutory obligation to give two separate notices one of the charges and other of the punishment proposed.

We do not think that any of the rulings relied upon by the learned counsel of the applicant purport to lay down that there is a statutory duty of this kind. On the ground of natural justice it is not possible to lay down a rigid rule of this nature which can be applicable to all possible cases regardless of their peculiar circumstances.

We think however that in the present case we are not called upon to decide this point, because in our opinion this requirement of two notices stressed so much by Mr. Chenoy has been complied with in substance in the present case. It is clear from the material on record that on 18-1-1952 a notice of the charges and also the punishment proposed was given.

A notice was again issued to him on 31-8-1952. See Deputy Inspector General of Police letter No. Roc/1830/A/52/Re. A further opportunity was thus given to the applicant to defend himself from the Charges brought against him. He knew what these charges were and what punishment was proposed and we think that he is not in a position to challenge the decision of his removal from the service on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution and not entitled to the issue of the writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution for quashing his order.

We think that the notice dated 19-1-1952 also satisfies the requirement of R. 17 of the Hyderabad Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. As all the charges brought against the applicant and the punishment proposed are clearly set out therein it is not necessary for us to express any opinion on the question on which lengthy arguments have been addressed to us on behalf of both the contending parties i.e., whether these rules are merely administrative regulations or have the force of law.

So far as the order of reversion is concerned, it has merged into the order of dismissal. Since after a fair inquiry charges serious enough to justify removal have been proved, it will be futile to question or impugn this order of removal on the ground of omission to issue notices and other irregularities.

No other point arises for decision. This application in our opinion has no merits and must fail and is hereby dismissed. We make no order as to costs because the application appears to have been filed in good faith and the applicant is a dismissed civil servant in straitened circumstances.