High CourtsSingle Bench

Madan Lal and others vs Piara Lal Malhotra

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 7 October 1975 · Citation: (1975) 10 P&H CK 0020

HON’BLE JUDGES
Rajendra Nath Mittal, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 — Section 17
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Execution Second Appeal No. 1870 of 1974
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Judgment

15 paragraphs · 1,361 words

Rajendra Nath Mittal, J.—This execution second appeal has been filed against the judgment of the District Judge, Patiala, dated October 18, 1974, by the objectors.

2.

Briefly, the facts of the present case are that Piara Lal was the owner of the property in dispute and Lachhman Dass was tenant under him. He filed an application for ejectment against the tenant. The application was allowed and eviction order of Lachhman Dass from the premises in dispute was passed by the Kent Controller. Piara Lal filed execution application against Lachhman Dass but he remained unsucassful. After sometime, Lachhman Dass died. Piara Lal, after his death, filed an execution application against the respondents who are sons, daughters and widow of Lachhman Dass deceased. They filed objections against the execution to the effect that Lachhman Dass was a statutory tenant, that the tenancy ended with his death and therefore, the order of eviction pissed against him could not be executed against the objectors. The objection petition was opposed by Piara Lal respondent. The trial Court accepted the objection petition and dismissed the execution application Piara Lal went up in appeal against the order of the executing Court to the District Judge, Patiala, who reversed the judgment of the trial Court and accepted the appeal. Consequently, he dismissed the objection petition. Some of the objectors have come up in second appeal, to this Court.

3.

The only question that has been canvassed before me by the Learned Counsel for the appellants is that Piara Lal, decree-holder, has no right to execute the decree against the appellants. Ha submits that Lachhman Dass was a statutory tenant and after his death those rights have not been inherited by the appellants. He, therefore, argues that they are not liable to ejectment in execution of that decree

4.

I have hared the Learned Counsel for the parties at a considerable length. In order to determine this question, it will be necessary to refer to section 17 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), which relates to execution of orders passed by the authorities under the Act. It says that every order made u/s 10, or section 13, and every order passed on appeal u/s 15 shall be executed by a civil Court having jurisdiction in the area as if it were a decree of that Court. It is not disputed that an order of ejectment has been passed in favour of Piara Lal against Lachhman Dass. A reading of the said section shows that this order is to be executed by the civil Court as a decree. In the said circumstance, the provisions of CPC (hereinafter referred to as the Code) shall be applicable for execution of the orders passed under the Act.

5.

Section 50 (1) of the Code says that the decree holder may apply to execute the decree against the Legal representatives of the deceased in case the judgment-debtor has died. The aforesaid section is as follows: --

50(1). Where a judgment-debtor dies before the decree has been fully satisfied, the holder of the decree may apply to the Court which passed it to execute the same against the legal representative of the deceased.

Section 47 of the Code is regarding questions to be determined by the Court executing decree. According to the said section, all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. The word ''legal representative'' has been defined in section 2(1) as follows:--

legal representative'' means a person who in law represents the estate of deceased person and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued.

A reading of the definition shows that not only the persons who in law represent the estate of the deceased person but even intermeddlers are included in the term "Legal representative".

6.

On going through section 50(1), along with the aforesaid sections, it is apparant that a decree-holder, in case of death of the judgment-debtor, has a right to execute the decree even against an inter-meddler. The right of the legal representatives in the property of a statutory tenant after the passing of the decree, is not an independent right. They remain in possession of the property as legal representatives. It has been settled by the Supreme Court in Jagdish Chander Chatterjee and Others Vs. Shri Kishan and Another, , that if the tenant dies during the proceedings of ejectment, the right to sue survives against the legal representatives of the tenant. In that case, the statutory tenant had died during the pendency of the appeal by the landlord in the High Court. The High Court had impleaded the legal representatives of the deceased and had ordered ejectment. The legal representatives of the tenant went up in appeal before the Supreme Court. The Hon''ble the Supreme Court, while determining the question as to whether the legal representatives could be impleaded, observed as follows: --

It is obvious that the appellant landlord''s right to proceed with the appeal with a view to obtain possession of his premises did survive under Order 21. Rule 4, read with rule 11, Civil Procedure Code. Where the right to sue and prosecute the appeal survives, the appellant is bound to cause the legal representatives of the deceased respondent to be made a party and proceed with the appeal. Therefore, the heirs and legal representatives of the aforesaid B.N. Chatterji were rightly brought on record and the appeal had to proceed.

7.

The above observations make it clear that in a proceeding for ejectment, the legal representative? of statutory tenant can be impleaded as parties. In case, the legal representatives of a statutory tenant can be made parties in proceedings for ejectment, a decree for ejectment passed again it such tenant can a fortiori be executed against his legal representatives. In the aforesaid view. I get support from a decision of this Court in Daulat Ram and Others Vs. Bhagwanti and Others, wherein it was observed that an order of eviction passed against a tenant can be executed after his death, and his widow and sons in occupation of the building can be evicted in execution of the same. Same view was taken by a Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Mohammad Idris and Others Vs. Mehar Illahi, The relevant observations of the learned bench are as follows :--

It is therefore, manifest, that on the death of a statutory tenant, against whom an order for recovery of possession of the tenanted premises was passed, his widow, children and legal representatives do not acquire any independent right or interest to continue in possession. The said order does not become in executable against the legal representatives; and they, not having inherited any rights in the premises in dispute from the deceased, do not become independent trespassers, who can be dispossessed only by a separate and fresh suit for possession They, on the other band, remain bound by the said order for possession in favour of the land-lord and are liable to be dispossessed thereof." This judgment was followed by a learned Judge of that Court in Mr. Sahni and others v. Shri Sada Nand 1973 R.C.R. 460. He also took the same view as was taken by the Division Bench.

8.

The Learned Counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on Balkesh Om Parkash v. Smt Shanti Devi (1972)74 P.L.R. 320. The facts of the said case were different from those of the present case. Moreover, after the decision of the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court in J.C. Chatteriees case (supra) took a different view. In the circumstances, the Learned Counsel for the appellants cannot derive any beneath from the said case.

9.

For the reasons recorded above, I dismiss the appeal with costs. Counsels fee Rs. 100.00.