Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, Chandrapur vs Mohammad Fasahatullah Khan

B.H. Marlapalle, J.—Complaint (ULP) No. 108/1983 came to be filed before the Industrial Court, Nagpur under Sec. 28 read with Item 9 of Schedule IV of Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act of 1971'' for short) by respondent Mohammad Fasahatullah Khan against Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation challenging charge sheet cum suspension order dated March 12, 1983. The case of the original complainant was that as per Subject No. 65 of the Settlement dated April 25, 1956, no workman of the Corporation could be suspended for a period beyond ten days and as the period of his suspension was over on March 21, 1983, the suspension order dated March 12, 1983 ought to have been withdrawn and the complainant ought to have been taken on duty from March 22, 1983. The complainant, therefore, alleged unfair labour practice as set out under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act of 1971 on the part of the Corporation inasmuch as there was a breach of the settlement dated April 25, 1956 by not allowing the petitioner to resume duties from March 22, 1983 onwards.

The said complaint was opposed by the Corporation by filing its written statement and it was contended that Subject No. 65 of Settlement dated April 25, 1956 was superseded/modified by subsequent Joint Committee''s Resolution dated July 18/19, 1974 in the 45th meeting of the Joint Committee in which period of suspension was extended upto 90 days. The Corporation, therefore, claimed that it was not guilty of any unfair labour practice, as alleged. The learned Member of the Industrial Court did not agree with the reasoning given by the Corporation and by his order dated March 3, 1987 held the Corporation to be guilty of the unfair labour practice under item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act of 1971 and the complaint was allowed. He further directed the Corporation to pay full wages along with costs of rupees five hundred.

Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Member of the Industrial Court on March 3, 1987 in Complaint (ULP) No. 108/1983, the Corporation filed Writ Petitioner No. 1240/1987 and prayed for quashing and setting aside the order passed by the Industrial'' Court, before this Court. As per the Appellate Side Rules, as amended by this Court, Writ Petition No. 1240/1987 came to be placed before the learned Single Judge (M. S. Deshpande, J.) for final hearing. It was brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge by the respective parties that on the subject of the writ petition, there were two earlier judgments, which were contrary to each other and both the judgments were delivered by two respective Single Benches inasmuch as in Writ Petition Nos. 255, 256, 259 and 267 of 1982 and Writ Petition Nos. 1913 and 1914 of 1981 decided on March 1, 2 and 3, 1982 by the learned Single Judge (R. S. Padhye, J.) and another Writ Petition No. 436 of 1982 decided on November 20, 1985 by the learned Single Judge (Patel, J.), there was difference of opinion and findings in both the judgments were contrary to each other on the same point of law. In his oral judgment dated September 17, 1992, the learned Single Judge (M. S. Deshpande, J.) has recorded respective findings, which were contrary to each other and, therefore, directed the office to place the petition before the learned Chief Justice for referring the matter for decision by Division Bench of this Court. The relevant portion of the order passed by the first Single Judge (R. S. Padhye, J.) reads as under :

"It is not disputed by anybody that U-6 is the settlement of 1968 and it defines the functions and the powers of the Joint Committee. It is also not disputed that according to this settlement, all matters affecting employees fall within the scope of the working of the Joint Committee and that the decision of the Joint Committee was to be binding on both the parties. If this was the settlement and if the 48th meeting of the Joint Committee was specifically set up under this settlement as specifically pointed out in the introductory part of C-16, one fails to understand as to why C-17, which was a decision taken in this 48th meeting of the Joint Committee, could not be treated as a settlement modifying the earlier settlement U-4 of 1956."

The relevant finding in the subsequent petition recorded by another learned Single Judge (Patel, J.) as is reproduced in the judgment by Deshpande, J. is as under :

"There is not much of difference between the scope and functions of the Joint Committee under the two settlements of 1961 and 1968. However, the relevant one would be the latter Settlement of 1968. The Joint Committee thereunder was empowered to look into all matters affecting employees will fall within the scope of the Joint Committee. It is nowhere specified or at least not pointed out to me that all matters referred to therein could embrace within its fold even alteration, modification or change in the terms of earlier Settlements. In my opinion, the functions of the Joint Committee cannot bring about alterations, modifications or changes, in the settled conditions of service of an employee and no right can accrue to the petitioner Corporation to unilaterally cancel Item No. 49, in the absence of any consensus on the point, in the meeting held for the purpose".

In view of the contrary views taken in the aforesaid two decisions of Single Benches, Deshpande, J. in his oral judgment dated September 17, 1992 in the present petition, held that it was necessary that the controversy be resolved by a larger Bench and, therefore, he framed the following question for decision by the Division Bench :

"Whether the Joint Committee cannot bring about alterations, modifications or changes in the settled conditions of service of an employee and whether the period of ten days fixed by 1956 Settlement could not have been extended by the Joint Committee, which has been constituted and re-constituted after that resolution was passed, in pursuance of the Settlements of 1956, 1961 and 1968."

The matter was, therefore, placed before the learned Chief Justice, who has passed necessary orders and thus, Writ Petition No. 1240 of 1987, has been referred to a Division Bench for decision. The points for consideration by the Division Bench as referred by Deshpande, J. are as under :

(i) Whether Joint Committee cannot bring about alterations/modifications or changes in the settled conditions of service of ar employee ?

(ii) Whether period of ten days fixed by 1956 Settlement could not have been extended by the Joint Committee, which has been constituted and re-constituted after that Resolution was Passed in pursuance of the Settlements of 1961 and 1968 ?

On our directions, the parties have placed on record copies of Settlements signed on March 27, 1952, April 25, 1956, January 23, 1959, June 27, 1961, October 21, 1966, July 31, 1968, October 15, 1994 as well as Settlements signed in 1973 and 1977 between State Transport Corporation and its Unions representing all the employees. For the purpose of our decision, we are concerned with the Clauses regarding provision for period of suspension as well constitution of Joint Committee with its scope of functioning and entering into Settlements or passing Resolutions in respect of the matters concerning service conditions of the employees.

In the Settlement of 1952, Clause 18 reads thus :

"Ordinarily the period of suspension will be 10 days, but in special cases, maximum period can be 90 days as prescribed in the Service Code. In such cases, the approval of the Chief Labour Officer will however, be obtained."

In 1956 Settlement there were in all 81 Clauses and Clauses 41, 49, 65, 80 and 81 which are relevant for our consideration are reproduced as under :

"41 - After June 15, 1955, no changes in service conditions of workers will he made without mutual agreement.

49 - Any employee working for 180 days including weekly off and other holidays continuously will be brought on the time scale of pay and will get all the benefits available to time scale workers. Any absence on account of authorised leave will not be treated as break for the above purpose and will not also count for service.

65 - Ordinarily the period of suspension will be 10 days but in special cases the maximum period can he 60 days provided prior permission of the Chief Labour Officer is obtained and the latter is satisfied that there is a Prima facie case of a serious nature against the employee concerned.

80 - A Joint Committee should be constituted for enforcing this Settlement and for removing grievances of workers. It should also ensure proper implementation of all terms of the agreements, settlements and decisions of the Joint Committee and also see that no party does any thing prejudicial to the rights and privileges of the S.T. Corporation or its employees. The implementation Committee referred to in demand No. 1 (b) shall comprise of the three persons nominated by the Corporation and three persons nominated by the S.T. Workers Federation.

81 - Nothing shall be done, which will adversely affect the present service conditions including rights and privileges of workers."

It is thus clear from the above Clauses 65 and 80 that the maximum period of suspension which was limited to ninety in the Settlement of 1952, was reduced to sixty days and for the first time a Joint Committee was constituted with specific subjects notified within its purview or in other terms, the area of operation of the Joint Committee was laid down and more particularly, the Joint Committee was constituted for enforcing implementation of the Settlement and removing grievances of the workers as well as to ensure that no party does anything prejudicial to the rights and privileges of the S.T. Corporation or its employees.

We need not refer to the 1958 Settlement for the present purpose. In 1961 Settlement Clauses 42, 43 and 45, which relevant for the present purpose need to be reproduced and they are as under :

"42 and 43-Joint Committee :

There will be a Joint Committee consisting of three representatives of the Corporation and three representatives of the Federation.

The meeting of the Joint Committee will be held once every month provided there is agenda. Once every six months, the General Secretaries of the Divisional Units of the Federation and one employee from each of the Units nominated by the Federation will be entitled to attend the meeting of the Joint Committee as observer. While considering the time table of any division under Clause 26(f) above, one representative of the Federation from the Division Concerned shall be entitled to attend and be heard by the Committee. One person nominated by the Federation shall be entitled to attend each of those meetings of the Joint Committee as observer on which there is otherwise no observer. Every observer shall be entitled to T.A. and D.A.

The Vice Chairman of the Corporation shall be the Chairman of the Joint Committee. The procedure of Masselley Joint Works Council shall be followed for the conduct of the meetings. The Secretary shall be a worker."

45-Interpretation of the Settlement-All matters affecting the employees will fall within the scope of the Joint Committee. The decision of the Joint Committee will be binding on both the parties subject to Corporation and Government approval where required. In case there is no decision for any reason on any issue, the same will be decided by the Corporation. The Corporation shall before deciding give an opportunity to the Federation representative to be heard.

The Joint Committee will inter alia be competent to consider any anomalies noticed in the pay-scales.

It is clear that Clause 80 in 1956 Settlement pertaining to formation of the Joint Committee is different from Clause 45 in the 1961 Settlement inasmuch as area of operation of the Joint Committee has been enlarged and it is specifically provided that all matters affecting employees will fall within the scope of the Joint Committee and the decision of the Joint Committee will be binding on both the parties subject to Corporation and Government approval where required. On the other hand, the Joint Committee in 1956 Settlement was constituted only to ensure proper implementation of the Settlement and to address itself on the grievance of the employees. It is also pertinent to reproduce Clause 48 of 1961 Settlement and it reads thus :

"48-All privileges, rights, advantages, facilities and amenities existing immediately prior to this agreement shall unless otherwise expressly provided be continued. The decisions of the Joint Committee and the Implementation Committee and previous Settlements or Awards shall be considered as in force or effective unless modified by the Settlement."

Coming to the last relevant Settlement of 1968, reference is necessarily to be made to Clause 9, which reads as under :

"9. Reconstitution of Joint Committee :

In view of the new situation created on account of the recognition of four unions at the State level, it was found necessary to revise the constitution of the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee to now consist of four representatives of the Corporation and representatives of the four recognised Unions as indicated below :

M.S.T. Workers

Federation 8 Members

Maharashtra

S.T. Mazdoor Sabha 8 Members

Provincial Rashtriya

Motor Kamgar Union,

Nagpur 1 Member

Motor Kamgar Panchayat

Amraoti 1 Member

The meeting of the Joint Committee should be held once every month provided there is agenda. The Vice-Chairman of the Corporation should be the Chairman of the Joint Committee and the Secretary should be a worker. All matters affecting the employees will fall within the scope of the working of the Joint Committee. The decision of the Joint Committee should be binding on both the parties subject to Corporation and or Government approval where required. In case there is no decision for any reasons on any issue, the same will be decided by the Corporation. The Corporation shall, however, before deciding such issues give an opportunity to the representative of all the four recognised Unions (one each) to be heard.

This arrangement is in supersession of the earlier arrangements concerning the constitution and scope of functions of the Joint Committee."

It is, therefore, clear that incorporating Clause 9 in the Settlement of 1968, all the earlier arrangements concerning the scope of functions of the Joint Committee were superseded and scope of working of the Joint Committee was in para material with the provisions contained in 1961 Settlement. However, representation of the workers on the Joint Committee was changed in view of recognition of four Unions at the State level. It is also pertinent to note at this juncture the preamble of 1968 Settlement and the short recital of the case in the relevant para in the said Settlement provided as under :

"During the deliberations of the third meeting of the Negotiating Committee held on March 6, 7, 8, 1968, it was unanimously decided that in view of the inordinate delay which lengthy discussions on all the 64 demands would entail, there should be a package deal covering the four major demands viz (1) revision of scales of pay, (2) linking of Dearness Allowance with the Cost of Living Index (3) increase in existing allowances and grant of new allowances, and (4) arbitration in disputes relating to Bonus calculations. It was further decided that the remaining demands be dealt with by the Joint Committee already set up and functioning."

The above preamble of 1968 Settlement goes to show that it was agreed between the parties that the charter of demands was divided into two parts, namely, monetary demands and nonmonetary demands and it was further decided between the parties that monetary demands will be settled separately, which were actually discussed and settled in the first two meetings of Negotiating Committee and the non-monetary demands were to be discussed and settled by the Joint Committee. It was in this view of the agreement between the parties that Clause 9 was incorporated in the Settlement re-constituting the Joint Committee with specifically setting out the subjects under its purview.

The Joint Committee in its 43rd meeting passed Resolution No. 716 to the effect that maximum period of suspension would continue to he 60 days and thereafter permission for extension of suspension period beyond 120 days need not be sought from the Chief Labour Officer. The Joint Committee in the next meeting i.e. 44th meeting passed Resolution No. 729(3)(b) extending the maximum period of suspension pending enquiry from 60 days to 120 days. By Resolution No. 732 passed on July 18/19, 1974 in the 45th meeting of the Joint Committee, it was decided to modify the earlier Resolution No. 729(3)(b) for the words" at the statutory figure of 120 days" appearing in second line of (b) of the said Resolution, words at "90 days" should be substituted and accordingly change was substituted in the last line of Settlement of Resolution No. 729 substituting the figure 90 days for figure 120 days. By this Resolution, the period of suspension permitted on the higher side was fixed at 90 days and we are concerned with this Resolution, which was relied upon by the petitioner Corporation before the learned Member of the Industrial Court in Complaint (ULP) No. 108/1983. The issues referred by Deshpande, J. have, therefore, to be answered in relation to this Resolution No. 732, which has resulted into maximum period of suspension, which was fixed at ten days by the 1956 Settlement and extended to ninety days by the said Resolution passed in the 45th meeting of the Joint Committee.

In the 48th meeting of the Joint Committee held on January 21/22, 1975, Resolution No. 741 was passed in respect of several items concerning the service conditions of employees like reimbursement of medical expenses, free passes to the children of S.T. employees, exemption to the Corporation from E.S.I. Act, establishment of Hospital for S.T. employees, advance increments to typists, incentive scheme to the Workship Staff, filling in of vacancies arising out of implementation of the Revised Depot Staff Structure, Gratuity Fund Regulations, grant of special disability leave to employees injured by the accident while on duty and suspension period pending enquiry. In the said meeting, it was decided to delete clause regarding period of suspension in view of the Joint Committee Resolution No. 729(3)(b) dated June 21, 1974. It was this Resolution, which was held to be a Settlement modifying earlier Settlement of 1956 by Padhye, J. in his judgment dated March 2&3, 1982. However, we are not required to decide whether Resolution No. 741 passed by the Joint Committee was a Settlement or not.

The learned Counsel Shri Khan appearing for the original complainant/employee while urging to answer both the issues referred by Deshpande, J. in the affirmative has contended that

(a) no condition of service could be changed unless a Settlement as contemplated under Sec. 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is signed between the parties, namely, petitioner Corporation and the Unions representing employees therein;

(b) as per Clause 81 of the 1956 Settlement, it was agreed between the parties that nothing shall be done, which would adversely affect the present service conditions including rights and privileges of workers; and

(c) the Resolution No. 729(3)(b) passed in the 43rd meeting of the Joint Committee and Resolution No. 732 passed in the 45th meeting of the Joint Committee cannot be called as settlement as defined under Sec. 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

The learned Counsel has vehemently submitted before us in this regard that the Joint Committee has no locus standi, in the eye of law, to enter into a Settlement or pass any Resolution affecting service conditions of the employees and such a course ought to have been adopted only by negotiations culminating into Settlements between the management of the petitioner Corporation and the recognised Unions. He contends that by no stretch of imagination, the Resolutions passed in the 43rd and 45th meetings of the Joint Committee could be called a Settlement as defamed under Sec. 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He has concluded his arguments by submitting that the Joint Committee could not bring about alterations, modifications or changes in the settled service conditions of employees and period of ten days fixed by the 1956 Settlement could not have been extended by Resolutions passed in the Joint Committee''s meeting though the Joint Committee was constituted in pursuance of the Settlements entered between the parties and in support of his contentions, he has relied upon the following judgments :

(i) C. Mackertich Vs. Steuart and Co., Ltd,

(ii) Jay Engg. Works Ltd. Vs. IV Industrial Tribunal and Others, ,

(iii) Co-operative Store Ltd. Vs. Ved Prakash Bhambri, ;

(iv) Adil K. Patel v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. & Ors. 1995 (I) Mah.LJ 574 (Bombay High Court - Single Bench).

All these judgments lay down a law that an agreement signed between the parties, namely, Management and Unions could not be termed as a Settlement as defined under Sec. 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 unless the provisions of Rule 58 of the Central Rules under the Industrial Disputes Act or Rule 62 of the Bombay Rules under the Industrial Disputes Act are satisfied. It is a settled position in law that an agreement between the Management and Unions to be called as a valid and binding Settlement, it is necessary that it ought to be set out in the prescribed form, copies thereof must be sent jointly to the Competent Authority as stipulated In the Rules (for bilateral Settlement) and such a Settlement should be signed by a competent body duly authorised by the Union. The learned Counsel for the employee contended that the Resolutions passed by the Joint Committee in its 43rd and 45th meetings extending the maximum period of suspension pending enquiry from ten days to ninety days could not satisfy the above mentioned tests and hence, they could not be termed as Settlements as defined under Sec. 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act and unless these Resolutions satisfy these tests for a valid and binding Settlement, they could not alter, modify or change the settled conditions of service of employees. The learned Counsel for the employee has also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs. D.J. Bahadur and Others, . However, a perusal of the said judgment would indicate that it is not applicable to the facts of the present case inasmuch as the issues involved in the present reference are not covered by the said judgment.

As already observed hereinabove, we have to confine our findings only to the specific issues referred by Deshpande, J. and examine the rival contentions with reference by the change brought about in the maximum period of suspension pending enquiry from ten days to ninety days. It is pertinent to observe that by the 1952 Settlement, which has been confirmed in Reference (IT) No. 115 of 1949, it is stipulated that ordinarily the period of suspension would be ten days, but in special cases, maximum period would be ninety days as prescribed in the Service Code and in such special cases, approval of the Chief Labour Officer will, however, be obtained. It is, therefore, to be noted that period of ten days of suspension pending enquiry was liable to be extended to ninety days in special cases with a rider that approval thereof was to be obtained from the Chief Labour Officer of the petitioner Corporation. It, therefore, implies that the Corporation had a discretion to extend the period of suspension pending enquiry from ten days upto ninety days and it could not be said that ten days'' period was the maximum period prescribed for suspension pending enquiry. The contention of the employee before the Industrial Court that extension of period of suspension pending enquiry beyond duration of ten days amounted to an act of unfair labour practice under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade. Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act inasmuch as it was a breach of 1952 Settlement is not supported by the mere fact that discretion was always vested with the Management to extend the period of suspension pending enquiry beyond ten days.

By the 1952 Settlement, it was decided between the parties (as can be seen in the last clause of the Settlement) that a Joint Labour Consultation Committee consisting of Motor Transport Controller, General Manager, Deputy General Manager (Administration) and Chief Labour Officer and the President, General Secretary and Secretary of the recognised Union would be set up immediately to discuss and finalise issues arising out of the Settlement and to see that the present conditions of service of workers would not be adversely affected. It is further stated in the said Clause that the object of the Committee was to see that harmonious relationship between State Transport Corporation and its employees was maintained so as to increase the efficiency and make nationalisation a grand success. The 1956 Settlement changed the name of the Joint Labour Consultation Committee as Joint Committee almost for the same purposes. The primary aim of this Joint Committee was to oversee implementation of the Settlement and to ensure that no party did anything prejudicial to the rights and privileges of the other party. Thus, role of the Joint Committee was very limited in both the Settlements, namely, Settlements of 1952 and 1956.

Clause 45 in the 1961 Settlement for the first time has enlarged the scope of working of the Joint Committee and it is stated that all matters affecting the employees would fall within the scope of the Joint Committee and decisions of the Joint Committee will be binding on both the parties subject to Corporation and Government approval where required. The Joint Committee is thus a creation of the legally valid and binding settlements with specific scope of functions and it was further agreed between the parties in no uncertain words that the decisions of the Joint Committee would be binding on them subject to Corporation and Government approval where required. It implies that in the matters where Corporation or Government approval was not required, decisions of the Joint Committee would be binding on both the parties automatically. We then come to the 1968 Settlement and it has to be read with specific reference to its preamble as reproduced hereinabove. The preamble of the 1968 Settlement shows that both the parties agreed to divide demands in two categories, namely, financial and non-financial demands and that non-financial demands would be discussed and settled by the Joint Committee. Clause 9 of the said Settlement of 1968 reiterates the scope of working of the Joint Committee and its decisions being binding on both the parties as was stipulated in the 1961 Settlement with further details of enlarging representation of the Unions on the Joint Committee. To repeat, we observe that the Joint Committee is a creation of the legal and valid settlements entered into between the parties and by these settlements, the parties have agreed on the scope of working of the Joint Committee and decisions of the Joint Committee to be binding on the parties. Without entering into a question as to whether such decisions of the Joint Committee amount to a legal and binding settlement as contemplated under Sec. 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is sufficient to observe that the parties have agreed in terms of these Settlements of 1961 and 1968 that the decisions of the Joint Committee would be binding on them and these decisions more particularly pertain to the service conditions, which do not involve monetary benefits or monetary demands. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the Joint Committee is a legal forum created by a valid and binding Settlement between the parties and decisions of the Joint Committee regarding service conditions are binding on both the parties. On a specific query, it was revealed that no grievance has been at any time made by any of the Unions operating amongst the employees of the State Transport Corporation regarding decisions of the Joint Committee and this is a sufficient proof of the fact that decisions of the Joint Committee have been always accepted to be binding on the Management as well as all the Union representing all employees of the Corporation. Viewed in this background, there cannot be any dispute that the Joint Committee was competent to bring about alterations, modifications or changes in the settled conditions of service of employees so long as such alterations, modifications or changes pertain to non-financial matters.

On our oral directions, Shri Bobde, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioned Corporation, submitted a copy of the Bombay State Transport Employees Service Regulation as well as a copy of Discipline and Appeal Procedure framed under Regulation No. 80 of the said Service Regulations. The Service Regulations have been framed under Sec. 40 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 under which the State Transport Corporation was established. Needless to mention that these Service Regulations have statutory force and govern the service conditions of the employees. Regulation No. 80 empowers the Corporation to frame discipline and appeal procedure, which has been so done by the Corporation. Regulation No. 82 states that an employee charge with any act of misconduct is liable to be suspended by the Corporation pending enquiry in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Regulation No. 80, whereas Regulation No. 83(a) states that in the case of suspension, the decision shall be given within ninety day from the date of suspension and if no decision is arrived at within 90 days for any reason, except for the employees'' own default, the employee will be eligible to be treated after expiry of 90 days as if he had not been suspended, provide that the Corporation shall be competent to extend the period of ninety days in exceptions cases. Clause (b) of Regulation No. 83 provides for payment of subsistence allowance during the period of suspension pending enquiry. A perusal of Regulation No. 83(a) clearly shows that maximum period of suspension pending enquiry ordinarily was 90 days after which employee was treated as if not suspended and he would be entitled for full salary. It is also clear that in exceptional cases, the Corporation is competent to extend the period of 90 days in respect of suspension pending enquiry. The clause regarding maximum period of suspension pending enquiry in the 1952 Settlements was contrary to the provisions of Regulation No. 83(a). However, it is to be noted that this Resolution has been framed as it appears (from the copy of the Regulations supplied) on November 18, 1955, i.e. after 1952 Settlement was signed. Clause 65 of the 1956 Settlement regarding maximum period of suspension pending enquiry being fixed at 60 days was also contrary to the provisions of Regulation No. 83(a) and for the first time, by the 1961 Settlement and rightly so, the maximum period of suspension pending enquiry was extended to 90 days in keeping with the statutory provision. These words ''statutory provision'' are clearly implied to refer to Regulation No. 83(a) of the S.T. Employees'' Service Regulations. Regulation Nos. 716(3) and 729 passed in the 44th and 45th meetings of the Joint Committee respectively have, therefore, taken into consideration the maximum period of suspension pending enquiry being fixed at 90 days under Regulation No. 83(a) of the Service Regulations and these Resolutions have not resulted into any adverse change in the conditions of service applicable to the employees.

Shri Khan then contended that the impugned Resolutions regarding period of suspension pending enquiry have adversely affected the service conditions, which is in breach of the clause 81 of the 1956 Settlement as referred to hereinabove and such a change was not permitted under that Settlement inasmuch as the impugned provision does not provide for an opportunity of being heard to the delinquent employee while extending the period of suspension from ten days to 90 days or any period beyond 10 days and this results into violation of principles of natural justice. Such a change has resulted into withdrawing the vested rights in favour of an employee as compared to rights available in the 1956 Settlement. In view of this, it is contended by Shri Khan that the Resolutions being in breach of the terms of the Settlement are illegal and not binding on the individual employees of the Corporation. He also stressed an additional point that Joint Committee is not a forum, which has a valid status in the eye of law to pass such Resolutions altering conditions of service. In this regard, it is pertinent to reproduce Resolution No. 729(3)(b), which read as under :

"It was decided that the maximum period of suspension should he set at the statutory figure of 120 days. But the G.M. should issue administrative orders whereby every case of such disciplinary action where proceedings have not ended (at the hands of the Competent Authority) within 60 days is reported in a statement from every week to the Central Office. In case it is not possible to finalise the cases even within 80 days, a detailed note on each case - not on its merits, but only on the question as to why it has not yet been completed - should be forwarded by each Divisional Controller (Administration), who should put up all such cases before a Sub-Committee, consisting of the G.M. and the two General Secretaries of the State level recognised Unions, which will meet every month regularly in order to see how best each such case can and should be disposed of within a maximum period of 120 days ......"

The Resolution of the 44th meeting of the Joint Committee was modified in the 45th meeting of the Joint Committee inasmuch as the figures of 120 days were substituted by the figures 90 days. However, reading the original Resolution with the modifications, it is clear that all such cases wherein enquiry could not be completed within 60 days are required to be referred to a Sub-Committee consisting of General Manager and two General Secretaries of the State level recognised Unions, which would meet every month regularly in order to see how best each such case could and should be disposed of within a maximum period of 90 days. The Resolution itself has provided a joint forum to examine all such cases and, therefore, the contention of Shri Khan that there is no opportunity of being heard, which has resulted into violation of principles of natural justice, is without merits. Even in Clause 65 of the 1956 Settlement, there was no such provision of an employee being heard while extending the period of suspension beyond ten days in exceptional cases. In fact, it is difficult to contemplate a hearing to be offered to the employee for extending the period of suspension in case the disciplinary proceedings pending against him could not be completed within the stipulated period of suspension pending enquiry and a delinquent employee could not claim such hearing as a matter of a legal right. All that the impugned Resolution has done is to bring the period of suspension pending enquiry on par with the statutory period, namely, maximum period of 90 days in normal circumstances set out in Regulation No. 83(a) of the State Transport Employees'' Service Regulations and, therefore, such a Resolution could not be termed as illegal or even for that matter, a Resolution affecting existing service conditions adversely.

Regarding the status of the Joint Committee to pass such Resolution, we may safely refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Brooke Bond India Ltd. Vs. The Workmen, wherein in the concluding para, it is observed as under :

"The language of Section 18(1) clearly shows that the settlement will be binding only "on the parties to the agreement". The definition of "settlement" in Sec. 2(p) of the Act also states that "settlement" means a settlement arrived at "between the employer and the workmen". So, normally in order that a settlement between the employer and the workmen may be binding on them, it has to be arrived at by agreement between the employer and the workmen. Where the workmen are represented by a recognised Union, the settlement may be arrived at between the employer and the Union. If there is a recognised Union of the workmen and the Constitution of the Union provides that any of its office bearers can enter into a settlement with the Management on behalf of the union and its members, a settlement may be arrived at between the employer and such office bearer or bearers. But, where the Constitution does not so provide specifically, the office bearer or bearers who wish to enter into a settlement with the employer should have the necessary authorisation by the executive committee of the Union or by the workmen ......"

In the instant case, the Joint Committee, as observed hereinabove, is a creation of the legal and valid settlements entered between the Management and Unions of the respondent Corporation. It could be termed as a legal body authorised to pass Resolutions and scope of such Resolutions is clearly stipulated in the Settlement with a further rider that all such Resolutions will he binding on the parties. We, therefore, hold that the Joint Committee was competent to pass the impugned Resolutions, i.e. Resolution Nos. 729(3)(b) and 732. If the petitioner Corporation had relied upon Regulation No. 83(a) of the Service Regulations, perhaps Deshpande, J. himself would have decided the petition and we feel that there would not have been any occasion to make the instant reference.

Our view regarding powers of the Joint Committee is also fortified by a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Fabril Gasosa Vs. Labour Commissioner and others, and the relevant observations of the Apex Court read thus :

"A conjoint reading of Sec. 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act and Rule 58 (supra) of the Central Rules unmistakably shows that the settlement contemplated by the said provisions is a written settlement and not an oral settlement. It is not in dispute that the 1986 Settlement was a written settlement arrived at between the parties. It could not, therefore, be varied or modified except by a written settlement or by a written memorandum duly signed by the parties incorporating the terms of the so-called understanding".

For deciding the present points of reference, it is not necessary to consider whether the impugned Resolutions amount to a Settlement as defined under Sec. 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Even if such Resolutions are not amounting to a settlement in the strict sense as defined under Sec. 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, such decisions will have to be held to be binding between the parties even if they are termed as agreements validly signed between the parties and have the trappings of a settlement. In the case of D. C. Tonge v. Maharashtra State Transport Kamgar Sangathana reported in 1985 2 LLN 112, it was alleged by some employees of the petitioner Corporation that the Corporation had failed to implement terms of the agreement/settlement. Subject 6 of that settlement provides for promotion and it was decided that Corporation would prescribe details of tests/procedure for such internal promotions. Some of the employees approached the Industrial Court by filing a complaint u/s 28 read with Item 9 of Schedule IV of Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 alleging that the Corporation had failed to follow the procedure prescribed vide a circular in pursuance of the said settlement. When the matter finally came to this Court, a learned Single Judge of this Court held that even a breach of the circular amounted to breach of a valid agreement between the parties and the terms of the said Circular were binding between the parties.

In another case, namely, case of Petroleum Employees Union v. Industrial Court, Maharashtra, Bombay and Anr. 1981 M. L.J. 316, a Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to decide the status of a letter addressed by the Management to the Union in pursuance of an oral understanding. The Management and Union had signed an agreement on the question of bonus and it was agreed that the said Settlement will cover only the employees earning less than Rs. 1600/- per month. It appears that there was further oral understanding that the Corporation would pay an ex-gratia amount to the employees earning more than Rs. 1600/- per month and this oral understanding was confirmed by a letter issued by the management to the President of the Union. This Court held that such letter confirming the oral agreement between the parties was an agreement though it may not be a settlement in the strict sense of a settlement defined under See. 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act and it was binding on the Management. In the instant case, the Joint Committee is a forum provided under the Settlements of 1952, 1961 and 1968 with stipulated subjects failing in its purview and we are of the considered view that this Joint Committee was competent to pass the impugned Resolutions, which amount to valid agreements between the parties and as long as such agreements derive their origin and sanctity from legally valid and binding Settlements, we see no reasons as to why such agreements altering, changing or modifying conditions of service cannot be accepted to be within purview of the Joint Committee. In any case, all that the Joint Committee in the instant case has done is to bring maximum period of suspension on line with the statutory provision set out in Regulation No. 83(a) of the Service Regulations, as observed hereinabove.

In the result, we answer both the points of reference in negative and we hold that the Joint Committee was competent to bring about alterations, modifications or changes in the settled conditions of service of an employee insofar as changes, alterations or modifications pertained to non-financial matters and the said Joint Committee was also competent to extend the period of ten days of suspension pending enquiry fixed by the 1956 Settlement. We accordingly direct the office to place Writ Petition No. 1240 of 1987 for final hearing before the appropriate Single Bench.