Mahavir Singh vs Delhi Transport Corporation

Badar Durrez Ahmed, J.—The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 10.05.2012 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi in OA 1572/2012. By virtue of the impugned order, the petitioner''s said Original Application has been dismissed on the ground of limitation. The facts leading up to the present petition are that the applicant while working as a driver at DTC depot-II, Hari Nagar, was proceeded departmentally. By an order dated 21.01.2003, passed by the disciplinary authority, the petitioner was imposed the punishment of stoppage of next two increments with cumulative effect. An appeal was filed by the petitioner before the appellate authority which came to be rejected by an order dated 17.02.2003. The petitioner did not do anything for the next seven years. On 27.07.2010, the petitioner purportedly filed a second appeal by addressing it to the Chairman, DTC. A communication was sent to the petitioner by the Depot Manager of the respondent on 24.08.2011, which was to the following effect:-

D.T.C. DWARKA SEC-2 DEPOT : N EW DELHI-75

No. DWS-2/PFC(Driver)/2011/3472

Dated:-24.08.2011

Reference your appeal dt.27.7.2010 addressed to Chairman/ G.M against the appeal rejection order issued vide letter No.HND-II/AI(T)/2003/775 dt.17.2.2003, on account of "Stoppage of next due two increments with cumulative effect". In this connection, It is Informed that the case file alongwith the appeal is received back with the remarks that there is no provision of second appeal in this corporation.

Sd/-

Depot Manager

Sh. Mahabir. Singh,

Driver B. No. 17829

Thr. T.I (Sch.) DWS-2

It is an admitted position that there is no provision for a second appeal insofar as the petitioner''s employment with the respondent is concerned. However, the petitioner felt aggrieved and filed the said Original Application before the Tribunal on 19.04.2012. It is the petitioner''s case that the said Original Application was within time. According to the petitioner, his cause of action arose on 24.08.2011 when the above mentioned communication, informing the petitioner that there was no provision for a second appeal, was issued by the respondent. Since that communication was issued on 24.08.2011 and the said Original Application was filed within one year, on 19.04.2012, according to the petitioner, the said OA was within time. Consequently, the petitioner did not even file any application for the condonation of delay.

The Tribunal, however, did not agree with the submission and contention of the petitioner. The Tribunal took the view that the final order that was passed in the petitioner''s case was that of the appellate authority dated 17.02.2003. The petitioner had one year from that date to approach the Tribunal. Since the petitioner did not do so within the period of one year and since he also had not sought any condonation of delay, the said Original Application was clearly barred by time in view of the mandatory provisions of Section 21(1)(a) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The Tribunal had also placed reliance on the Supreme Court decisions in the cases of S.S. Rathore Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, and C. Jacob Vs. Director of Geology and Mining Indus. Est. and Another, , wherein the Supreme Court held that repeated representations would not extend the period of limitation.

The Tribunal also held that the mere receipt of the intimation dated 24.08.2011 would not constitute a cause of action. This is so because there was no provision for a second appeal at all.

We do not find any reason to differ from the view taken by the Tribunal. We may also point out that even the so-called second appeal, which the petitioner had filed, was on 27.07.2010 and, that is, after seven years of the passing of the order dated 17.02.2003 by the appellate authority. The petitioner is silent about these seven years. Thus, in any way the matter is looked at, there is no justification for the petitioner to approach the Tribunal after such a long time. And, that too, without any application seeking condonation of delay. Consequently, the Tribunal was absolutely right in concluding that the petitioner''s said Original Application was barred by time. The writ petition has no merit. The same is dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.