Madan Mohan Pani vs State of Orissa and Another

G.K. Misra, C.J.—The petitioner was elected as chairman of Buguda Panchayat Samiti in the district of Ganiam. He assumed charge of the office of the Chairman on 25-1-1961. The term of office under the statute as it then stood, was for a period of five years and was due to expire on 25-1-1966. The term of office was extended u/s 46-D of the Orissa Panchayat Samiti and Zilla Parishad Act, 1959 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) till 14-8-1967; but the same was subsequently reduced to 10-4-1967 u/s 46-D proviso (a), when the petitioner made over charge. From 10-4-1967 to 14-1-1968 the Sub-Divisional Officer remained in charge of the office of the Chairman u/s 46-D. Proviso (d). There was a fresh election. The petitioner was again elected as Chairman of the Panchavat Samiti and he assumed charge of the office on 15-1-1968. He resigned his office on 12-12-1970. He filed his nomination paper for election of Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti on 26-12-1970. The Election Oficer (opposite party No. 3) rejected his nomination u/s 16 (3). Proviso (a), on the ground that the petitioner being Chairman for two consecutive terms was ineligible for the office of Chairman. The impugned order is Annexure 2. These facts were not disputed at the time of hearing.

Though a large number of grounds had been taken in the writ application, Mr. Patnaik for the petitioner advanced two contentions; (i) the word "consecutive" in Section 16 (3), Proviso (a), connotes continuity and absence of interruption. In between the two terms during which the petitioner was functioning as Chairman, there was a period of gap from 10-4-1967 to 14-1-1968 when the Sub-Divisional Officer was in charge of the office u/s 46-D. proviso (d). The impugned order rejecting the nomination is contrary to law, and (ii) the word "term" used in the section does not include part of a term. As the petitioner had resigned a few days before the expiry of the term of three years, there is no consecution between that term and the term for which election has been held.

The second contention was not seriously pressed by Mr. Patnaik and rightly. The word ''term'' would include part of a term (see Dictionary of English Law, Jowitt, page 1739). Any construction to the contrary would lead to absurd results. The prohibition in the statute can be easily avoided, as the petitioner has done in this case, by tendering his resignation just a month before the expiry of the term.

The word ''consecutive'' has the following meanings more or less in all the dictionaries. Those meanings are (i) following in a train, (ii) succeeding one another in a regular order, and (iii) uninterrupted in course or succession.

Mr. Patnaik contends that the statute should be read literally by giving the words used by the Legislature their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. Only if such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. Reliance is placed on AIR 1955 SC 376 (Jugalkishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd.) Mr. Mohanty, on the other hand, relies on the principle of construction that in order to get the true import of a statute it is necessary to view the enactment in retrospect, the reasons for enacting it, the evils it was to end and the objects it was to subserve. The Newspapers Ltd. Vs. The State Industrial Tribunal, U.P., is relied upon.

Both these principles are well known rules of construction. The object of the impugned proviso clearly is that the same person should not be allowed to function as Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti for more than two consecutive terms. Apparently, the idea is that vested interests will not be allowed to slow in the elective machineries at the lowest rung of organisations for self-government. Even giving a literal meaning to the proviso it seems clear that two terms will not be taken to be consecutive only if another term intervenes between those two terms. The interregnum wherein an official functions as Chairman of the Panchavat Samiti is not a term and would not break the consecution. The word consecutive must be construed in the context of the concept of the word "term", as defined in Section 46-C. during which an elective Chairman functions.

Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts of this case the period from 25-1-1961 to 10-4-67 constitutes a term. The intervening period from 10-4-1967 to 14-1-1968 is not a term. Section 46-C (1) says that the term of office of the Chairman of the Parishad or Samiti shall be three years. Altogether different wordings are used with reference to the period during which an official functions as Chairman. Section 46-D, Proviso (d), lays down that during the period beginning with the date of such notification and until the reconstitution of the Samiti all or any of the powers and duties of the Samiti and its Chairman shall be and discharged as far as may be and to such extent as the Government may determine by such person as they may appoint in that behalf. This period during which an official functions is not a term. Thus the term from 25-1-1961 to 10-4-1967 and the next term from 15-1-1968 to 12-124970 are consecutive terms though apparently they are separated by the intervening period from 10-4-1967 to 14-1-1968. The concept of consecution must be determined with reference to the term during which an elective Chairman functions and not with reference to a period during which an official remains in charge.

On the aforesaid analysis, the nomination of the petitioner was rightly rejected.

In the result, the writ application fails and is dismissed. But in the circumstances, there will be no order for costs.

A. Misra, J.

I agree.