Mahesh A.C. vs The State of Karnataka

H.G. Ramesh, J.—Petitioners in Writ Petition Nos. 15002/2011 & 21131-21146/2011, 16948-16995/2010, 17294-17327/2010, 17481/2010 & 17485-17490/2010 & 17723-17727/2010, 19401/2011 & 21520-21530/2011 & 41905-41908/2010 & 6747-6758/2011 & 908-911/2011 are challenging the order dtd. 25.05.2010 passed by the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal (''the Administrative Tribunal'') in Application Nos. 182 to 185, 187, 195, 197 to 202 of 2007, quashing the recruitment notification dtd. 18.08.2006 insofar as it relates to recruitment of Motor Vehicles Inspectors and consequently quashing all appointments of Motor Vehicles Inspectors made pursuant thereto.

By the aforesaid recruitment Notification, the Karnataka Public Service Commission (''the KPSC'') had called for applications for the post of Motor Vehicles Inspectors. The Administrative Tribunal, by the impugned order, has quashed the recruitment notification and the appointments made pursuant thereto on the ground that the recruitment notification did not stipulate one of the minimum qualifications prescribed by the Central Government for the post of Motor Vehicles Inspectors namely, ''work experience of at least one year in a reputed automobile workshop''. This is one of the minimum qualifications prescribed by the Central Government as per the notification dtd. 19th June 1989 in exercise of the power under S. 213(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (''the M.V. Act, 1988'').

We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the impugned order dtd. 25.05.2010. In the light of the contentions urged by the learned counsel, following questions arise for determination in the writ petitions referred to above:

Whether the qualifications prescribed for the post of Motor Vehicles Inspectors by the Karnataka General Services (Motor Vehicles Branch)(Recruitment) Rules, 1976 as amended by Government of Karnataka by notification dtd. 24th November 2005 in exercise of the power under Sub-sec. (1) of S. 3 r/w S. 8 of the Karnataka State Civil Services Act, 1978 would override the minimum qualifications prescribed by the Central Government by notification dtd. 19th June 1989 in exercise of the power under S. 213(4) of the M.V. Act, 1988?

Whether the recruitment notification dtd. 18.08.2006 is illegal, as held by the Administrative Tribunal, on the ground that the qualifications stipulated in the recruitment notification for the post of Motor Vehicles Inspectors did not include one of the minimum qualifications prescribed by the Central Government by notification dtd. 19th June 1989 in exercise of the power under S. 213(4) of the M.V. Act, 1988?

Whether the qualification of work experience of one year prescribed by the Central Government is impossible of compliance?

Whether work experience gained by the appointees after the appointment would cure the illegality, if any, in the appointments made?

Whether the appointments, if illegal, could be interfered at this stage?

Whether the applicants before the Administrative Tribunal had locus standi to challenge the appointments in question?

Learned counsel appearing for the parties, in support of their contentions, relied on the following decisions:

The State of Bombay and Another Vs. F.N. Balsara,

Zaverbhai Amaidas Vs. The State of Bombay,

R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla Vs. The Union of India (UOI),

The State of Rajasthan Vs. G. Chawla and Dr. Pohumal,

State of Orissa Vs. M.A. Tulloch and Co.,

D. Nagaraj and Others Vs. State of Karnataka and Others,

R.S. Joshi, Sales Tax Officer, Gujarat and Others Vs. Ajit Mills Limited and Another,

Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others,

Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others,

Prem Chand Jain and Another Vs. R.K. Chhabra,

Om Prakash Shukla Vs. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla and Others,

India Cement Ltd. and Others Vs. State Of Tamil Nadu and Others,

H.C. Puttaswamy and others Vs. The Hon''ble Chief Justice of Karnataka High Court, Bangalore and others,

M.S. Mudhol and Another Vs. S.D. Halegkar and Others,

S. Satyapal Reddy and Others Vs. Govt. of A.P. and Others,

Madan Lal and Others Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others,

Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, New Delhi and another Vs. M.V. Sastry and another,

Union of India and another Vs. P. Sathikumarana Nair and others,

Ashok Kumar Uppal and Others Vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Others,

State of Madhya Pradesh and Another Vs. Dharam Bir,

Dr. Duryodhan Sahu and Others Etc. Etc. Vs. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and Others Etc. Etc.,

Mangej Singh and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others,

Buddhi Nath Chaudhary and Others Etc. Vs. Abahi Kumar and Others,

G.N. Nayak Vs. Goa University and Others,

Assistant Director of Inspection Investigation Vs. Kum. A.B. Shanthi,

State of Karnataka and Others Vs. K. Srinivasulu and Others,

Shri Kirshna Gyanoday Sugar Ltd. and Another Vs. State of Bihar,

Welfare Assocn. A.R.P., Maharashtra and Another Vs. Ranjit P. Gohil and Others,

Vijay Syal and Another Vs. State of Punjab and Others,

Engineering Kamgar Union Vs. Electro Steels Castings Ltd. and Another,

Hindustan Lever and Another Vs. State of Maharashtra and Another,

Umrao Singh Vs. Punjabi University, Patiala and Others,

Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others Vs. Umadevi and Others,

Ramegowda Vs. The State of Karnataka and Others,

State of Kerala and Others Vs. Unni and Another,

Greater Bombay Co-op. Bank Ltd. Vs. United Yarn Tex. Pvt. Ltd. and Others,

Union of India (UOI) and Another Vs. Narendra Singh,

Dhananjay Malik and Others Vs. State of Uttaranchal and Others,

Tridip Kumar Dingal and Others Vs. State of West Bengal and Others,

Bondu Ramaswamy Vs. Bangalore Development Authority and Others,

Dr. M.S. Patil Vs. Gulbarga University and Others,

Manish Kumar Shahi Vs. State of Bihar and Others,

Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Bangalore Development Authority and Others,

K.K. Baskaran Vs. State rep. by its Secretary, Tamil Nadu and Others,

Lalit Kumar Modi Vs. Board of Control for Cricket in India and Others,

Bedanga Talukdar Vs. Saifudaullah Khan and Others,

State of Kerala and Others Vs. Mar Appraem Kuri Company Ltd. and Another,

State of Gujarat and Others Vs. Arvindkumar T. Tiwari and Another,

State of U.P. and Others Vs. Pankaj Kumar Vishnoi,

Basawaraj and Others Vs. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer,

Vikas Pratap Singh and Others Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others,

We have examined the matter in the light of the above decisions relied on by the learned counsel and proceed to answer the questions formulated above.

Re. question Nos. 1 & 2: As stated above, the Administrative Tribunal has set aside the Recruitment Notification dtd. 18.08.2006 and also the appointments of Motor Vehicles Inspectors made pursuant thereto on the ground that the recruitment notification did not stipulate one of the minimum qualifications prescribed by the Central Government for the post of Motor Vehicles Inspectors under Sub-sec.(4) of S. 213 of the M.V. Act, 1988. It also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in S. Satyapal Reddy and Others Vs. Govt. of A.P. and Others, .

The controversy in these writ petitions is, whether quashing of the appointments of Motor Vehicles Inspectors by the Administrative Tribunal by its order dtd. 25th May 2010 on the aforesaid ground is correct in law.

The contention urged is that, notwithstanding the qualifications prescribed by the Central Government in exercise of the power under S. 213(4) of the M.V. Act, 1988, the State has absolute freedom to prescribe qualifications for the post of Motor Vehicles Inspectors in view of Karnataka State Civil Services Act, 1978, whose subject matter is relatable to Entry 41 in List II (State list) of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution namely, State Public Services. In view of the qualifications prescribed for the post of Motor Vehicles Inspectors by the recruitment Rules framed by Government of Karnataka in exercise of the power under Sub-sec. (1) of S. 3 r/w S. 8 of the Karnataka State Civil Services Act, 1978, it was contended that the minimum qualifications prescribed by the Central Government for the said post in exercise of the power under Sub-sec.(4) of S. 213 of the M.V. Act, 1988 will not apply to State of Karnataka.

It was also contended that Karnataka State Civil Services Act, 1978, having had received the assent of the President, has an overriding effect on S. 213(4) of the M.V. Act, 1988 and therefore, the qualifications prescribed by the recruitment rules framed under the State Act would override the qualifications prescribed by the Central Government under S. 213(4) of the M.V. Act, 1988.

S. Satyapal Reddy and Others Vs. Govt. of A.P. and Others, was sought to be distinguished on the ground that it was rendered in relation to the State of Andhra Pradesh, where the rules prescribing the qualifications was made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution and not under any enactment. Whereas, in Karnataka, the rules prescribing the qualifications are made in exercise of the power under the Karnataka State Civil Services Act, 1978 which Act was assented by the President. Hence, it was contended that Satyapal Reddy (supra) has no application to this case and the qualifications prescribed by the State will prevail over the qualifications prescribed by the Central Government.

Before proceeding to examine the aforesaid contentions, it is relevant to refer to the qualifications prescribed by the Central Government and also the State Government. The Notification dtd. 19th June 1989 issued by the Central Government and published in the Gazette of India dtd. 19th June 1989, prescribing minimum qualifications for the posts of Inspector of Motor Vehicles or Assistant Inspector of Motor Vehicles reads as follows:--

"MINISTRY OF SURFACE TRANSPORT

S.O. 443(E).--(Dated June 19, 1989).--In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (4) of Section 213 of the Motor Vehicles, Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), the Central Government hereby prescribes that the minimum qualification for the class of officers consisting of the category of Inspector of Motor Vehicles or Assistant Inspector of Motor Vehicles (by whatever names called) shall be as under:--

Qualification:

(1) Minimum general educational qualification of a pass in X standard; and

(2) a diploma in Automobile Engineering (3 year course) or a diploma in Mechanical Engineering awarded by the State Board of Technical Education (3 year course); and

(3) working experience of at least one year in a reputed automobile workshop which undertakes repairs of both light motor vehicles, heavy goods vehicles and heavy passenger motor vehicles fitted with petrol and diesel engine; and

(4) must hold a driving licence authorising him to drive motor cycle, heavy goods vehicles and heavy passenger motor vehicles.

Nothing contained in the notification shall apply to an officer appointed to such post before the first day of July, 1989 and to an officer appointed to discharge function of a non-technical nature.

This notification shall come into force on the first day of July, 1989."

As could be seen from the above notification, it was issued by the Central Government in exercise of the power under S. 213(4) of the M.V. Act, 1988. It is relevant to refer to sub-secs.(1) & (4) of S. 213 of the M.V. Act, 1988:

"Sec. 213. Appointment of motor vehicles officers.--

(1) The State Government may, for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Act, establish a Motor Vehicles Department and appoint as officers thereof such persons as it thinks fit.

...........................................

(4) The Central Government may, having regard to the objects of the Act, by notification in the official Gazette, prescribe the minimum qualifications which the said officers or any class thereof shall possess for being appointed as such.

...........................................

The qualifications prescribed by Government of Karnataka for the post of Motor Vehicles Inspectors under the Karnataka General Services (Motor Vehicles Branch) (Recruitment) Rules, 1976, as amended by notification dtd. 24.11.2005 in exercise of the power conferred by the Karnataka State Civil Services Act, 1978, are as follows:

"(1) Must be holder of diploma in Automobile Engineering of not less than three years course or a diploma in Mechanical Engineering awarded by the State Board of Technical Education or other institution recognized by the Government;

(2) Must hold a current driving licence to drive motor cycle, heavy goods vehicles and heavy passengers motor vehicles; and

(3) Must possess following minimum physical standards, namely.--

..........................................."

It is not in dispute that the qualifications stipulated in the recruitment notification did not include one of the minimum qualifications namely, work experience of one year in a reputed automobile workshop, prescribed by the Central Government by Notification dtd. 19th June 1989, which came into effect from first day of July, 1989.

The contention that notwithstanding S. 213(4) of the M.V. Act, 1988, the State has absolute freedom to prescribe qualifications for the post of Motor Vehicles Inspectors because of enumeration of ''State Public Services'' in Entry 41 of List II of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and the corresponding enactment of Karnataka State Civil Services Act, 1978 cannot be accepted in view of the notification dtd. 19.06.1989 issued by the Central Government, prescribing the minimum qualifications for the said post in exercise of the power under sub-sec. (4) of S. 213 of the M.V. Act, 1988 and for the following reasons.

Sub-sec. (4) of S. 213 of the M.V. Act, 1988 may incidentally encroach on the subject matter in Entry 41 of List II namely, State Public Services, but it will not render the sub-section unconstitutional in view of the doctrine of pith and substance.

The doctrine of pith and substance means, if an enactment substantially falls within the powers expressly conferred by the Constitution upon the legislature enacting it, it cannot be held to be invalid, merely because it incidentally encroaches on matters assigned to another legislature. In this context, it is relevant to refer to the following observations made by a Five Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in The State of Bombay and Another Vs. F.N. Balsara, :

"(8) ........................................... It is well settled that the validity of an Act is not affected if it incidentally trenches on matters outside the authorised field, & therefore it is necessary to inquire in each case what is the pith and substance of the Act impugned. If the Act, when so viewed, substantially falls within the powers expressly conferred upon the Legislature which enacted it, then it cannot be held to be invalid, merely because it incidentally encroaches on matters which have been assigned to another legislature.............................."

The following observations made by a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Prem Chand Jain and Another Vs. R.K. Chhabra, are also relevant:

"8. ........................................... The legal position is well settled that the entries incorporated in the lists covered by Schedule VII are not powers of legislation but ''fields'' of legislation. Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, . In The State of Bihar Vs. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others, this Court has indicated that such entries are mere legislative heads and are of an enabling character. This Court has clearly ruled that the language of the entries should be given the widest scope or amplitude. Navinchandra Mafatlal Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City, Each general word has been asked to be extended to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be comprehended. (See The State of Madras Vs. Gannon Dunkerley and Co., (Madras) Ltd., ). It has also been held by this Court in The Check Post Officer and Others Vs. K.P. Abdulla and Bros., that an entry confers power upon the legislature to legislate for matters ancillary or incidental, including provision for avoiding the law. As long as the legislation is within the permissible field in pith and substance, objection would not be entertained merely on the ground that while enacting legislation, provision has been made for a matter which though germane for the purpose for which competent legislation is made it covers an aspect beyond it. In a series of decisions this Court has opined that if an enactment substantially falls within the powers expressly conferred by the Constitution upon the legislature enacting it, it cannot be held to be invalid merely because it incidentally encroaches on matters assigned to another legislature. (See The State of Karnataka and Another Vs. Shri Ranganatha Reddy and Another, ; Kerala State Electricity Board Vs. The Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd., ; Subrahmanyam Chettiar v. Mutuswami; Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Commerce; Ganga Sugar Co. v. State of U.P.). We, therefore, do not accept the submission that the definition of university given in Section 2(f) or the prohibition in Section 23 of the Act are ultra vires the Parliament on the ground that such provisions are beyond its legislative competence."

When an impugned provision of law appears to touch two different entries in two lists, then the Rule of Pith and Substance helps in characterizing the law as belonging to this or that entry. Where the question for determination is whether a particular law relates to a particular subject mentioned in one list or the other, the Courts will look into the substance of the enactment. Thus, if the substance of a parliamentary enactment falls within the Concurrent List (List III), then any incidental encroachment by it on any matter in the State List (List II) would not make it invalid. The fact of incidental encroachment does not affect the vires of the law even as regards the area of encroachment. The reason behind the rule of pith and substance is that, if every legislation were to be declared invalid on the ground of any incidental encroachment on any matter not reserved to the said Legislature, then the power of each legislature will be drastically circumscribed to deal effectively with the subjects entrusted to it for legislation.

The subject matter of the M.V. Act, 1988 undoubtedly falls under Entry 35 (Mechanically Propelled Vehicles ...) of List III (concurrent list) of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The subject of prescribing minimum qualifications under S. 213(4) of the M.V. Act, 1988 for Motor Vehicles Inspecting Officers, in pith and substance, also falls under the aforesaid Entry as it is germane to the main matter in the said Entry namely, ''Mechanically Propelled Vehicles'', though it incidentally touches upon the matter in Entry 41 of List II namely, State public services. However, this will not render sub-sec. (4) of S. 213 of the M.V. Act, 1988 unconstitutional in view of the rule of pith and substance.

As Parliament had competence to enact S. 213(4) of the M.V. Act, 1988, the State has no power to prescribe qualifications less than the qualifications prescribed by the Central Government under S. 213(4) of the M.V. Act, 1988, unless the State Law prescribing the qualifications has received the assent of the President as laid down under Article 254(2) of the Constitution, the assent being subsequent to the enactment of the M.V. Act, 1988.

The contention that Karnataka State Civil Services Act, 1978 overrides S. 213(4) of the M.V. Act, 1988, in view of the Presidential assent to the Karnataka State Civil Services Act, 1978 is devoid of substance. The President''s assent to the Karnataka State Civil Services Act, 1978 was not sought to overcome the effect of S. 213(4) of the M.V. Act, 1988 as the M.V. Act, 1988 was not even enacted when the President gave his assent to the Karnataka State Civil Services Act, 1978 on 12th July 1985. Hence, the contention that the qualifications prescribed under the Karnataka General Services (Motor Vehicles Branch) (Recruitment) Rules, 1976 will override the qualifications prescribed by the Central Government by Notification dtd. 19th June 1989 issued in exercise of the power under S. 213(4) of the M.V. Act, 1988 cannot be accepted.

We may also state that sub-sec. (4A) of Section 5 of the Boilers Act, 1923 is similar to sub-sec. (4) of S. 213 of the M.V. Act, 1988, whose subject matter of legislation is also relatable to concurrent list - List III (Entry 37 - Boilers). The said sub-sec. (4A) reads as follows:

"(4A) No person shall be appointed as the Chief Inspector, Deputy Chief Inspector or Inspector unless he possess such qualifications and experience as may be prescribed by the Central Government."

We will now refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in S. Satyapal Reddy and Others Vs. Govt. of A.P. and Others, . The following observations made therein are relevant:

"3. Shri K. Madhava Reddy and Shri Gururaja Rao, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants contended that as the Act was made under Entry 35 of List III of the VIIth Schedule to the Constitution read with Article 246 of the Constitution, the Act receives paramountcy and the Central Government alone is competent to prescribe the qualifications as to eligibility for recruitment as Assistant Motor Vehicles Inspectors and the power of the State Government to that extent gets eclipsed and the prescription of qualification of Degree in Mechanical Engineering becomes void since it runs in conflict with the qualifications prescribed by the Central Government. Therefore, the State rules become inapplicable. In support thereof, it was further contended that other State Governments had fallen in line in prescribing the qualification of Diploma in Mechanical Engineering prescribed by the Central Government and the State Government of A.P. had not adopted that course. Since the State rule is in conflict with the Central rule, the Central rule would prevail over the State rules, by operation of Article 254 of the Constitution.

................................................

................................................ It is the State Government that operates the provisions of the Act through its officers. Therefore, sub-section (1) of Section 213 gives power to the State Government to create Transport Department and to appoint officers, as it thinks fit. Sub-section (4) thereof also preserves the power. By necessary implication, it also preserves the power to prescribe higher qualification for appointment of officers of the State Government to man the Motor Vehicles Department. What was done by the Central Government was only the prescription of minimum qualifications, leaving the field open to the State Government concerned to prescribe if it finds necessary, higher qualifications. The Governor has been given power under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, subject to any law made by the State Legislature, to make rules regulating the recruitment which includes prescription of qualifications for appointment to an office or post under the State. Since the Transport Department under the Act is constituted by the State Government and the officers appointed to those posts belong to the State service, while appointing its own officers, the State Government as a necessary adjunct is entitled to prescribe qualifications for recruitment or conditions of service. But while so prescribing, the State Government may accept the qualifications or prescribe higher qualification but in no case prescribe any qualification less than the qualifications prescribed by the Central Government under sub-section (4) of Section 213 of the Act. In the latter event, i.e., prescribing lesser qualifications, both the rules cannot operate without colliding with each other. When the rules made by the Central Government under Section 213(4) and the statutory rules made under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution are construed harmoniously, there is no incompatibility or inconsistency in the operation of both the rules to appoint fit persons to the posts or class of officers of the State Government vis-a-vis the qualifications prescribed by the Central Government under sub-section (4) of Section 213 of the Act.

It is seen that A.P. Transport Subordinate Service Rules have been made by the Governor exercising the power under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution and Rule 6 thereof prescribes the qualifications as enumerated above. Graduation in Mechanical Engineering is one of the higher qualifications than Diploma. Since Section 213(4) gives such power to the State Government by operation of Section 217 of the Act, the statutory rules remain valid and operate in the field without colliding with the Central rules. Both the rules would operate harmoniously and effect can be given to both the rules. Thus the question of inconsistency or repugnancy under Article 254 of the Constitution does not arise. Therefore, we do not find that there is any conflict in the exercise of power by both Central and State Governments or inconsistency in operation of the provisions of the statutory rules made by the Governor under proviso to Article 309 and the rules made by the Central Government under Section 213(4) of the Act. The recruitment as per State rules is valid and legal."

(Emphasis supplied)

As could be seen from the above observations, the question of law that fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Satyapal Reddy was whether the qualifications prescribed by the Central Government will prevail over the qualifications prescribed by the State Government. That was negatived by the Supreme Court by holding that the State Government may accept the qualifications prescribed by the Central Government or prescribe higher qualifications but in no case prescribe any qualification less than the qualifications prescribed by the Central Government under sub-sec.(4) of S. 213 of the M.V. Act, 1988.

The contention urged in these petitions is that the qualifications prescribed by Government of Karnataka will prevail over the qualifications prescribed by the Central Government. As could be seen from paras 13 to 19 above, we have rejected this contention by examining the matter on first principles as it was contended that Satyapal Reddy (supra) will not apply to this case in view of Karnataka State Civil Services Act, 1978.

Re. question No. 3: The contention that the qualification of work experience of one year in a reputed automobile workshop prescribed by the Central Government is impossible of compliance cannot be accepted. The submission that there are no reputed workshops in Karnataka is difficult to accept. No material is placed on the record of the case to prove non-availability of work-shops fulfilling the requirement prescribed by the Central Government. Instead, as recorded by the Administrative Tribunal in the impugned order at paras 27 & 28, the requirement of experience was dispensed with by an obscure process during drafting of the recruitment rules. We also find from the Draft Rules notified by Government of Karnataka as per the Notification dtd. 16.05.2011 proposing to amend the Karnataka General Services (Motor Vehicles Branch) (Recruitment) Rules, 1976, that work experience of one year in a reputed automobile workshop is included as one of the qualifications for the post of Motor Vehicles Inspectors. The said draft Rules dtd. 16.05.2011 which is published in the Karnataka Extraordinary Gazette dtd. 16.05.2011, to the extent it is relevant herein, is extracted below:

Draft Rules

"1. Title and Commencement:- These rules may be called the Karnataka General Services (Motor Vehicles Branch) (Recruitment) (Amendment) Rules, 2011.

(2) They shall come into force from the date of their publication in the Official Gazette.

Amendment of Schedule:- In the schedule to the Karnataka General Services (Motor Vehicles Branch) (Recruitment) Rules, 1976, in the category of post of Motor Vehicles Inspectors, in column 3, the following shall be substituted, namely:-

"For Direct Recruitment:-

(1) Must have passed S.S.L.C. or possess equivalent qualification.

(2) Must be holder of a Diploma in Automobile Engineering of three years duration or a Diploma in Mechanical Engineering (three years course) awarded by the State Board of Technical Education; and

(3) Must have working experience of not less than one year in a reputed automobile workshop recognized by Government which undertakes repairs of both light and heavy motor vehicles, heavy goods and passengers motor vehicles fitted with petrol and diesel engine.

Note: Reputed automobile workshop means workshop employing not less than 10 persons and registered as per labour laws.

(4) Must be holder of a current driving license to drive motorcycle, heavy goods vehicles and heavy passenger motor vehicles.

(5) Must possess the following minimum physical standards.

................................................"

(Underlining supplied)

Re. question Nos. 4 & 5: The contention that this Court should not interfere with the appointments at this distance of time as the appointees have gained experience subsequent to their appointment cannot be accepted as the appointments were challenged before the Administrative Tribunal without any delay and the appointments have been set aside by the Administrative Tribunal by the order impugned herein. This Court is only examining as to whether the order of the Administrative Tribunal is correct or not. The appointments cannot be sustained in law as the recruitment notification issued by the KPSC did not prescribe even the minimum qualifications required to be prescribed as per the notification dtd. 19th June 1989 issued by the Central Government. As held by the Supreme Court in Dr. M.S. Patil Vs. Gulbarga University and Others, , persons appointed illegally shall not be permitted to be continued.

Re. question No. 6: The contention that the applicants before the Administrative Tribunal had no locus standi to challenge the appointments is rightly rejected by the Administrative Tribunal with the following reasoning:

"14. In the present case we had asked the learned advocate for the applicants as to how the applicants could be considered as aggrieved persons when their applications had been rejected for want necessary qualifications like Heavy Goods Driving License, driving license or not fulfilling some educational qualification. The learned counsel for the applicants pointed out that atleast in respect of Sri. Rajesh Kumar, the applicant in A. No. 200 of 2007 he had possessed all the qualifications and he had been called for interview. The said candidate was in fact interviewed on 22.2.2008. He submits that in respect of other candidates they possessed requisite driving licences and other qualifications and that it can be shown that they possessed all qualifications. In the statement submitted by the Assistant Secretary, Recruitment Branch, KPSC, it is stated that the applicant in A. No. 184 of 2007 though was a candidate for 1997 recruitment process, he had not applied for the posts of motor vehicle inspectors in 2006 and others were not possessing requisite qualifications except the applicant in A. No. 200 of 2007 who had qualified for interview.

We find that the applicant in A. No. 184 of 2007 was a candidate in 1997 and that he had not applied for the post of MVIs in 2006. It indicates that he had possessed the qualifications prescribed for the candidates when the applications were called for in 1997. Since other applicants were candidates for the posts of MVIs and one of them possessed all requisite qualification prescribed in the Notification, they cannot be termed as disgruntled candidates in challenging the recruitment process. Every one of them was interested in being appointed as a motor vehicle inspector. They can not be considered as strangers or busybody or meddlesome interlopers. As regards the applicant in A. No. 200 of 2006, he possessed all the qualifications. Therefore, we find that all the candidates are interested in the matter. They are aggrieved persons and have locus standi to maintain the applications."

As stated above, the recruitment notification dtd. 18.08.2006 did not stipulate one of the minimum qualifications prescribed by the Central Government in its Notification dtd. 19.06.1989. As discussed above, it was not permissible for the State Government to have prescribed qualifications less than the minimum qualifications prescribed by the Central Government. Hence, the Administrative Tribunal has rightly set aside all the appointments made pursuant to the aforesaid recruitment notification.

For the reasons stated above, we find no error in the order dtd. 25.05.2010 passed by the Administrative Tribunal to warrant interference by this Court. Hence, the writ petitions referred to at para. 1 above are liable to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed.

In Writ Petition No. 24525/2010, the petitioner is challenging the order dtd. 26.05.2010 passed by the Administrative Tribunal in Application No. 2360/2008 dismissing the said application as having become infructuous in view of the earlier order of the Administrative Tribunal dtd. 25.05.2010 quashing the recruitment notification dtd. 18.08.2006. As we have confirmed the order dtd. 25.05.2010 passed by the Administrative Tribunal quashing the recruitment notification, this writ petition is also liable to be dismissed and it is accordingly dismissed.

In Writ Petition Nos. 6842-6880/2010, 8215/2010, 8715/2010 & 8906/2010, 103593/2014 & 103620-103657/2014, 10106/2010 & 12726-12763/2010, the petitioners are challenging the order dtd. 02.03.2010 passed by the Administrative Tribunal in Application Nos. 1212 to 1250/2010. It is relevant to state that the applicants therein were aggrieved as they were not appointed by the Government on the ground that they were not having the minimum height required under the Rules. The Administrative Tribunal allowed the said applications by the aforesaid order dated 02.03.2010 by directing appointment of the applicants as Motor Vehicles Inspectors. The Administrative Tribunal has directed issuance of appointment orders inter alia on the ground that several other candidates who did not even possess the prescribed qualifications have been appointed. It is relevant to refer to the following reasoning of the Administrative Tribunal in the order dtd. 02.03.2010:

"7. It is also seen that in response to the same Notification dated 18.8.2006, some candidates who did not possess the prescribed qualification of Diploma in Automobile Engineering or Mechanical Engineering but who possessed qualification of Diploma in Tool and Dye Making had applied. Their case was not considered and, hence, they also filed Applications before this Tribunal. However, considering their request, the Respondents have issued orders of appointment to them on 22.10.2009.

................................................

From the aforesaid facts it is seen that almost all the selected candidates except the Applicants have been appointed. Even candidates who do not possess the prescribed qualifications have been appointed subject to the result of the Applications pending before this Tribunal. Therefore there is no justification to deny appointment to the applicants. The action of the Respondents in delaying and denying appointments to the Applicants is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The Applicants are also entitled for similar treatment."

(Underlining supplied)

The above reasoning of the Administrative Tribunal is erroneous and unsustainable in law. As observed by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana and Others Vs. Ram Kumar Mann, , two wrongs can never make a right, and accordingly, a wrong order of the Government does not confer a right to claim parity or equality. Similarly in Fuljit Kaur Vs. State of Punjab and Others, , it is observed that Article 14 of the Constitution is not meant to perpetuate illegality. A wrong order in favour of one party does not entitle any other party to claim benefit on the basis of such a wrong order.

In view of confirmation of the order dtd. 25.05.2010 of the Administrative Tribunal and dismissal of the writ petitions referred to at para. 1 above, the order dtd. 02.03.2010 of the Administrative Tribunal passed in the applications referred to at para. 29 above directing issuance of appointment orders is liable to be set aside and it is accordingly set aside. The writ petitions referred to at para. 29 above, except Writ Petition Nos. 10106/2010 and 12726-12763/2010, are accordingly disposed of. The writ petitions filed by the State in W.P. Nos. 10106/2010 and 12726-12763/2010 are disposed of as withdrawn as sought in the memo dated 17.07.2014. In view of final disposal of all the writ petitions in terms stated above, no order is necessary on the pending interlocutory applications; and they stand disposed of accordingly.