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Judgment
This Writ Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India impugns an order of the Labour Court, Dhule dated December 16, 1986, made in Application (IDA) No. 187 of 1985 u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act").
The First Petitioner is a Statutory Corporation carrying on the business of carriage of passengers by bus. The Second Petitioner is the Administrative and Executive Head of the First Petitioner''s Dhule Division. The First Respondent was employed as a Clerk in its service since 1979. On January 14, 1984, the First Respondent submitted an application for leave on the ground that he had to attend to some work of his union and, thereafter, without bothering to find out whether the leave was sanctioned or not, he went away. As a matter of fact, the said leave was not sanctioned and, consequently, the First Respondent was marked absent on January 14, 1984, which resulted in his not being paid the salary of January 14, 1984. The First Respondent filed the application under the provision of Section 33-C(2) and claimed that he had a vested right to claim the salary for January 14, 1984 and sought a direction for payment thereof. His application was contested by the Petitioners on the ground that the application was not maintainable u/s 33-C(2) and, in any event, the applicant''s leave having been refused, the applicant had not earned salary on January 14, 1984. However, both the contentions were rejected by the Labour Court, which directed that the Petitioners pay a sum of Rs. 29.98, together with costs of Rs. 50 to the First Respondent. Hence, this Writ Petition.
In view of the fact that the amount involved is a paltry sum of Rs. 79.98 (inclusive of costs), I inquired from Mr. Pai, learned Advocate appearing for the Petitioners, whether it was worthwhile invoking the powers of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He submits that it was not the amount directed to be paid by the Petitioners to the First Respondent which was important which the Petitioners would not recover from the First Respondent, whatever be the result of the petition, but that it was the principle on which the Labour Court ordered the Petitioners to pay the said amount, which was challenged. Mr. Pai submits that, if this judgment is allowed to hold the field, it is likely that there may arise in future occasions wherein, by taking the present impugned order as a precedent, there may be adverse orders made against the Petitioners. It is for this reason that the Petitioners are seriously pursuing the present petition.
Although the Labour Court has chosen to write a lengthy order, running into about 10 pages, the entire matter may be compressed into the jurisdictional issue alone. The Petitioners have rightly cited the judgment of the Supreme Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited Vs. The Workmen and Another, , in which the Supreme Court clearly delineated the jurisdictional limits of a Labour Court u/s 33-C(2) of the Act. The Supreme Court contrasted an application u/s 33-C(2) to the jurisdiction exercisable by a Civil Court while entertaining a suit and observed :
"In a suit, a claim for relief made by the Plaintiff against the defendant involves an investigation directed to the determination of (i) the plaintiffs right to relief; (ii) the corresponding liability of the defendant, including whether the defendant is, at all, liable or not; and (iii) the extent of the defendant''s liability, if any. The working out of such liability with a view to give relief is generally regarded as the function of an execution proceeding. Determination No. (iii) referred to above, that is to say, the extent of the defendant''s liability may sometimes be left over for determination in execution proceedings. But that is not the case with the determinations under heads (i) and (ii). They are normally regarded as the functions of a suit and not an execution proceeding. Since a proceeding u/s 33-C(2) is in the nature of an execution proceeding it should follow that an investigation of the nature of determinations (i) and (ii) above is, normally, outside its scope. It is true that in a proceeding u/s 33-C(2), as in an execution proceeding, it may be the person by whom or against whom the claim is made if there is a challenge on that score. But that is merely ''incidental''. To call determinations (i) and (ii) ''incidental'' to an execution proceeding would be a perversion, because execution proceedings in which the extent of liability is worked out are just consequential upon the determinations (i) and (ii) and represent the last stage in a process leading to final relief. Therefore, when a claim is made before the Labour Court u/s 33-C(2) that Court must clearly understand the limitations under which it is to function. It cannot arrogate to itself the functions - say of an Industrial Tribunal which alone is entitled to make adjudications in the nature of determinations (i) and (ii) referred to above, or proceed to compute the benefit by dubbing the is former as "incidental'' to its main business of computation. In such cases determinations (i) and (ii) are not ''incidental'' to the computation. The computation itself is consequential upon and subsidiary to determinations (i) and (ii) as the last stage in the process which commenced with a reference to the Industrial Tribunal. It was, therefore, held in State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. R. L. Khandelwal, 1968 II LLJ 589 that a workman cannot put forward a claim in an application u/s 33-C(2) in respect of a matter which is not based on an existing right and which can be appropriately the subject matter of an Industrial Dispute which requires a reference u/s 10 of the Act."
Out of the three contingencies contemplated hereinabove, the Supreme Court held that only in contingency (iii), would an application u/s 33-C(2) properly lie to the Labour Court under the Act. The learned Judge of the Labour Court fell into error in not following the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation''s case (supra).
In numerous judgments, apart from Central Inland Water Transport Corporation''s case (supra), the Supreme Court has pointed out that, if the controversy which is thrown up by an application is as to the title to a monetary benefit or money then the Labour Court would not have jurisdiction u/s 33-C(2) to direct such amount to be paid, but that, if the controversy was only with regard to the computation of such a benefit or the exact ascertainment of the existence of the employer-employee relationship and/or the quantification of the money, then such jurisdiction could be exercised. In the instant case, the First Respondent''s application for leave had been rejected. Even if I assume that there was good reason for seeking leave and further assume that the order passed by the Petitioners in rejecting the said leave application was erroneous, it would only mean that the action of the Petitioners in refusing leave would be subject to challenge. Clearly, such a challenge was not entertainable before the Labour Court while exercising limited jurisdiction u/s 33-C(2) of the Act. It was not a case where the identity or the existence of employer-employee relationship was in issue; it was not a case where the right to wages was admitted; it was not a case where only computation was required. It was clearly a case where the entitlement to wages on January 14, 1984 was; challenged on the ground that the employer had refused to grant leave to an employee. The case, therefore, fell within categories (i) and (ii) highlighted by the Supreme Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation''s case (supra). Unfortunately, the Labour Court does not seem to have appreciated this and misdirected itself on the jurisdictional issue. On this ground alone, the petition is liable to be allowed and the order of the Labour Court set-aside.
En passant, I may observe that the attitude adopted by the First Respondent was also highly improper and deprecable. An employer much less a public authority like the Petitioner Corporation can hardly carry on its activities, if each employee chooses to walk off duty by throwing an application for leave at the face of the employer and assumes that his leave has been sanctioned. Entitlement to leave under the service rules is always subject to exigencies of work and no workman can claim that he ought to be sanctioned leave the moment he presents an application for leave, even if he has leave to his credit. It is neither the requirement in law, nor is it conducive to work culture. If the employer refuses to sanction leave, even in justifiable circumstances, then the remedy is not by way of an application u/s 33-C(2) of the Act, but by raising an industrial dispute.
In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed. Rule made absolute. The impugned Order of the Labour Court dated December 16, 1986 in Application (IDA) No. 187 of 1985 is hereby quashed and set aside. As conceded by the Petitioners, the amount of Rs. 29.98 and the cost of Rs. 50, if already paid to the First Respondent, shall not be recovered from him.