Mahanth Ramlagan Gossain vs Nandipat Mahton

Wort, J.—I propose to state very briefly my reasons for coming to the conclusion that the decision of the learned Judge in the Court below was right. The appeal concerns two out of twelve sale deeds--one executed on 11th April 1917 and the other on 3rd September 1917 by Mahanth Bhagwat Bhagat. I do not propose to deal with the question of the plaintiff''s title to sue in this action for the reason which will presently appear, namely that the matter is disposed of on the ground of limitation, which is the only substantial point. The death of Mahanth Bhagwat Bhagat took place on 7th January 1920 and this suit was brought on 4th December 1931, and but for other events to which I must refer, the action would have been clearly within time, the death of the Mahanth having taken place within 12 years of the date of the suit. But other considerations apply.

On 5th September 1917, that is to say, two days after the date of the last of the two alienations to which I have referred, Mahanth Bhagwat Bhagat purported to dispose of the balance of the property of the math. The deed was a deed of samarpannama and purported to deal with 37 bighas and 810 kathas. But the learned Judge is correct in coming to the conclusion that not merely the 37 odd bighas but all the remaining balance of the property was dealt with by that deed, that is to say the balance remaining after the disposal of the property by the sale deeds, the subject matter of this suit.

There are two observations in the recent case in AIR 1933 75 (Privy Council) which in my judgment govern this case, and that is the only authority to which I propose to refer. The opinion of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was stated in the course of the judgment in these words:

In other words a mahant has power (apart from any question of necessity) to create an interest in property appertaining to the math which will continue during his own life, or to put it perhaps more accurately, which will continue during his tenure of office of mahant of the math, with the result that adverse possession of the particular property will only commence when the mahant who had disposed of it ceases to be mahant by death or otherwise.

The two observations to which I more particularly refer are these:

(1) To create an interest in property appertaining to the math which will continue during his own life, or to put it perhaps more accurately, which will continue during nil tenure of office of mahant of the math;

and

(2) adverse possession will only commence when the mahant who had disposed of it ceases to be mahant by death or otherwise.

It is the contention here by the defendant-respondent that by the deed of 5th September 1917, the mahanth not only disposed of all the remaining properties of the math but that he ceased to be a mahanth and therefore in that sense suffered civil death, the consequence being (so it is argued) that the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in AIR 1933 75 (Privy Council) would apply. I have already pointed out that the balance of the properties was disposed of by that deed, that is to say, everything--not only the 37 bighas odd but other properties, indeed the whole of the math properties as is dear from the body of the deed itself and from the schedules thereto. But the matter goes further. The Mahanth by that deed dedicates the properties to the worship of Khauri Maharaj, and the learned Judge in the Court below states that the plaintiff''s witnesses had admitted that Khauri Maharaj was a deity worshipped not by the sect to which the Mahanth himself belonged but another sect, namely the Satkabir sect. This finding of the learned Judge in the Court below is not controverted by the appellant in this Court. The substance therefore of the transaction of 5th September 1917 was that the mahanth to all intents and purposes, and effectively, had ceased to be the mahanth of that particular math. It seems to me therefore that the case would come within the propositions which I have read from the judgment of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in AIR 1933 75 (Privy Council)

But it is contended by the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant before us that the reference made by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to the two cases, one reported in Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram 23 Mad. 271 and the well--known case in Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das 37 Cal. 885 would govern the facts of this case. The contention, as I understand it, is this, that the appellant in this case is not concerned with the properties which were disposed of by the deed of 5th September 1917 but admittedly concerned with the properties under the two sale deeds of a prior date and that therefore the rule which was laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case reported in AIR 1933 75 (Privy Council) , namely that adverse possession of the particular property will commence when the mahant who had disposed of it ceased to be mahant by death or otherwise'' would not apply to the facts of this case.

The contention in more detail is this, that the transactions although they purported to be alienations of the absolute right to the properties the subject matter of the deed would by their Lordships'' decision enure for the lifetime of the mahanth: that the transactions were not void but voidable and that consequently so long as the mahanth was alive, time would not begin to run against the plaintiff. But the short answer to that argument is quite dearly found in the observations to which I have already referred to the effect that the mahanth was entitled to create an interest in property appertaining to the math

which will continue during his own life, or to put it perhaps mote accurately, which will continue during his tenure of office of mahant of the math.

The finding being as it is and being in my judgment a correct finding that the mahanth has in effect ceased to be a mahanth, the proposition to which I have just made reference would apply and the argument which was addressed to us in this connexion on behalf of the appellant is in my judgment one which cannot be sustained. Time would run either from the death or from the date on which the mahanth ceased to be mahanth--in this case from 5th September 1917 which makes the action quite clearly barred by limitation. In my judgment the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.

Manohar Lall, J.

I entirely agree.