Madhavi vs CHAIRMAN, APPOLLO HOSPITAL

ONE K.N. Subramanian (since deceased) was an employee of Neyveli Lignite Corporation. ONE Mrs. Madhavi (1st complainant) and Mrs. Dhanabakiam (2nd complainant) are respectively his wife and mother while minor Kalpana (3rd complainant) and minor Shanbhagam (4th complainant) are his daughters.

THE 1st opposite party is the Chairman, Apollo Hospital, Greams Road, Chennai-6. THE 2nd opposite party is one Dr. Rangabashyam, Ramana Surgical Clinic, 38, Venkatnarayan Road, T. Nagar, Chennai-17. The aforesaid K.N. Subramaniam was under trauma of heavy sweating, shivering besides being unable to consume any food. He was admitted at Apollo Hospital of the 1st opposite party on 14.2.1998 and after certain initial treatment having been given to him, he was discharged on 18.2.1998. He developed, it is said, a severe pain in his spinal cord area and his weight terribly came down from 62 kgs. to 45 kgs. and he was again admitted in the said Apollo Hospital from 14.3.1998 to 1.4.1998. He was said to have been admitted as an inpatient in the said hospital for a period of 15 days without any effective treatment and thereafter he was referred to one Dr. Rangabashyam, the 2nd opposite party. On the reference so made, he was admitted in the clinic of the 2nd opposite party as an inpatient on 2.4.1998. He was stated to have been informed that he has to undergo pancreas surgery. This surgery, it appears, as suggested, was stated to have been performed in the said hospital and thereafter he breathed his last on 3.5.1998.

The complainants would allege that due to deficiency in service on the part of the 1st and 2nd opposite parties he died and for such deficiency in service on their part, compensation quantified in a sum of Rs. 16 lakhs had been claimed against the said opposite parties.

THE complaint was presented before this Commission on 2.5.2000. In the complaint so presented, the 1st complainant Mrs. Madhavi alone subscribed her signature in the column provided for the signature of the complainant. THE other three complainants did not at all sign the complaint. One N.Chandrasekaran signed in the complaint as a Counsel for the complainant. THE said Chandrasekaran is not at all an Advocate. He is the Secretary of Consumer Welfare Foundation, Chennai. A vakalat had been filed and in the said vakalat one S. Natarajan, a practising Advocate and the aforesaid N. Chandrasekaran signed as if they are the Counsel for the complainant. The said N. Chandrasekaran suo motu revoked the vakalat of learned Counsel Mr. S. Natarajan on 14.2.2002 by filing a memo thereof.

APART from signing in the vakalat filed by learned Counsel Mr. S.N. Natarajan, the said N. Chandrasekaran also filed an authorisation letter from the 1st complainant, namely Mrs. Madhavi to represent her case before this Commission. The 1st complainant did not at all authorise the said N. Chandrasekaran as a guardian-mother of the complainants 3 and 4 to represent them in the case before this Commission. The 2nd complainant, mother of the deceased, Mrs. Dhanabakiam did not at all give any sort of an authorisation to the said N. Chandrasekaran to represent her case. The case came up for admission before us on 14.2.2002. This Commission entertaining a doubt as to whether it is legally permissible for an authorised agent like N. Chandrasekaran to have a right of audience before ever the complaint was admitted. This Commission, as a matter of fact, directed the Registry for the issuance of notice to the various Bar Associations and Consumer Associations apart from affixing a notice in the Notice Board of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forums, Chennai (South) and (North). The direction of the Commission had been complied with by the Registry. The notice so issued is reflected as below : NOTICE "Day in and day out several cases are being filed before the State Commission as well as the District Fora in the State on behalf of individual complainants by "authorised agents" posing to represent the individual consumers concerned. 2. No doubt true it is that Rule 4 Sub-clause (8) of the Tamil Nadu Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 (for short, "the Rules, 1988") empowers the parties-complainant or opposite party to engage an authorised agent for representing their cases. The Rules, 1988 had been framed under Sub-clause (2) of Section 30 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short, "the Act"). 3. The Act, 1986 does not contain any statutory provision at all empowering the parties-complainant or opposite party to engage an authorised representative on their behalf to represent their cases. 4. The Rules, 1988, as framed, is after all a subordinate legislation and such sort of a subordinate legislation cannot at all provide for any contingency or situation in respect of which no provision has been made in the Act itself. Such being the case, Rule 4 Sub-clause (8) cannot at all have any legal effect and the said Rule must have to be struck down as null and void or must have to be read down in conformity with the statutory provisions of the Act. 5. In this view of the matter, the State Commission feels that such an authorised representative of the litigant complainant-consumer not being an Advocate, cannot at all be given the right of audience. There is no prohibition for the party/complainants to represent their own case before the Fora constituted under the Act. 6. This Commission feels that such a vexed question has to be decided by way of an authoritative pronouncement by an order emanating from this Commission, after considering the pros and cons of the issues, and also the views of the various Consumers Associations, Advocate Associations and the Bar Association of Madras. 7. Therefore, various Consumer Associations, members of various Advocate Associations and members of the Bar are invited to take part in the discussion on such an aspect of the matter on Monday, the 18th March, 2002 when such an issue has been posted for enquiry.

Sd/- xxxxx Date : 22.2.2002 President To 1. Notice Board of State Commission. 2. Notice Board of DCDRF, Chennai (South). 3. Notice Board of DCDRF, Chennai (North). 4. The President, Bar Association, High Court, Chennai. 5. The President, Advocate Association, High Court, Chennai. 6. The President, Women Lawyers'' Association, High Court, Chennai. 7. The President, Advocate Association, City Civil Court, Chennai. 8. The President, Madras Consumer Court Bar Association, Chennai-4. 9. The President, Bar Association, District Court Campus, All Districts. ...... They are requested to affix a copy of this notice in the Notice Board.

THE Secretary, SMN Consumer Protection Council, 2/380, I Main Road, AGS Colony, Kottivakkam, Chennai-600 041.

THE Secretary, Federation of Consumer Organisations, Tamil Nadu (FEDCOT), No. 2/380, I Main Road, AGS Colony, Kottivakkam, Chennai - 600 041. The Secretary, Trichy District Consumer Council, 182, Kannan Buildings, Madurai Road, Tiruchirapalli.

The Secretary, Consumer Action Group, No. 7, 4th Street, Venkateswara Nagar, Adyar, Chennai-20.

MR. Nijamudeen, Secretary, Consumer Protection Council, Sub-Jail Road, Cuddalore. Mr. J.V. George, President, Tamil Nadu Consumer Welfare Council, Federation of Consumer Organi-sations, No. 12E, Sri Nagar, Ramanathapuram, Coimbatore - 641 045. By order Sd/- Registrar" 10. The hearing was initially listed on 18.3.2002 to hear the arguments on the vexed question to be decided by way of an authoritative pronouncement by an order emanating from this Commission after considering the pros and cons of the issues, and also the views of the various Consumer Associations, Advocate Associations and the Bar Association, Madras. However, arguments could not be heard on such a vexed question on 18.3.2002 for want of quorum and it was adjourned for arguments on 3.4.2002. 11. Arguments emerged from certain Advocates and Representatives of the Consumer Associations. Learned Counsel who participated in the discussion are : (1) Mr. Shriram Panchu (2) Mr. N.L. Rajah (3) Mr. M.B. Raghavan (4) Mr. Srinath Sridevan (5) Mr. R.S. Ranganathan

Of the five Advocates referred to above, Mr. Shriram Panchu and Mr. R.S. Ranganathan made submissions for and on behalf of various Consumer Associations. Mr. N.L. Rajah, President, Consumer Court Bar Association, Chennai, though represented for and on behalf of Consumer Court Bar Association, Chennai, yet his main thrust and trend of arguments supported the cause of the various Consumer Associations. The other two Advocates, namely Mr. M.B. Raghavan and Mr. Srinath Sridevan projected their hues of views by scanning, sifting and analysing the various statutory provisions and in such process the views as expressed by them turned out to be in favour of the Advocates. 13. One J.V. George, Tamil Nadu Consumer Welfare Centre, Coimbatore (2) Mr. V.S. Karupannan, (retd.) Police Officer, General Secretary, Namakkal Consumer Protection Association, and Mr. M. Nijamuddin, General Secretary, Federation of Consumer Organisation of Tamil Nadu (FEDCOT), 9, Easwaran Koil Street, Cuddalore also projected arguments in favour of the Consumer Organisations. 14. One B. Nagarajan, Arumbakkam, Chennai called himself as a Legal Practitioner wanted to submit arguments on such a vexed question and when this Commission ascertained as to his status of the Legal Practitioner in the sense of questioning him as to whether he was a practising lawyer, he divulged this Commission that he is not a qualified lawyer but he is after all a B.Com. Graduate. But he is practising in various Civil and Criminal Courts as a Legal Practitioner of course after obtaining the necessary and requisite permission from the Courts, Civil or Criminal before which he is appearing and projecting the cause of views of certain parties engaging him to represent their cause. The moment we came to know that he was not a lawyer, he was not allowed to project his hues of views. 15. Of course, large number of representatives of various Consumer Associations in the State and private individuals thronged the Hall of this Commission in rather a bid to project their hues of views on the vexed question posed for consideration. Such representatives exhibited violent and rude behaviour in the sense of going far beyond the level of decency and decorum expected of from them, befitting the dignity and status of this Commission and consequently this Commission expressed the view that it is better for them to keep off this premises in enabling the Commission to hear arguments in a calm atmosphere from the representatives of certain other Consumer Associations who are very well interested in sharing their views with this Commission. The moment this Commission expressed such a view, the majority of the individuals and representatives of certain other Consumer Associations - to name them individually it is not possible, created a commotion besides exhibition of rude behaviour and went away from the Hall of this Commission. Such members also created a commotion in the road, even going to the extent of preventing the traffic in the road giving all sorts of views to the news media and also television media. Consequently, the police were called in to clear the mob from the road so as to enable the free flow of traffic in the road.

ONE Bharath Jayaraj representing Consumer Action Group, and one Dr. G. Sundaram, I.A.S. (Retd.) representing Voice, Delhi and Mr. Asokan, Chairman, Consumer Welfare Council, Salem did not make any separate submissions but adopted only arguments as projected by learned Counsel Mr. Shriram Panchu and Mr. N.L. Rajah. Besides, this Commission received through post, representation from various Consumer Organisations not only in the State but also from other States like Mumbai and Delhi. We also sifted and perused those representations. The sum and substance of those representations to the effect that the representation of the various recognised Consumer Associations must have the right of audience before the Fora constituted under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short, "the Act, 1986") in projection of cause of the aggrieved or affected consumers. We may now advert to certain specific submissions made by learned Counsel and representatives of the various Associations who participated in the discussion before us. Learned Counsel Mr. Shriram Panchu : The Act, 1986 is a special piece of legislation for the better protection of the interest of consumers. In the redressal machineries provided under the Act, 1986, namely District Fora, State Commission and the National Commission, extensive participation is given to the lay members of the public in getting them appointed as Members of the District Fora, State Commission and the National Commission. The resultant product of experience of the Members of the lay public, he would say, appears to be the legislative intent to be shared with the legalistic personality occupying the position of the President of the Forum, State Commission and the National Commission. This sort of an arrangement has been made, he would say, to make the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986 to behave not like ordinary Courts, Civil and Criminal in the administration of the justice system but in a different way in the sense of giving succour and relief to the affected or aggrieved consumers quickly with nil or no expense on their part. Most of the procedural formalities as associated with ordinary Courts - Civil and Criminal and even higher Courts - High Court and Supreme Court are not made applicable with the avowed purpose, he would say, that the technicality and adoption of rig-morale of procedure should not result in causing prejudice to the cause of justice to the consumers. Observance of principles of natural justice alone is sufficient in rendering justice to the consumers. Viewed in that light, he would say, the Fora constituted under the Act-be it to be the District Forum, State Commission or the National Commission should avoid the strict observance of the procedural laws with the manifest intention of doing substantial justice to the affected consumers. The Act, 1986 itself, he would say, contains relevant statutory provisions for the recognised Consumer Associations to present complaint before the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986. He would cite the provisions as adumbrated under Section 2(1)(b)(ii) and Section 12 of the Act. Besides, he would also refer to Rule 4(8) and Rule 8(8) of the Tamil Nadu Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 (for short, "Rules, 1988"). A perusal of the Rules, he would say, would make it appear that it is legally permissible for the representatives of the Association to have the right of audience before the Fora consistuted under the Act, 1986. He would also plead that under the administrative control vested with the National Commission as per Section 24B of the Act, 1986, better it is for the National Commission to issue instructions regarding the adoption of uniform procedure in the hearing of matters by empowering the representatives of the various Consumer Associations being conferred with the right of audience in the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986 when especially unhelpful advocacy from lawyers and lay public affecting consumers problems cannot at all be ruled out of consideration. Learned Counsel Mr. N.L. Rajah, President, Consumer Court Bar Association, Chennai : The Act, 1986 is an unique piece of legislation for the better protection of the consumers at large. The nature and character of the redressal machineries provided under the Act, 1986 are altogether different from the ordinary Courts-Civil and Criminal. They cannot at all be called as Courts of Law though they may be having the trappings of Court of Law. The nature, character and status of the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986 came up for consideration in more than one decisions emerging from the Supreme Court such as (1) Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Shantha & Ors., III (1995) CPJ 1 (SC)=1995 (6) Supreme Court Cases 651; (2) Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S.G. Industrial Institute, II (1995) CPJ 1 (SC)=1995 (3) Supreme Court Cases 583, and (3), M/s. India Photographic Co. Ltd. v. H.D. Shourie, VII (1999) SLT 86=1999 (6) Supreme 373 and in the light of the observations made in those decisions it cannot at all be stated that the right of audience is granted by the Advocates Act, 1961 (Act 25 of the Act, 1961) (for short, "the Act, 1961") only in favour of persons practising the profession of law before Courts and such audience is denied to the authorised representatives of the Consumer Associations, notwithstanding the fact that they are not the lawyers, before the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986. In other words, the right of audience inheres in favour of the authorised reprentatives of the Consumer Associations as granted by the salient provisions adumbrated under the Act, 1986 in the shape of statutory provisions like Section 2(1)(b)(ii) and Section 12 of the Act, 1986 and Rules 4(8) and 8(8) of 1988 Rules. What is further contended alternatively was that it is not as if the statutory provisions as adumbrated under the Act, 1961 creates a right in favour of the professional Advocates alone to have a right of audience and denial of such audience to the non-lawyers. Section 32 of the Act, 1961 provides notwithstanding anything contained in this Chapter (Chapter IV) any Court, authority or person may permit any person not enrolled as an Advocate under this Act, to appear before it or him in any particular case. That means, a power of Court is there to grant special permission to a non-lawyer to appear in particular cases. Such being the case, there is nothing wrong or illegal for the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986 to permit or grant the right of audience to the authorised representatives of the Consumer Associations. To put it differently, he would say, that the right of authorised representatives of the Associations, to have the audience before the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986 cannot at all be claimed as a matter of right but the same can be had after obtaining proper leave from the Fora before which the authorised representatives of the Consumer Associations seek the right of audience. He would also seek support for such a proposition from the decision arising from the Supreme Court, namely Management of Keonjhar Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (1977) 2 Supreme Court Cases 339. If the provisions of the Act, 1986 grant the right of audience, such right cannot at all be taken away or interdicted by the provisions contained under Act, 1961 on the obvious principle of "Special" excludes "General" in the sense of the Act, 1961 being construed as a general law and Act, 1986 a special law. A conjoined reading of Sections 13(4)(vi) and 30(1) of Act, 1986 would confer power upon the Central Government to make rules although such a power is not granted to the State Government under Sub-section (2) thereof for the adoption of uniform procedure in giving right of audience to the authorised representatives of the Consumer Associations. Learned Counsel Mr. M.B. Raghavan : Salient provisions as adumbrated under Act, 1961 in the shape of Sections 29, 32 and 33 would give right of audience to the Advocates practising the profession of law before any Court, authority or person as a matter of right and non-lawyers cannot at all claim such a privilege to be conferred upon them. He would lay emphasis upon the words "any Court, authority or person" as found mentioned in those Sections. What he would say is the right of audience sought may be before the Court or authority or any person and the fact that the authority or person is not a Court is of no consequence. The authority or person may be a Tribunal or a Body which is a creature of Statute. In all such Forums, the right of audience is grantable only to Advocates practising the profession of law as having been enrolled as an Advocate under the Act, 1961 and not any other person unless and until the right of audience to the non-lawyers had been provided by certain provisions in the Act, 1961 or any other law for the time being in force. The projection of such hues of views is nothing but reflection of the ideas as contained in Sections 29, 32 and 33 of Act, 1961. The Act, 1986 does not contain any specific provisions therein granting the right of audience to the authorised representatives of the Consumer Associations or other third party representatives with the due leave of the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986 just like statutory provisions as adumbrated in Order III Rule 1 and Rule 2 and Section 2(q) of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC). Of course, Rules 4(8) and 8(8) of 1988 Rules and Rule 14(3) of 1987 Rules provide for the appearance of the authorised agents of the parties-complainants/opposite parties- before the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986. The provisions as contained in those rules, he would say, have not been made pursuant to any specific power granted by the Act, 1986 in favour of the State Government. The Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Rule 30 of Act, 1986 do not grant such power either in favour of the Central Government or the State Government to frame such rules and such being the case, the rules framed by the Central and State Government must have to be construed as null and void as having been made by way of excessive legislation. Though such a rule cannot at all be struck down as null and void by this Commission, a creature of Statute, yet, there may not be any sort of a legal impediment for enabling this Commission to read down those rules in conformity with the statutory provisions as adumbrated under the Act, 1986. In projection hues of views relatable to right of audience, implicit reliance had been placed upon : (1) M. Krishnammal v. T. Bala Subramania Pillai, AIR 1937 Madras 937, Full Bench. (2) D. Sornam v. State of Madras, 1969 I M.L.J. 207. (3) T.C. Mathai v. District and Sessions Judge, Thiruvanathapuram, AIR 1999 SC 1385; and (4) Harishankar Rastogi v. Girdhari Sharma, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 1019. In sum and substance he would say by way of conclusion that non-lawyers can have no right of audience before the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986 even with an application submitted praying for leave.

Learned Counsel Mr. Srinath Sridevan : Act, 1986 had been enacted for the better protection of the consumers from the on-slaught and havoc caused by manufacturers and producers of goods and providers of services. The products as manufactured and offered for sales and the service to be rendered by the providers of the services may involve in claims either of petty nature where the monetary value in paltry or almost nil or of a big magnitude involving huge monetary claims by way of a compensation either for the defect in the goods offered for sale or deficiency in service therefor either by the manufacturers of goods or providers of services. Launching of a complaint before the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986 is possible in a petty matter like the seller selling the product by a paltry amount more say 5 paise (np) than the price of articles required to be sold under the provisions of the relevant Act. Launching of a complaint for huge monetary compensations quantified in lakhs or crores, is also possible by way of launching of complaints before the competent Forum having the necessary and requisite pecuniary jurisdiction whether the complaint launched is for compensation - paltry or huge, it is permissible for the complainant to launch a complaint before the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986 taking into consideration the pecuniary jurisdiction before which he launches the complaint. He contemplates two modes of filing a complaint. They are : (1) The aggrieved complainant himself may launch a complaint without the assistance of anyone - lawyer or non-lawyer, and (2) complaint may be launched for and on behalf of the aggrieved consumer-complainant by a recognised consumer organisation. There may not be any problem at all for the right of audience to be given to the party-complainant in case he wishes to represent by himself without engaging the assistance of anyone else. Likewise, there may not be any problem or insurmountable obstacle for the complainant to engage a Counsel of his choice to represent him in the complaint he had launched and in respect of right of audience to such a Counsel, there may not any problem. Problems may arise, he would say, as relatable to audience to representatives of the Consumer Associations as authorised by the complainant to represent him in the case. Statutory provisions of Act, 1986 and the Rules framed thereunder did not contemplate the right of audience to the authorised representative of the Consumer Associations or to the agents or in the shape of third parties as authorised by the complainant to represent his or her case before the Fora constituted under the Act. All these insurmountable obstacles may obviously arise on account of the salient provisions in the shape of Sections 29, 32 and 33 of Act, 1961. The lawyers owe a duty to the client or to the Court, Tribunal or authority before which they practice. They are having a code of ethics. This apart, the position of lawyers is governed by Bar Council of India Rules, 1975. The deficiency in service on the part of the lawyers can also be tackled by the client by launching a complaint against them for the deficiency in service on their part under the relevant provisions of Act, 1986. The lawyer can very well be controlled by Court, Tribunal or authority or person before which they are practising. They can even be hauled for contempt in the cases of misbehaviour. Authorised representatives of Consumer Associations or third parties cannot at all be expected to behave always in a sober fashion before the Court, Tribunal or authority before which they are authorised to represent. Often they may go astray and exhibit violent behaviour in not befitting the decency and decorum of the Court or the authority before which they are authorised to appear. It is not even permissible on such an occasion to resort to take action against them more especially by a Consumer Forum constituted under the Act, 1986. The authorised agents either belonging to the Consumer Associations or third parties may not at all be very well equipped with the knowledge to deal with the cases in respect of which they are having the necessary authorisation from the parties. The conduct of the case by such representatives may even prove detrimental to the party engaging them. There is further plausibility or possibility of obstructing the proceedings before the Court, Forum or authority before which they are appearing. They adopt all sorts of dilatory tactics and antics in protracting the proceedings. The likelihood of such people resorting to arguments in a hyperbole fashion not at all germane or relevant to the issue in focus in the case on hand may not at all be ruled out of consideration. When the Court or the Forum or the other authority resorted to curtail such irrelevant arguments emanating from them, the wordy duel or altercation between the Court, Fora or authority as the case may be and such personnel, leading to the creation of unpleasant situation, not befitting the dignity or the status of the Court or Forum or authority before which such instance or events take place cannot at all be avoided. As such, he would say, on public policy consideration, such authorised representatives either of the Consumer Associations or of the third parties should not at all be admitted to barge in and advance arguments in the absence of any specific provisions traceable to the provisions of Act, 1986. He would say that there is no statutory provisions at all in the Act, 1986 inhering the right of audience in favour of such authorised representatives of the associations or the third parties. Even the Rules 4(8) and 8(8) of the Rules, 1988 do not grant the right of audience in favour of the authorised representatives of the Consumer Associations or the third parties and such authorised agents may if at all can represent the parties -complainant/opposite party in the proceedings before the Forum in case of their absence so as to avoid passing of orders in default or ex parte and nothing further. He would also alternatively submit that there is no provision in Act, 1986 enabling the State or Central Government to frame rules as had been done, namely 4(8) and 8(8) framed by the State Government and Rule 14(3) by the Central Government and in the absence of such statutory provisions traceable to the Act, 1986, the rules so framed must have to be struck down as null and void by the Competent Authority or at least the rules so framed must have to be read down in conformity with the statutory provisions in the Act, 1986. He would further contend that if this Commission in any event happens to come to the conclusion that the authorised representatives of the Consumer Associations or the third parties have the right of audience, then even such right of audience cannot at all be claimed as a matter of right and such audience is capable of being granted only with the leave of this Commission. He would also place implicit reliance upon a decision emerging from the High Court of Judicature, Madras in C.M. Visalakshi & Ors. v. K. Kuppusamy, AIR 1989 Madras 27. The enactment of a provision like Section 2(1)(b)(ii) and Section 12 of the Act, 1986 was with an avowed object of containing the hypertechnical objection of locus standi of filing a complaint by the recognised Consumer Associations in the absence of the aggrieved complainant having come forward to launch a complaint and nothing further. He would also refer "agent" as defined in Rule 2(b) of Rules, 1988 according to which an "agent" means "a person duly authorised by a party to present any complaint or appeal or reply on its behalf before the State Commission or the District Forum". As per the said definition, he would say, authorisation to an agent cannot be anyone other than for the purpose of the presentation of the complaint or appeal or reply before the State Commission or the District Fora as the case may be. Nothing is traceable with the said definition as to the right of audience inhering in favour of such agent. This apart, the agent referred to therein can be a person authorised to represent the complainant or the opposite party. This is inferable from the words couched by the definition of the agent itself. The agent can present a complaint. He can also present an appeal. In case the complainant succeeds in the complaint filed by him, the appeal has to be preferred by the opposite party. The fact that an agent can present an appeal suggests that the agent can also appear for the opposite party. The word reply as used in the definition of agent may even be traceable to a version to be filed by the opposite party. Therefore, the agent as contemplated under Rule 2(b) of 1988 Rules may be an agent for the complainant as well as for the opposite party. The agent or the authorised representative of the association, therefore, may equally appear for the aggrieved consumer-complainant or the opposite party against whom the aggrieved consumer-complainant launched a complaint. This is not in tune with the spirit and scheme of the Act. The agent as contemplated by Rule 2(b) of the Rules, 1988 cannot have the restricted meaning of agent as authorised by the complainant alone. We may now advert to the arguments as focussed by the representatives of the various consumer organisations. (1) Mr. J.V. George, President, Tamil Nadu Consumer Welfare Centre, Coimbatore : From a combined reading of the provisions as adumbrated under Section 2(1)(b)(ii) coupled with Section 12 of the Act, 1986 and Rule 4(8) of the Rules, 1988 besides Rule 14(3) of rules, 1987 would indicate in no uncertain terms that the authorised agent of the party to the proceedings under the various Fora constituted under the Act, 1986 have the inalienable right of audience before the Fora before which they are appearing in projection of the cause of the parties. (2) Mr. V.S. Karuppannan, (Retd. Police Officer), General Secretary, Namakkal District Consumer Protection Association : Besides adoption of arguments of learned Counsel Mr. N.L. Rajah, he would also state that taking into consideration the plight of aggrieved consumers in seeking redressal before the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986 it would be better for this Commission to extend the long arm of mercy in giving the right to the authorised agents of the Consumer Associations for representating their cases before the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986 in saving them from the exploitation by lawyers charging heavy fees for their appearance for them even in petty cases. (3) Mr. A. Asokan, Chairman, Consumer Welfare Council, 1 B, Mariamman Koil Street, Hasthampatti, Salem-7 : Besides adopting the arguments of learned Counsel Mr. Sriram Panchu and N.L. Rajah, he would vociferously state that non-grant of right of audience to the authorised agents of the Consumer Associations would produce disastrous consequences of even shutting down the Fora or the Commission - State and National constituted under the Act, 1986. (4) Mr. M. Nijamudeen, General Secretary, Federation of Consumer Organisations of Tamil Nadu (FEDCOT) 9, Easwaran Koil Street, Cuddalore : He would unhesitatingly adopt the argument of learned Counsel M/s. Sriram Panchu and N.L. Rajah. Besides, he would state that there are some black sheeps -Consumer Associations tarnishing the image of members of consumer organisations, making a lot of sacrifice for the cause of consumers in the country. He would make a fervent prayer for the grant of right of audience to the authorised representatives of the Consumer Associations in rather a bid to save the consumers from the onslaught of lawyers.

Learned Counsel Mr. R.S. Ranganathan : Act, 1986 being a benevolent legislation to protect the interest of consumers should not be construed too rigidly and receive a broader interpretation where legislation is designing to give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the Court is not to make in roads by making etymological excursions. The Court must adopt social beneficient rule of construction in a social welfare legislation like the Act, 1986. If the provision of the Act is capable of different interpretation, the interpretation that should be preferred which fulfil the policy of the Act and is more beneficial to a person in whose interest the Act had been passed. Non-Advocate cannot be permitted to address Court on the strength of power of attorney. The right of people practicing in Courts for a principal is subject to Sections 32 and 33 of the Act, 1961. The provisions of the Act, 1986 and rules framed thereunder enable the authorised agents of the parties to represent and argue the case before the Forum before which they are authorised to appear. The authorised agent even under such authorisation cannot claim the right of audience as a matter of right but such audience is capable of being granted with the leave of the Court before which they are appearing. He also placed implicit reliance upon two decisions, one emerging from the Andhra Pradesh High Court and the other from Kerala High Court. They are : (1) Hari Om Rajender Kumar & Ors. v. Chief Rationing Officer of Civil Supplies, A.P., Hyderabad, AIR 1990 Andhra Pradesh 340, and (2) C.S. Nayakam v. A.N. Menon, AIR 1968 Kerala 213 Full Bench. In pith and substance what he would say is that the authorised representatives of the association appearing for the parties in the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986 has the right of audience of course with the leave of Forum before which they appear.

FROM the pith and substance of the projections of hues of views of learned Counsel and representatives of certain consumer organisations as reflected above, the one and only question that crops up for consideration is as to whether the authorised representatives of the parties to the consumer disputes have the right of audience as a matter of right before the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986. The answer to such a question has to be traced in the relevant provisions as adumbrated in the Constitution of India, Act 1961, Act 1986 and the other related provisions as adumbrated under relevant Statutes. Before ever we embark upon a discussion of those relevant statutory provisions, better it is for them to understand the nature, character and status of the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986. Such an understanding we rather feel will enable us with ease and grace and without any difficulty whatever to untie the knot in the knotty question so raised for consideration.

THE nature, character and status of the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986 had been dealt with by the Apex Court of this country in decisions more than one. We may profitably refer to three of those decisions as referred to by learned Counsel Mr. N.L. Rajah. THEy are : (1) Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Shantha & Ors., III (1995) CPJ 1 (SC)=(1995) 6 Supreme Court Cases 651; (2) Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S.G. Industrial Institute, II (1995) CPJ 1 (SC)=(1995) 3 Supreme Court Cases 583; and (3) M/s. India Photographic Co. Ltd. v. H.D. Shourie, VII (1999) SLT 86=1999 (6) Supreme 373. THE relevant portions of the observations are traceable to paragraphs 33, 35, 36 and 37 in V.P. Shantha & Ors. (supra), are reflected in the head notes as below : "All the Consumer Disputes Redressal Agencies are headed by a person who is well-versed in law and has considerable judicial or legal experience. Thus in the matter of constitution of District Fora, the State Commission and the National Commission, the Act combines with legal competence the merits of lay decision-making by members having knowledge and experience in dealing with problems relating to various fields which are connected with the object and purpose of the Act, namely protection and interest of the consumers. It is no doubt true that the decisions of the District Forum as well as the State Commission and the National Commission have to be taken by majority and it may be possible in some cases that the President may be in minority. But the presence of a person well versed in law as the President will have a bearing on the deliberations of these agencies and their decisions. Since the persons to be chosen as members are required to have knowledge and experience in dealing with problems relating to various fields connected with the object and purpose of the Act, viz, protection and interest of the consumers, the said knowledge and experience would enable them to handle the consumer disputes coming up before them for settlement in consonance with the requirement of the Act. To say that the members must have adequate knowledge or experience in the field to which the goods or services in respect of which the complaint is made, are related would lead to impossible situations. Since the goods or services in respect of which complaint can be filed under the Act may relate to number of fields it cannot be expected that the members of the Consumer Disputes Redressal Agencies must have expertise in the field to which the goods or services in respect of which complaint is filed, are related. It will be for the parties to place the necessary materials and the knowledge and experience which the members will have in the fields indicated in the Act would enable them to arrive at their findings on the basis of that material. It cannot, therefore, be said that since the members of the Consumer Disputes Redressal Agencies are not required to have knowledge and experience in medicine, they are not in a position to deal with issues which may arise before them in proceedings arising out of complaints about the deficiency in service rendered by medical practitioners. Moreover, there is a further safeguard of an appeal against the order made by the District Forum to the State Commission and against the order made by the State Commission to the National Commission and a further appeal to the Supreme Court against the order made by the National Commission. It cannot, therefore, be said that the composition of the Consumer Disputes Redressal Agencies is such as to render them unsuitable for adjudicating on issues arising in a complaint regarding deficiency in service rendered by a medical practitioner

. (Paras 33, 35 and 36) As regards the procedure under the Act though sometimes complicated questions requiring recording of evidence of experts may arise in a complaint about deficiency in service based on the ground of negligence in rendering medical services by a medical practitioner; but this would not be so in all complaints about deficiency in rendering services by a medical practitioner. THEre may be cases which do not raise such complicated questions and the deficiency in service may be due to obvious faults which can be easily established. THE issues arising in the complaints in such cases can be speedily disposed of by the procedure that is being followed by the Consumer Disputes Redressal Agencies and there is no reason why complaints regarding deficiency in service in such cases should not be adjudicated by the Agencies under the Act. In complaints involving complicated issues requiring recording of evidence of experts, the complainant can be asked to approach the Civil Court for appropriate relief. Section of the Act which prescribes that the provisions of the Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force, preserves the right of the consumers to approach the Civil Court for necessary relief. (Para 37) In Laxmi Engineering Works (supra), the observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraphs 8 and 10 are relevant and they reflected as under : "8. It is significant to notice that in the Statement of Objects and Reasons as well as in the Preamble, the new Forums which the Act was setting up are referred to as "quasi-judicial machinery" and as ''authorities'' respectively but not as Courts. The Act has created the Disputes Resolution Authorities at District, State and National levels called District Forum, State Commission and National Commission. Section 3 expressly states that : "(T)he provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force". Chapter III provides for "Consumer Disputes Redressal Agencies". The use of the expression ''agencies'' is again significant. Section 9, which provides for establishment of Forums at three levels reads thus : ''9. Establishment of Consumer Disputes Redressal Agencies-There shall be established for the purpose of this Act the following agencies, namely- (a) a Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum to be known as the ''District Forum'' established by the State Government with the prior approval of the Central Government in each district of the State by notification; (b) a Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission to be known as the ''State Commission'' established by the State Government with the prior approval of the Central Government in the State by notification; and (c) a National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission established by the Central Government by notification.'' 10. A review of the provisions of the Act discloses that the quasi-judicial bodies/authorities/agencies created by the Act known as District Forums, State Commissions and the National Commission are not Courts though invested with some of the powers of a Civil Court. They are quasi-judicial Tribunals brought into existence to render inexpensive and speedy remedies to consumers. It is equally clear that these Forums/Commissions were not supposed to supplant but supplement the existing judicial system. The idea was to provide an additional Forum providing inexpensive and speedy resolution of disputes arising between consumers and suppliers of goods and services. The Forum so created is uninhibited by the requirement of Court-fee or the formal procedures of a Court. Any consumer can go and file a complaint. Complaint need not necessarily be filed by the complainant himself; any recognised consumer''s association can espouse his cause. Where a large number of consumers have a similar complaint, one or more can file a complaint on behalf of all. Even the Central Government and the State Government can act on his/their behalf. The idea was to help the consumers get justice and fair treatment in the matter of goods and services purchased and availed by them in a market dominated by large trading and manufacturing bodies. Indeed, the entire Act revolves round the consumer and is designed to protect his interest. The Act provides for "business-to-consumer" disputes and not for "business-to-business". This scheme of the Act, in our opinion, is relevant to and helps in interpreting the words that fall for consideration in this appeal."

In M/s. India Photographic Co. Ltd. (supra), observations made in paragraph 4 is relevant and it reads as under : "4. The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 has been enacted to provide for better protection of the interest of the consumers by making provisions for the establishment of Consumer Councils, other authorities for the settlement of consumer disputes and for matter connected therewith. The Act was enacted as a result of widespread consumer protection movement. On the basis of the report of the Secretary General on Consumer Protection dated 27th May, 1983, the United Nations Economic and Social Council recommended that the World Governments should develop, strengthen and implement a coherent consumer protection policy taking into consideration the guidelines set out therein. Each Government was obliged to set its own priorities for the protection of consumers in accordance with the economic and social conditions of the country keeping in view the needs of its people and bearing in mind the costs and benefit of the proposed legislation Government were to further provide adequate infrastructure including the bodies as well as financial facilities to develop, implement and monitor consumer protection policies. The introduction of new products in the developing countries was to be assessed in relation to the local conditions having regard to the existing production, distribution and consumption patterns of the country or region concerned. The various enactments such as The Contract Act, The Standards of Weight and Measures Act, The Motor Vehicles Act, The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, Food Adulteration Act, etc., were found to be inadequate in providing the relief to the consumers. In discharge of the international obligations and to protect the interest of the consumer in the country, the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 was enacted (hereinafter called "the 1986 Act"). The reference to the consumer movement and the international obligations for protection of the rights of the consumer provision has been made herein with the object of interpreting the relevant law in a rational manner and for achieving the objective set forth in the Act. Rational approach and not a technical approach is the mandate of law."

FROM the scintillating observations as made by the Apex Court of the country in the above decisions, we can draw the quintessence of what is said by the Supreme Court. The Fora constituted under the Act are quasi-judicial Tribunals or authorities brought into existence to render inexpensive and speedy justice to consumers with some of the powers of a Civil Court. The rational approach is to be made in interpreting provisions of the Act, 1986 in the background of the scheme and the object of the Act, 1986 avoiding scrupulously all technicalities in the process of interpretation. The procedural wrangles afflicted with the ordinary Courts of the land are to be scrupulously avoided in rather a bid to render justice to the consumers in the quickest fashion possible. We may now embark upon a discussion as relatable to the right of audience which the authorised agents of the parties in consumer disputes seek as a matter of right in the adjudicator process of such disputes before the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986.

ARTICLE 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, which is relevant for the present purpose prescribes that "all citizens shall have the right to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business". The right guaranteed as such is not without any fetters or restrictions. The fetters or restrictions as imposed in exercise of such right is traceable to ARTICLE 19(6) which reflects as under : "19(6) Nothing in Sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law insofar as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law insofar as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to,- (i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or (ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a Corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise."

Article 21 of the Constitution prescribed that "no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law". It is not as if this Article protects the life and liberty of a citizen alone. It even protects a non-citizen. This is indicated by the expression "no person" (emphasis supplied). As such, the life or personal liberty of a citizen or a non-citizen cannot at all be deprived except according to procedure established by law. The procedure as well as the law referred to therein must be fair, reasonable and justiceable. If the procedure or law happens to be unreasonable, unfair and not justiceable, the same will be struck down as null and void. Chapter IV of Act, 1961, is relatable to right of practice. Three sections of the said Chapter, namely Sections 29, 32 and 33 are relevant for the present purpose. Section 29 is captioned as "Advocates to be the only recognised class of persons entitled to practise law". The said section prescribes that "subject to the provisions of this Act and any rules made thereunder, there shall, as from the appointed day, be only one class of persons entitled to practise the profession of law, namely Advocate". The Advocate is defined under Section 2(1)(a) according to which, the Advocate entered in any roll under the provisions of this Act. The right of practice as inhering in the Advocates is not a fundamental right, but a statutory one. The Advocates have been conferred the right to practise not only in all Courts including the Supreme Court but also any Tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence and also before any other authority of person before whom such Advocate is by or under any law for the time being in force entitled to practise.

SECTION 32 deals with the power of Court to permit appearances in particular cases. The section prescribes that "notwithstanding anything contained in this Chapter, any Court, authority or person may permit any person, not enrolled as an Advocate under this Act, to appear before it or him in any particular case".

A private person, who is not an Advocate, has no right to argue for a party. He must get the prior permission of the Court, for which the motion must come from the party itself. It is open to the Court to grant or withhold or withdraw permission in its discretion. Section 33 deals with the right of Advocates to practise. The section provides that "except as otherwise provided in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, no person shall, on or after the appointed day, be entitled to practise in any Court or before any authority or person unless he is enrolled as an Advocate under Act." (Emphasis supplied)

There is no warrant whatsoever to place a recognised agent holding a general power of attorney to take proceedings in Courts, in the same position, as an Advocate to whom a Vakalatnama has been given. To do so, would be to defeat the provisions of the Act, 1961.

SECTION 45 deals with penalty for persons illegally practising in Courts and before other authorities. The said section provides that "any person who practise in any Court or before any authority or person, in or before whom he is not entitled to practise under the provisions of this Act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months". It is thus crystal clear that a specific prohibition had been laid down both in positive or negative form that no person other than an Advocate will be entitled to practise law in any Court or before any authority. Order III Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC are relevant and they read as under : "Order III Recognised Agents and Pleaders 1. Appearances, etc., may be in person, by recognised agent or by pleader.-Any appearance, application or act in or to any Court, required or authorised by law to be made or done by a party in such Court, may, except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognised agent, or by a pleader appearing, applying or acting, as the case may be, on his part : Provided that any such appearance shall, if the Court so directs, be made by the party in person. 2. Recognized agents.-The recognized agents of parties by whom such appearances, applications and acts may be made or done are- (a) persons holding powers-of-attorney, authorizing them to make and do such appearances, applications and acts on behalf of such parties; (b) persons carrying on trade or business for and in the name of parties not resident within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court within which limits the appearance, application or act is made or done, in matters connected with such trade or business only, where no other agent is expressly authorized to make and do such appearances, applications and act."

RULE 16 of the Civil RULEs of Practice is relatable to party appearing by agent. It reads as reads as under: "RULE 16. Party appearing by agent-(1) When a party appears by an agent, other than a Pleader or Advocate, the agent shall, before making or doing any appearance, application, or act in or to the Court, file in Court, the power of attorney, or written authority, thereunto authorizing him or a properly authenticated copy thereof, or in the case of an agent carrying on a trade or business on behalf of party, without a written authority, an affidavit stating the residence of his principal, the trade or business carried on by the agent on his behalf and the connection of same with the subject-matter of the suit and that no other agent is expressly authorised to make or do such appearance, application or act. (2) The Judge may thereupon record in writing that the agent is permitted to appear and act on behalf of the party; and unless and until the said permission is granted, no appearance, application, or act of the agent shall be recognised by the Court."

Section 2(q) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act No. 2 of 1974) is relevant and it reads as under : "2. Definitions-In this Code, unless the context otherwise requires- ............................. ............................. ............................. (q) ''Pleader'', when used with reference to any proceeding in any Court, means a person authorised by or under any law for the time being in force, to practice in such Court, and includes any other person appointed with the permission of the Court to act in such proceeding."

We may now advert to certain precedents emerging from superior Courts of jurisdiction regarding the question as to whether the power of attorney agent is entitled to the right of audience as a matter of right. The Full Bench of the Madras High Court happened to deal with such a question in Thayarammal v. Kuppuswami Naidu, AIR 1937 Madras 937. The Full Bench took the view that an Agent with a power of attorney to appear and conduct judicial proceedings, but who has not been so authorised by the High Court, has no right of audience on behalf of the principal, either in the appellate or original side of the High Court. There is no warrant whatever for putting a power of attorney given to an authorised agent to conduct proceedings in Court in the same category as a vakalat given to a legal practitioner, though latter may be described as a power of attorney. The latter power of attorney or appointment is confined only to Pleaders, that is those who have a right to plead in Courts. The power of attorney agent cannot be accorded all the rights and privileges which are enjoyed by the members of the legal profession, whose qualification for admission to its ranks are laid down in the rules made by the Bar Council with the sanction of the High Court and whose professional conduct thereafter is regulated by rules of practice and professional etiquette and who are subject to the disciplinary control of the High Court; whereas the power of attorney agent need possess no qualifications whatsoever as regards education and character and is not bound by rules of professional conduct or etiquette and is not subject to the disciplinary control of the High Court or of any one.

THEREFORE, the power of attorney agent cannot carry on business as a solicitor or attorney, drafting, engrossing and filing plaint, Judge''s summons, affidavits and generally issuing legal process and cannot charge fees to the principal. For to carry on business in such capacity is to practise. What constitutes carrying on business is a question of fact. But, even one isolated instance amounts to carrying on business or practices, rendering such person liable to be dealt with under law.

WE may now refer to a Division Bench decision of the High Court of Madras in the case of D. Sornam v. State of Madras, 1967 I MLJ 207, which deals in an elaborate fashion in a scintillating way as respect right of audience in the light of relevant provisions as adumbrated under Act, 1961, Civil Procedure Code, Criminal Procedure Code by referring to catena of decisions available on the subject. Better it is, we feel to refer to the facts of the case in an incisive fashion in rather a bid to firmly grasp the dictum evolved in that case. The actual petitioner whose rights are agitated in the writ petition is one D. Sornam and the question involved is the rejection of her application to the Medical College as a Science Graduate on the ground that she is only a Home Science Graduate and so not qualified for admission under Rule 1(e) of the Rules of the Government for admission to the Medical College. The writ petition is filed by her power of attorney holder D.A.S. Swami. Even the affidavit in support of the application, is sworn to by this D.A.S. Swami, who describes himself as a lawyer and the petitioner''s power of attorney holder. He is the holder of a law degree and he had been removed from the rolls of the High Court on account of some professional irregularities. Manifestly, he cannot claim to appear for a suitor as a Pleader or Advocate. It is interesting to note that the general power of attorney which has been filed describes him as a Lawyer. As a matter of fact, D.A.S. Swami has sought appearance in Courts in more than one case as power of attorney holder of the party. Writ petitioner is no doubt the niece of D.A.S. Swami and she, who is very much major, aged about 23 years, describes him as her statutory guardian after the demise of her father in 1963. D.A.S. Swami himself referred in the grounds of Writ Appeal that he acted as a power of attorney holder from an accused in a criminal case, after displacing a practising Advocate who was appearing for an accused and sought to intervene in the proceedings. Writ Petition got dismissed even at the admission stage by giving rise to a Writ Appeal. When the power of attorney holder sought to address on the merits of the case, learned Judges sitting in the Division Bench pointed out the existence of certain obstacle to his having an audience before Court on the merits of the case. It was suggested that he may engage an Advocate to appear in the case or ask the appellant Sornam herself to present the case as best as she can. D.A.S. Swami would have none of it and would claim a right to address this Court as a power of attorney holder of the party authorising him to prosecute the matter in Courts. Therefore, D.A.S. Swami was called upon to decide upon the question of right of audience of the power of attorney agent.

The Division Bench after referring to the catena of decisions available on the subject in the light of the relevant provisions as available under the Civil Procedure Code, Criminal Procedure Code and Act, 1961 ultimately said thus : "We cannot overlook that both in the power of attorney and in the affidavit in support of the Writ Petition, D.A.S. Swami is described as a lawyer which in popular sense means one who practises the profession of law. The Full Bench in Krishnammal v. Balasubramaniam, I.L.R. (1938) Mad. 12 : (1937) 2 M.L.J. 552, pointed out that even one isolated instance of the exercise of the related function could constitute practising. The learned Judges referred to the law in England where even one isolated act has been held to constitute ''acting as a Solicitor'' rendering the person guilty of such conduct liable to be dealt with under Section 26 of the Solicitors Act of 1860 for Contempt of Court. We see no warrant whatsoever to place a recognised agent holding a general power of attorney to take proceedings in Courts, in the same position, as an Advocate to whom a vakalat has been given. To do so, would be to defeat the provisions of the Advocates Act and the Legal Practitioners Act and the salutory privileges, rules and restrictions that govern those who would practise the honourable profession of law. It cannot be contended that reasonable restrictions should not be placed on those who practise the profession of law. Nor can it be said that the retrictions which have been placed and the rules and regulations which govern the practice of the profession of law are not reasonable. It is not in the interest of suitors and not conducive to the efficient administration of justice to permit pleading for them in Courts as of right by persons who are not governed by any professional ethics or code of conduct and who are not subject to any disciplinary jurisdiction in the matter of the conduct of a suitor''s case. We are not for giving the inpr mature of the Court and commit suitors to self-styled lawyers who are not amenable to any professional discipline to expouse and plead their causes in Courts. The Constitution does not compel us to do that. The power of attorney holder here does not seek before us permission to represent the suitor as a special case without reference to the power that has been given to him. We may at once state that, having regard to his antecedents, we may not grant it even if requested. He would not avail himself of the services of any Advocate which he could do as the recognised agent of the party. He does not want time for the appellant herself to appear and plead her cause. In the circumstances, we cannot but dismiss the Writ Appeal. The Writ Appeal is dismissed. When we were about to read the judgment, Sri R. Srinivassa Ayyangar represented that he was authorised duly by vakalat by the power of attorney agent to argue the case for admission. It is also represented that the Writ Petition has not been gone into on the merits. In the circumstances, the Writ Petitioner, D. Sornam may invoke the jurisdiction of this Court again and present a fresh Writ Petition as there has (sic.) disposal of the case on the merits."

THE Andhra Pradesh High Court of Judicature also happened to consider the question of right of audience to a non-advocate authorised by agent in the case of Hari Om Rajender Kumar & Ors. v. Chief Rationing Officer of Civil Supplies, A.P. Hyderabad (supra). THE gist essence of the said decision is summed up in the head notes which reflects as under : "A non-Advocate, when he seeks permission to ''appear'' cannot be permitted to ''address'' the Court on the strength of the power-of-attorney. THE provisions of Order 3 Rule 1 which permit appearance, applications or acting in any Court by a power-of-attorney holder on behalf of a principal are subject to the provisions of the Advocates Act 1961 in particular, Sections 32 and 33. THE Parliament in its wisdom has introduced Section 33 in the Advocates Act permitting Advocates alone to practise. One of the exceptions to the abovesaid provision is contained in Section 32 which gives power to the Court to permit appearance in particular cases by persons who are not Advocates. It has to be noticed that Section 33 of the Act uses the word ''practise'' while Section 32 uses the word ''to appear'' in the Courts etc. THE word ''practise'' means appear, act, and plead, unless there is anything in the subject or context to limit its meaning. THErefore the word ''appear'' is only one aspect and does not take in the concept of ''pleading'' without which, it cannot be equated to ''practising''. THE right to appear in Court and plead for a principal as also the right to practise in Courts have to be distinguished from the other acts, which a power of attorney can perform under Order 3 Rule 1, C.P.C. So far as the signing or verifying or doing other acts are concerned, these could be done by the power of attorney duly authorised therefor but so far as appearing or practising in Court are concerned, they are subject to the provisions of Sections 32 and 33 of the Advocates Act. As such the power-of-attorney holder cannot plead or practise in Court for a principal unless specially authorised by the Courts in that behalf under Section 32 of the Advocates Act (1961). Though the Court has power to grant permission for non-lawyers to plead/argue cases in certain special circumstances, where the power of attorney permitted the agent to file, plead and argue all cases of the principals in future and the deed is not confined to any particular case, and the petitioner agent is continuously pleading and arguing every case for the principals on the sole ground that the principals have decided never to engage any lawyers before any Court or Tribunal, that clearly is hit by Section 33 of the Advocates Act. In the absence of any special grounds applicable to the case before the Court warranting grant of permission under Section 32. THE agent could not be permitted to plead the case in Court."

The Full Bench of the Kerala High Court happened to consider the distinction between ''authority of an agent'' and the ''authority of an Advocate'' who filed vakalat for the conduct of the case in the case of C.S. Nayakam v. A.N. Menon, AIR 1968 Kerala 213. What the Kerala High Court said on such aspect of the matter is getting reflected as under : "The construction of a document appointing an agent is different from the construction of a vakalat appointing Counsel. In the case of an agent the document would be construed strictly and the agent would have only such powers as are conferred expressely or by necessary implication. In the case of Counsel the rule is otherwise because there we are dealing with a profession where well-known rules have crystallised through usage. The functions and duties of an Advocate are not those of an agent simplicitor, and his authority cannot be confined to specific powers which might be enumerated in the vakalat, by which he is appointed to act."

THE Supreme Court of India happened to consider the case of an agent with power of attorney appearing for an accused before a Criminal Court in the case of T.C. Mathai & Anr. v. District & Sessions Judge, Thiruvananthapuram, III (1999) SLT 346=AIR 1999 Supreme Court 1385. THE Supreme Court said thus : "An Agent who is power of attorney holder cannot become a "Pleader" for the party in criminal proceedings, unless the party secures permission from the Court to appoint him to act in such proceedings. Section 2 of the Power of Attorney Act cannot override the specific provision of a statute, which requiries that a particular act should be done by a party in person. When the Code requires the appearance of an accused in a Court it is no compliance with it if a power of attorney holder appears for him. It is a different thing that a party can be permitted to appear through Counsel. Chapter XVI of the Code empowers the Magistrate to issue summons or warrant for the appearance of the accused. Section 205 of the Code empowers the Magistrate to dispense with "the personal attendance of accused, and permit him to appear by his Pleader" if he sees reasons to do so. Section 273 of the Code speaks of the powers of the Court to record evidence in the presence of the Pleader of the accused, in cases when personal attendance of the accused is dispensed with. But in no case can the appearance of the accused be made through a power of attorney holder. THE work in a Court of law is a serious and responsible function. THE primary duty of Criminal Court is to administer criminal justice. Any law or wayward approach, if adopted towards the issues involved in the case, can cause serious consequences for the parties concerned. It is not just somebody representing the party in the Criminal Court who becomes the Pleader of the party. In the adversary system which is now being following in India, both in civil and criminal litigation, it is very necessary that the Court gets proper assistance from both sides. THE reason for the Parliament for fixing such a filter in the definition clause [Sec. 2(q) of the Code] that prior permission must be secured before a non-Advocate is appointed by the party to plead his cause in the Court, is to enable the Court to verify the level of equipment of such person for pleading on behalf of the party concerned."

The Supreme Court was called upon to decide the question in a Criminal Court as to whether it is open to a person who is a party to the proceedings to get himself represented by a non-Advocate in particular instance or case in the case of Harishankar Rastogi v. Girdhari Sharma (supra). What the Supreme Court said in such context is relevant and it is getting reflected in paragraphs 2 to 4 which read as under : "2. Advocates are entitled, as of right, to practise in this Court [Section 30(i)(Sic) Section 32 of the Advocates Act, 1961]. But, this privilege cannot be claimed as of right, by anyone else. While it is true that Art. 19 of the Constitution guarantees the freedom to practise any profession, it is open to the State to make law imposing, in the interest of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right. The Advocates Act, by Section 29, provides for such a reasonable restriction, namely that the only class of persons entitled to practise the profession of law shall be Advocates. Even so, is it not open to a party who is unable for some reason or other to present his case adequately to seek the help of another person in this behalf ? To negative such a plea may be to deny justice altogether in certain cases, especially in a land of illiteracy and indigence and judicial processes of a sophisticated nature. That is precisely why legislative policy has taken care to provide for such contingencies. Sections 302, 303 and 304 of the Criminal Procedure Code are indicative of the policy of the Legislature. I do not think that in this Court we should totally shut out representation by any person other than the party himself in situations where an Advocate is not appearing for the party. A comprehensive programme of free legal services is in a sense a serious obligation of the State if the rule of law were to receive vitality in its observance. Until then parties may appear through Advocates, and where they are not represented by one such, through some chosen friend. Such other person cannot practise the profession of habitually representing parties in Court. If a non-Advocate specialises in practising in Court, professionally he will be violating the text of the interdict in the Advocates Act. I cannot allow him to do so. Nevertheless, it is open to a person, who is party to a proceeding, to get himself represented by a non-Advocate in a particular instance or case. Practising a profession means something very different from representing some friend or relation on one occasion or in one case or on a few occasions or in a few cases. In the present instance, permission is sought for representation through a non-Advocate. It is absolutely clear that anyone who is not an Advocate, cannot as of right, force himself into this Court and claim to plead for another. Permission may, however, be granted by this Court taking the justice of the situation and several other factors into consideration for such non-professional representation. This approach accords with the policy of the Criminal Procedure Code (I am concerned with a criminal proceeding here) as spelt out in Section 2(q). A Pleader by definition, includes any person other than one authorised by law to practise in a Court if he is appointed with the permission of the Court to act in a particular proceeding. This Court''s power may well be exercised in regulating audience before it in tune with the spirit of Section 2(q) of the Code. 3. The petitioner has put in a written representation citing a number of decisions to justify his stand that private persons may be permitted by the Court to appear, (sic.) plead. He has cited a number of decisions in support of his position. Apparently, some legal hand has lent him help. I thought it fit to give notice to the Supreme Court Bar Association and Sri Nain has represented the Bar Association before me and assisted me with his brief but telling submissions. His experience as a senior member of the Bar and as a one-time Judge of a High Court is an additional factor of assistance, Sri Nain persuasively stated that while a private person who is not an Advocate by profession cannot, as of right, walk-in and claim to argue before this Court, he may, in a particular case, be specially permitted by the Court in exercise of its wise discretion. The wisdom of the discretion, in his submission, must be guided by a plurality of considerations. If the man who seeks to represent has poor antecedents or irresponsible behaviour or dubious character, the Court may receive counter-productive service from him. Justice may fail if a knave were to represent a party. Judges may suffer if quarrelsome, ill-informed or blackguardly or blockheadly private representatives fling arguments at the Court. Likewise, the party himself may suffer if his private representative deceives him or destroys his case by mendacious or meaningless submissions and with no responsibility or respect for the Court. Other situations, settings and disqualifications may be conceived of where grant of permission for a private person to represent another may be obstructive, even destructive of justice. Indeed, the Bar is an extension of the system of justice; an Advocate is an Officer of Court. He is master of an expertise but more than that accountable to the Court and governed by a high ethic. The success of the judicial process often depends on the services of the legal profession. 4. Having regard to this conspectus of considerations I hold that a private person who is not an Advocate, has no right to barge into Court and claim to argue for a party. He must get the prior permission of the Court, for which the motion must come from the party himself. It is open to the Court to grant or withhold permission in its discretion. In fact, the Court may, even after grant of permission, withdraw it half-way through if the representative proves himself reprehensible. The antecedents, the relationship, the reasons for requisitioning the services of the private person and a variety of other circumstances must be gathered before grant or refusal of permission. In the present case I have noticed the petitioner and his friend who is to represent him, come together with mutual confidence. The party somehow has not shown sufficient confidence in Advocates he has come by. This bodes ill for him. I should have suspected the association of the private person as having sinister implications of exploitation of a guideless party but suspicion by itself should not be the basis of a conclusion. Therefore, I think it right to give the party, who appears to be unable to represent his own case, an opportunity to present his grievance through his friend. That friend, judging by the note prepared and put in, seems to be familiar with law, although quacks can prove fatal friends. I grant the petitioner permission to be represented by a private person as prayed for, with the condition that if this latter proves unworthy, the permission will be withdrawn."

We may now delve deep into the provision of Act, 1986 to find out as to whether the provision as adumbrated therein grants the right of audience to the authorised agents of the parties to the consumer disputes before the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986. Section 2(1)(b) defines a "complainant". The said Section reads as under : "2. Definitions.-(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,- ................................ (b) "complainant" means- (i) a consumer; or (ii) any voluntary Consumer Association registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or under any other law of the time being in force; or (iii) the Central Government or any State Government, who or which makes a complaint; (iv) one or more consumers, where there are numerous consumers having the same interest."

SECTION 12 is relatable to the manner in which the complaint shall be made. This section reads as under: "12. Manner in which complaint shall be made.-A complaint, in relation to any goods sold or delivered or agreed to be sold or delivered or any service provided or agreed to be provided may be filed with a District Forum, by - (a) the consumer to whom such goods are sold or delivered or agreed to be sold or delivered or such service provided or agreed to be provided; (b) any recognised Consumer Association whether the consumer to whom the goods sold or delivered or agreed to be sold or delivered or service provided or agreed to be provided is a member of such Association or not; (c) one or more consumers, where there are numerous consumers having the same interest, with the permission of the District Forum, on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all consumers so interested; or (d) the Central or the State Government."

Thus, a complainant need not necessarily be the aggrieved consumer. The complainant can even be a voluntary consumer organisation registered under the Companies Act, 1956 or any other law for the time being in force or even the State or Central Government. Thus, the complaint may be launched before the competent Forum by any of the persons referred to and not necessarily by the aggrieved consumer/complainant.

RULE 2(b) of the RULEs, 1988 defines "agent" and the said RULE reads as under : "2. Definitions.-In these rules, unless the context otherwise requires,- .......................... (b) "agent" means a person duly authorised by a party to present any complaint or appeal or reply on its behalf before the State Commission or the District Forum;"

Rules 4(8) and 8(8) of Rules, 1988 relevant for the purpose read as under : "4(8) If during the proceedings conducted under Section 13, the District Forum fixes a date for hearing of the parties, it shall be obligatory on the complainant and opposite party or its authorised agent to appear before the District Forum on such date of hearing or any other date to which hearing could be adjourned. Where the complainant or his authorised agent fails to appear before the District Forum on such day, the District Forum may in its discretion either dismiss the complaint for default or decide it on merit. Where the opposite party or its authorised agent fails to appear on the day of hearing the District Forum may decide the complaint ex parte."

"8(8) If during the proceedings conducted under Section 13, State Commission fixes a date for hearing of the parties, it shall be obligatory on the complainant and opposite party or his authorised agent to appear before the State Commission on such date of hearing or any other date to which hearing could be adjourned. Where the complainant or his authorised agent fails to appear before the State Commission on such day, the State Commission may in its discretion either dismiss the complaint for default or decide it on merits. Where the opposite party or its authorised agent fails to appear on the day of hearing, the State Commission may decide the complaint ex parte."

Rules 2(b) and 14(3) of Rules, 1987 relevant for the purpose read as under : "2. Definitions.-In these Rules, unless the context otherwise requires,- ................................. (b) "agent" means a person duly authorised by a party to present any complaint, appeal or reply on its behalf before the National Commission."

"14. Procedure to be followed by the National Commission- ............................... ............................... (3) On the date of hearing or any other date to which hearing could be adjourned, it shall be obligatory on the parties or their agent to appear before the National Commission. Where the complainant or his agent fails to appear before the National Commission on such days, the National Commission may in its discretion either dismiss the complaint for default or decide it on merit. Where the opposite party or its agent fails to appear on the date of hearing the National Commission may decide the complaint ex parte."

THE definition of "agent" and "authorised agent" representing parties-complainant and opposite party in both Rules 1987 and 1988 are in pari materia of provisions. Those provisions contemplate the contingency of the authorised agents appearing either for the complainant or for the opposite party on the date of hearing. In the absence of the complainant or the opposite party as the case may be as such the authorised agent virtually represent the complainant or the opposite party in their absence before the Forum before which the proceedings are pending. If either the complainant or his authorised agent is absent it shall be open to the Forum to dismiss the complaint for default or decide it on merits. Likewise, if the opposite party or his authorised agent fails to appear on the date of hearing before the Forum it may decide the complaint ex parte. Thus, it is crystal clear that the provisions adumbrated under the Act, 1986 enables a voluntary consumer organisation registered under the Companies Act, 1956 or under any other law for the time being in force to present a complaint for and on behalf of the aggrieved complainant/consumer in the absence of himself virtually figuring and filing a complaint as a complainant. Authorised agent appears for and on behalf of the complainant or the opposite party in their absence before the Forum on the hearing dates. THE authorised agent either for the complainant or for the opposite party is not at all empowered to make a representation for and on behalf of party he is appearing for. His appearance before the hearing date is actually to dispense with the presence of the complainant or the opposite party on the date of hearing and nothing further. As such, the statutory provisions adumbrated under the Act, 1986 does not give the right of audience either to the voluntary organisations registered under the provisions of Companies Act, 1956 or any other law for the time being in force or in favour of the authorised agents either for the complainant or for the opposite party. It appears that the salient provisions in the Act, 1986 had been adumbrated in rather, a bid to avoid an order being passed, dismissing the complaint for the default of the complainant or an order being passed ex parte on merits or for the avoidence of the technical objection of locus standi that may emerge for the complaint to be filed by such associations instead of by the aggrieved party/complainant/consumer and nothing further. The authorised agents may belong to the representatives of a voluntary consumer organisation registered under the Companies Act, 1956 or any other law for the time being in force or any other third party not having any sort of a connection with such association. It is not as if the authorised agent can represent the complainant alone on the date of hearing in his absence, he can as very well as earlier indicated represent the opposite party on the date of hearing in his absence so as to avoid ex parte order being passed against the opposite party. Therefore, the authorised agent in the shape of a representative of a voluntary consumer organisation or of a third party cannot at all be expected to be inhering in his favour the right of audience in the absence of any provision as adumbrated under the Act, 1986 empowering him such a right of audience before the Fora constituted under the Act. Such being the case, therefore, such authorised agent not enrolled as an Advocate under the Act, 1961 has to necessarily seek permission of the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986 for their appearance before them in any particular case. It is not as if the moment the permission is sought for under Section 32 of Act, 1961 the permission asked for would be granted by the ritualistic performance of filing of an application therefor. If such a permission is granted by the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986 day in and day out to all authorised representatives not enrolled as an Advocate under the Act, 1961 it will have the effect of violating the salient provisions adumbrated under Section 33 of Act, 1961 which entitles Advocates alone to practise the profession of law. If at all, the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986 can grant permission under Section 32 in a particular case where the Forum is satisfied that such a permission, if not granted, is likely to result in injustice being caused to the party concerned.

PERTINENT it is at this juncture to refer Section 3 of the Act, 1986 which prescribes that provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. Thus, it is crystal clear that the Act, 1986 is not to supplant but to supplement the provisions of any other law for the time being in force such as the Act, 1961 etc. Of course, true it is that the scheme of the Act, 1986 is to provide speedy justice to the aggrieved consumers with nil or no expense. That perhaps the reason no Court-fee is prescribed for the launching of a complaint and that apart even the process fee for issuing summons to the opposite party is spent from the coffers of the Government provided for such purpose. This apart, in petty matters the aggrieved complainant cannot at all be expected by launching a complaint before the competent Fora either by himself in person or by a voluntary organisation registered under the Companies Act, 1956 or any other law for the time being in force. In order to contain such a situation, this Commission in exercise of power under Section 24B of the Act, 1986 issued instructions dated 14.1.2000 as Instruction No. 8 providing for a complaint being sent by registered post to the District Forum along with necessary and requisite documents in support or proof of the case projected. Such complaints are even taken on file without the presence of the complainant and even notice is issued to the opposite party and after his appearance and complying other formalities, the complaint is decided on merits. In such petty cases, the services of a lawyer or even assistance of anyone other than lawyer is required and the case gets decided by itself on the merits of the issue with the legal knowledge possessed by the Presiding Deity of the Forum ably assisted by the members possessing practical knowledge in various fields of activities in real life without causing any inconvenience, embarrassment or any expense on the part of aggrieved complainant/consumer. If such a course is not adopted or resorted to, the affected complainant/consumer may not knock at the doors of the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986 on the ground that it is not worthfinding and in such an eventuality the consuming public will be greatly affected leading to the enrichment of the manufacturers of goods and providers of services. This can be best explained by the example of the selling of an article by few paise more than the one as fixed to be sold under the relevant provisions of the Act. The aggrieved consumer may not be interested if he is insisted to present the complaint either by himself in person or through a voluntary organisation. The loss to him is minimal but the magnitude of injury or loss by the public is so grave. Equally, the manufacturers of such goods get enriched by few lakhs of rupees. Ultimately, the society suffers. Under the Act, 1986 claims for compensation for the defective manufacture of a pin, the cost of which being paltry or the defect in the manufacture of a machine worth several lakhs of rupees. Under the Amending Bill XLII of 2001, the jurisdiction of the District Forum is enhanced from Rs. 5 lakhs to Rs. 20 lakhs, State Commission from Rs. 20 lakhs to Rs. 1 crore and the National Commission Rs. 1 crore and above. Claims for compensation in huge amount normally arise in the case of medical negligence or in the case of purchase of machineries found to be defective worth several lakhs. In tackling such cases, the assistance of a competent lawyer is necessary. It may be stated that neither the lawyer nor the Judge may be proficient in the medical science or possession of knowledge of technology in deciphering the defect in the manufacture of the machine. That sort of an argument may not stand for a moment. Judges and lawyers are undoubtedly jack of all trades but master of none. Judges and lawyers being made of such a mettle as enables them to raise up to the occasion in understanding the intricacies of the problem though they are not having any special knowledge. They equip themselves with ease and grace the required knowledge of medical science or technology in the process of examination of experts during the course of enquiry or gaining such knowledge by reading the relevant textbooks on the subject. This sort of a feat can be achieved without any difficulty whatever by Judges and lawyer but that may not be the same position with non-lawyers though some of the non-lawyers will be having the necessary skill in equipping themselves with such knowledge cannot be ruled out of consideration. If assistance of lawyers in such cases is not there, it will be very difficult if not impossible to render justice to the parties concerned. Therefore, the assistance of lawyers in such cases would prove to be a boon and not a bane to the consumers as well as the opposite parties against whom complaints are caused to be filed unnecessarily by the abuse or misuse of provisions of the Act, 1986. Therefore, we are of the view that in most of the matters, consumer disputes are capable of being decided without any difficulty whatever before the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986 even without the assistance of an Advocate or anyone other than an Advocate representing the aggrieved consumer/complainant. But in medical negligence and other cases involving knowledge of technology, the presence and assistance of lawyers, if available, would have the effect of not causing prejudice to the cause of justice.

WE may point out that when the Constitution of India came into force, there was no provision at all for rendering legal aid to persons placed in impecunious circumstances or indigent situations. It is only after the expiry of nearly 26 years, Article 39A had been inserted by Section 8 of the Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976 w.e.f. 3.1.1977 during the reign of this country by the late lamented Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi. The Article 39A reads as under : "39A. Equal justice and free legal aid.- The State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice, on a basis of equal opportunity, and shall, in particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any other way, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities."

Legal aid may be provided either by suitable legislation or schemes or in any other way in order to see that the operation of the legal system promotes justice on the basis of equal opportunities and ensure that opportunity for securing justice shall not be denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities. Originally, legal aid was rendered to the citizen of this country by the formulation of a scheme by the Apex Court of this country. So far as Tamil Nadu was concerned, a Legal Aid Society was founded by registering it under the Societies Registration Act. The said Legal Aid Society in Tamil Nadu was rendering an yeomen service to persons placed in a impecunious circumstances or indigent situations, the needy people, women and what not. Subsequent to the coming into force of Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (for short, "the Act, 1987"), State Legal Services Authority has come into existence rendering an yeomen service to the needy public under the scheme of the Act, 1987. Legal aid is given to the bulk of the population in the State. All women irrespective of rich or poor are given free legal aid. The women folk in the State constitute almost 50% of the population. Likewise scheduled caste and tribes are given free legal aid. That constitutes 19% of the population of the State. This apart, free legal aid is given to all persons rich or poor accused of heinous offence in an incommunicado situation. This apart, flood and fire affected victims are given free legal aid. Rest of the population in the State are given legal aid on the basis of the income criteria devised by the Legal Services Authorities. The benevolent State of Tamil Nadu in rather a spirit of rendering legal aid to persons placed in an indigent circumstances grants aid in crores of rupees. The Legal Service Authority is granting legal aid to such persons from the lowest Criminal and Civil Courts to the highest Supreme Court in the country. Such being the case, the aggrieved complainant/consumer placed in an indigent circumstances in the launching of cases for medical negligence may utilise the services of the State Legal Services Authority in the sense of getting aid from them by making a request for the provision of the competent lawyer to prosecute the case before the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986. Such an aid may be sought even by the recognised consumer organisations in rather a bid to help the hapless and indigent consumers/complainants.

IF the authorised representatives of the Consumer Associations want to plea and argue the cases before the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986, in such cases, of course, even after making the necessary and requisite application for seeking permission to do so, then such representatives are merely quacks or having off-baked. Knowledge of law which may prove detrimental to the interest of the affected litigant/complainants/consumers and this sort of a permission cannot at all be given by the Presiding Deity in a ritualistic fashion as and when any permission petition had been filed pursuant to the provisions adumbrated under Section 32 of the Act, 1961. Such grant of permission would enable the quacks to practise the profession of law in violation of the salient provisions adumbrated under Section 33 of the Act, 1961. Therefore, such a permission as a matter of right cannot at all be granted to the representatives of the associations by the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986. Such being the case, the only course open to such an aggrieved complainant/consumer is to make a representation of his/her case before the Court or engage a lawyer for such purpose or seek the aid of the Legal Services Authority for the provision of competent lawyers for the conduct of his/her case on his/her behalf. It would be legally permissible for the complainant to conduct the case by himself/herself. He can, of course, conduct a petty case by himself without the assistance of a lawyer. He cannot conduct a case requiring knowledge of medicine or technology. That requires the assistance of a competent lawyer. Otherwise, he suffers the detriment. To engage a lawyer, he may not have the necessary and requisite financial resources. Then, in an eventuality, such a complainant can benefit by seeking competent Counsel provided by the legal aid free of cost for the conduct of the case. IF such a course is adopted, the aggrieved complainant will derive the benefit of the competent legal assistance without spending any money from his or her pocket in prosecution of the complaint and if such a course is adopted it will be in tune with the object of the Act, 1986. It will also help the Fora or the Commission as the case may be in the sense of getting good legal assistance in such cases. The opposite parties being professional people having all sorts of resources on earth will be in a position to engage very good competent Counsel on their behalf which will not tilt the balance in their favour in case the complainant is also represented by a competent Counsel provided by the State Legal Services Authority free of cost. The Fora will then be placed in a good position to render just decision in the case without causing prejudice to the cause of justice. The Advocates practising the profession of law alone are entitled to charge for the professional services they are rendering. The authorised representatives of the Consumer Associations not having been enrolled as an Advocate are not at all entitled to charge any fees for the services they are rendering in prosecuting the complaint before the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986. If any fee or charge is levied for rendering of such services by authorised representatives of the Consumer Associations, such sort of an act deserves to be condemned. Of course, we are not having any sort of a knowledge as to the factum of the receipt of fee of charge by the authorised representatives of the Consumer Associations from the parties for whom they are appearing. However we are able to infer from the behaviour and conduct of the authorised representatives of the various associations assembled in large numbers before the Commission pursuant to the notice we have issued that they levy fee or make a charge for such services cannot at all be ruled out of consideration. There may be some exceptions in the sense of certain authorised representatives of the Consumer Associations in the sense of not levying or charging any fees. We are, however, of the view that the rude behaviour exhibited by the representatives of certain associations in this Commission hall on the day of the commencement of the argument is proof positive of the fact that they were a little bit worried when this Commission took up the question for consideration as to whether the authorised representatives of the Consumer Associations can have the right of audience as a matter of right before the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986 when they appear for and on behalf of certain parties before the Fora constituted under the Act. Perhaps such representatives of the associations might have felt that in case this Commission holds that the right of representation is not inhering in their favour, it is likely to affect their carrier of practising the profession of law in such capacity though they are not enrolled as Advocates and consequently affect their earning and cause irreparable dent in their livelihood and that perhaps was the reason for the sound and fury being raised by them in the open hall of this Commission and thereby attempted to disturb the proceedings, surcharging the atmosphere with tension and fear psychosis in the minds of one and all assembled in the premises.

We are to reiterate at this juncture the scintillating observations of His Lordship Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer made in Harishankar Rastogi (supra).... "Judges may suffer if quarrelsome, ill-informed or blackguardly or blockheadly private representatives fling arguments at the Court. Likewise, the party himself may suffer if his private representative deceives him or destroys his case by mendacious or meaningless submissions and with no responsibility or respect for the Court. Other situations, setting and disqualifications may be conceived of where grant of permission for a private person to represent another may be obstructive, even destructive of justice. Indeed, the Bar is an extension of the system of justice; an Advocate is an Officer of Court. He is master of an expertise but more than accountable to the Court and governed by a high ethic. The success of the judicial process often depends on the services of the legal profession".

AT the time when His Lordship Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer delivered the judgment in the aforesaid case, there was no enactment like Act, 1986. Claims for compensation for deficiency in service on the part of the Advocates was for the first time introduced in the Act, 1986. As such, if there is any deficiency in service on the part of the Advocates appearing for the consumer/complainant/litigant there is every scope of the Advocates being called upon to answer such a claim. This sort of a provision as made in the said enactment makes the Advocates to be more careful and cautious in conducting the case for the complainant/consumer in the Fora constituted under the Act, 1986. If the authorised representatives of the consumer associations commit any sort of a deficiency in the conduct of the case for the consumer complainant, there is no possibility or plausibility of such representatives being called upon to answer the claims relatable to deficiency in service on their part by way of launching a complaint claiming compensation against them. It is worthwhile at this juncture to refer to the observations we have made regarding the functioning of the voluntary organisations in the State in our order dated 26th July, 2000 in A.P. No. 567/97. Paragraphs 23 and 24 of the order are relevant and they read as under : "23. Before parting with the matter, we are desirous of stating about the functioning of voluntary consumer organisations in the State of Tamil Nadu. Most of the voluntary organisations functioning in the State, of course, are registered either under the Companies Act, 1956 or under any other law for the time being in force viz., the Societies Registration Act, 1975. Most of the voluntary Consumer Organisations bear the name in a camouflaged way such as "Consumer Protection Council", "Consumer Rights and Action Council", "Consumer Rights Protection and Welfare Council" so on and so forth. This sort of a name appended to such voluntary Consumer Associations is taken for granted by the unwary consumer/litigant/public as if such associations are part and parcel of either the Central Consumer Protection Council established under Section 4 by the Central Government or the State Consumer Protection Council as constituted under Section 7 by the State Government. Such voluntary associations, in their functioning, also pose as if they are having necessary and requisite right to issue notice and adjudicate the consumer disputes by themselves without resorting to raising a dispute before the Fora or the Commission constituted under the salient provisions of the Act, 1986. This sort of a thing, if allowed to continue, there is every likelihood for such associations misusing or abusing the provisions of the Act to the detriment of the consumers. This, we rather feel, is to be effectively checked by the authorities concerned while according registration to them either under the Companies Act or under the Societies Registration Act. Care must be taken to see that such voluntary associations should not be allowed to camouflage the names of either the Central Consumer Protection Council or the State Consumer Protection Council as had been respectively established under Section 4 or under Section 7 of the Act, 1986. The nomenclature of name of such voluntary associations should not at all be allowed to resemble the Consumer Protection Council established by the State Government or by the Central Government. Their names simplicitor to the unwary litigant public - consumers, must appear to be a voluntary service associations and nothing further. For example, the name of the voluntary association may be like "Consumer Service Centre", "Consumer Assistance Centre" and so on and so forth. Such voluntary associations, if at all, can render assistance to the unwary consumer litigant-public by instituting proceedings before the competent Fora constituted under the Act without charging anything for the service so rendered. This is possible in view of the salient provisions adumbrated under Section 2(1)(b)(ii) of the Act which prescribes that a "complainant" means, "any voluntary Consumer Association registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or under any other law for the time being in force". Such voluntary association cannot at all be construed as a substitute for the professional Advocates in focussing or projecting the views of all consumer litigant-public and such a thing, if allowed will tantamount to licensing such associations to practice the profession of law without any degree therefor. It is also likely that certain unscrupulous persons form such associations and take up the position of Advocates without having any law degree by having a lucrative practice before the Consumer Fora constituted under the Act. No doubt, voluntary consumer associations, under the Act can project the cause of consumers by their appearance. But, while doing so, we reiterate that they should not charge anything for such service rendered. It is not our intention to say that such voluntary association should not be allowed to participate in the proceeding before the Fora constituted under the Act. But, what we want to say is that such associations should not be construed as a substitute for Advocates and they should not be allowed to plead the cause of consumers by charging them heavily. It should however be noted here that such Consumer Associations can simply represent the case of the consumers before the Fora constituted under the Act and should not take up themselves the burden of adjudicating such matters by issuance of notices to the parties and settling their disputes by themselves. 24. The only Authority entitled to issue notice or summons to the adverse parties on receiving accusations against the opposite parties from the person/s aggrieved, is the Legal Services Authority-whether the matter is relatable to any dispute whatever, under the sun except non-compoundable offences, for the purpose of conciliation, negotiation and settlement. Any aggrieved consumer either by himself or through voluntary consumer Sssociations may approach the District or other State Legal Services Authorities, for settlement of disputes by way of conciliation or negotiation and if such settlement is not possible, such affected party can seek the assistance of such Legal Services Authority for fighting their cause before the competent Forum even by engaging a Counsel at the cost of the Legal Services Authority, provided the aggrieved person seeking such assistance is entitled to the assistance within the salient provisions adumbrated under the Legal Services Authority Act, 1987. We are of the view that Legal Services Authority can render yeomen service to the affected consumers either by way of settlement of dispute between the consumer and the adverse parties or project their causes before the competent Forum by giving proper legal assistance to them in all fitting and deserving cases."

SUBSEQUENT to the rendering of the order as above, this Commission sent a communication vide letter Rc. No. A-1/429/2000 dated 20.11.2000 to the Secretary to Government, Co-operation, Food and Consumer Protection Department, Secretariat, Chennai - 600 009 bringing to light the functioning of the Voluntary Consumer Organizations bearing camouflaged name as if they are statutory bodies under the Act, 1986 and taking action to prevent the use of such camouflaged names. The letter so sent is worth reading which reads as follows : "Sir, Sub : Consumer Protection-Registering Voluntary Consumer Organisations as Forum or Council or Com-mission-Banning of Registra-tion-Regarding. Ref : Government letter No. 1376/H2/2000-2, Co-operation, Food and Consumer Protection Department, dated 4.2.2000. With reference to the letter under reference, I am directed to state as follows : (1) Most of the Voluntary Consumer Organisations functioning in the State are registered either under the Companies Act, 1956 or under the Societies Registration Act, 1975 or under any other law for the time being in force. Such Organisations bear the name in a camouflaged way such as "Consumer Protection Council", "Consumer Rights and Action Council", "Consumer Rights Protection and Welfare Council", so on and so forth. This sort of a name appended to such Voluntary Consumer Organisations is taken for granted by the unwary consumer-litigant-public as if such associations are part and parcel either the Central Consumer Protection Council established under Section 4 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short, "the 1986 Act") by the Central Government or the State Consumer Protection Council as constituted under Section 7 of the 1986 Act by the State Government. (2) Care must be taken to see that such voluntary consumer organisations should not be allowed to camouflage the names of either the Central Consumer Protection Council or the State Consumer Protection Council. The nomenclature of the names of such voluntary consumer organisations should not at all be allowed to resemble the Consumer Protection Council established by the State Government or by the Central Government. Their names simplicitor to the unwary litigant-public-consumers, must appear to be a voluntary service associations and nothing further. For example, the name of a voluntary consumer organisation may be like, "Consumer Service Centre", "Consumer Assistance Centre" and so on and so forth. (3) The Competent Authority either under the Companies Act, 1956 (for short, "that 1956 Act") or under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 (for short, "the 1975 Act,"), somehow or other, allowed the registration of the Voluntary Consumer Organisations with appellation of words like "Commission", "Forum", "Council", perhaps inadvertently and without understanding the significance of such appellations. Hundreds of Voluntary Consumer Organisations are now in existence with such appellations. (4) The Government, realising the significance of such appellations, decided to bring in an amendment to the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 (Tamil Nadu Act, 27 of 1975) to restrict the appellation of such words as stated above in the name of any Voluntary Consumer Organisation at the time of registration and consequently the Government decided to permit the registration of any Society by a name which contains the words "Commission", "Forum", "Council", only when such Society has obtained the sanction in writing of the Government and to amend the 1975 Act suitable for the purpose. (5) Pursuant to such a decision taken, the Government brought in the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration (Amendment) Act, 1999. By Section 2 of the said Amendment Act, the desired amendment was made and the said section reads as under :

"2. In Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975, in Sub-section (2), in item (c), for the expression "Union" or "State", the expression "Union" or "State" or "Commission" or Forum" or "Council" shall be substituted." (6) Even the amendment so brought about, cannot at all be stated to have achieved the purpose. Voluntary Consumer Organisations registered earlier will not get affected by such an amendment and they will continue to have their original names with the offending appellation of words as above stated. The Government can prevent only the Voluntary Consumer Organisations to be started afresh subsequent to the Amendment. It is not as if the appellation of such words to the names of Voluntary Consumer Organisations can once and for all be prevented by the Government. The Government if it thinks fit, can even grant the registration of Voluntary Consumer Organisations with the appellation of such offending words. This is contrary to the Code of Conduct as formulated by the Government of India for the Voluntary Consumer Organisations. The Code of Conduct as framed by the Government of India had been communicated to all the Voluntary Consumer Organisations and the State Governments for implementation as stated by the Special Commissioner of Civil Supplies. One of the Code guidelines prohibits the use of terms such as "Council", "Forum" or "Commission" in the names of the Voluntary Consumer Organisations. (7) By way of reiteration, for the sake of emphasis, it may be stated here that, the Central Government, under Section 4 of the 1986 Act, may establish a Council to be known as "Central Consumer Protection Council" and likewise, the State Government may constitute, under Section 7 of the 1986 Act, a Council to be known as "State Consumer Protection Council". No power had been granted either to the Central Government or to the State Government in the said salient provisions to constitute any other Council other than the one referred to in the respective sections. Such being the case, the Amendment brought above to the 1975 Act retaining the power with the Government to permit registration of Voluntary Consumer Organisation by a name which contains the words "Commission", "Forum" or "Council", is contrary to the provisions of the 1986 Act (Central Act 68 of 1986). In case of inconsistencies arising between laws made by the Parliament and the laws made by the Legislatures of State, the law as made by the Parliament shall prevail according to Article 254 of the Constitution of India, and the law made by the State Legislature shall, to that extent of repugnancy, be void. (8) In such circumstances, it becomes imperative upon the Government to take immediate steps to inform all the Voluntary Consumer Organisations which contain the words as mentioned above, to re-register their names with the Registrar of Societies by omitting such words. This Registry also has addressed a letter No. A-1/429/2000 dated 12.4.2000 to the Secretary to Government, Co-operation, Food and Consumer Protection Department, Secretariat, Chennai - 9, on this aspect of the matter. (9) These things apart, this Commission also passed a judicial order on 16th July, 2000 in A.P. No. 567 of 1997 with regard to the nomenclature of the names of Voluntary Consumer Organisations. A xerox copy of the said order is herewith enclosed for perusal. (10) Paragraphs 23 and 24 of the order contain the relevant directions of the Hon''ble Commission in this regard. (11) For all these reasons as stated above, I am directed to state that the opinion as expressed by Thiru Arun Ramanathan, I.A.S., Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Civil Supplies and Consumer Protection, Chepauk, Chennai - 600 005 to the effect that "only the Statutory Redressal Authorities of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 should desirably be identified by the words "Commission" and "Forum" and it is not desirable to permit Voluntary Consumer Organisations to use these terms in their names", has necessarily to be endorsed with respects. (12) As such the Government cannot at all reserve their right of according permission to any private consumer organisation to use the word "Commission", "Forum", and "Council" for registering their name in Tamil Nadu Registration Act. (13) This Commission is, therefore, of the view that the amendment brought about by Section 2 of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration (Amendment) Act, 1999 has to be necessarily repealed as it is repugnant to Central Act, 1986 by way of deletion and the requisite amendment has to be brought in conformity with the Code guidelines as formulated by the Government of India for Voluntary Consumer Organisations. (14) I am, therefore, to request that orders of Government in the above matter may be obtained and communicated to this Commission at an early date. Yours faithfully,

Sd/- Registrar The communication sent to the Government of Tamil Nadu as above we trust and hope would culminate in action as expeditiously as possible in the larger interest of the litigants-consumers. There is a mushroom growth of Consumer Organisations bearing such camouflaged names in the State of Tamil Nadu and we are told that their number is round about 300. 64 of these associations it appears received from the Central Government ex-gratia payments on and from year 1994 to 1997 to the tune of Rs. 58,67,664/- for creating consumer awareness and other allied matters. Accounts were settled by the associations only to the tune of Rs. 37,18,950/- and there remains a balance of Rs. 21,48,714/- in respect of which accounts are required to be settled. The accounts to be settled by FEDCOT is to the tune of Rs. 9,89,384/-; by SMN Council to the tune of Rs. 5,35,000/-; the Consumer Action Group to the tune of Rs. 1,80,000/-; and Trichy District Consumer Council Rs. 2,58,300/- and certain other associations. (Annexure giving details of the ex-gratia payments made to various Consumer Organisations in Tamil Nadu by the Central Government and particulars regarding account settled and yet to be settled etc. by various Organisations is pinned up to the Order by way of information). Not only the Voluntary Consumer Organisations in the State of Tamil Nadu received ex-gratia payments from the Central Government but the plain fact is that the ex-gratia payments by various Consumer Organisations from all the States in India had been received and total amount received by them would run to few crores of rupees. Of course, funding of these Organisations by the Central Government had been done pursuant to the suggestion or recommendation made by the General Assembly of the United Nations while passing Resolution dated 27th May, 1983 for the enactment of a Statute in all democratic countries for the better protection of the interest of the consumers. A word of caution was administered while making such recommendation by the General Assembly. The General Assembly said that while implementing the recommendations they had made due considerations must be given to the local condition and situation. As such, the recommendation so made need not necessarily be observed in toto. The economic condition in India is rather very pathetic. India is reeling under quagmire of ocean of debt burden to other countries at the global level. The interest paid for the debts incurred so far also it appears runs into several thousands of crores of rupees. Placed in such a predicament situation, this country has to curtail unnecessary and wasteful expenditure which are obviously not growth-oriented. A glaring example of such an expenditure is one, we rather feel, is ex-gratia payments given to the Consumer Organisations throughout India running to a few crores of rupees. Comparable to the colossal debt burden to this country, expenditure incurred by the Central Government in making ex-gratia payments to the various Consumer Organisations in the country may appear to be rather insignificant. The addition of such insignificant amount to the debt burden of this country may not, we hope, take the shape of placing the last straw on the camel''s back in the sense of breaking the backbone of the economy of the country. To have a check and control over the expenditure of the Government institutions in the very nature of things, now-a-days prove to be very difficult despite elaborate audit procedures at all levels. The officials of the Government department are accountable and disciplinary action can even be taken against them for financial irregularities or embezzlement committed by them. Ex-gratia payments made by the Central Government to the Voluntary Consumer Organisations if not accounted properly by such organisations, there is no remedy at all. It is not possible for the Central Government to properly oversee and scrutinise the expenditure incurred by the various Consumer Organisations from the ex-gratia payments made to them. The fact that very many organisations despite elapse of so many years from the date of getting the ex-gratia payments did not settle the accounts is proof positive of the fact that the funds sanctioned to them were not properly utilised. On one fine morning after enterning into so much of correspondence with the Consumer Organisations, the Central Government is likely to close the accounts as settled after receiving some sort of a scribbling or jotting of entires in a plain paper the expenditure made by those associations equivalent to the ex-gratia payments received by them. We are not here to point out in what manner the Government of India is to devise its policy. Of course, it is for the Government to frame the policies governing the country. If the Government of India in its wisdom thinks that the expenditure by way of ex-gratia payments made to the various Consumer Organisations in the country has not served the purpose for which the expenditure were incurred, better it is for it to stop incurring any further expenditure by way of ex-gratia payments made to those Consumer Organisations under the so-called avowed object of a service to be rendered by such organisations for the better protection of the interest of the consumers in this country. We should not be mistaken while making such an observation as if we are having some sort of a malice as against those Consumer Associations. We are impelled to make such observations in the interest of the country as a whole when especially the country is facing a stringent financial crunch all over and even finding it difficult to meet the payment of salaries of Government servants each and every month.

ETERNAL vigilance is the prize of democracy. If the people of this country are not vigilant in having proper knowledge of the functioning of the various Consumer Organisations in the country there is every likelihood of large majority of unwary consumers being duped, doped and live on promises made by such Voluntary Organisations bearing a camouflaged name said to be working for the betterment of the interest of the consumers. It is high time for the governmental agencies to make a probe into the working of such Organisations and weed out derecognising such of those blacksheep associations. Even if weeding out is done by such process, we are of the view, the derecognised organisations will start an associations under different names and will get benefit of ex-gratia payments made by the Central Government. Such a possibility cannot at all be ruled out of consideration.

ONE projection of hues of views as aired by learned Counsel Mr. N.L. Rajah that the combined reading of Section 13(4)(vi) and Section 30(1) of Act, 1986 would point out the possibility for the Central Government to provide by way of rules giving right of audience to be inhering in favour of the authorised representative of the Consumer Associations. We initially thought to leave it left open inasmuch as no rules had been prescribed as of now in the Rules, 1987 giving right of audience to the authorised representatives of the Consumer Organisations. We, however, revised our thinking and proceed to consider the merits of such a projection of hues of views. Section 13(4) of Act, 1986 vested with District Forum the same powers as are vested in Civil Court under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 while trying a suit in respect of certain enumerated categories. They are : "(i) the summoning and enforcing attendance of any defendant or witness and examining the witness on oath; (ii) the discovery and production of any document or other material object producible as evidence; (iii) the reception of evidence on affidavits; (iv) the requisitioning of the report of the concerned analysis or test from the appropriate laboratory or from any other relevant source; (v) issuing of any commission for the examination of any witness; and (vi) any other matter which may be prescribed."

Sub-section (1) of Section 30 deals with the power of Central Government to make rules for carrying out the provisions contained in certain provisions of the Act. One such provision is Clause (vi) of Sub-section (4) of Section 13. This sort of a power however is not given to the State Government and this aspect of the matter is getting cleared by a cursory perusal of Sub-section (2) of Section 30 in the sense of Clause (vi) of Sub-section (4) of Section 13 not having been included in the said sub-section. Even if the power to frame a rule in respect of Clause (vi) of Sub-section (4) of Section 13 inheres in favour of the Central Government, the power can be utilised for the inclusion of any other provision of Civil Procedure Code in Section 13(4) so that the included provision may be applicable in the conduct of the enquiry before the District Forum. It is quite possible for the Central Government to include Order III Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code utilising the power under Clause (vi) of Sub-section (4) of Section 13. Even if Order III Rules 1 and 2 is included in Section 13(4), that is not going to improve the position in the matter of grant of right of audience in favour of authorised representatives of the Consumer Associations on the face of the dictum laid down by the High Court of Judicature in the case of M. Krishnammal v. T. Bala Subramania Pillai (supra), and D. Sornam v. State of Madras (supra).

MENTION has to be made about one B. Nagarajan styling himself as a Legal Practitioner. His residential address is 7, GST Road, Rangasamy Complex, Chengalpet. He has given his office address at J-136, I Floor, MMDA Colony, Arumbakkam, Chennai-106. He is also a subscriber of a phone bearing No. 4755724. He is also having a pager bearing No. 9627443350. Though he styled himself as a Legal Practitioner, he had not mentioned the degree of law he obtained by suffixing it to his name. That raised a doubt as to whether he is a person enrolled as an Advocate though he called himself as a Legal Practitioner. When we questioned the said Legal Practitioner, he had the audacity and guts to represent to us that though he was not enrolled as an Advocate, yet he had been continuously practising in Civil and Criminal Courts projecting the cause of litigant-public of course after obtaining the necessary and requisite permission of the Court before which he appears in projecting the cause of litigant in civil or criminal cases. On the same sort of an analogy he sought permission from this Commission for the projection of the hues of views. The permission so sought for had been negatived by us and he was not allowed to make his submissions. He went to the extent of stating that he was unable to understand as to how this Commission could prevent him from making his submissions when especially he had been granted the necessary and requisite permission to represent as a Legal Practitioner of litigants in civil and criminal cases by Courts-Criminal and Civil in the State of Tamil Nadu. Despite his persuasive argument on such aspect of the matter, we denied him permission to make his submissions. We are unable to understand how he had been practising the profession of law in Civil and Criminal Courts of the State without getting himself enrolled as lawyer possessing the necessary and requisite qualification by the ritualistic exercise of getting permission from the Court before which he is appearing. Such sort of an act on his part does amount to practise the profession of law without his being enrolled as an Advocate contrary to the provisions of Section 33 of the Act, 1961. It is to be noted that violating of provisions of Act, 1961 is punishable under Section 45 which prescribes that "any person who practises in any Court or before any authority or person, in or before whom he is not entitled to practise under the provisions of this Act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months." We are bringing to the knowledge of the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu as to his practising the profession of law in contravention of the provision of the Act, 1961 and it is for the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu, if it thinks so fit, to initiate proper action against him according to law. For the reasons as above, there is no other go for us except to answer the point posed for consideration in the negative and we accordingly do so.

OF course, the complaint as earlier stated is not signed by the 2nd complainant, mother of the deceased, apart from complainants 3 and 4 not being shown as minors represented by guardian mother, 1st complainant. Apart from the 1st complainant signing the complaints, the Secretary of Consumer Welfare Foundation, Chennai Mr. N. Chandrasekaran signed the same. We have already held that even in the absence of certain aggrieved complainants resorting to launch a complaint before the Court a Voluntary Consumer Association can present the complaint for and on behalf of the aggrieved consumers not interested in filing the complaint. Therefore, the complaint though not signed by the 2nd complainant and the minors 3rd and 4th complainants not represented by their mother and guardian, the 1st complainant, we are of the view that the complaint filed as such signed by the Secretary, Consumer Welfare Foundation, Chennai Mr. N. Chandrasekaran would be sufficient on the face of the salient provisions adumbrated under Section 2(1)(b)(ii) and Section 12 of the Act, 1986. In view of recording of the finding on the point posed for consideration, Mr. N. Chandrasekaran is not granted the right of audience. Consequently, we did not give right of audience. There is no bar for the complainant to project her hues of views as respects existence of prima facie materials in the complaint for admission. No purpose will be served by her being asked to argue on her behalf when especially when we on perusal of the averments in the complaint and other documents filed along with it came to the conclusion that there are prima facie materials available in the complaint for admission and, therefore, we admit the complaint and direct the Registry to issue notice to the opposite parties returnable by 28.5.2002. Before parting, with the order, we want to observe that the copy of this order is to be circulated to all the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forums in the State. The Registry is, therefore, directed to make as many copies as there are District Forums and despatch a copy of the order to each of the District Forums for due compliance of the law laid down in this order in future. Call on 28.5.2002. Complaint disposed of.