Maharaja Bahadur Ram Ranbijaya Prasad Singh vs Ami Tewary and Others

Agarwala, J.—This appeal by the decree-holder raises a question of the construction of the Bihar Restoration of Bakasht Lands and Reduction of Arrears of Rent Act, 1938. Broadly speaking this Act entitles raiyats whose holdings have been sold in execution proceedings and purchased by their landlords to be restored to possession on the same terms on which they held the holdings prior to the sale, and the Act also contains provisions for the compulsory reduction of rents of agricultural holdings. The facts of this case were that the appellant obtained a decree for rent and in execution of it sold the judgment-debtors holding and purchased it himself. This purchase was in 1934. Possession of the holding was delivered to the appellant in pursuance of his purchase in 1935. For the period between the date of the sale and the date on which possession was delivered to him, the appellant sued the judgment-debtors to recover a certain sum of money. This sum of money was in respect of the period between the date of sale and the date of delivery of possession and was calculated at the rate of rent formerly payable in respect of the holding. The suit was registered as a rent suit and it was decreed. When the decree-holder sought execution of this decree, the judgment-debtors claimed that they had been restored to possession under the Act of 1938 with the consequence that all their former rights in their holding '' revived and that the rent of the holding had also been reduced by the revenue authorities in proceedings under the Act. They, therefore, claimed that the decree-holder was entitled to recover only at the reduced rate of rent, relying on Section 15(a) of the Act of 1938, which provides that, where the rent of an occupancy holding has been reduced, a landlord shall not, in any suit or proceeding instituted before or after the date on which Section 15 came into force, be entitled to recover from the raiyat of such holding any arrears of the rent of such holding in respect of the years covered by such suit or proceeding, at a rate in excess of the reduced rent, whether such arrears of rent accrued due before or after the date on which the rent was reduced. To my mind this section is quite clear that it deals only with rent and the only question for consideration is, whether the decree which the appellant has obtained and which he is trying to execute is a decree for arrears of rent.

Now, as I have already stated, the holding was sold to the appellant in 1984. The relationship of landlord and tenant between the decree-holder and the raiyat, therefore, came to an end in 1934, and that relationship, having ceased to exist then, whatever might be payable by the person in possession to the landlord was not rent. It would be damages for use and occupation. The mere fact that it was calculated at the rate of rent formerly paid for the holding or that the suit in which it was recovered described it as a rent suit does not really affect the issue. But the opposite party relies on Section 12 of the Act of 1938. So far as it is material to the present case that section provides that when any land is restored to a raiyat under the provisions of the Act all such rights as the raiyat had in respect of the said land and the incidents thereof before its sale shall revive. It is contended that the meaning of this section is that because the former tenant has been restored to the holding, the suit in which the decree that is now being executed was obtained must be regarded as a suit for rent with the consequence that the landlord is debarred by Section 15 from recovering at a rate higher than that which has now been reduced. In my opinion the effect of Section 12 is not that which is contended for. The section cannot, in my opinion, convert what was a suit for use and occupation into a suit for rent at the time when the decree under execution was obtained. There was clearly no claim for rent and no decree for rent was passed. The relationship of landlord and tenant was not in existence at the time. In this view of the matter, the decision of the Court below, in my opinion, is wrong and must be set aside and the appeal decreed with costs throughout. Leave to appeal under the Letters Patent is granted.