Mahendra Singh vs State of M.P.

Tarun Kumar Kaushal, J.—Heard.

Present petition is directed u/s 482 of the Cr.P.C. for seeking quashment of the FIR registered at Crime No. 285/2013 at police station Sanodha District Sagar u/s 306 of the IPC and Sections 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act against the petitioner and other accused persons.

Necessary facts of the case in short are that on 13.10.2013 at about 4.20 P.M. Kundan Ahirwar (since deceased) ended her life by setting ablaze himself and was taken to hospital where he succumbed to his injuries during treatment. In the hospital, Executive Magistrate, Sagar recorded his dying declaration which reads as under:

After completing the investigation, police preferred the charge sheet against the petitioner and three other accused persons mainly on the basis of dying declaration and other evidence including the statement of witnesses u/s 161 of the Cr.P.C.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that even assuming the text of the dying declaration is to be true in toto, no ingredients of Section 107 of the IPC are available on record. On 7.5.2013 brother-in-law (Jeejaji) of the deceased namely Jamuna Ahirwar committed rape on the prosecutrix aged about 16 years of village Sobhapur and police registered a case against the accused. Deceased took undue interest to pressurize the prosecutrix to compromise the case with his brother-in-law. In the capacity of Sarpanch the petitioner protected the prosecutrix and it was a case of grudge between the petitioner and the deceased. Learned counsel further submits that on 17.5.2013 one Ramprasad Ahirwar lodged a report against the deceased and three other persons making allegations of quarrel and marpeet on the basis of which police Jaishrinagar District Sagar registered a case against the deceased and other accused persons at Crime No. 94/2013 under Sections 341, 323, 324, 294 and 506 of the IPC. Aforesaid criminal antecedents of deceased by itself says a lot to presume that there can be some other pressures and reasons for suicide.

Placing reliance on Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, and Gangula Mohan Reddy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, , learned counsel submits that even assuming the dying declaration is to be true then also there is no link in any of the act of the petitioner with the commission of crime. Learned counsel further submits that alleged beating was done by the petitioner to the deceased about 6-7 days prior to the date of suicide, hence no link can be presumed or established between the alleged act of the petitioner and in the act of suicide of the deceased.

Per contra learned counsel for the State submits that it has come on record that deceased ended her life by burning himself. In the dying declaration recorded by the SDM names of accused persons have clearly come on record. At this stage, it is not possible to appreciate the veracity of the dying declaration. It has to be left to the wisdom and the discretion of the trial Court.

Considering the aforesaid and after considering the entire charge sheet, it appears to be a case of groundless or there is no sufficient ground for presuming the evidence and involvement of the petitioner. Meticulously appreciation of evidence is neither desire nor possible.

In Central Bureau of Investigation, Hyderabad Vs. K. Narayana Rao, , the Apex Court elaborated the clear cut distinction of guideline showing the scope of trial court in framing the charge in discharging the accused which reads below:

Exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 227 and 228 CrPC

On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:

(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges u/s 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case.

(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.

(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence.

(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible.

(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.

(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.

In view of the aforesaid, I see no error in the order of framing charge. Points raised by the petitioner in this petition may be established before the trial court during trial.

Accordingly, this petition is dismissed.