MAHAJAN STELL SALES vs SANTOSH RANI

WHETHER the registration of a criminal case for a connected ancillary offence would be a bar to the maintainability of a consumer dispute before the redressal agencies under the Act? This is the solitary though significant question in this revision.

IN view of the pristinely legal issue aforesaid the facts giving rise thereto pale into insignificance. These may, therefore, be noticed in the barest outline. The respondent-Smt. Santosh Rani has alleged in her complaint that she purchased 175 bags of cement from the petitioner concern. This was used in the construction of her building. However, when the lintel and the slabs were opened, they cracked and fell down to the ground. The complainant alleged a patent defect in the cement supplied due to the adulteration thereof. She claimed compensation to the tune of Rs. 95,000/-. The petitioner raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the complaint. It was their case that the complainant had earlier lodged a false F.I.R. at Police Station Thanes war alleging that the petitioner was selling fake cement. Thereon a criminal case under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code was registered against Shri Ashwani Kumar, a partner of the firm. He was arrested and released on bail after 4/5 days and during the investigation, 33 samples including the samples of slabs and fallen lintel were taken and sent for analysis to the State Laboratory. This preliminary objection was strenuously pressed and an order on the maintainability of the complaint was sought at the very threshold.

On the other hand, the complainant put in an application for the appointment of a Commission to take a sample of cement as also to assess the loss or damage suffered by the complainant and other connected matters.

THE District Forum considered both the applications together and by the impugned order, it rejected the preliminary objections of the Petitioner and allowed the application for the appointment of a Commission. Hence the present revision. Mr. Jagdish Manchanda, the learned Counsel for the petitioners had with considerable persistence urged that in view of the pendency of the criminal case before a Magistrate, the whole issue was subjudice. It was the submission that the question of the defective cement supplied was common to the complaint and the criminal proceedings and since the Criminal Court was seized of the matter, the District Forum had no jurisdiction to proceed with the complaint. Primal reliance was placed on the order of National Commission in II (1991) CPJ 262 (NC), Santosh Sharma & Ors. v. State Bank of India & Ors. Support by way of analogy was sought from I (1991) CPJ 78 (NC), M/s. Special Machines, Karnal v. Punjab National Bank & Ors., I (1991) CPJ 332 (NC), M/s. Gitanjali Cements Pvt. Ltd. v. Applied Industrial Products (P) Ltd. & Ors. and I (1991) CPJ 586, M/s. Byford v. Ramesh Taneja.

BEFORE examining and appraising the aforesaid contention, it is somewhat refreshing to consider the question on principle in its larger perspective. It is "well-established that the same wrongful act may give rise to both civil and criminal liability. It is equally elementary that the remedy and the relief in the civil vis-a-vis the criminal jurisdiction can be secured only in different forums and would differ in nature and content from each other. Herein, the apt analogy is that of a TORT which may both be a civil and criminal wrong. In this context, one cannot do better than to quote, the authoritative statement in ''Salmond on Torts'', Fourteenth Edition in the following terms:- "It is often the case that the same wrong is both civil and criminal-capable of being made the subject of proceedings of both kinds. Assault, libel, theft and malicious injury to property, for example, are wrongs of this kind. Speaking generally, in all such cases the civil and criminal remedies are not alternative but concurrent, each being independent of the other. The wrongdoer may be punished criminally by imprisonment or otherwise, and also compelled in a civil action to make compensation or restitution to the injured person."

It bears repetition that the civil and criminal remedies are not in the alternative but are concurrent. To our recollection, it has never been held that the proceedings in a Criminal Court would bar the civil remedy for the same wrongful act. Now what is true of the civil and criminal jurisdiction inter se would to our mind be equally if not more true about the civil and the Consumer jurisdiction as well on the broader principle. It then deserves high-lighting that the causes of action under the Consumer Protection Act are somewhat peculiar and special to the said statute. It is now accepted on all hands that this beneficent piece of Legislation first confers certain fresh legal rights on the favoured class of consumers. Of particular notice is the right to seek redressal against the supply of defective goods within the wide-ranging parameters of the defect as defined in Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Act. Equally the Act confers the right of redressal against any deficiency in the services hired by the consumer again within the wide-ranging arena of the deficiency as defined in Clause (g) of the section aforesaid. Yet again the Act creates a hierarchy of redressal agencies for granting expeditous relief there for against any rights conferred on the consumers under the Act which is enjoined to be so adjudicated upon not beyond a period of three months. It would be axiomatic that the relief sought in a consumer''s dispute on the basis of the rights conferred by the Act can in essence be granted primarily by the redressal agencies established there under. Perhaps the ordinary Civil Court would not be able to grant the adequate relief pertaining to the peculiar consumer rights under the statute. If that be so, obviously a Criminal Court cannot even remotely entertain or adjudicate upon a cause of action arising primarily under the Act. Indeed the cause of action and the remedy and relief sought in a consumer''s dispute is radically different from a charge for the commission of any related offence in a Criminal Court.

ONE may now advert to ''Santosh Sharma and Others v. State Bank of India and Others'' (Supra), which is the sheet anchor of the petitioners. A close perusal of that short order would indicate that therein the basic and primal allegation of the complainant widow was that the employees of the State Bank asaulted her husband in which assault the chowkidar of the bank also joined and as a result thereof her husband was alleged to have sustained serious injuries which subsequently proved to be fatal. The complainant had attempted to bring the matter within the CONSUMER jurisdiction by seeking compensation to the tune of Rs. 17,50,000/- for the death of her husband. Summarily rejecting the complaint, the National Commission in the operative and last para of their order held as under:- "Quite apart from what has been stated above we are clearly of opinion that this is not a case where there has been any deficiency in service on part of the Bank so as to entitle the complainant to seek relief before the CONSUMER Disputes Redressal Forums set up under the Act. We are accordingly constrained to reject this complaint petition on the aforesaid ground."

IT would be somewhat manifest from the above that the National Commission non-suited the complainant on the basic ground that her allegations did not give rise to any cause of action under the Act. That is the basic ratio of the case. Only in passing, it had been earlier observed that because the police had investigated into the matter and registered a criminal case against the bank officials, it was not apt or open to the National Commission to hold an enquiry into the factual position as to whether the allegations contained in the complaint petition were correct and true. This . analysis would clearly indicate that this case is plainly distinguishable. We are unable to even remotely infer therefrom that the pendency of a criminal case is an absolute bar to the proceedings of a consumer dispute. Perhaps in this context it is apt to recall the hallowed dictum of Lord Halsbery in ''Quin v. Leathern'' 1901 Appeal Cases 491 that a decision is only an authority for what it actually decides and what is relevant is the ratio thereof and not every passing observation therein. Once the aforesaid decision is explained and distinguished and consequently out of the way, the main plank of the petitioner''s case would crumble. Learned Counsel''s reliance on ''M/s. Special Machines, Karnal v. Punjab National Bank & Others,'' M/s. Gitanjali Cement Pvt. Ltd. v. Applied Industrial Products (P) Ltd. & Others'' and M/s. Byford v. Ramesh Taneja (Supra) can in no way advance his stand. All these cases pertain to a situation where the identical cause of action was pending either in a civil case or in the writ jurisdiction or was before the M.R.T.P. Commission. Plainly enough these have no relevance what so ever to the primal issue herein about the registration or pendency of a criminal case. Indeed these judgments in a way boomerang on the petitioner. The underlying ratio therein is that where the cause of action and the relief claimed is practically identical, then the same cannot be adjudicated in parallel jurisdictions. As has been indicated above, the cause of action and relief in a consumer dispute far from being practically identical with a criminal matter is indeed radically different therefrom.

Now apart from principle and precedent, it also appears to us that if the stand of the petitioner herein were to be accepted, as a rule, it can lead to startling and inequitous results. If it were to be held that the registration of a criminal case would operate as a bar against the proceedings in the connected consumer dispute, the latter remedy would virtually be rendered nugatory in the particular situation. Judicial notice can perhaps be taken of the inevitable delays which now afflict the criminal jurisdiction as well. Inevitably there would be appeals, revisions and special leave petitions against the orders of the Criminal Court. If the consumer dispute cannot proceed meanwhile, it would be virtually rendered infructuous, by sheer delay and passage of time, as against its proclaimed ideal of expeditious disposal. It is well settled that even where the interpretations are open, the one which is likely to lead to mischievous result has to be necessarily avoided. For this additional ground as well, the primal argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner merits rejection. For all the foregoing reasons, the answer to the question posed at the very out-set has necessarily to be rendered in the negative. It is held that the registration of a criminal case for a connected ancillary offences is in no way a bar to the maintainability of a consumer dispute before the redressal agencies under the Act.

ONCE it is held as above, the present revision petition must fail and is hereby dismissed. The order of the District Forum is affirmed on the additional grounds recorded above. Revision dismissed.