M.A. Rajarathnam vs T. Rajammal

Balasubrahmanyan, J.—This cause comes before us on a reference by Swamikkannu, J. The question is whether in a revision filed u/s 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act XVIII of 1960, the revision Petitioner is entitled to exclude the time taken for obtaining a certified copy of the order of the appellate authority for purposes of limitation. Since the learned judge felt some difficulty in the matter, he referred the question to be decided by a Bench.

Under the scheme of the Tamil Nadu (Buildings Lease and Rent Control Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the rent control Act), proceeding in the first instance are heard and determined by the Rent Controller, Against any order passed by the Rent Controller, Section 23 of the Rent Control Act provides for an appeal to an appellate authority. From an order passed by an appellate authority, a revision files to this Court u/s 25 of the Rent Control Act. It has been held by the Supreme Court in a recent decision that notwithstanding the wide language used in describing the power of revision of the High Court u/s 25 of the Act, that, in essence, is only a revisional jurisdiction and not an appellate jurisdiction. Section 25(2) provides for a period of limitation within which a revision petition can be filed before this Court. The same Section also provides for a limited jurisdiction in the High Court to allow further time under certain circumstances. The provision regarding limitation in Section 25 are cast in the following words:

25(2): Every application to the High Court for the exercise of its power under Sub-section (1) shall be preferred within one month from the date on which the order or proceeding to which the application relates is communicated to the Applicant.

Provided that the High Court may, in its discretion, allow further time not exceeding one month for the filing of any such application, it is satisfied that the Applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the application within the time specified in this Sub-section.

The period of limitation prescribed in Section 25(2) is one month from the date on which the appellate authority''s order is communicated to the revision Petitioner. The question is whether in calculating the period of one month the revision Petitioner is entitled to exclude the time taken by him for obtaining a certified copy of the order of the appellate authority which is sought to be subjected to revision.

There is no express provision in Section 25 of the Act which province for he excitation of the time taken for obtaining a certified cops. We may, however, refer to Rule 24 of the statutory rules called the Tamil Nadu. Buildings Lease and Rent Control Rules, 1974 governing the procedure for furnishing certified copies. This rule lays dawn that any person affected by any order passed by the appellate authority acting u/s 23 of the Act shall be entitled to be furnished with a copy thereof duly certified by the appellate authority on application. The rule further provides that the Civil Rules of Practice and Circular Orders made by the High Court in regard to the making of applications and the grant of certified copies shall, so far as may be, apply to any application filed and the grant of any copies to be furnished by the appellate authority under the Act.

It is convenient, at this stage, to refer to the procedure which has been prescribed by the Appellate Side Rules of this Court for proceedings in revision. Order IV, Rule 21 of the Appellate Side Rules, 1965 provides that civil revision petitions u/s 115 of the Code or any other enactment shall be accompanied, among other things, by a certified copy of the decree or order which is to be revised and a certified copy of the judgment, if any, on which the decree is based as well as a certified copy of the judgment or order, if any to the Court or Tribunal of the first instance.

It is, therefore, clear from the Rent Control Act and the Appellate Side Rules that there is not only a provision for obtaining certified copies of the order of the appellate authority, but a revision to the High Court would not be regarded as having been properly presented unless the revision petition is accompanied by a certified copy of the order sought to be revised. In these circumstances, and in the absence of any express provision in Section 25(2) of the Rent Control Act providing for exclusion of time for obtaining certified copies, the question is whether such time can be excluded for purposes of calculating the limitation for filing a revision petition. This question has got to be examined in the light of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. This provision lays down that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, then those special periods of limitation shall be dealt with as if they were incorporated in the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Section 29(2) further provides that in computing the special period of limitation provided for under any special or local law, the provisions contained in Section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act shall apply in so far as and to the extent to which they are no expressly excluded by such special or local law.

The inquiry u/s 29(2) of he Limitation Act would therefore, be to find out whether the limitation provisions in any enactment other than the Limitation Act can be regarded as limitation provisions in a special or local Act. The next part of the inquiry would be to find out if in that special or local Act, there is any express provision excluding the applicability of Section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act. If there is no express exclusion, then the special periods of limitation under the special or local law must be computed by applying Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act wherever applicable.

At one time the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and the comparable provisions in the earlier Indian Limitation Act, 1908 were construed to mean that there must be an express exclusion in the special for law of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act; otherwise, in the absence of any express exclusion, those provisions will automatically apply to the special or local law concerned. The Supreme Court in Hukumdev Narain Yadav Vs. Lalit Narain Mishra, however, held that eyen in cases, where a special or local law does not contain express words of inclusion of Section 2 to 24 of the Limitation Act, yet those sections can be excluded by necessary intendment, on constructions of the scheme of the special or local Act, the nature of the provisions contained therein and their subject matter.

We have already observed that in this case Section 25 of the Rent Control Act does not expressly exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act from being applicable in the matter of computing the period of limitation for filing revision petitions to the High Court against the order of the appellate authority. Amongst the groups of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, Section 12 deals with inclusion of time in legal proceedings. Sub-Section (2) of his section enacts that in computing the period of limitation for a revision, the date on which the judgment complamed of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a certified copy of the decree or order sought to be revised shall be excluded. The question is whether under the particular scheme of the Rent Control Act it could be said that Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act stands excluded from application.

It would be useful, in this context, to refer to Section 23 of the Act which provides for an appeal from the Rent Controllers order as well as prescribes a time-limit for filing the appeal. Section 23(1)(b) of the Rent Control Act provides for the period of limitation for filing an appeal, in the following forms:

Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller may, with in fifteen days from the date of such order, prefer an appeal in writing to the appellate authority having jurisdiction,

In computing the fifteen days aforesaid, the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded.

This provision gives an indication that it is not either the policy or the scheme of the Act to ignore the time requisite for obtaining a certified copy of the order for the purpose of reckoning the limitation period for filing an appeal. On the contrary, the express provision is made for not counting the time for obtaining certified copy of the order. This provision is an indication, in our judgment, to show that it is not the purpose or intention of the scheme behind the Act to ignore the time taken by the party to obtain a certified copy of the order which is passed against him for the purpose of enabling him to pursue further proceedings available to him under the Statute. We have earlier observed that under the scheme of the Rent Control Act, the authority who has to pass orders in the first instance is the Rent Controller, followed by an appellate authority having appellate powers, over whom the High Court is invested with powers of revision: In the face of this statutory hierarchy of authorities having control over the proceeding under the Act, it would be too much to hold that it was the intention of the legislature not to take note of the time seen for Obtaining certified copies of orders passed by each of these authorities for the purpose of further Proceedings. The Rules passed under the Rent Control Act relating to the application for, and furnishing of, certified copies of orders of the Rent Controller and of the appellate authority have been framed by the State Government in exercise of the rule making power conferred on them u/s 34 of the Act. The power has been granted generally for carrying out the purpose of the Act Sub-section (5) of Section 34 Indicates that the Miles framed under the Act by the State Legislature have equal force with the provisions of the Act, since pro-vision is made for amendment of the Rules by the Legislature Taking note of the express provision made in Section 23(1)(b) of the Act as well as the provision in the Rules for applying for and obtaining, certified copies of the order, we cannot read into the scheme of the Act any intention to exclude the provisions of Section 12(3) of the Limitation Act from being operative for the purpose of limitation order Section 25 of the Act. We cannot imagine that the Legislature infolded to apply one standard for an appeal, and quite a different standard for a revision under the Act. We may further observe that under the Rules framed under the Rent Control Act governing the procedure for appeals before the appellate authority it is laid down that any appeal filed before the appellate authority shall be accompanied by a copy of the order of the Rent Controller appealed from: Apparently, this was the reason why the Rules also provide for the application for and furnishing of certified copies. The Rules made under the Act do not expressly pro-vide for the procedure to be followed in the case of petitions for revision u/s 25 of the Act. This Rule are silent on this subject. This is a clear indication that the Appellate Side Rules of the High Court will have to be applied, as governing the procedure for filling revisions u/s 25 of the Act. To this extent, at any rate, the Rent Control Act and Rules are not a self contained code. We have earlier referred, to the language of Order IV, Rule 21 of the Appellate Side Rules which regulate not only revisions filed u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but also revision petitions filed under any other enactment. Having regard to the insistence by the Appellate Side Rules that in order to be a proper presentation, any memorandum of revision petition has got to be accompanied by a certified copy of the order sought to be revised, and also having regard to the provisions of the Rent Control Act and Rules which we have referred to above, we are satisfied that the time taken by the revision Petitioner for obtaining the certified copies of the appellate authority''s order must be excluded in calculating the period of limitation u/s 25(2) of the Rent Control Act.

Mr. K.C. Rajappa, learned Counsel for the Respondent, submitted that Section 12 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked for the purposes of computing the limitation u/s 25(2) of the Rent Control Act, because Section 25(2) itself lays down that the limitation period must be reckoned not from the date of the order, but from the date on which the order is communicated to the Applicant. For construing this phrase, learned Counsel relied on two judgments of two learned Single Judges of this Court. They are reported in Sivaprakasam v. Radhakrishna (1975) T.L.N.J. 328 and Rakku v. Vasanthalakshmi M.L.J. 19 (S.N.). Both the decisions hold that the date of pronouncement of the order is also the date of communication of the order within the meaning of Section 25(2) of the Act. It is unnecessary for purposes of the present discussion to consider whether the interpretations placed by the learned Judges on the expression communicated occurring in Section 25(2) of the Rent Control Act is or is not correct. For the inquiry in the present revision is whether Section 12 of the Limitation Act can be invoked for the purpose of calculating the period of limitation u/s 25(2) of the Act. In our judgment, for purposes of Section 12(2) of the limitation Act, it does not matter, if the date of communication of the order is equated to the date of pronouncement of the order.

We may now refer to the particulars facts and circumstances in the instant case which have given rise to this reference by Swamikkannu, J. It appears from the record, that the order of the appellate authority was made on 17th February 1981. The revision Petitioner applied for a certified copy of that order on 26th February, 1981. The Copy was made ready on 22nd May, 1981. By this time the Courts had closed for the summer vacation. The Petitioner actually filed the revision in this Court on 22nd June, 1981. The contention of learned Counsel for the revision Petitioner is that although on the date of filing the revision petition the limitation period of 30 days had expired, still he entitled to invoke the proviso to Section 25(2) of the Rent Control Act and invoke the discretion of this Court for condoning the delay. It may be observed that this proviso put a ceiling on the power of this Court when it lays down that in no case shall the High Court extend the time beyond the period of 30 days from the end of the time-limit of one month fixed u/s 25 of the Rent Control Act. In this case, however, it is common ground that, if the time taken for obtaining certified copies is excluded I by applying Section 12 of the Limitation Act, then the further delay which the revision Petitioner asks this Court to condone is within the period of 30 days laid down in proviso to Section 25(2) of the Rent Control Act. The objection of Mr. K. C. Rajappa was based on a different calculation. If Section 12 of the Limitation Act is held not applicable, then, the filing of the application on 26th February, 1981 would exceed an aggregate of 60 days from the date of the order passed by the appellate authority. In that event, according to Mr. K.C. Rajappa, the revision would be irredeemably barred by time. In the view we have held that Section 12 of the Limitation Act must be applied to petitions for revision u/s 25(2) of the Rent Control Act, the question of condoning the delay in excess of 30 days does not arise. The delay on such calculation, would be only 12 days.

We did not bear much of an argument from Mr. K.C. Rajappa on the question as to whether there was really sufficient cause for the 12 days delay which had occurred when the revision Petitioner filed this revision on 22nd June, 1981. In the affidavit in support of the petition the revision Petitioner represents . that he was engaged in celebrating his nephew''s marriage on the 11th June, 1981 at Tuticorin and immediately after the marriage, because of illhealth which got aggravated by his exertions during the wedding, he had to undergo treatment under a medical practitioner. A certificate from the medical practitioner is part of the record. The explanation of the Petitioner was that in his bad state of health, he could not undertake the long journey to Madras to hand over the papers to a lawyer for the purpose of filing the revision. We are satisfied that the explanation furnished by the Petitioner for the delay of 12 days provides sufficient cause within the meaning of the proviso to Section 25(2) of the Rent Control Act.

In the result, Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 6569 of 1981 is allowed. The civil revision petition will be numbered and posted, and dealt with in the usual course.