Mahamad Issaque vs State of Orissa

Mohapatha, J.—This is a Plaintiff�s First Appeal against the judgment and decree of Sri M.N. Mukherji, Subordinate Judge of Dhenkanal, dated 27th June 1955, arising out of a suit mainly with a prayer for a declaration that the Defendant is not entitled to realise the amount covered by the certificates issued by the Certificate Officer, Dhenkanal, on the basis of the certificates dated 7th and 21st December 1950 (Exts. 6 and 9 respectively). The Plaintiff had further prayed for the refund of the amount deposited by him voluntarily, the amount being Rs. 4937/8/-. The Plaintiff�s suit arises in the following circumstances:

The Collector of Dhenkanal auctioned the monopoly of the collection of bides and bones of domestic animals. The Plaintiff was the highest bidder for a sum of Rs. 13,750/-. The licence to be issued on the basis of the highest bid having been accepted was to enure for the year 1st April 1950 to 31st March 1951. As under the rules the Plaintiff was to deposit an amount of one-fourth of the highest bid, that is, Rs. 3437/8/- the Plaintiff made a deposit and got a Patta (Ext. D) on 1st April 1950. Thereafter the Plaintiff had not paid any further amount which was due as the balance for the highest bid. The Certificate Officer of Dhenkanal therefore issued certificates for the realisation of the balance amount on the basis of the aforesaid two certificates (Exts. 6 and 9). It is not necessary to recite the facts alleged by the Plaintiff under what circumstances he asserted to be justified in not paying the balance amount as the issue regarding that aspect of the case need not be decided in the present appeal. The issues which cover other allegations of the Plaintiff and controverted by the Defendant are Issues 2 and 3 (a) which may be quoted here:

Had the Government Defendant right to grant licence on 23.3.1950 in respect of hides and bones in the ex-State area of Dhenkanal in favour of the Plaintiff? Does the said licence infringe in any way the Fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 13, 19 and 31 of the Constitution of India?

3(a). Is the contract relating to auction sale void and inoperative by reason of Defendant�s failure to discharge his part of the obligation thereof?

Apart from the aforesaid two issues the main contention of the Plaintiff before the Court below and before us is that the certificates are illegal, without jurisdiction and invalid, and as such, they have got to be quashed and a permanent injunction may be issued restraining the Certificate Officer from realising the aforesaid balance amount on the basis of the two certificates. It is to be noted here, so far as the prayer for refund of the amount of Rs. 4937/8/., which the Plaintiff had paid voluntarily on the date of the highest bid having been accepted, is concerned, it is not pressed in the suit and we may observe that the decision of issues 2 and 3 (a), as quoted above, will also remain open as they are not necessary for proper disposal of the Plaintiff�s suit in the light of the view that we are going to take on the first point, that is, to say, that the certificates issued by the Certificate Officer of Dhenkanal are illegal, without jurisdiction and invalid.

We will first refer to the definition of "Public Demand" as contained in Section 3, Clause (6) of the Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914. It runs as follows:

"Public Demand" means any arrear or money mentioned or referred to in Schedule I and includes any interest which may, by law, be chargeable thereon up to the date on which a certificate is signed under Part II;

This requires clarification only by reference to the enumerated items in Schedule I attached to the Act. The schedule contains as many as 14 items enumerating what amounts can be taken to be public demands so .that the demands will come within the purview of the provisions of the Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act. The learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the State in the Court below, stated before the Subordinate Judge, as is apparent from the judgment itself, that he placed reliance only on Item No. 7 of the schedule. The learned Government Advocate, appearing on behalf of the State before us, also, after a full consideration of the enumerated items, has very fairly concentrated upon item No. 7 and argues that if the demand can be termed as a public demand, it can be recovered as such only by the provisions of Item No. 7 and under no other item. We, therefore, proceed to examine whether the particular demand can be taken to be public demand on the consideration of Item No. 7 which runs as follows:

Any demand payable to the Collector by a person holding any interest in land, pasturage, forest rights, fisheries or the like, whether such interest is or is not transferable, when such demand is a condition of the use and enjoyment of such land, pasturage, forest rights, fisheries or other things.

We may observe at the outset that the procedure laid down under the provisions of the Public Demands Recovery Act is an extra-ordinary one and a summary procedure in taking out the cases from the ordinary laws of the country. We shall have to construe the provisions of these items strictly and see if really these are cases where ordinary laws of the land have got to be ignored and the summary procedure laid down in the Act may be resorted to for the speedy realisation of the amounts; As is apparent from Ext. D, this is for collection and export of the hides and bones of domestic animals. By no stretch of imagination it can be taken to be an interest in the land, pasturage, forest rights, fisheries. It can never be also a case where the demand is a condition of the use and enjoyment of such land, pasturage, forest rights, fisheries. Mr. R. C. Misra, appearing on behalf of the State, states that this may be taken to be a case under the residuary words "or the like "or other things". In our view, apart from the principle of ejusdem generis we cannot accept the contention to make the provisions so comprehensive as to include cases of demand in respect of right to collect hides and bones of domestic animals in the ex-State of Dhenkanal. They had absolutely no connexion with any of the enumerated sub-items in Item No. 7, that is, it can never be taken to be an interest in land, pasturage, forest rights, fisheries. To accept the contention of Mr. R. O. Misra will be to interpret Item No. 7 as any demand payable to the Collector can be taken to be a public demand. The subsequent words, which limit the demand payable to the Collector, will have to be deleted as surplusages which, according to us, is contrary to the most elementary and fundamental principles of Interpretation of Statutes. It is well settled, the Courts are not entitled to read words into the Act of Parliament unless clear reasons for it is ,to be found within the four corners of the Act itself. We are not to supply omissions by implications and analogy, unless the existing provisions of a statute by necessary intendment so compel the Court. When it appears to us an elementary position that the entire limiting principles have got to be deleted as surplusages, by accepting the contention we cannot persuade ourselves to observe that it was so intended by the Legislature that any demand payable to the Collector can be taken to be a case of public demand as defined in Section 3, clause (6) of the Act. As it is not covered by any other items, the inevitable conclusion is that it cannot be taken to be a public demand in which case the Certificate Officer must be declared as completely without jurisdiction to issue such certificates which are being impugned in the present case. The certificates (exts. 6 and 9) dated 7th and 21st December 1950 are, therefore, declared by us to be illegal, without jurisdiction and invalid.

The judgment and decree passed by the Court below are set aside, the Plaintiff�s suit to that extent is decreed and the necessary injunction prayed for must issue. The Plaintiff is entitled to proportionate costs throughout.

Barman. J.

I agree.