High CourtsSingle Bench

Madan Gopal Sehgal vs Om Parkash

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 18 September 1964 · Citation: (1964) 09 P&H CK 0014

HON’BLE JUDGES
P.D. Sharma, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 — Section 14
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Second Appeal from Order No. 144-D of 1964
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Judgment

8 paragraphs · 1,519 words

P.D. Sharma, J.—This judgment will dispose of three second appeals Nos. 144-D, 147-D and 172-D of 1964 which have arisen out of the following circumstances.

2.

Madan Gopal Sehgal, Hari Ram Das and Parkash Nath Gupta occupied three different portions of the first-floor of house No. 3039, Ward No. XV, Chuna Mandi, Pahar Ganj, New Delhi. Om Parkash filed three separate petitions Nos. 830, 831 and 832 of 1961 u/s 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, for ejectment of each of them. He alleged that the premises were let out to the tenants for residential purposes, that he was the owner thereof and bona fide required the premises for the residence of himself and dependent members of his family and had no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. He also relied upon clause (k) of section 14 in support of his claim but did not press it and the two Courts below therefore took no notice of the same. The three tenants, namely, Madan Gopal Sehgal, Hari Ram Das and Parkash Nath Gupta, in their separate written-statements admitted the tenancy and the rate of rent payable by them but added that the petitioner was living with his father and had sufficient accommodation with him. Madan Gopal Sehgal and Hari Ram Das further pleaded that the premises in their respective possession had been let out for residential as well as commercial purposes and that being so they could not be ejected from there by the landlord on the basis of his personal requirement. It was also urged that no notice was issued by the petitioner terminating their tenancies and so also they could not be evicted. The Rent Controller consolidated proceedings in petitions Nos. 831 and 832 of 1961 and vide his order dated 3rd September, 1963, accepted both of them and allowed the landlord to recover possession of the premises in question. The order was made executable after six months from the date it was passed. Similarly, by another order of the same date he allowed the landlord''s petition No. 830 of 1961 to recover possession of the premises in dispute from Madan Gopal Sehgal also. The order was made executable after six months from the date it was passed. Madan Gopal Sehgal, Hari Ram Das and Parkasu Nath Gupta felt aggrieved from the above orders of their ejectment from the premises in dispute and preferred three separate appeals Nos. 910, 936 and 913 of 1963. The Rent Control Tribunal Consolidated the first two of them and dismissed the same on 25th February, 1964. He also dismissed the third appeal on the same day. In each case the tenants occupants were allowed six months'' time to vacate the premises and were also directed to bear costs. The present three second appeals have been preferred against the above orders of the Rent Control Tribunal.

3.

The learned counsel for the appellants in the course of their arguments reiterated the grounds previously urged by the appellants against their eviction from the premises before the Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal. They cuntended that Om Parkash landlord-respondent was not the sole owner of the premises in dispute, that he did not bona fide require the same for the residence of himself and the dependent members of his family, and that he had other reasonably suitable residential accommodation, and on behalf of Madan Gopal Sehgal and Hari Ram Das appellants it was further urged that the premises had been let for residential as well as for commercial purposes and their eviction could not be claimed on the basis of personal requirement. All these points were gone into by the Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal in detail. It was firmly found that as a result of partition of Hindu United Family property the premises in dispute fell to the lot of Om Parkash respondent personally and on behalf of his minor son and that Om Parkash respondent was living in the house which in the family partion fell to the lot of his father where he could not stay as a matter of right and the accommodation in his possession in his father''s house was also inadeqate and that his family comprised of seven members and the premises in occupation of the three tenant-appellants were required for the residence of himself and the dependent members of his family and further that he had no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. It was also held that the premises were let for residential purposes only to Madan Gopal Sehgal and Hari Ram Das appellants. These are findings of fact and rest on reliable, relevant and admissible evidence and indeed cannot be interfered with at this stage. Further, Om Parkash respondent in the appropriate column of his three ejectment petitions mentioned himself as the sole landlord and this fact was accepted as correct by the three appellants. He could, therefore, maintain the three petitions for the three appellants'' ejectment from the premises being the sole landlord. It is well nigh settled that in the case of a joint owners of property which had been rented out a petition for ejectment of the tenant is maintainable even if the same is required for the bona fide residence of one of the co owner landlords. In the circumstances, even if it is conceded that the son of Om Parkash respondent was also a co-owner in the premises then also Om Parkash could claim ejectment of the three appellants because he was admittedly an owner and landlord thereof.

4.

The learned counsel for the appellants finally urged that omission of the landlord respondent to serve notices, terminating the tenancy, on the tenants invalidated his petitions for the appellants'' ejectment from the premises and in doing so relied on Bhaiya Punjalal Bhagwanddin Vs. Dave Bhagwatprasad Prabhuprasad, , which inter alia laid down:

The provisions of section 12 of Bombay Act 57 of 1947 will operate against the landlord after the determination of the "tenancy by any of modes referred to in section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. What this section of the Act provides is that even after the determination of the tenancy, a landlord will not be entitle to recover possession, though a right to recover possession gets vested in him, so long as the tenant complies with what he is required to do by this section. It is this extra protection given by this section which will be useful to the tenant after his tenancy has determined. The section does not create a new right in the landlord to evict the tenant when the tenant does not pay his rent, A landlord''s right to evict the tenant for default in payment of rent will arise only after the tenancy is determined and the continued possession of the tenant is not on account of the contractual terms but on account of the statutory right conferred on him to continue in possession so long as he complies with what sub-section (1) requires of him. Hence, where a tanant is in possession under a lease from the landlord, he is not to be evicted from a cause which would give rise to a suit for recovery of possession u/s 12 if his tenancy has been determined already. It follows that whenever a tenant acts in a way which would remove the bar on the landlord''s right to evict him, it is necessary for the landlord to serve him with a notice determining his tenancy and also serve him with a notice under sub-section (2) of section 12 of the Act.

This authority has no direct bearing on the facts of the instant cases as these have been brought under the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act and not Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act (57 of 1947). The Delhi Rent Control Act is a complete Code in itself and thus supersedes the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. In the circumstances it was not incumbent on the landlord respondent to serve notices terminating the tanancies u/s 106, Transfer of Property Act, on the appellants tenants before instituting the petitions for the their ejectment from the premises. My view find suport from the decision in Bhagwant Singh v. Mrs. N.D. Khanna (1964) 66 P.L.R. 402, where it was held, "that Rent Control Act is a complete Code. No notice under the Transfer of Property Act is required to be served on the tenant before instituting proceedings for ejectment of the tenant under the Rent Control Act." Therefore the landlord respondent''s claim for ejectment of the appellants (tenants) cannot be defeated on the short ground that he omitted to serve them notices terminating their tenancies u/s 106, Transfer of Property Act.

5.

The learned counsel for the appellants lastly urged that the appellants might be allowed time to vacate the premises in their occupation to enable them to make alternative arrangements for their accommodation.

6.

For the reasons given above, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. The appellants are, however, allowed six months'' time to vacate the premises in their respective possession.