High CourtsSingle Bench

M.A. Qayyum vs APSRTC, Musheerabad, Hyd. and another

Andhra Pradesh High Court · Decided on 10 September 1999 · Citation: (2000) 1 ALT 643

HON’BLE JUDGES
A.S. Bhate, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — Section 11A
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition No. 13037 of 1999
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Judgment

7 paragraphs · 933 words
1.

Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Counsel for the respondents.

2.

The case of the petitioner is very simple. The petitioner was admittedly appointed as a Conductor in December, 1973 by the respondent-Corporation. While he was working, due to disciplinary proceedings initiated against him, he was removed from service on 18-7-1989. The petitioner having failed in appeal raised a dispute before the Additional Labour Court, Hyderabad by ID No.8 of 1992. The Labour Court after considering the rival contentions, set aside the order of removal and passed award on 17-8-S992 directing the respondent-Corporation to reinstate the petitioner into service with continuity of service, it was directed that petitioner was not entitled for any backwages or attendant benefits. The award was published in December, 1992. Thus, the award had to be enforced by end of January, 1993. The petitioner was reinstated into service on 2-2-1993. The petitioner, submits that since he was granted the benefits of continuity of service, he was entitled to notional increments which accrued to him from the date of removal till the date of reinstatement. The petitioner contends that he was making such request, but no decision was taken by the respondent. Ultimately, he made a representation on 26-4-1999. The said representation was rejected by the respondent-Corporation by impugned order dated 7-6-1999. The order stated that it was clarified by Deputy CPM (HCR) that petitioner was not entitled for notional increments in terms of Circular No.9/1992 dated 8-9-1992. The petitioner was reinstated into service without backwages and attendant benefits. The petitioner challenges the said order.

3.

The learned Counsel for the respondents very strenuously contends that the petitioner is not entitled to any notional increments because the order of Labour Court was specific that petitioner was not entitled to attendant benefits. It is argued that granting of notional increments would amount to grant of attendant benefits which have been denied by the Labour Court. Further, it is contended that the petitioner has not approached to seek relief expeditiously. He was reinstated in February, 1993 while he has come to the Court after almost six years for claiming the relief. The argument is that delay should come in the way of petitioner in seeking relief.

4.

As far as the first contention raised by the respondent is concerned the matter is now covered by a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Managing Director, APSRTC and Others Vs. M. Sankaraiah, . Precisely same point was raised before the Division Bench. The Division Bench observed, "We cannot accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that backwages having been denied by the respondent, the benefit of notional increments cannot also be given. It is not as if the learned single Judge directed any arrears for the past period to be paid. Benefit of continuity of service cannot be restricted only to the Computation of seniority or for pensionary benefits."

5.

Even in that case the Labour Court had directed that the labourer would not be entitled to any attendant benefits. The learned Counsel for the petitioner (sic respondents) submits that this law has been declared only in 1998 and therefore petitioner cannot claim benefit of the said decision. The contention is not valid. Once the law is declared, the interpretation has to be given effect to all the matters still pending whether they were prior to the decision laying down the law or subsequent to the said decision. It is well established legal principle.

6.

It is next contended that the petitioner has approached the Court belatedly and hence he is not entitled for claiming relief. This contention also cannot be accepted in the instant case. The petitioner''s claim does not come in way of anybody else''s right. Further, there is no such a long delay in the instant case which would justify rejection of petitioner''s claim particularly because, the respondent was also required to comply with the orders of the labour Court which were passed in its true spirit as per the interpretation of law which has now become final as per decision of the Bench. It was expected that the employer would carry out the orders of Labour Court in letter and spirit and would not deprive the labourer of his legitimate right at the cost of repetition that there is no claim made for any wages which had accrued prior to reinstatement. The petitioner cannot be deprived of legitimate right merely because there is some delay. The respondent cannot take advantage of this delay in implementing the award in a case like this where a question of fixing pay of the labourer arises. The learned Counsel for the petitioner (sic respondent) relied on Jai Dev Gupta Vs. State of H.P. and Another, , for contending that if there is a long delay in claiming the relief like backwages, the petitioner should not be granted the relief after long lapse of time. Firstly, the delay in that case was of ! 8 years. Secondly, even in that case ultimately the Court granted backwages to the employee though they were restricted and also it may also be noted that petition was for claiming backwages and not for implementing the award which was the duty of the employer itself. The non-fixation of proper pay furnishes recurring course of action.

7.

In view of all these contentions, I do not think that there is any ground for rejecting the petitioner''s claim. The petition is allowed. The respondent is directed to give the notional increments to the petitioner from the date of reinstatement. No costs.