Mahendra Singh and Others vs Special Secretary, State of U.P. and Others

R.R.K. Trivedi, J.—Heard counsel for the Petitioners.

This writ petition has-been filed challenging order dated 30th August, 1996, Anncxure-3 to the writ petition, and order dated 16th September, 1996 communicated by Block Development Officer, Pahasu, Tehsil Khurja, District Bulandshahr in pursuance of the order passed by the Collector, Bulandshahr on 6th September, 1996.

The facts giving rise to this writ petition are that Respondent No. 6 Rajendra Singh was elected Gram Pradhan of Gram Panchayat, Kamauna, Block Pahasu, Tehsil Khurja, District Bulandshahr. Against Respondent No. 6, an order was passed on 13th February, 1996 by Sub-Divisional Officer, Khurja directing that he will not be entitled to exercise the financial and administrative powers as Pradhan and a regular enquiry u/s 95(1)(g) of U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ''Act''), was also directed against him. By the same order, a committee consisting of Petitioners was also nominated to perform the functions of the Pradhan. After the aforesaid order, Government Order dated 30th August, 1996, Annexure-3 to the writ petition was served on all the Commissioners and Collectors of the districts for compliance. Under this order," it has been said that the Government has been appraised that in same districts. Sub-Divisional Officers arc exercising the powers u/s 95G of the Act and are depriving the Pradhans of their financial and administrative powers. It has been further said that this power u/s 95G of the Act cannot be exercised by such officers as the power now vests in the State, hence in case any such irregularity is noticed, the matter should be forwarded to State Government for action. When (his order was served on the Collector, it appears that he passed the order dated 6th September, 1996 by which he restored the powers of Respondent No. 6 as Gram Pradhan of the village, which has been communicated to Respondent No. 6 by order dated 16th September, 1996. Aggrieved by the aforesaid two orders, Petitioners who were nominated as members of committee by order dated 13th February, 1996 have filed this writ petition.

Learned Counsel for the Petitioners has submitted that the Sub-Divisional Officer as Prescribed Authority could pass order dated 13th February, 1996 which is legal and well within his rights and the Respondent No. 6 could not be allowed to discharge the functions of the Pradhan as a strong prima facie case was found against him. Learned Counsel has also placed reliance on the judgment or this Court dated 8th July, 1996. In Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 21017 of 1996, which has been filed as Annexure-6 to the writ petition.

I have considered the submissions of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners. It cannot be disputed that u/s 95 falling under Chapter VII of the Act, the external control over the Gram Panchayats vests In the State Government. The relevant Section 95(1)(g) of the Act provides authority to (he Stale Government to remove a Pradhan, Up-Pradhan or any ether authority of the Gram Panchayat, mentioned therein from the office on the grounds mentioned in Clauses (i) to (v). First proviso to Section 95(1)(g) of the Act, provides that where, In an enquiry held by such person and in such manner as may be prescribed, a Pradhan or Up-Pradhan is prima facie found to have committed financial and other irregularities, such Pradhan or Up-Pradhan shall cease to exercise and perform the financial and administrative powers and functions, which shall, until he is exonerated of the charges In the final enquiry, be exercised and performed by a committee consisting of three members of Gram Panchayat appointed by the State Government. First Proviso has been substituted by amending Act, i.e. U.P. Act No. 9 of 1994. Prior lo this, during pendency of proceedings for removal of Pradhan, power of suspension could be exercised u/s 95(1)(g) by Slate Government which was delegated to Sub-Divisional Officer. However, after amendment, the powers contemplated under the first proviso added to Section 95(1)(g), have not been delegated to any authority or officer u/s 96A of the Act. Contrary to it, specific direction has been issued on 30th August, 1996 which says that the power vests in the State Government and it shall not be exercised by any other officer, and when the financial or administrative irregularities are noticed, the matter should be reported to the State Government for further action. In the circumstances, it is difficult to accept the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners that the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer on 13th February, 1996 was a valid order. After the amendment, such power cannot be exercised by the Sub-Divisional Officers. The first proviso substituted to Section 95(1)(g) of the Act in 1994 provides altogether fresh powers and they cannot be termed to be the same power of suspension which was exercised under Clause (g) of Section 95(1) of the Act which has been omitted by the same Amending Act.

Learned Counsel for the Petitioners has placed reliance in the judgment of this Court dated 8th July, 1996. I have perused the order. However, the judgment is distinguishable and does not help Petitioners as the dispute in the aforesaid writ petition was as to whether Chief Development Officer can exercise such powers or not. There is no doubt about the legal position that the Chief Development Officer has no such power. Under the amended provisions, the enquiry has to be held by such person and in such manner as may be prescribed by general or specific order passed by the State Government. The first proviso substituted to Section 95(1)(g) uses the word ''prescribed'' which cannot be read as Prescribed Authority. In the circumstances, the judgment dated 8th July, 1996 does not help Petitioners in any manner. Under the proviso in question, committee can also be nominated by the State Government. In the circumstances, the nomination of the Petitioners as committee to look after the functions of the Pradhan was wholly Illegal and without authority of law and they are not entitled for any relief.

For the reasons recorded above, this writ petition has no merits and is, accordingly, rejected. No order as to costs.