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Judgment
Paramjeet Singh, J.—Instant writ petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India for quashing the order dated
11.09.1990 (Annexure P/2) passed by respondent No. 3 - Financial Commissioner, Haryana, whereby the case of the petitioner of surplus area
has been reopened.
Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was owner in possession of 694 kanals and 17 marlas of ordinary land which is equivalent to 1522
kanals 19 marlas of ''C'' category land. The petitioner filed a ''declaration form'' u/s 9 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1971
(hereinafter referred to as the ""Act"") on 13.08.1976 wherein it was stated that his family consisted of himself, his wife, Anil Kumar, son (12 years)
and Rajinder Kumar, son (14 Years). The said age was with reference to appointed day i.e. 24.01.1971. In the declaration form, it was submitted
that the date of birth of his one of the sons was 04.06.1958 and he had become adult. The petitioner claimed one primary unit and one separate
unit for his adult son. The prescribed authority got verified the facts and found that petitioner and his family owned 694 kanals 17 marlas of
ordinary land which is equivalent to 1522 kanals 19 marlas of ''C'' category land. The petitioner had alienated land measuring 521 kanals 5 marlas
which is equivalent to 818 kanals 7 marlas of ''C'' category land by sale to different persons. Out of this land, 281 kanals 17 marlas were sold on
16.08.1971, 160 kanals were sold on 10.05.1974 in two different transactions, 47 kanals 8 marlas were sold on 24.07.1975 and 32 kanals were
sold on 25.07.1975. The petitioner claimed that the said transfers were bona fide and, therefore, the total area transferred was to be deducted
from the holding of the petitioner, as a result of this, he was left with only 266 kanals 16 marlas of ''C'' category land, which is permissible area for
a primary unit admissible to the petitioner. Therefore, there was no surplus land in the hands of the petitioner. The prescribed authority accepted
the transfers as bona fide and closed the surplus area case of the petitioner vide order dated 07.09.1984 (Annexure P/1). The Government did not
file any appeal/revision before the competent authorities. After lapse of more than 4 years, State of Haryana filed a revision before the Financial
Commissioner. The Financial Commissioner vide order dated 11.09.1990 (Annexure P/2) re-opened the entire case and remanded the case to the
prescribed authority to take all steps to ensure that the case is decided by him expeditiously. Hence, this writ petition.
In pursuance of notice of motion, the respondents-State filed written statement, admitting the fact that the case was closed vide order dated
07.09.1984 (Annexure P/1) which is illegal and arbitrary and has rightly been set aside by the Financial Commissioner vide impugned order dated
11.09.1990. The objection has also been taken that the Financial Commissioner is competent u/s 18(6) of the Act to review the order passed by
the prescribed authority and he can exercise suo motu power and dismissal of the writ petition has been prayed for.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that order dated 07.09.1984 (Annexure P/1) was not challenged by the Government.
At that time, the Prescribed Authority had considered the entire case and found that the transfer was legal and valid. Neither an appeal nor revision
was filed, however, revision was filed by the State of Haryana before the Financial Commissioner u/s 18(6) of the Act after a lapse of four years
praying for invoking his suo motu power to look into the legality of the order after calling the record from the Collector. Financial Commissioner,
after hearing both the parties, set aside the order dated 07.09.1984 (Annexure P/1)and passed the order dated 11.9.1990 (Annexure P/2) holding
that the order dated 07.09.1984 was vitiated by patent illegality. Learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that Financial Commissioner
should not have exercised the revisional power after lapse of more than 4 years from the date of order passed by the Prescribed Authority as the
State never filed an appeal or revision against that order. So the impugned order (Annexure P/2) is not sustainable in the eyes of law.
Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgments of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Loku Ram Vs. State of Haryana and Others ;
The State of Gujarat Vs. Patil Raghav Natha and Others, ; Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Collie Sangham Vs. K. Suresh Reddy and Others,
and Shri Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil and Others Vs. Shri Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale and Others, to contend that suo motu power can be
exercised only within a reasonable period although no limitation is prescribed under the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner further relied upon
the judgment of this Court in Dayawanti Vs. State of Haryana and C.W.P. No. 895 of 1991 - Chandgi Ram v. State of Haryana and others,
decided on 08.07.2013, wherein identical issue was involved.
Learned counsel for the State vehemently opposed the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner and contended that the
powers of the Financial Commissioner are very wide under the provisions of the Act. u/s 18(6) of the Act, Financial Commissioner can exercise
the power suo motu at any time and call for the records of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him. As such the order was
legal and valid. The writ petition deserves to be dismissed.
I have considered the rival contentions and perused the record.
It would be appropriate to reproduce Section 18 of the Act, which reads as under:--
Appeal, review and revision.--(1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the prescribed authority, not being the Collector, may,
within fifteen days from the date of the decision or order, prefer an appeal to the Collector in such form and manner as may be prescribed:
Provided that the Collector may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of fifteen days if he is satisfied that the appellant was
prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time.
(2) Any person aggrieved by a decision or order of the Collector (whether acting as prescribed authority or not) not being a decision or order
made in an appeal under sub-section (1), may, within fifteen days from the date of the decision or order, prefer an appeal to the Commissioner in
such form and manner as may be prescribed.
Provided that the Commissioner may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of fifteen days if he is satisfied that the appellant was
prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time.
(3) xxxx
(4) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Collector under sub-section (1), may within thirty days from the date of the order, file a revision
petition before the Commissioner so as to challenge the legality or propriety of such order and the Commissioner may pass such order as he may
deem fit. The order of the Commissioner shall be final.
(5) xxxx
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing Sub-sections, the Financial Commissioner may suo motu at any time call for the records of
any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of such proceedings
or order, and may pass such order in relation thereto as he may deem fit.
(7) xxxx
(8) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 21, a person who files an appeal or a revision against the order declaring his land as surplus area
and the appeal or revision filed by him fails, shall be liable to pay, for the period he is or has at any time been in possession of the land declared
surplus to which he is or was not entitled under the law, a licence fee equal to thirty times the land holdings tax, recoverable in respect of this area.
No doubt, Section 18(6) of the Act uses the expression ''at any time'' but it cannot be indefinite time. The power has to be exercised within
reasonable time. The Hon''ble Supreme Court in State of Gujarat (supra) has extensively considered the expression ''at any time'' and after
construing expression ''at any time'' has stated the law thus:--
The question arises whether the Commissioner can revise an order made u/s 65 at any time. It is true that there is no period of limitation
prescribed u/s 211, but it seems to us plain that this power must be exercised within reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be
determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised.
Further perusal of Section 18(2) of the Act clearly shows that it prescribes the period of 15 days for filing an appeal and Section 18(4)
prescribes period of 30 days for filing revision before the Commissioner. The above-said sub-sections prescribe a very short period of 15 days
and 30 days, respectively. It would be unreasonable to hold that the Financial Commissioner has unlimited power to entertain revision after lapse
of several years.
In Ibrahimpatnam Taluk (supra) the Hon''ble Supreme Court has considered the identical provision and held as under:--
Even before the Division Bench of the High Court in the writ appeals, the appellants did not contend that the suo-motu power could be exercised
even after long delay of 13-15 years because of the fraudulent acts of the non-official respondents. The focus of attention before the Division
Bench was only on the language of Sub-section (4) of Section 50B of the Act as to whether the suo-motu power could be exercised at any time
strictly sticking to the language of that sub-Section or it could be exercised within reasonable time. In the absence of necessary and sufficient
particulars pleaded as regards fraud and the date or period of discovery of fraud and more so when contention that the suo-motu power could be
exercised within a reasonable period from the date of discovery of fraud was not urged, the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of
the High Court were right in not examining the question of fraud alleged to have been committed by the non-official respondents. Use of the words
at any time"" in sub-section (4) of Section 50B of the Act only indicates that no specific period of limitation is prescribed within which suo-motu
power could be exercised reckoning or starting from a particular date advisedly and contextually. Exercise of suo-motu power depended on facts
and circumstances of each case. In cases of fraud, this power could be exercised within a reasonable time from the date of detection or discovery
of fraud. While exercising such power, several factors need to be kept in mind such as effect on the rights of the third parties over the immovable
property due to passage of considerable time, change of hands by subsequent bona fide transfers, the orders attaining finality under the provisions
of other Acts (such as Land Ceiling Act). Hence, it appears without stating from what date the period of limitation starts and within what period the
suo-motu powers is to be exercised, in sub-section (4) of Section 50B of the Act, the words ""at any time"" are used so that the suo-motu power
could be exercised within reasonable period from the date of discovery of fraud depending on facts and circumstances of each case in the context
of the statute and nature of rights of parties. Use of the words ""at any time"" in sub-section (4) of Section 50B of the Act cannot be rigidly read
letter by letter.'' It must be read and construed contextually and reasonably. If one has to simply proceed on the basis of dictionary meaning of
words ""at any time"", the suo-motu power under sub-section (4) of Section 50B of the Act could be exercised even after decades and then it would
lead to anomalous position leading to uncertainty and complications seriously affecting the rights of the parties, that too, over immovable properties.
Orders attaining finality and certainty of the rights of the parties accrued in the light of the orders passed must have sanctity. Exercise of suo-motu
power ""at any time"" only means that no specific period such as days, months or years are not prescribed reckoning from a particular date. But that
does not mean that ""at any time"" should be unguided and arbitrary. In this view, ""at any time"" must be understood as within a reasonable time
depending on the facts and circumstances of each case in the absence of prescribed period of limitation.
The Hon''ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ranveer Singh and Others Vs. State of M.P., , while relying upon the judgment of Hon''ble
Supreme Court in Santosh Kumar Shivgonda Patil (supra), has held as under:--
The Supreme Court in Shri Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil and Others Vs. Shri Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale and Others, while considering
revisional power of Sub Divisional Officer u/s 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code ultimately held that the order which was not obtained
by any fraudulence cannot be set aside after 17 years by exercising suo motu powers and, hence, is liable to be set aside and accordingly set aside
the said order of the revisional authority. The Supreme Court further held that ordinarily the reasonable period within which such power is to be
exercised should be not more than three years but of course only in the exceptional circumstances.
The Supreme Court in another decision Mohamad Kavi (supra) while considering Section 84C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural
Lands Act, 1948 also held that the suo motu powers should be exercised within a reasonable period and looking to the transfer which took place
during intervening period in the year 1972 the suo motu powers exercised in September 1973 was found to be unreasonable because by that time
investments were made by the purchasers and the key decision of The State of Gujarat Vs. Patil Raghav Natha and Others, was placed reliance as
well as another decision Ram Chand and others, 1993 AIR SCW 3479/supra) was also relied upon and the suo motu power which was exercised
u/s 84C of the said Act by Mamlatdar was quashed and set aside.
On this basis a view is possible that for limitation purposes the period of limitation provided in Section 18 of the Act may have to be kept in
view. Of course the Full Bench has also held that non fixing of upper limit for exercising suo motu powers, will not confer unfettered rights to the
revisional authority to exercise this power at any moment of time accordingly to his whims.
From the catena of decisions referred to herein above, it can be noticed that law is fairly well settled that the suo motu powers cannot be
exercised by the revisional authority after the expiry of several years. It has been held in almost every decision that such powers should be
exercised within a reasonable period and in most of decisions, it is held that it should be exercised within a few months. The view, thus, is clear that
suo motu powers cannot be left at the whims and sweet will of the revisional authority to be exercised whenever and wherever it wants to do so.
There is no plea raised before me on behalf of the respondents to explain the delay on the part of revisional authority to invoke its suo motu
powers. From the perusal of provisions of the Act as well as the law settled by the Hon''ble Supreme Court, impugned order (Annexure P/2)
cannot be sustained as order does not disclose any reason to hold that period of more than 4 years is reasonable on the facts of the case nor it
discloses that the power has been exercised on the facts and circumstances of the case within a reasonable period. For the reasons afore-
mentioned, writ petition is allowed. Impugned order passed by Financial Commissioner (Annexure P/2) is hereby set aside and order of
Prescribed Authority (Annexure P/1) is restored. No order as to costs.