Maheen M vs State Of Kerala

Jobin Sebastian, J.

This writ petition is directed against Ext.P1 order of externment dated 24.08.2024 passed against the petitioner by the 2nd respondent invoking Section 15(1)(a) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 [KAA(P) Act for the sake of brevity].

As per the said order, the petitioner was restrained from entering the limits of the District Police Chief, Thiruvananthapuram Rural for a period of one year from the receipt of the said order.

For passing the order of externment, the competent authority reckoned 4 cases in which the petitioner got involved. The details of the said cases are as follows:

Sl. No.

Crime No.

Police Station

Sections involved

Status of case

1

628/2019

Poovar

U/s143, 147, 148, 149,

294(b), 341, 323, 324 and 308 IPC

Pending trial

2

150/2021

Poovar

U/s 294(b), 324, 326, 308 and 34 IPC

Pending trial

3

1081/2022

Pozhiyoor

U/s 294(b), 506(i), 34 IPC

Pending trial

4

359/2024

Poovar

294(b), 341, 323, 324, 34 IPC

Pending trial

Heard Sri. B.R. Muraleedharan, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri. K.A. Anas, the learned Public Prosecutor.

The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order impugned by way of this writ petition has been passed without proper application of mind. According to the petitioner, it was without arriving at the requisite objective and subjective satisfaction Ext.P1 order was passed. According to the counsel, there is an inordinate delay in mooting the proposal as well as in passing the order after the last prejudicial activity. It is pointed out that the long delay in the submission of the proposal and in the issuance of the externment order will snap the live link between the last prejudicial act and the purpose of the externment, rendering the impugned order vitiated.

Per contra the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that there is no unreasonable delay in passing Ext.P1 order of restriction. According to him, some minimal delay is inevitable while passing an order especially when it is the duty of the authority to ensure adherence to the natural justice principles while passing such an order. According to him, the authority's need to gather details of prejudicial acts leads to minimal delay in the submission of the proposal.

We have considered the rival contentions and perused the records. The records show that the petitioner was classified as a “known rowdy”, considering his involvement in four cases. While considering the contention of the petitioner, regarding the delay that occurred in submitting the proposal and in passing the order, it cannot be ignored that an order under Section 15 of KAA(P)Act is having a significant impact on the personal right of an individual. So such an order could not be passed in a casual manner instead it can only be passed on credible materials after arriving at the requisite objective and subjective satisfaction. Furthermore, there exists no inflexible rule requiring that a restriction order has to be passed within a specific time frame following the last prejudicial act. However, when there is undue delay in making the proposal and passing the externment order, the same would undermine its validity particularly when no convincing or plausible explanation is offered for the delay.

In Stalin C.V. v. State of Kerala & Others [2011 (1) KHC 852], this Court has held that before passing an order under Section 15, the principle of natural justice is to be observed, and therefore, some delay is inevitable. The question of whether a person's prejudicial activities warrant the passing of an externment order, and whether such activities are proximate to the time the order is made, depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. There is no universal rule or exhaustive guideline that applies to all situations. The test of proximity is not a rigid one based solely on the number of months between the offending acts, the submission of the proposal, and the externment order. However, if there is an undue or significant delay between the prejudicial activities and the issuance of the externment order, the constitutional court before which the matter is brought up for review will have to examine whether the authority has satisfactorily explained the delay.

Keeping in mind the above principles, while coming to the facts in the present case it can be seen that the case registered against the petitioner with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.359/2024 of Poovar Police Station. The offences alleged in the said case are under Sections 341, 323 and 324 read with 34 of the IPC. The records reveal that the date of occurrence of the said crime was on 23.04.2024. However, the proposal for initiating proceedings under Section 15 of the KAA(P) Act was forwarded by the District Police Chief to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Thiruvananthapuram Range only on 08.07.2024. Therefore, it is decipherable that there is a delay of two months and fifteen days in submitting the proposal after the registration of the case with respect to the last prejudicial activity. The said delay contributed towards the delay which occurred in passing the externment order also. The said delay cannot be justified by saying that the same was necessary for observing natural justice principles. The assertion that additional time was needed to gather the details of the crimes before forwarding the proposal lacks credibility. In the case at hand, only four cases formed the basis for proposing and issuing the externment order. The details of those cases were readily available and could have been obtained without delay, given the technological upgradation attained by the Law Enforcement Authority. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the delay in mooting the proposal is unreasonable and unjustifiable. If the Superintendent of Police was having bonafide apprehension regarding the repetition of anti-social activities by the petitioner, definitely, he would have acted swiftly and with great alacrity in submitting the proposal immediately after the last prejudicial activity. In the case at hand, as already stated, there is a delay of more than 2 months in mooting the proposal for initiation of proceedings under KAA(P) Act. Therefore, we are of the view that the said delay will snap the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of the impugned order.

Resultantly,  Ext.P1  order  is  set  aside  and  the  petition  stands allowed.