Madras Non-Gazetted Civil Accounts Officers' Association vs Accountant-General and Others

This is an appeal directed against the order of Kailasam, J., by which he dismissed the appellant''s petition under Art. 223 of the Constitution to

quash an order or the Accountant-General, Madras, dated 27 September 1968. By that order the appellant was told that, in view of the strike by

certain Government servants in the Department of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, he had come to the conclusion that the de facto

recognition of the appellant-association should be withdrawn with immediate effect. The order also stated that the facilities given to the association

and its office-bearers should stand automatically withdrawn and that the secretary of the association should make over immediately to the care-

taker of the Accountant-General''s office vacant possession of the room in the office premises which had been in the occupation of the association.

Kailasam, J., was of the view that the recognition of the association being no longer rested on any statutory rules, its withdrawal could not be

interfered with. He was also of the view that since Rule 4B of the Cants-ail Civil Service''s (Conduct) Rules, 1955, was held to be violative of

Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution is Ghosh (O.K.) and Anr. v. Joseph (E.X) and vice versa 1962 I .L.J. 615 It automatically followed that the

Central Civil Services (Recognition of Services Associations) Rules, 1959, should be regarded as invalid. Oil the contention that the withdrawal of

recognition was without notice to the appellant, the learned Judge considered that It could not be stated that, as a rule of law, even in cases where

the appellant had no right in law, notice should be given.

We are unable to share the view of Kailasam J., is so far as it related to the validity of the Central Civil Services (Recognition of service

Associations) Rules, 1959. In our view those ruled are not invalidated by reason of Ghosh (O. K.) awl Anr. v. Joseph (E. X.) and vice versa 1982

I.L.J. 615 (vide supra) and the assumption of the respondent, to the contrary, is not well-founded. Tausoase only held that the exercise of the

fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c) could not validly be conditioned on recognition, subject to certain conditions of an association.

Rule 4B of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955, prohibited a Government servant from attending or continuing to be a member of any

service association of Government servants which had not, within a specified period, obtained the recognition of the Government under the rules

prescribed in that behalf, or, the recognition in respect of such association had been refused of withdrawn by the Governments under those rules,

The Central Civil Services (Recognition of Service Associations) Rules, 1959, were framed by the President, after consultation with the

Comptroller and Auditor-General, in exercise of the powers under Articles 148(5) and 149 of the Constitution read with Rule 4B of the Central

Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955. Rule 7 relates to withdrawal of recognition, and, It says that recognition can be withdrawn in respect of a

services association if it had failed to comply with the conditions set out in Rules 4, 5 and 6. The respondents do not say, we may notice in passing,

that the withdrawal, in this case, is covered by Rule 7, for it was not on the ground that the appellant had failed to comply with the conditions set

out in Rules 4 to 6. If the Recognition Rules of 1959 are still in force, there can be no doubt, therefore, that the withdrawal of recognition of the

appellant-association cannot be supported. But the respondents assume they ware invalid and, because of that, the Accountant-General, by his

communication, dated 1 April 1967, stated that the recognition of the appellant should be regarded as purely on de facto basis and that it was

subject to the conditions ambled in the recognition Rules, 1959.

Ghosh (O.K.) and Anr. v. Joseph (E.X) and vice versa 1962 I.L.J. 615 (vice supra) entirely left untouched the validity of the Central Civil

Services (Recognition of Services Associations) Rules, 1959. Since Rule 4B of the Conduct Rules violated the Government servants fundamental

right under Art. 19(1)(c), the Supreme Court considered that it was not easy to see any rational, direct or proximate connexion between the

observance of the conditions for continued recognition of the association and public order and that, it was possible, therefore, that recognition

might be refused or withdrawn on grounds which were wholly unconnected with public order. On that view, It was held that the right to form

associations guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c) was made subject to the rigorous restriction that the association In question must secure and continue

to enjoy recognition from Government and that the restriction thus imposed would make the guarantee ineffective or even illusory. It may be seen

at once that the Court, in that case, was looking at, the matter from the standpoint of the fundamental right of the Government servant to form

associations. That right could not be made dependent on whether recognition was given to an association by the Government, or, if it was given, it

continued to operate or it was withdrawn. But that has nothing to do with the validity of the Central Civil Services (Recognition of Service

Associations) Rules, 1959. No association has a fundamental right to recognition by the Government. Indeed, that was not the question that came

up for consideration or decision in Ghosh (O.K.) and Anr. v. Joseph (E. X.) and vice versa 1982 I.L.J. 6.5 (vide supra). It is one thing to say that

a Government servant''s right under Article 19(1)(c) cannot be media to depend on whether an association was a recognized one or not, and, it is

quite another that if and when an association is formed, it is entitled to recognition or not. The last aspect is not governed by Article 19(1) at all.

The Recognition Rules were, therefore, not affected by Ghosh (O.K) and Anr. v. Joseph (E. X.) and vice versa 1962 I.L.J. 615 (vida supra).

Their validity is also not affected by the fact that Rule 4B of the Conduct Rules has been struck down. In fact, the power to make the Recognition

Rules was not derived from Rule 4B though it was cited in the preamble to the notification of the Recognition Rules. Merely because a wrong rule

was cited, as the source of power, it does not follow that it would, by itself, invalidate the rules if they can be justified with reference to the power

under the proper source.

It follows that the view of the department that the appellant had only de facto recognition cannot be maintained. The recognition accorded to it

under the Recognition Rules continued to operate, and since it is not the case that the withdrawal of the recognition was under Rule 7 of the

Recognition Rules, the order of the Accountant-General dated 27 September 1968 cannot be sustained as valid.

The appeal is allowed and the impugned order is quashed. There will be no order as to costs here and in the writ petition.