AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
King, J.—This appeal raises the question of the interpretation of certain sections in the Marumakkathayam Act (XXII of 1933). The
appellants in this appeal were defendants in a suit for partition filed under this Act by the plaintiff who represented one tavazhi of a tarwad in South
Malabar. The suit was filed on the 23rd October, 1933. Prior to filing that suit, the plaintiff had received notice of an application made u/s 43 of the
Act, to the Collector for the registration of the tarwad as impartible. While the suit was pending, the Collector did register the tarwad as impartible
on the 15th January, 1934. The question which then arose before the learned District Munsiff who was trying the suit as whether the order of the
Collector registering the tarwad as impartible rendered the suit incompetent. The District Munsiff held that it did so render it but upon appeal to the
learned District Judge, the opposite view was taken and the Judge remanded the suit for disposal upon its merits. This is now an appeal by the
defendants against that order of remand.
The disposal of the appeal turns essentially upon the true construction of Sub-section (4) of Section 43 of the Act. Sub-section (3) prescribes
the conditions under which the Collector can register the tarwad as impartible and then Sub-section (4) goes on to enact as follows:
On such registration, the provisions of Chapter VI shall not apply to such tarwad unless and until the registration is cancelled u/s 44.
The provisions of Chapter VI give to the members of the tarwad the right of partition. It is quite clear (see Kunchi Amma v. Minakshi Amma
(1935) 70 M.L.J. 114 : ILR 59 Mad. 693 that that right is actually exercised at the very moment when one of such members files a suit. In the
present case, therefore, the rights granted by Chapter VI had already been exercised before the Collector registered the tarwad as impartible. It is
argued that the order registering the tarwad as impartible should be read as referring back to the date of the application. It seems to me impossible
to accept this view of the section on the plain meaning of the expression ""on such registration"". Mr. Sitarama Rao, however, argues that his
contention is reasonable because the only point which the Collector has to decide is whether more than two-thirds of the members of the tarwad
actually signed the application to him. I agree that the argument is a reasonable one if all the Collector has to decide is the intention and attitude of
the members of the tarwad on the date of the application. But a further scrutiny of Section 43(3) will show that the Collector must also be satisfied
that on the date when he does register the tarwad as impartible, they are of the same mind as they were when they signed the petition:
If, after giving notice to all the major members of the tarwad and making such enquiry as he deems fit, the Collector is satisfied that not less than
two-thirds of the major members of the tarwad have signed the petition with their free consent and desire (it is to be particularly noted that the
present tense is used here), the registration of the tarwad as impartible, he shall register the tarwad as impartible.
I am therefore clearly of opinion that the right to partition granted by Chapter VI cannot be taken away until the actual registration by the
Collector u/s 43 and that any exercise of that right which has been carried into effect before registration is not affected by it. Finally Mr. Sitarama
Rao argues that the whole question is subject to the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is true that for certain purposes
Section 45 does invest the Collector under this Chapter with the powers of a Court and declares that the proceeding before him shall be deemed
to be a judicial proceeding. But I am not satisfied that there is sufficiently express language here used to bring the Collector''s enquiry within the
scope of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. There is no authority yet available in support of this argument, and I see no reason why I
should accept it.
In the result, the order of the learned District Judge seems to me to be right and this appeal fails, and is dismissed with costs.
Leave to appeal granted.
